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[2019] ZAGPPHC 193
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Minister of Water and Sanitation v Public Protector of the Republic of South Africa and Another (27609/2019) [2019] ZAGPPHC 193 (31 May 2019)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISON,
PRETORIA)
CASE
NO.: 27609/2019
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED
DATE:
31/5/2019
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
MINISTER
GUGILE ERNEST NKWINTI
APPLICANT
MINISTER
OF WATER AND SANITATION
and
THE
PUBLIC PROTECTOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA:
ADV
BUSISIWE MKHWEBANE N.O
FIRST RESPONDENT
THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
MATAMELA
CYRIL RAMAPHOSA N.O
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
SARDIWALLA
J:
[1]
This is an urgent application
in
terms of the provisions of Rule 6(12)(a) of the Uniform Rules of
Court
resulting from a refusal by the first
respondent to grant the applicant an extension to respond and comment
on the first respondent’s
report. The applicant seeks to
interdict or restrain the first respondent from publishing her
report.
[2]
The applicant, Guguile Ernest Nkwinti,
is the former Minister of the Department of Rural Development
and
Land Reform (DRDLR) and the current duly appointed Minister of Water
and Sanitation. The first respondent, the Public Protector,
received
a complaint from the applicant after a draft report from Deloitte was
leaked regarding certain allegations of maladministration,
corruption
and irregularities in the acquisition of the Bekendvlei Farm which
was purchased as a going concern which formed part
of the DRDLR’s
PLAS Version 2 Policy. The Public Protector undertook an
investigation, at the conclusion of which she informed
the applicant
about the allegations, and asked him to respond to her report dated 1
April 2019 by no later than 20 April 2019.
The applicant requested an
extension to respond to the report which was scheduled for release on
6 May 2019 to which the first
respondent refused.
[3]
The applicant brought this application
as a result of the first respondent’s refusal. The
relevant
factual background will be dealt with later in this judgement. The
applicant seeks an interdict or mandamus against the
first respondent
prohibiting her from making her report public pending the review
application against the findings of the Public
Protector’s
report in terms of the provisions of Promotion of Access to Justice
Act
[1]
(PAJA) and or in terms of
Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Background
to the Application:
[4]
In February 2017, the applicant lodged
a complaint with the Office of the Public Protector against
the
leaked content of Deloitte’s draft report for the purpose of an
investigation.
[5]
It is alleged that the first
respondent, upon receiving the complaint, only informed the applicant
2 years later of her findings of the investigation and invited him to
respond to her final conclusions which she shared with the
applicant
for the first time in a section 7(9)(a) notice dated 1 April 2019.
[6]
On 16 April 2019 and 24 April 2019,
the applicant wrote to the first respondent as per annexure
'GEN1'
and ‘GEN2’ requesting an extension to 10 May 2019 to
adequately respond to her letter. On 30 April 2019 the
first
responded wrote to the applicant as per annexure ‘GEN4’,
wherein the applicant was informed that:
‘
1.
Reference is hereby made to your correspondence to the writer hereof
dated 16 April 2019 and 24 April 2019, the contents of which
are
noted.
2.
Regrettably, I cannot accede to your request for a further extension
to 10 May 2019, in which to provide your response
to the notice in
terms of
section 7(9)
of the
Public Protector Act, 1994
[2]
,
dated 1 April 2019 as it would not be in the interest of the
complainant, Mr. Thomas Walters to delay the matter any further.’
Applicant’s
Argument
[7]
The applicant attacks the Public
Protector’s refusal to grant an extension claiming that
it was
irregular and unlawful. It submits that the refusal to grant the
applicant an opportunity to adequately respond to the report
in terms
of
section 7(9)(1)(a)
of the Act will have an adverse effect on the
applicant and is unreasonable and irrational. Further that the
applicant has established
a clear right in terms of
section
7(1)(b)(i)
and
section 7(9)(a)
of the Act to respond to the first
respondents notice. The first respondent’s failure to allow the
applicant an opportunity
to comment on the findings of her report
will result in irreparable harm being caused to the applicant’s
reputation and therefore
warrants the interim relief.
First Respondent’s
Argument
[8]
The Public Protector opposes this
application on the basis that the application lacks urgency
and is
without merit as the applicant cannot interdict the Public Protector
from publishing or in any manner disseminating her
findings in
respect of the complaint lodged with her in terms of the
Constitution
[3]
and the Act for
the following reasons:
“
3.2.1
the applicant seeks to interdict me from publishing the report and/or
making the report available to any person as contemplated
in section
8(1) of the Public Protectors Act of 1994 and the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, which is a Constitutional
imperative under
the circumstances where the applicant has failed to respond to my
notice in terms of section 7 (9)(a) of the Act
(“the notice”);
3.2.2
section 182(1) of the Constitution confers powers on the Public
Protector to (a) investigate, (b) report and (c) take appropriate
remedial action. These powers are complimentary;
3.2.3
section 7(1)(b) (i) states that the format and the procedure to be
followed in conducting any investigation shall be determined
by the
Public Protector with due regard to the circumstances of each case.”
The Public
Protector
[9]
The Office of the Public Protector was
first created by the interim Constitution .
[4]
Section 181(1) of the Constitution established a number of
institutions, generally referred to as Chapter 9 institutions,
which
were to strengthen constitutional democracy. They are the Public
Protector, the South African Human Rights Commission, the
Commission
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious
and Linguistic Communities, the Commission for
Gender Equality, the
Auditor-General and the Electoral Commission.
[10]
In terms of section 181(2) all of the Chapter 9
institutions are ‘
independent, and subject only to the
Constitution and the law, and they must be impartial and must
exercise their powers and perform
their functions without fear,
favour or prejudice’
. Section 181(3) places an obligation
on other organs of state to ‘
assist and protect these
institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity and
effectiveness of these institutions’
. Section 181(4)
prohibits persons or organs of state from interfering with the
functioning of any Chapter 9 institution. Section
181(5) provides
that they are accountable to the National Assembly and that they are
each required to report to it on the fulfilment
of their mandates
annually at least.
[11]
Sections 182 and 183 of the Constitution deal
specifically with the Public Protector. Section 182(1) provides:
‘
The Public
Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation-
(a)
to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public
administration in any sphere of government,
that is alleged or
suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or
prejudice;
(b)
to report on that conduct; and
(c)
to take appropriate remedial action.’
[12]
Section 182(2) allows for these powers to be
supplemented by national legislation. Section 182(3) places
only one
limit on the Public Protector’s power: she may not investigate
‘
court decisions’
. Section 182(4) places an
obligation on the Public Protector: her office must be
‘
accessible to all persons and communities’
.
Section 182(5) requires the Public Protector’s reports to be
‘
open to the public unless exceptional circumstances, to be
determined in terms of national legislation, require that a report be
kept confidential’
.
[13]
While the primary source of the Public Protector’s
powers is the Constitution, the
Public Protector Act is
the
legislation contemplated by
section 182(2)
that supplements her
powers.
[5]
[14]
Section 7 of the Act gives the Public Protector
extensive investigatory powers. On receipt of a complaint
the Public
Protector has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation for
the purposes of determining the merits of the complaint,
allegation
or information and the manner in which the matter concerned should be
dealt with.
[6]
The Public
Protector has the power to determine the format and procedure to be
followed in conducting any investigation.
[7]
The Public Protector is, furthermore, entitled to subpoena persons
and require them to give evidence.
[15]
In
Public
Protector v Mail and Guardian Ltd & other
s
[8]
Nugent JA stressed the importance of the office of the Public
Protector, which he described as an “
indispensable
constitutional guarantee
”,
stating that it “
provides
what will often be a last defence against bureaucratic oppression,
and against corruption and malfeasance in public office
that are
capable of insidiously destroying the nation
”.
Interim Interdict
[16]
An interim interdict is a court order preserving or restoring the
status quo pending the determination
of rights of the parties. It is
important to emphasize that an interim interdict does not involve a
final determination of these
rights and does not affect their final
determination. In this regard the Constitutional Court said the
following:
[9]
“
An interim
interdict is by definition 'a court order preserving or restoring the
status quo pending the final determination of the
rights of the
parties. It does not involve a final determination of these rights
and does not affect their final determination.'
The dispute in an
application for an interim interdict is therefore not the same as
that in the main application to which the interim
interdict relates.
In an application for an interim interdict the dispute is whether,
applying the relevant legal requirements,
the status quo should be
preserved or restored pending the decision of the main dispute. At
common law, a court's jurisdiction
to entertain an application for an
interim interdict depends on whether it has jurisdiction to preserve
or restore the status quo
.
”
[10]
[17]
The requirements for the granting of an interim interdict are the
following: a
prima
facie
right,
a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim
relief is not granted and the ultimate relief is eventually
granted,
that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interim
relief, and that the applicant has no other satisfactory
remedy.
[11]
In this regard Holmes JA
[12]
said the following:
“
The granting of
an interim interdict pending an action is an extraordinary remedy
within the discretion of the Court. Where the
right which it is
sought to protect is not clear, the Court's approach in the matter of
an interim interdict was lucidly laid down
by INNES, J.A., in
Setlogelo v Setlogelo,
1914 AD 221
at p. 227. In general the
requisites are –
(a) a
right which, 'though prima facie established, is open to some doubt';
(b) a well
grounded apprehension of irreparable injury;
(c) the
absence of ordinary remedy.
In exercising its
discretion the Court weighs, inter alia, the prejudice to the
applicant, if the interdict is withheld, against
the prejudice to the
respondent if it is granted. This is sometimes called the balance of
convenience.
The foregoing considerations are not individually
decisive, but are interrelated; for example, the stronger the
applicant's prospects
of success the less his need to rely on
prejudice to himself. Conversely, the more the element of 'some
doubt', the greater the
need for the other factors to favour him. The
Court considers the affidavits as a whole, and the interrelation of
the foregoing
considerations, according to the facts and
probabilities; see Olympic Passenger Service (Pty.) Ltd. v Ramlagan,
1957 (2) SA 382
(D) at p. 383D - G. Viewed in that light, the
reference to a right which, 'though prima facie established, is open
to some doubt'
is apt, flexible and practical, and needs no further
elaboration.
”
[18]
Where the right is clear “…
the remaining questions
are whether the applicant has also shown:
(a) an
infringement of his right by the respondent; or a well-grounded
apprehension of such an infringement;
(b) the absence
of any other satisfactory remedy;
(c) that
the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interlocutory
interdict.”
[13]
[19]
In this case the applicant seeks an interdict pending the
determination of the review application against
the findings of the
first Respondent. There is a dispute about whether the applicant has
a right to engage with and respond to
the findings of the Public
Protector’s report prior to it being published. The question
therefore is whether it has established
a
prima
facie
right. The approach to be adopted in considering whether an applicant
has established a
prima
facie
right has been stated to be the following:
[14]
“
The accepted
test for a prima facie right in the context of an interim interdict
is to take the facts averred by the applicant,
together with such
facts set out by the respondent that are not or cannot be disputed
and to consider whether, having regard to
the inherent probabilities,
the applicant should on those facts obtain final relief at the trial.
The facts set up in contradiction
by the respondent should then be
considered and, if serious doubt is thrown upon the case of the
applicant, he cannot succeed.
”
[15]
The
Audi Alteram
Partem
Rule
[20]
It is prevalent in a number of court decisions in South Africa, such
as
South
African Football Union v President of South Africa (SARFU)
[16]
and the
South
African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council
[17]
the view was expressed that the
audi
alteram partem
rule
should not necessarily depend on whether proceedings were
administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial.
[21]
In
Du
Preez and another v Truth and Reconciliation Commission
[18]
(
Du
Preez
)
,
the court held that the Commission was under a duty to act fairly
towards those implicated by the information received during
the
course of its investigations or hearings.
[22]
The court in
Du Preez
further indicated that it was
instructive that the Committee’s findings in this regard and
its report to the Commission could
accuse or condemn persons in the
position of the appellants. The court also noted that, subject to the
granting of amnesty, the
ultimate result could be criminal or civil
proceedings against such persons. The court noted that the
whole process was potentially
prejudicial to them and their rights of
personality. They had to be treated fairly. Procedural fairness meant
they had to be informed
of the substance of the allegations against
them, with sufficient detail to know what the case was all about.
[23]
In the case of
SARFU
,
supra
, the question was
whether the President, in appointing the Commission, acted in
accordance with the principles and procedures which
in that
particular situation or set of circumstances were right and just and
fair. Accordingly, the principle of natural justice
should have been
enforced by the court as a matter of policy irrespective of the
merits of the case.
[24]
The Commission emphasized that the fact that a Commission is an
advisory body does not, detract from the
fact that it is likely in
the ordinary course of events, to make findings which would cause
prejudice to
SARFU
, and its officials.
[25]
A basic rule of fairness is that a person who will
be adversely affected by an act or a decision of the
administration
or authority shall be granted a hearing before he suffers
detriment
[19]
.
Peach
sums up the
audi
rule as
follows:
[20]
“
The
audi alteram partem rule implies that a person must be given the
opportunity to argue his case. This applies not only to formal
administrative enquiries or hearings, but also to any prior
proceedings that could lead to an infringement of existing rights,
privileges and freedoms, and implies that potentially prejudicial
facts and considerations must be communicated to the person who
may
be affected by the administrative decision, to enable him to rebut
the allegations. This condition will be satisfied if the
material
content of the prejudicial facts, information or considerations has
been revealed to the interested party.
”
[26]
The requirement that in certain circumstances decision-makers must
act in accordance with the principles
of natural justice or
procedural fairness has ancient origins.
[27]
In general terms, the principles of natural justice consist of two
component parts,
to wit
; the first is the hearing rule, which
requires decision-makers to hear a person before adverse decisions
against them are taken.
The second and equally important component is
the principle which provides for the disqualification of a
decision-maker where circumstances
give rise to a reasonable
apprehension that he or she may not bring an impartial mind to the
determination of the question before
them. The latter aspect is
not relevant in this matter.
[28]
The principles of natural justice are founded upon fundamental ideas
of fairness and the inter-related concept
of good administration.
Natural justice contributes to the accuracy of the decision on the
substance of the case.
[29]
The rules of natural justice help to ensure objectivity and
impartiality, and facilitate the treatment of
like cases alike.
Natural justice broadly defined can also be seen as protecting human
dignity by ensuring that the affected
individual is made aware of the
basis upon which he or she is being treated unfavourably, and by
enabling the individual to participate
in the decision-making
process. The application of the principle of natural justice
has proved problematic.
[30]
The challenge is always how to strike the right balance between
public and private interest. Whilst
this court, in the
circumstances of this matter seems compelled to respond to the
vulnerability of the applicant facing the pervasive
power of the
Public Protector, I am at the same time aware that the court has to
avoid a situation where the unconstrained expansion
of the duty to
act fairly threatens to paralyse its effective administration.
[31]
In my respectful view, the public interest necessarily comprehends an
element of justice to the individual.
The competing values of
fairness and individual justice on the one hand and administrative
efficiency on the other hand, constitute
the public and the private
aspects of public interest.
[32]
It seems plain to me that the principles of natural justice are
intended to promote individual trust and
confidence in the
administration. They encourage certainty, predictability and
reliability in government interactions with
members of the public,
irrespective of their stations in life and this is a fundamental
aspect of the rule of law.
[33]
In a delicate balancing act, it is the duty of the courts to uphold
and vindicate the constitutional rights
of the applicant to his good
name this cannot have the effect of precluding the Public Protector
from discharging duties and responsibilities
exclusively assigned to
it by the Constitution. However, such an inquiry may only proceed in
a manner which strictly recognises
the right of the applicant to have
the inquiry conducted in accordance with natural justice and fair
procedures.
[34]
In a matter involving similar facts as the applicant’s case De
Vos J in
Gamede
v The Public Protector
[21]
held that;
“
When it appears
to the respondent, during the course of an investigation, that a
person is implicated by the investigation and that
such implication
may be to his/her detriment, or that an adverse finding may be made
against such person, the respondent will inform
the affected person
of the implication and provide him/her with an opportunity to
respond. Taking into account that the complaint
was lodged in June
2015…, it must be accepted as a fact that the applicant was
informed of- and requested to respond to-
the complaint very soon
after it was received. Therefore, I can safely conclude that on 17
June 2015 the investigation process
was in a preliminary stage before
any provisional or final decision was taken. The respondent, will
after completion of the preliminary
investigation and if it appears
to her that the applicant may be implicated to his detriment, by way
of a letter communicate her
preliminary findings based on the
information sourced during the investigation process, and will
propose remedial action in light
of these findings. The affected
individuals are thereby provided with a further opportunity to
present any additional evidence
to the respondent. The respondent
also provides the complainant with an opportunity to submit any
further comments on the matter
being investigated, should he/she wish
to do so.
After considering the
comments and/or additional information received, the respondent, with
the assistance of her staff, integrate
the comments and evaluates
them, following which the respondent edits and completes the final
report. Subsequent to that event
the final report is published and
made accessible to the public, unless there are special
considerations that require that it be
kept confidential.
The investigation
process is still in the preliminary stage and essentially comprises
of an information gathering exercise. The
investigative process is a
fact finding mission which includes personal interaction and
engagement with the complainant, the applicant,
and factual
witnesses...”
Analysis
and findings
[35]
It is common cause between the parties that the first respondent’s
report directly implicates the
applicant and implies that he violated
the Executive Ethics Code. It is important to note that the first
respondent despite the
complaint also being lodged by the applicant,
never sought it fit to engage the applicant at any stage during the
preliminary or
investigative process. The first respondent although
clearly entitled in terms of section 7(1)(b)(i) of the Act to conduct
an investigation
and determine procedures relating to it at her own
discretion, it is also prudent in a fact finding investigation to
inform and
interact with a person whose rights may be adversely
affected. In the present matter the first respondent did not at any
stage
of her investigation find it necessary to engage with the
applicant, who was clearly implicated, until the issuing of the
section
7(9) notice of the Act on 1 April 2019. This goes against the
principles of natural justice and fair procedure.
[36]
At this stage, I am satisfied that the applicant has a
prima facie
right more particularly to challenge and present his version or
evidence relating to the first respondent’s conclusions of
his
conduct in the acquisition and lease of the Bekendvlei Farm. It
cannot be disputed that the first respondent’s refusal
to
afford the applicant an opportunity to respond is threatening the
applicant’s aforesaid right to natural justice and fair
procedures. It cannot be denied that if the applicant is not granted
the relief that he seeks that the first respondent will submit
the
report to the second respondent for remedial action and publish the
report to the media, the results of which will interfere
with the
rights of the applicant. I am also satisfied that if the aforesaid
publication goes ahead and decisions are taken the
applicant will
suffer irreparable harm. Furthermore, I am satisfied that the balance
of convenience favours the granting of the
interim order. The
applicant will suffer prejudice if the interim interdict is not
granted and on the other hand the respondent
will suffer a mere delay
if the interim interdict is granted.
[36]
It is important to note that the proceedings that the applicant seeks
to institute is against the findings
and recommendations that the
first respondent which include the remedial action to be taken by the
second respondent. There are
strong prospects of succeeding in the
review wherein the applicant will be granted the opportunity to
respond to the scathing allegations
set out in the report.
However, should the interdict not be granted the damage to the
applicant’s reputation would
be irreversible. The applicant in
these circumstances has no other remedy except the interim relief
that he seeks.
[37]
Accordingly, the following order is made:
1.
An interim interdict or
mandamus
against the first respondent prohibiting her from:
1.1
making her report (Report No.20
of 2019/20) “An investigation into the allegations of a
violation of the Executive Ethics
Code by the former Minister of
Rural Development and Land Reform, the Honourable Guile Nkwinti, MP
(currently Minister of Water
and Sanitation) in connection with the
acquisition and lease for the Farm Bekendvlei: purportedly signed on
3 May 2019 known to
any person as contemplated in section 8(1) of the
Public Protectors Act, 1994
1.2
submitting the aforementioned
report to the National Assembly as contemplated in section 8(2)(b) of
the Act;
1.3
making the aforementioned report
available to the public as contemplated in the provision of section 8
(2A)(a) of the Act;
1.4
making the aforementioned report
available to the complainant Thomas Walters;
1.5
submitting the aforementioned
report to the second respondent with the purpose of taking any
remedial action against the applicant
and submitting to the National
Assembly, and from
1.6
releasing the aforementioned
report on 6 May 2019 or thereafter to the Media
1.7
Pending the outcome of the review
application by applicant against the findings by the Public Protector
in her aforementioned report
in terms of the provisions of PAJA
and/or in terms of Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
2.
An order in terms of which the
applicant is directed to launch the review proceedings against the
first respondent, referred to
in paragraph 2 above, within 1 (one)
month calculated from the date of this order;
3.
An order, in the event that the
aforementioned review proceedings are not launched within 1 (one)
month from the date of the granting
of this order, that this order
shall lapse;
4.
An order of costs against any of
the respondents, only in the event of opposition to the relief sought
herein and in the event of
the first respondent opposing the
application a cost order on a punitive basis against her.
5.
Costs
to be costs in the cause.
C
M SARDIWALLA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Date
of Hearing:
06 May 2019
Date
of Judgement(Reasons) 31 May
2019
Appearances
:
For
the Applicant:
Adv.
E S J VAN GRAAN
Instructed
by:
De
Swart Myambo Attorneys
For
the First Respondents:
Adv.:
B TSHABALALA
Instructed
by:
Seanego
Attorneys Inc.
For
the First Respondents:
Instructed
by:
State
Attorney Pretoria
[1]
Act 3 of 2000.
[2]
Public Protector Act 23 of 1994
. Hereinafter referred to as the Act.
[3]
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
[4]
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 at
Section 110.
[5]
South
African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd & others v Democratic
Alliance & others
2016
(2) SA 522
[6]
Section
7 (1)(a) of the Act:
"Investigation
by Public Protector
(1) (a) The Public
Protector shall have the power, on his or her own initiative or on
receipt of a complaint or an allegation
or on the ground of
information that has come to his or her knowledge and which points
to conduct such as referred to in section
6 (4) or (5) of this Act,
to conduct a preliminary investigation for the purpose of
determining the merits of the complaint,
allegation or information
and the manner in which the matter concerned should be dealt with."
[7]
Section
7(1)(b) of the Act:
"(b)(i) The
format and the procedure to be followed in conducting any
investigation shall be determined by the Public Protector
with due
regard to the circumstances of each case.
(ii) The Public
Protector may direct that any category of persons or all persons
whose presence is not desirable, shall not be
present at any
proceedings pertaining to any investigation or part thereof."
[8]
2011
(4) SA 420
(SCA);
[2011] ZASCA 108
para
6
.
[9]
In
National Gambling Board v Premier, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others 2002(2)
SA 715 CC
[10]
At page
730 – 731 para 49.
[11]
See
Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton and Another
1973(3)SA 685 (A)
Knox
D Arcy Ltd v Jamison and Other 1996(4) SA 348 (A) at 361
[12]
In
Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton and Another,
supra, at 691.
[13]
Knox
D'Arcy Ltd and Others v Jamieson and Others
1995 (2) SA 579
(W) at
592 – 593.
[14]
In
Simon NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others 1999 (1) SA 217
(SCA).
[15]
At 228;
See also Webster v Mitchell
1948 (1) SA
1186
(W) at 1189
and
Manong & Associates (Pty) LTD v Minister of Public Works and
Another
2010
(2) SA 167
(SCA) at 180
.
[16]
1998
(10) BCLR 1059.
[17]
1991
(4) AlI SA 722 (AD).
[18]
1997
(3) SA 204 (A).
[19]
See
De
Smith, SA (1955) “
The
right to a hearing in English Administrative Law” 68(4)
Harvard Law Review 569-599, 569.
[20]
See Peach, VL (2003) “
The
application of the audi alteram partem rule to the proceedings of
commissions of inquiry
”
Thesis (LL.M. (Public Law))—North-West University,
Potchefstroom Campus (Accessed at http://hdl.handle.net/10394/58),
8.
[21]
(99246/2015)
[2018] ZAGPPHC 865; 2019 (1) SA 491 (GP)at para 51,52 and 53.