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[2019] ZAGPPHC 226
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South African Legal Practice Council v Mamorobela and Another (40561/2018) [2019] ZAGPPHC 226 (15 May 2019)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED
Case number: 40561/2018
Date: 15/5/2019
In
the matter between:
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
PRACTICE COUNCIL
APPLICANT
AND
MATOME ALPHEUS
MAMOROBELA
1
ST
RESPONDENT
M A MAMOROBELA
INCORPORATED
2
ND
RESPONDENT
(Trading
as MAMOROBELA INCORPORATED
ATTORNEYS)
JUDGMENT
TOLMAY,
J:
[1]
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for the
suspension of the First Respondent from practice as a legal
practitioner, alternatively, for the
removal of the First
Respondent's name from the roll of legal practitioners.
THE RESPONDENTS
[2]
The
First Respondent was admitted and enrolled s an attorney of this
Honourable Court on 10 May 2012. He was a non-practising member
until
04 September 2012 md commenced practising as a sole director at the
firm M A Mamorobela Incorporated (Second Respondent)
with effect from
07 August 2014.
[3]
The
name of the First Respondent is still on the roll of legal
practitioners of this Court.
SERVICE OF THE
APPLICATION
[4]
On
20 June 2018, the application was served on the Respondents.
[5]
On
24 July 2018, the Respondents opposed the application, but failed to
file an answering affidavit. On 21 August 2018, the Respondents
filed
a Notice of Change of Address. It is stated that on 28 August 2018,
the Applicant's attorneys attempted to effect service
of the Notice
of Set Down on the Respondents, at the address as per the Notice of
Change of Address, served on its office on 21
August 2018, but the
First Respondent informed the security guard at the gate of the
complex, not to allow the office assistant
of the Applicant's
attorney access to the premises. Subsequently, and on the same day,
the Notice of Set Down was sent to the Respondents
by e-mail. On 13,
14, 18 and 19 September 20181 the Sheriff attempted to effect service
of the Notice of Set Down on the Respondent
without success.
[6]
On
02 October 2018, the Applicant's attorneys again attempted to effect
service of the Notice of Set Down on the Respondents. The
Applicant's
attorneys found the First Respondent. but he refused to accept
service of the Notice of Set Down.
[7]
On
11 October 2018, the Applicant's attorneys sent a letter to the
Respondents raising its concerns about the First Respondent's
continued refusal to accept service. On 17, 18, 23, 25 and 29 October
2018, the Sheriff again attempted to effect service of the
Notice of
Set Down on tl1e Respondents, again without success. On 21 January
2019, the Sheriff attempted service of the Notice
of Set Down at an
alternative address, without success. On 14 March 2019, a further e-
mail was sent to the Respondents requesting
an alternative address
for service.
[8]
On the day of the hearing we were informed by Ms Magardi that her
office received
an email during the morning of the hearing, that the
First Respondent was allegedly involved in a car accident the
previous day
and could therefore not attend Court. While we were busy
dealing with the matter counsel entered the Court and told us that
she
was briefed by the Respondents to appear in the matter and to
request a postponement. During questioning of counsel it became
apparent
that she had no papers in the matter nor any knowledge of
the facts. She did not accept the Invitation by the Court to let the
matter stand down for her to peruse the papers. It also quite
concerningly transpired that she was told by the First Respondent
that he did file opposing papers, which is untrue. Counsel then
withdrew and left the Court
[9]
As a result, it is apparent that First Respondent was aware of the
date of the hearing.
The Court proceeded with the matter, as it was
clear that the Respondents were aware of the date of hearing and
chose not to oppose
the application. Legal practitioners are held to
a high standard and the conduct of First Respondent in dealing with
this very
serious matter does not bode well for his ability to act
professionally and may point to him, not being a fit and proper
person
to be admitted as a legal practitioner.
SUBSTITUTION OF THE LAW SOCIETY
WITH LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL (LPC)
[10] In
preparation of the matter the Court became aware of an unreported
judgment,
The
South African Legal Practice Council v Brown
[1]
where an application was brought by the LPG in terms of Rule 15 of
the Uniform Rules of Court for substitution of the Law Society
by the
Legal Practice Council (LPC), Rule 15(3) and {4) read as follows:
"(3)
Whenever
a
party
to any proceedings dies or ceases to be capable of acting as such,
his executor, curator, trustee or similar legal representative,
may
by notice to all other parties and to the registrar intimate that he
desires in his capacity as such thereby to be substituted
for such
party, and unless the court otherwise orders, he shall thereafter for
all purposes be deemed to have been so substituted.
(4)
The
court may upon a notice of application delivered by any party within
20 days of service of notice in terms of subrule (2) and
(3), set
aside or vary any addition or substitution of a party this affected
or may dismiss such application or confirm such addition
or
substitution, on such terms, if any, as to the delivery of any
affidavits or pleadings, or as to postponement or adjournment,
or
as
to costs or
otherwise, as to it may
seem
meet."
[11]
The Court then requested the LPC to
address the Court on the question whether such a substitution in
terms of Rule 15 is not required,
before it can proceed with the
application. As a result, the LPC filed supplementary heads of
argument, which is appreciated.
[12]
Section 116(2) of the Legal
Practitioners Act (LPA)
[2]
deals with pending provisions and reads as follows:
"(2)
Any
proceedings in respect of the suspension of any person from practice
as an advocate, attorney, conveyancer or notary or in respect
of the
removal of the name of any person from the roll of advocates,
attorneys, conveyancers or notaries which have been instituted
in
terms of any Jaw repealed by this Act,
and which have not
been concluded at the date referred to in section 120(4), must be
continued and concluded as if that law had
not bf3en repealed , and
for that purpose
a
reference in the
provisions relating to such suspension or removal, to the
General Council of the Bar of South Africa, any Bar Council, any
Society
of Advocates, any society or the State Attorney must be
construed
as
a reference to the Council."
[Court's emphasis]
[13]
Section 119, is also relevant and reads
as follows:
"119. Repeal and
amendment of laws, and savings
(2)
Any-
(a)
regulation made under any law
referred to in subsection (1) and in force immediately before the
date referred to in section 120(4);
and
(b)
rule, code, notice, order,
instruction, prohibition, authorisation, permission, consent,
exemption , certificate or document promulgated,
issued, given or
granted and any other steps taken in terms of any such law
immediately before the date referred to in section
120(4) and having
the force of law,
remain in force, except in so
far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act,
until amended or revoked by the
competent authority under the
provisions of this Act.
(3)
Anything done in terms of a law
repealed or amended by this
Act-
(a)
remains
valid if it is consistent with this Act, until repealed or
overridden; and
(b)
is
deemed to have been done in terms of the corresponding provision of
this Act.
(4)
A Provincial Council contemplated
in section 97(1)(a)(ii) continues to exist and is deemed to have been
established by the Council
in terms of this Act."
[14]
On a proper interpretation of the
aforementioned sections, it would seem that anything done under the
repealed legislation remains
valid, as if it were done under the LPA.
This must include applications for suspension/removals of a legal
practitioner, as well
as applications that were pending on the date
of the commencement of the LPA. It would seem that there was a
statutory substitution
of the Law society with the LPC, which then
would do away with the need for a formal substitution in terms of
rule 15.
[15]
As a result, a formal substitution in
terms of Rule 15 is not required, in circumstances where the
application was pending, when
the LPA came into effect.
THE
MERITS
[16]
The First Respondent transgressed
several provisions of the Attorneys Act and the applicable
regulations. The First Respondent failed
to cause his auditor to
lodge unqualified audit reports for the periods ending February 2016
and February 2017. As a result the
First Respondent was not issued
with Fidelity Fund Certificates for the years commencing January 2017
and January 2018.
[17]
The First Respondent failed to effect
payment of his subscription fees for the financial years 2016, 2017
and 2018. The total amount
outstanding is R9 063.00.
[18]
A complaint was lodged against the
Respondents by Munyai Attorneys on behalf of Mr Clarence Moshiga. Mr
Moshisa previously instructed
the First Respondent to finalise a
matter against the RAF. An amount of R1 045 513.50, was subsequently
paid into the trust account
of the First Respondent on 14 March 2016,
in settlement of the complainant's claim against the RAF.
[19]
The First Respondent allegedly did not
do much work on the matter; however, the First Respondent took an
amount of R445 513.50,
in respect of fees, without furnishing the
complainant with a statement of account. The complainant still has to
settle the account
of Munyai Attorneys for services rendered with
regards to the RAF matter.
[20]
On 12 May 2016, the First Respondent
signed an undertaking to effect payment of an amount of R218 571 .00,
in favour of Munyai Attorneys,
which he failed to do. The First
Respondent failed to answer to correspondence addressed to him by the
Applicant in this regard.
REPORT
BY MPETE DATED 28 FEBRUARY 2018
[21]
Ms Enica Mpete (Mpete) a legal official
employed in the LPC's monitoring unit, investigated the complaints
against the Respondents.
During her visit to the firm, Mpete
requested the file of Mr Moshiga as well as the firm's accounting
records in order to inspect
same. The First Respondent advised that
Mr Moshiga's file had been with his correspondent attorney in
Polokwane. The First Respondent
also demanded a written request
before he could allow Mpete to inspect his firm's accounting records,
which Mpete furnished on
12 July 2017. The First Respondent has
however, failed to furnish Mpete with the firm's accounting records
and documents relating
to the matter of Mr Moshiga.
[22]
With regards to the complaint of Mr
Moshiga, the First Respondent,
inter
alia,
advised that he was indeed
approached by Mr Moshiga, as Mr Moshiga was unhappy with the services
he had received from Munyai Attorneys,
who at the time had already
finalised the merits of the matter and that the only outstanding
issue had been quantum. The First
Respondent undertook to pay Munyai
Attorneys for work done, upon receipt of their statement of account.
[23]
The First Respondent explained that he
took R250 000.00, as fees. An amount of R150 000.00, was retained as
fees for Munyai Attorneys.
However, Munyai Attorneys rendered a
statement of account for R218 571.00. The First Respondent informed
Mpete that he no longer
had the trust funds to pay Munyai Attorneys,
as he had utilised it. The First Respondent also admitted not having
had a contingency
fee agreement in place with Mr Moshiga and not
having furnished Mr Moshiga with a statement of account.
[24]
Mpete also pointed out that, in addition
to the funds due to Munyai Attorneys, an amount of R184 135.13, was
also still due and
payable to Mr Moshiga. A certificate of balance
shows that an amount of only R728.44 was available in the firm's
trust bank account
as at 22 February 2018.
[25] The
Respondent's actions were in contravention of various sections in the
LPA and the Rules of the
Attorneys Profession.
APPLICABLE
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[26]
It
is trite that the question whether a legal practitioner is a fit and
proper person is not dependent upon factual findings, but
lies in the
discretion of the Court, and that the enquiry which the Court must
conduct is threefold
[3]
:
1.
The
Court must first decide as a matter of fact whether the alleged
offending conduct by the legal practitioner has been established.
2.
If
the Court is satisfied that the offending conduct has been
established, a value judgment is required to decide, whether the
person concerned is a fit and proper person to practise as a legal
practitioner.
[4]
3.
If
the Court decides that the legal practitioner concerned is not a fit
and proper person to practise as a legal practitioner, it
must decide
in the exercise of its discretion whether in all the circumstances of
the case the legal practitioner in question is
to be removed from the
roll or merely suspended from practice. Ultimately, this is a
question of degree.
[5]
[27]
The Court's discretion must be based
upon the facts before it and facts in question must be proven upon a
balance of probabilities.
[6]
The facts upon which the Court's discretion is based should be
considered in their totality
[7]
.
[28]
In the light of all the facts of this
case I am of the view that the Respondents should be struck from the
roll of legal practitioners.
There are no circumstances that warrant
a mere suspension. In the light of all the facts Frist Respondent's
conduct was dishonourable,
unprofessional and unworthy of a legal
practitioner.
[29]
In the light of the aforementioned the
following order is made:
1.
That
the name of
MATOME ALPHEUS MAMOROBELA
(hereinafter referred to as the
First Respondent) be removed from the roll of legal practitioners of
this Court.
2.
The
First Respondent is ordered to immediately surrender and deliver
to
the registrar of this Court his
certificate of enrolment as a legal practitioner of this Court.
3.
That
in the event of the First Respondent failing to comply with the terms
of this order detailed in the previous paragraph within
two (2) weeks
from the date of this order, the sheriff of the district in which the
certificate is, is authorised and directed
to take possession of the
certificate and to hand it to the Registrar of this Court.
4.
That
the Respondents be prohibited from handling or operating the trust
accounts as detailed in paragraph 5 hereof.
5.
That
Johan van Staden, the head: Legal Practitioners' Affairs of the
Applicant or any person nominated by him, be appointed as
curator
bonis
(curator) to administer and
control the trust accounts of the Respondents, including accounts
relating to insolvent and deceased
estates and any deceased estate
and any estate under curatorship connected with the Respondents'
practice, as a legal practitioner
and including, also, the separate
banking accounts opened and kept by Respondents at a bank in the
Republic of South Africa
in
terms
of section 86(1) & (2) of Act No 28 of 2014 and/or any separate
savings or interest-bearing accounts as contemplated by
section 86(3)
and/or section 86(4) of Act No. 28 of 2014, in which monies from such
trust banking accounts have been invested by
virtue of the provisions
of the said sub-sections or in which monies in any manner have been
deposited or credited (the said accounts
being hereafter referred to
as the trust accounts), with the following powers and duties:
5.1
immediately to take possession of the
Respondents accounting records, records, files and documents as
referred to in paragraph 6
and subject to the approval of the Legal
Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board of Control (hereinafter referred
to as the Fund) to
sign all forms and generally to operate upon the
trust account(s), but only to such extent and for such purpose as may
be necessary
to bring to completion current transactions in which the
Respondents were acting at the date of this order;
5.2
subject to the approval and control of
the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board of Control and where
monies had been paid incorrectly
and unlawfully from the
undermentioned trust accounts, to recover and receive and, if
necessary in the interests of persons having
lawful claims upon the
trust account(s) and/or against the Respondents in respect of monies
held, received and/or invested by the
Respondents in terms of section
86(1) & (2) and/or section 86(3) and/or section 86(4) of Act No
28 of 2014 (hereinafter referred
to as trust monies), to take any
legal proceedings which may be necessary for the recovery of money
which may be due to such persons
in respect of incomplete
transactions, if any, in which the Respondents were and may still
have been concerned and to receive such
monies and to pay the same to
the credit of the trust account(s);
5.3
to ascertain from the Respondents'
accounting records the names of all persons on whose account the
Respondents appears to hold
or to have received trust monies
(hereinafter referred to as trust creditors) and to call upon the
First Respondent to furnish
him, within 30 (thirty) days of the date
of service of this order or such further period as he may agree to in
writing, with the
names, addresses and amounts due to all trust
creditors;
5.4
to call upon such trust creditors to
furnish such proof, information and/or affidavits as he may require
to enable him, acting in
consultation with, and subject to the
requirements of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board of
Control, to determine whether
any such trust creditor has a claim in
respect of monies in the trust account(s) of the Respondents and, if
so, the amount of such
claim;
5.5
to admit or reject, in whole or in part,
subject to the approval of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund
Board of Control, the
claims of any such trust creditor or creditors,
without prejudice to such trust creditor's or creditors' right of
access to the
civil courts;
5.6
having determined the amounts which he
considers are lawfully due to trust creditors, to pay such claims in
full but subject always
to the approval of the Legal Practitioners'
Fidelity Fund Board of Control;
5.7
in the event of there being any surplus
in the trust account(s) of the Respondents after payment of the
admitted claims of all trust
creditors in full, to utilise such
surplus to settle or reduce (as the case may be), firstly, any claim
of the fund in terms of
section 86(5) of Act No 28 of 2014 in respect
of any interest therein referred to and, secondly, without prejudice
to the rights
of the creditors of the Respondents, the costs, fees
and expenses referred to in paragraph 10 of this order, or such
portion thereof
as has not already been separately paid by the
Respondents to the Applicant, and, if there is any balance left after
payment in
full of all such claims, costs, fees and expenses, to pay
such balance, subject to the approval of the Legal Practitioners'
Fidelity
Fund Board of Control, to the First Respondent, if he is
solvent, or, if the First Respondent is insolvent, to the trustee(s)
of
the First Respondent's insolvent estate;
5.8
in the event of there being insufficient
trust monies in the trust banking account(s) of the Respondents, in
accordance with the
available documentation and information, to pay
in full the claims of trust creditors who have lodged claims for
repayment and
whose claims have been approved, to distribute the
credit balance(s) which may be available in the trust banking
account(s) amongst
the trust creditors alternatively to pay the
balance to the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund;
5.9
subject to the approval of the chairman
of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board of Control, to
appoint nominees or representatives
and/or consult with and/or engage
the services of legal practitioners, counsel, accountants and/or any
other persons, where considered
necessary, to assist him in carrying
out his duties as curator; and
5.10 to render
from time to time, as curator, returns to the Legal Practitioners'
Fidelity Fund Board of Control
showing how the trust account(s) of
the Respondents has/have been dealt with, until such time as the
board notifies him that he
may regard his duties as curator as
terminated.
6.
That
the Respondents immediately deliver the accounting records, records,
files and documents containing particulars and information
relating
to:
6.1
any
monies received, held or paid by the Respondents for or on account of
any person while practising as a legal practitioner;
6.2
any
monies invested by the Respondents in terms of section 86(3) and/or
section 86(4) of Act No 28 of 2014;
6.3
any
interest on monies so invested which was paid over or credited to the
Respondents;
6.4
any
estate of a deceased person or an insolvent estate or an estate under
curatorship administered by the Respondents, whether as
executor or
trustee or curator or on behalf of the executor, trustee or curator;
6.5
any
insolvent estate administered by the Respondents as trustee or on
behalf of the trustee in terms of the
Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936
;
6.6
any
trust administered by the Respondents as trustee or on behalf of the
trustee in terms of the Trust Properties Control Act, No
57 of 1988;
6.7
any
company liquidated in terms of the provisions of the Companies Act,
No 61 of 1973 read together with the provisions of the
Companies Act,
No 71 of 2008
, administered by the Respondents as or on behalf of the
liquidator;
6.8
any close corporation liquidated in
terms of the
Close Corporations Act, 69 of 1984
, administered by the
Respondents as or on behalf of the liquidator; and
6.9
the First Respondent's practice as a
legal practitioner of this Court, to the curator appointed in terms
of paragraph 5 hereof,
provided that, as far as such accounting
records, records, files and documents are concerned, the Respondents
shall be entitled
to have reasonable access to them but always
subject to the supervision of such curator or his nominee.
7.
That
should the Respondents fail to comply with the provisions of the
preceding paragraph of this order on service thereof upon
him or
after a return by the person entrusted with the service thereof that
he has been unable to effect service thereof on the
Respondents (as
the case may be), the sheriff for the district in which such
accounting records, records, files and documents are,
be empowered
and directed to search for and to take possession thereof wherever
they may be and to deliver them to such curator.
8.
That
the curator shall be entitled to:
8.1
hand over to the persons entitled
thereto all such records, files and documents provided that a
satisfactory written undertaking
has been received from such persons
to pay any amount, either determined on taxation or by agreement, in
respect of fees and disbursements
due to the firm;
8.2
require from the persons referred to in
paragraph 8.1 to provide any such documentation or information which
he may consider relevant
in respect of a claim or possible or
anticipated claim, against him and/or the Respondents and/or the
Respondents' clients and/or
fund in respect of money and/or other
property entrusted to the Respondents provided that any person
entitled thereto shall be
granted reasonable access thereto and shall
be permitted to make copies thereof.
8.3
publish this order or an abridged
version thereof in any newspaper he considers appropriate; and
8.4
wind-up of the Respondents' practice.
9.
That the First Respondent be and is
hereby removed from office as:
9.1
executor of any estate of which the
First Respondent has been appointed in terms of
section 54(1)(a)(v)
of the
Administration of Estates Act, No 66 of 1965
or the estate of
any other person referred to in
section 72(1)
;
3.5
cm; margin-right: 0.04cm; text-indent: -1.24cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; line-height: 150%">
9.2
curator or guardian of any minor or
other person's property in terms of
section 72(1)
read with
section
54(1)(a)(v)
and
section 85
of the
Administration of Estates Act, No
66 of 1965
;
9.3
trustee of any insolvent estate in terms
of
section 59
of the
Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936
;
9.4
liquidator of any company in terms of
section 379(2)
read with 379(e) of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973
and read together with the provisions of the Companies Act, No 71 of
2008;
9.5
trustee of any trust in terms of section
20(1) of the Trust Property Control Act, No 57 of 1988;
9.6
liquidator of any close corporation
appointed in terms of section 74 of the Close Corporation Act, No 69
of 1984; and
9.7
administrator appointed in terms of
Section 74 of the Magistrates Court Act, No 32 of 1944.
10.
That the Respondents be and is hereby
directed:
10.1
to pay, in terms of section 87(2) of Act
No. 28 of 2014, the reasonable costs of the inspection of the
accounting records of the
Respondents;
10.2
to pay the reasonable fees of the
auditor engaged by applicant;
10.3
to pay the reasonable fees and expenses
of the curator, including travelling time;
10.4
to pay the reasonable fees and expenses
of any person(s) consulted and/or engaged by the curator as
aforesaid;
10.5
to pay tile expenses relating to the
publication of this order or an abbreviated version thereof; and
10.6
to pay the costs of this application on
an attorney-and-client scale.
11.
That
if there are any trust funds available the Respondents shall within 6
(six) months after having been requested to do so by
the curator, or
within such longer period as the curator may agree to in writing,
shall satisfy the curator, by means of the submission
of taxed bills
of costs or otherwise, of the amount of the fees and disbursements
due to the First Respondent in respect of his
former practice, and
should he fail to do so, he shall not be entitled to recover such
fees and disbursements from the curator
without prejudice, however,
to such rights (if any) as he may have against the trust creditor(s)
concerned for payment or recovery
thereof;
12.
That
a certificate issued by a director of the Legal Practitioners'
Fidelity Fund shall constitute
prima
facie
proof of the curator's costs
and that the Registrar be authorised to issue a writ of execution on
the strength of such certificate
in order to collect the curator's
costs.
R G TOLMAY
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
AGREE
T
E JOYINI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE
OF HEARING:
24
APRIL 2019
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
15 MAY 2019
ATTORNEY
FOR PLAINTIFF: DAMONS MAGARDIE RICHARDSON
ADVOCATE
FOR PLAINTIF" MS S MAGARDIE
ATTORNEY
FOR DEFENDANT: MAMOROl3ELA ATTORNEY (no
appearance)
ADVOCATE
FOR DEFENDANT :NO APPEARANCE
[1]
Case no 10382/2018 dated 20 March 2019
[2]
28 of 2014
[3]
Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope vs C, 1986(1) SA 616(A) at 637
C - E. A vs Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope, 1989(1)SA
849(A)
at 851 A-E. Law Society Transvaal vs Mathews,
supra
at 393 1-
J.
[4]
For an analysis of what a "fit and proper person" is in
the context of an attorney, see
Kaplan vs Incorporated Law
Society, Transvaal, 1981 (2) SA page 762 at page 782 A
- C;
Reyneke vs Wetsgenootskap van die Kaap die Goeie Hoop 1994 (1) SA
page 359 at page 369- 370.
[5]
Jasat v Natal Law Society
2000 (3) SA 44
(SCA) at 51 8-1; Law
Society of the Cape of Good Hope vs Buddricks 2003 (2) SA ·11
(SCA) at 13 I and 14 A to B; Malan
v The Law Society of the Northern
Provinces (568/2007)[2008] ZASCA 90 (12/09/2008) at [4 - 9].
[6]
Law Society Transvaal vs Mathews,
supra
at 393 1- J ; Olivier
vs Die Kaapse Balie-Raad 1972(3) SA 485(A) at 496 F-G; Summerley vs
Law Society Northern Provinces 2006(5)
SA 613(SCA) at 615 8-F; Malan
v The Law Society of the Northern Provinces (568/2007)
[2008] ZASCA
90
(12/09/2008) at [9]/
[7]
Law Society Transvaal vs Mathews,
supra
at 393 I-J; Olivier
11s Die Kaapse Balie-Raad 1972(3) SA 485(A) at 496 F-G; Summerley vs
Law Society Northern Provinces 2006(5)
SA 613(SCA) at 615 8-F; Malan
v The Law Society of the Northern Provinces (568/2007)
[2008] ZASCA
90
(12/09/2008) at [9].