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[2019] ZAGPPHC 164
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Wentzel v Discovery Life Limited and Others (30934/2018) [2019] ZAGPPHC 164; 2019 (6) SA 472 (GP) (6 May 2019)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES/
NO
(2)
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED
CASE NUMBER:30934/2018
6/5/2019
In
the matter between:
MALCOLM
WENTZEL
APPLICANT
and
DISCOVERY
LIFE LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT
JOACHIM
HENDRIK BOTHA N.O.
SECOND RESPONDENT
REINETTER
STEYBURG N.O.
THIRD RESPONDENT
ZOLILE
ABLE DLAMINI N.O.
FOURTH RESPONDENT
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
TLHAPI
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
During May 2018 the applicant, an
unrehabilitated insolvent, launched two applications. In the first
application, which is the present
one (Case 30934/2018) he seeks
declaratory relief and, in the second application (Case 30935/2018)
he applied for his rehabilitation.
The latter application was later
withdrawn by him in January 2019.
[2]
The relief sought by the applicant is
that it be declared that he is the owner and beneficiary of policy
5130640002 resulting from
an insurance contract entered into with the
first respondent; that the first respondent in terms of the contract,
be ordered to
pay the total proceeds of the policy to him and that
the proceeds not be made payable to the joint trustees ('trustees')
of his
insolvent estate. The first respondent did not oppose the
application and abides the decision of the court, however, the second
to the fourth respondent opposed it.
[3]
The trustees issued a counter
application in their respective capacities, seeking a declaratory
order that they as trustees of the
unrehabilitated insolvent estate
were intitled to the proceeds of the life policy payable by the first
respondent.
[4]
Despite being responsible for the
administration of the insolvent estate, the fifth respondent did not
favour the court with a report
in both applications.
BACKGROUND
[5]
The applicant and his wife Lizane
Wentzel were married to each other in community of property on 25
August 2007. The applicant entered
into an insurance contract with
the first respondent, which was registered under policy number
513064002 and the inception date
thereof was on 1 January 2012. He
took out an insurance on the life of his wife and appointing himself
as beneficiary of the proceeds
of the policy in the event of her
death. The same policy also insured his life and appointed his wife
as beneficiary in the event
of his death. Lizane Wentzel died on 16
April 2017.
[6]
The joint estate of the applicant and his late wife was provisionally
sequestrated
by order of court on 20 February 2012, and the said
order was confirmed on 3 April 2012. The second to the fourth
respondents were
appointed trustees ('trustees') of the insolvent
estate on 20 September 2012. A First and Final Liquidation and
Distribution Account
dated 24 January 2014 in the joint insolvent
estate was filed by them and confirmed by the fifth respondent on 11
July 2014, (copies
are annexed).
[7]
On 9 May 2017 the applicant as nominated beneficiary to the insurance
policy claimed
and accepted payment of the proceeds of the insurance
policy amounting to R5 240 345.56. The first respondent informed him
that
the proceeds would be paid over to the trustees of the insolvent
estate and he objected. The trustees insisted upon payment being
made
to the insolvent estate, that is, to them because neither the
applicant or his late wife had been rehabilitated when such
proceeds
became payable by the first respondent.
[8]
The applicant averred that the proceeds were payable to him because
the first and
final liquidation and distribution account in the
insolvent estate had been confirmed therefore for all intents and
purposes, the
administration of the insolvent estate had been
finalized and the demand by the trustees was not supported by the
present legal
position at South African Law.
[9]
The trustees averred that three claims were lodged and proved by
creditors as reflected
in the first and final liquidation and
distribution account confirmed by the fifth respondent. Standard Bank
of South Africa had
two secured claims of R2 091 857.91 and R518
016.86 respectively and Alert Staal (Pty) Ltd had a concurrent claim
of R2 958 043.08.
After realization of the assets of the insolvent
estate a dividend was distributed to the creditors in order of
preference amounting
to R2 161 038 99, leaving a deficiency of
R3
480 986,88.
[10]
According to the trustees neither the applicant and / or Lizane
Wentzel (prior to death) had
successfully applied for their
rehabilitation, the proceeds of the policy were therefore payable to
the insolvent estate. Their
stance was that the estate of the
insolvent remained vested in the trustees until such time that the
insolvent is either re-vested
therewith pursuant to a composition or
the rehabilitation of the insolvent, provided that any property as as
contemplated in section
25 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 ('the
Act'), which immediately before rehabilitation vested with the
trustees, remains so vested
in them for purposes of realization and
distribution to creditors. This remained the position held by the
trustees even though
the marriage between the applicant and his late
wife was
ex lege
dissolved by death. This position was
communicated to the applicant and the first respondent.
[11]
They contend that the present
declaratory application which precedes the application for
rehabilitation seeks to alter the effects
of sequestration. The
creditors who had proven claims which still remain unpaid in as far
as the deficiency was concerned, stood
to be prejudiced in their
rights to be paid should this application succeed. A point
in
limine
was raised of non-joinder in
that such creditors had a direct and substantial interest in the
application and should have been joined.
The application should
therefore be dismissed on account of non-joinder or that the
applicant should be directed to join such creditors.
[12]
In their counter application the
trustees reiterate the position that the applicant as an
unrehabilitated insolvent remained as
such even at the time when the
proceeds of the policy became payable to him. The counter application
is premised on the terms of
section 25 (read with sections 20, 23 and
24) of the Act. The rehabilitation application was opposed on the
basis that applicant
failed to make a full and frank disclosure of
this application and that he stood to receive a substantial amount of
money from
the first respondent.
[13]
The applicant's reply to the main
application and opposing affidavit to the counter application
confirmed the common cause facts
of his position as unrehabilitated
insolvent and, that together with the trustees they sought
declaratory relief claiming entitlement
to the proceeds of the
policy. When the trustees intervened in the rehabilitation
application it was agreed with them not to proceed
with the said
application until this application inclusive of the counter
applications were finalized.
[14]
The applicant contends that the former
joint estate was dissolved at the death of his wife on 16 April 2017
and the sequestrated
and insolvent joint estate to which the trustees
were appointed was dissolved
ex lege
on date of death and the proceeds of
the insurance policy only became payable on 9 May 2017.
[15]
In as far as it related to the
deficiency of the concurrent claim of Alert Staal (Pty) Ltd ('Alert
Staal') and pursuant to an insolvency
enquiry in the insolvent estate
of Zencron Site & Maintenance CC, (Zencron), where applicant
was
a
member, he contended that an
agreement was entered into with the liquidator in 2011 for payment of
R900 000.00. The applicant understood
that the monies were to secure
payment to this creditor and because the proceeds of the policy were
not payable into the insolvent
joint estate, none of the creditors of
such estate had any interest in this application. He was under no
obligation to give notice
of this application to any of the
creditors. The point
in limine
on
non-joinder of the creditors had no merit especially that the
trustees had also not themselves cited or joined the creditors
in
their counterclaim. The point
in
limine
stood to be dismissed with
costs.
[16]
According to the trustees Alert Staal
was not a party to the agreement with the liquidators of Zencron and,
the R900 000.00 was
not used to liquidate any debt in the
.applicant's
insolvent estate.
THE
LAW
[17]
Mr Heyns contended that the adjudication
of this matter was based on the trite principles that the joint
estate of the parties married
in community of property is dissolved
by
"death of one or both of the
spouses, by divorce, by an order of division, or by the change in the
matrimonial property system
in terms of section 21 of the Matrimonial
Property Act
or
death"
and that consequently the dominium
of each spouses vests in that spouse on dissolution;
Corporate
Liquidators (Pty) Ltd v Wiggill
2007
(2) SA 520.
[18]
I agree with such submission. However,
before a share in the joint estate is distributed, the interested
parties report the estate
to the Master and an executor is appointed
to administer the estate of the deceased person. In this instance,
the estate of the
late Lizana Wentzel even though she died insolvent
would have to be administered. On instructions of the Master the
executor calls
for the lodgement of claims against the estate and the
liabilities of the joint estate are paid before the remainder or
balance
of the assets of the joint estates are distributed. The
allocation is first to the half share of the surviving spouse, before
the
other half share of the deceased is dealt with in terms of a will
or laws of intestacy. It has always been the position that where
a
beneficiary has been appointed the insurance policy would be paid to
such beneficiary and where none is appointed the proceeds
would be
paid into the estate.
[19]
The question that has to be answered is
what effect does the death of the applicant's wife have on the joint
estate which was sequestrated.
Mr Heyns contends that the trustees
only vested with the assets of the insolvent joint estate which 'was
terminated or became dissolved
on 16 April 2017'. As I see it, while
the joint estate is dissolved by death, the status of the applicant
and that of his late
wife is not changed by her death, until they are
released from such as provided in the Act by rehabilitation. It is
possible for
a surviving insolvent and the estate of a deceased
insolvent to acquire assets and, in respect of the latter it is
possible for
his/her estate to be reported as that of the late so and
so who was a party to a marriage in community of property which was
sequestrated
prior to her death. It seems as contended by the
trustees, that the acquisition of the proceeds of the policy present
problems
for applicant as an unrehabilitated insolvent in relation to
the trustees and creditors in the insolvent joint estate.
[20]
On sequestration an insolvent is
divested of his/her estate which vests in the Master until a trustee
is appointed, where after
it vests in such trustee, section 20 (1)(a)
of the Act. Section 20(2)(b) read with 20(1)(a) provides that the
insolvent estate
includes all property movable or immovable at date
of sequestration, including all property acquired or accruing to the
insolvent
during sequestration, except as otherwise provided in
section 23 of the Act. Sections 79 and 82 (6) also provide for
exclusions
and or exemptions from the general application.
[21]
The trustee remains vested with the
insolvent estate until it is re-vested in the insolvent by way of
composition as provided in
section 119 of the Act or until the
insolvent is rehabilitated in terms of section 127 or 127A of the
Act. In
Moodley N.
O.
v Milne N.
O.
1965 (1) SA 154
(D) James J said at 160 A-C:
"In my judgement nothing
which Mr Gurwitz has urged disturbs Mr Didcott's basic submission
that the estate of an insolvent
vests in the trustee in terms of
section 25(1) of Act 24 of 1936......Subject to certain statutory
exemptions ... .... subsequently
acquired assets vest in the Trustee,
see section 23 (1) of Act 24 of 1936, and in my judgment such
subsequent acquired assets will
only become the property of the
estate if they are included in the estate which is re-vested in terms
of a deed of composition
or if they are the subject of a special
order to that effect made by the court on occasion of the insolvent's
rehabilitation....The
fact that the insolvent is dead would appear
not to be a bar to an order of rehabilitation being granted or to an
order being applied
for at that stage directing that certain assets
should fall into the deceased estate. But in such a case the rules
regarding notice
to creditors and the trustees would still have to be
observed.·
[22]
It is trite that on sequestration a
concursus creditorum
is
established and those creditors who have lodged and proved claims,
commit themselves to the administration of the insolvent estate
by
the trustee under the supervision of the Master. No single creditor
may therefore enter into any transaction with the debtor
that has the
effect of prejudicing the body of creditors; Walker v Syfret NO 1911
(AD) 141. The general body of creditors understand
the possibility of
not being paid in full, but that they may be paid a portion of their
claims, the trustee paying according to
the scheme provided for in
the Act as is applicable to the different categories of creditors.
Where there is a deficiency there
always remains the possibility of
more assets if found, being realised and distributed by the trustee
and this in my view is applicable
also to the estate of the deceased.
[23]
The general body of creditors look to
the trustee who has the responsibility to protect their interests in
the insolvent estate
and in light of a provision in the Act, which
allows for creditors meetings to be held and for creditors to prove
claims and, sometimes
to attend to other business or issues relating
to the administration of the insolvent estate. The general body of
creditors will
always have an interest in the affairs of the
insolvent related to his/her assets before re-vestment as provided in
the Act.
[24]
In as far as the point
in
limine
on non-joinder was raised by
the trustees, Ms Lettering contended that the insolvent's election to
launch the two separate applications
did not absolve him from giving
notice to the creditors. I agree, as found in the authorities cited
by her in her heads of argument,
that the creditors should have been
joined and properly notified; Ex Parte Steel
1948 (1) SA 1203
(1) SA
1203 0N) at 1204 and Ex Parte Potgieter
1967 (2) SA 310
(T) at 311
D-E Hiemstra J stated:
"Dit skyn of ... ..geoordeel
het dat die Transvaalse afdeling in Ex Parte Steel ook bedoel het dat
daar persoonlike betekening
van 'n kennisgewing met volledige
besonderhede aan bewese en onbewese skuldeisers moet wees. Die vorm
van kennisgewing word egter
nie daar vermeld nie en ek is van oordeel
dat dit 'n saak van goedunke van die Hof meet wees. In baie gevalle
sal persoonlike betekening
aan alle skuldeisers 'n groot beslommemis
of self onmoontlik wees."
[25]
Although
Potgieter
supra
dealt with an application for
rehabilitation, which included an application to declare him owner of
immovable property purchased
during sequestration, it reaffirms the
importance of notification to the creditors by an insolvent and the
need for their joinder.
The applicant in seeking a declaratory order
in respect of the asset he seeks relief for, would therefore be
required in terms
of the authorities cited by Ms Lettering, to give
notice to the creditors ("bewese en onbewese skuldeisers).
Although Mr Heyns
disagreed that such notice was required he made a
concession that provisional relief could be granted by giving notice
of the application
to the creditors who had lodged and proved claims,
so as to give them an opportunity to respond to the application.
[26]
As I see it, the filing of a first and
final liquidation and distribution does not necessarily mean that the
trustees have completed
their duties in the administration of the
joint insolvent estate. The confirmation of the liquidation and
distribution account
only meant that after examination of the said
account by the Master, it had lain for inspection without objection,
and that the
Master had confirmed that the trustees could pay to the
creditors the dividend reflected in such account. Such confirmation
has
to be advertised.
[27]
The trustees are therefore not barred
from filing further accounts, with approval of the Master in respect
of other assets which
might later vest in them or acquired by the
insolvent before the rehabilitation of the insolvent and their
discharge from their
duties as trustees. Even where there is
re-vestment of assets in terms of a composition the trustees have to
file an account reflecting
such composition approved by the
creditors.
The Proceeds of the Insurance
Policy.
[28]
Mr Heyns contends that in terms of the
legal principles in
Pieterse v
Shrosbree N.O.
and
Others, Shrosbree N.O. Love and Others
2005
(1) SA 309
(SCA) as at paragraphs 8 to 12, the proceeds of the life
insurance policy are payable in terms of the contract between the
life
assured (the deceased) and the first respondent directly to the
nominated beneficiary irrespective of whether that estate was solvent
or insolvent.
Naidoo v Discovery Life
Limited and Others
(2002) /2017
ZASCA 88 (31 May 2018) at paragraph 9 confirmed that a risk-only
policy containing a
stipulatio alteri
is not an asset in the estate of the
policy holder and therefore is not an asset in the joint estate in a
marriage in community
of property.
[29]
This is in opposition to the view of the
trustees that the proceeds are payable to them and Ms Lettering
contends that
Pieterse supra
was
not applicable in this application in as far as section 63 of the
Long Term Insurance Act 52 of 1988 was concerned because it
' does
not purport to divert the proceeds of an insurance policy from a
nominated beneficiary to the insolvent estate of the deceased
policy
holder."
[30]
The distinguishing factor between the
present application and
Pieterse
supra
is that in the latter matter
the estate of the deceased only became insolvent after death. In this
application the principles in
Pieterse
supra
are of assistance in as far as
they shed light on the relationship established in a contract of life
insurance between the proposer,
the insurer and the beneficiary as
stated in paragraph 9:
"[9] In such a case the
policy holder (the
stipulans)
contracts with the insurer( the
'promittens)
that an agreed offer would be made by the insurer
to a third party ('the beneficiary') with the intention that, on
acceptance of
the offer by the beneficiary, a contract will be
established between the beneficiary and the insurer. What is required
is an intention
on the part of the original contracting parties that
the benefit upon acceptance by the beneficiary, would confer rights
that are
enforceable at the instance of the beneficiary against the
insurer, for that intention is at the very heart of the
stipulatio
alteri
(Ellison Kahn: Extension Clauses in Insurance Contracts
(1952) 69 SALJ 53
and 56) Thus the beneficiary, by adopting the
benefit, becomes a party to the contract (see Total South African
(Pty) Ltd v Bekker
N.O.
[1991] ZASCA 183
;
1992 (1) SA 617
(A) 625D-G)
[31]
My understanding of the Act and of the
relationship that is created as described above, is that it is only
the appointed beneficiary
who may demand and accept or refuse the
benefit offered by the insurer and such call cannot be made by a
trustee of his insolvent
estate directly to such insurer. It is
common cause that the applicant took the initiative without notifying
interested parties
to demand and accept such benefit. As I see it,
such benefit when paid over to the insolvent by the insurer (and as
the insurer
is obliged to pay) now represents an asset in the hands
of the insolvent which is not protected in that it is not exempted or
excluded
by the laws of Insolvency from reach by the creditors of his
insolvent estate. The trustee remains in control as envisaged in
section
25 of the Act as stated in
Moodley
N.O. supra.
Therefore, when the
insurer makes payment, the applicant must hand over such payment to
the trustee as administrator of his insolvent
estate because he has
acquired an asset. Alternatively, the trustee has a right to claim
from the applicant because as stated before
the proceeds are an asset
acquired by the insolvent before his rehabilitation and before
re-vestment as envisaged in the Act.
[32]
The first respondent has in
correspondence and as averred in the founding affidavit confirmed
that the benefit has been claimed
and accepted and that it abides the
decision of the court. Therefore, the applicant who is not
incapacitated from contracting as
a result of his insolvent status,
by claiming and accepting the benefit is still obliged to have this
acquisition administered
by the trustee as an unrehabilitated
insolvent and in as far as it pertains to the creditors of his
insolvent estate. The trustee
remains answerable to the Master and
creditors until discharged. The trustees claim does not arise in a
stipulatio alteri
but
as a result of the laws of insolvency as explained above.
[33]
It is my further view that the trustees
having filed a first and final liquidation and distribution account,
a formal process needs
to be engaged to notify the Master that a
situation has arisen whereby a second liquidation and distribution
account might be lodged
after a process has been commenced to engage
the creditors. Both the main and the counter applications have to be
dismissed to
allow the trustees to engage such process because the
applicant as an insolvent has not been rehabilitated and the trustees
have
not been discharged.
[34]
In the result the following order is
granted:
1.
The main and counter application are
dismissed.
2.
Each party has to pay their own costs
which include the costs of opposition.
TLHAPI
VV
(JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT)
MATTER
HEARD ON
: 16
APRIL 2019
JUDGMENT
RESERVED ON
: 16
APRIL 2019
ATTORNEYS
FOR THE APPLICANT
:
DAY
ATTORNEYS INC.
ATTORNEYS
FR THE RESPONDENTS
:
TINTINGERS INC.