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[2020] ZAGPPHC 20
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Sokhela v Khumalo and Others (24613/2019) [2020] ZAGPPHC 20 (19 February 2020)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case number: 27242/19
19/2/2020
In
the matter between:
SIYABONGA
SOKHELA
APPLICANT
and
ADV PHELELANI
KHUMALO
FIRST RESPONDENT
ACTING
REGISTRAR OF THE HEALTH
PROFESSIONS
COUNCIL OF SOUTH
AFRICA
DR J
CROSIER
SECOND RESPONDENT
DR J
REID
THIRD RESPONDENT
DR AJ
LAMBRECHTS
FOURTH RESPONDENT
ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
FIFTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
VAN STADEN, AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The
applicant lodges an application wherein he, although not framed in
the exact words, requests the review and setting aside of
the ruling
of the Road Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal.
[2]
He
cites the Acting Registrar (the Registrar) of the Health Professions
Council of South Africa as first respondent, the members
of the Road
Accident Fund Appeal Tribunal (the Appeal Tribunal) as the second,
third and fourth respondents, and the Road Accident
Fund (RAF) as the
fifth respondent.
[3]
The
issues in dispute involve the question whether the Appeal Tribunal’s
decision that the applicant does not suffer from
a serious injury be
reviewed, due to the applicant not being granted opportunity of
addressing the Appeal Tribunal, as well as
because the Appeal
Tribunal failed to consider relevant considerations.
APPLICANT’S FOUNDING AFFIDAVIT
[4]
The
applicant was injured in a motor vehicle collision on 5 July 2016. By
means of letter dated 12 September 2018 the RAF’s
attorneys
rejected the applicant’s serious injury assessment report, RAF
Form 4, lodged on behalf of the applicant. On 9
October 2018 the
applicant submitted the RAF 5 Form to commence appeal proceedings,
requesting the Registrar to appoint an Appeal
Tribunal to determine
the dispute concerning
the
RAF’s rejection of the serious injury assessment report.
[5]
The
applicant’s RAF Form 4 was completed by Dr Julius Preddy, an
orthopaedic surgeon. He opined that the applicant‘s
Whole
Person Impairment (WPI), according the American Medical Association’s
Guides (AMA Guides), is 14%. He submitted that
the applicant’s
injury is serious in accordance with the Narrative Test contained in
paragraph 5.1 of the RAF Form 4,
serious
long-term impairment or loss of a body function
.
Paragraph 5 of the RAF 4 Form addresses the Narrative Test in respect
of non-serious injuries and requires that the expert
opinion
be supported by reports attached as annexures.
[6]
In
the RAF Form 4 attachment dated 14 May 2018, Dr Preddy opines that
the applicant has reached maximum medical improvement as far
as the
loss of his left knee is concerned, which is associated with pain. He
indicates that the applicant has had ongoing problems
related to his
left knee, cannot fully flex his knee, has severe pain in his left
knee and can only ambulate with the usage of
crutches.
[7]
In Dr Preddy’s
comprehensive expert report dated 2 May 2018 he inter alia opines
that the applicant may benefit from a manipulation
under anaesthesia
of his left knee to try and regain full movement. He also opines that
there is a small chance that the applicant
may require an open
procedure where scarring of the quadriceps mechanism would be
released. He may also require a lengthening procedure
of the left
quadriceps to regain full movement.
[8]
The
RAF’s rejection of the applicant’s serious injury report
by letter dated 12 September 2018 is premised on the expert
report of
Dr Tony Birrell, an orthopaedic surgeon. Dr Tony Birrell examined the
applicant on 2 August 2018 and prepared a report
on his examination.
He compiled a separate assessment summary in respect of the Narrative
Test. Therein he opines that the applicant’s
WPI is 6% and that
his injury does not qualify as a serious injury under the Narrative
Test.
[9]
In
his comprehensive expert report Dr Birrell points out that there is
considerable symptom magnification when comes to the examination
of
the left knee. Initially with the applicant sitting on the edge of
the examining couch, the knee flexed to 90°, but with
him lying
down he refused to flex his left knee for more than 30°. As far
as Dr Birrell can ascertain, the knee is stable and
there is
certainly no effusion present.
[10]
Dr
Birrell indicates that the applicant’s gait is normal and that
he carries a crutch, which is clearly no more than a stage
prop and
is not used as a proper walking one. He notes that the applicant
walked out of the consulting room down a fairly long
passage, not
using the crutch at all, holding it in his left hand. Dr Birrell
believes that after an arthrotomy of the left kneecap
the applicant
ought to have a very good prognosis. After he has had this minor
surgery he is not expected to suffer any loss of
note.
[11]
On
21 January 2019 the Registrar informed the applicant that an Appeal
Tribunal, consisting of the second respondent, an orthopaedic
surgeon, the third respondent, a neurologist, and the fourth
respondent, an orthopaedic surgeon, has been appointed to consider
the appeal.
[12]
Under
letter dated 1 March 2019 the applicant was informed of the Appeal
Tribunal’s determination, that the applicant’s
injury
probably does not qualify as a serious injury under the Narrative
Test. The Appeal Tribunal referred to the comments by
Dr Birrell in
respect of the applicant’s complaints that he cannot walk
without crutches. The Appeal Tribunal found that
the applicant’s
upper limbs are clinically normal, and that there is painful
restricted flexion of the left knee, with the
ligaments stable. It
found that the left knee injury has residual symptoms. The Appeal
Tribunal also referred to Dr Preddy’s
WPI assessment of 14% and
that of Dr Birrell of 6%. The Tribunal’s decided that the
applicant suffers from non-serious musculoskeletal
and neurological
injuries on the available information.
[13]
The
applicant’s grounds of review are twofold. He firstly contends
that the Appeal Tribunal’s decision, the administrative
action
sought to be set aside, is procedurally unfair in terms of the
provisions of section 6(2)(c) of the Promotion of Administrative
Action Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). The applicant says he was denied the
right to be present and advance submissions in support of the
applicant’s case.
[14]
The
applicant secondly contends that in terms of section 6(2)(e)(iii) of
PAJA relevant considerations were not considered. He alleges
that the
Appeal Tribunal did not have regard to the full contents of Dr
Preddy’s reports wherein he unequivocally states
his view. He
contends that in terms of the disagreement between Drs Preddy and
Birrell the Appeal Tribunal ought to have exercised
its powers in
determining that the applicant be examined by an independent
orthopaedic surgeon. He submits that the members of
the Appeal
Tribunal failed to apply their minds to the relevant issues. The
decision they arrived at in finding that the applicant
didn’t
suffer a serious injury has been arrived at arbitrarily.
RESPONDENT’S ANSWERING AFFIDAVIT
[15]
The
second respondent deposes to the answering affidavit on behalf of the
first four respondents. He raises two points in limine.
He submits
that the first respondent was incorrectly cited and that the
applicant should have cited the Appeal Tribunal. He also
contends
that the fifth respondent was incorrectly cited, that it plays no
role in the appeal procedure.
[16]
The
second point in limine raised is that the applicant doesn’t
rely on the provisions of PAJA in bringing the application.
[17]
As
far as procedural unfairness is concerned, the second respondent
points out that the RAF 5 Form, indicating the method to approach
the
Appeal tribunal, specifically states “
if
asked to do so, the Appeal Tribunal may say that legal argument
should be made on certain issues and an attorney or advocate
will
then be appointed to hear such argument.
”
From this it is evident, according to the second respondent, that the
discretion to consider evidence or submissions from
the applicant
lies solely with Appeal Tribunal. The applicant or its legal
representatives do not have any per se right per se
to attend the
Appeal Tribunal hearing. The second respondent points out the
provisions of regulation 3(11) of the regulations (the
Regulations)
promulgated in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (the
RAF Act), in this regard.
[18]
The
second respondent asks what further contribution could have been made
by the presence of the applicant and his attorney at the
Appeal
Tribunal hearing. The Appeal Tribunal consists of two more
orthopaedic surgeons, who agree with Dr Birrell. All documentation,
reports and record were at hand and considered by the Appeal
Tribunal.
[19]
The
second respondent submits that the applicant is cherry-picking from
the evidence available. He contends that the applicant makes
no
substantial averments or offers no facts in relation to substantive
grounds of review.
APPLICANT’S REPLYING AFFIDAVIT
[20]
In
reply the applicant relies on the Constitution in contending that the
applicant, and his representative, should have been granted
the
opportunity to address the Appeal Tribunal. A bland refusal to
address the Appeal Tribunal cannot be said to amount to a prudent
exercise of such discretion. No valid or justifiable reason was given
for the refusal to permit the applicant’s attendance
and for
him to make submissions, which amounts to a violation of the
provisions of section 5 of PAJA.
[21]
The
applicant submits that Dr Preddy’s report is not mentioned in
the Appeal Tribunal’s minute and the Tribunal didn’t
indicate why it disagreed with him.
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
[22]
In
terms of section 3 of the RAF Act the object of the Act is the
payment of compensation in accordance with the Act for loss or
damage
wrongfully caused by the driving of motor vehicles.
[23]
Section
26(1) and (1A) of the RAF Act provides for the regulation making
powers of the Minister of Transport:
“
(1)
The Minister may make regulations regarding any matter
that shall or may be prescribed in terms of this Act or which
it is
necessary or expedient to prescribe in order to achieve or promote
the object of this Act.
(1A) Without derogating from the
generality of subsection (1), the Minister may make regulations
regarding-
(a) the
method of assessment to determine whether, for purposes of section
17, a serious injury has been
incurred;
(b)
injuries which are, for the purposes of section 17, not regarded as
serious injuries;
(c) the
resolution of disputes arising from any matter provided for in this
Act.”
[24]
Section
17(1) of the RAF Act limits the payment of non-pecuniary loss to
serious injuries as contemplated in section 17(1A). The
latter
section determines that the assessment of a serious injury shall be
based on a prescribed method adopted after consultation
with medical
service providers and shall be reasonable in ensuring that injuries
are assessed in relation to the circumstances
of the third party.
[25]
Regulation
3 of the Regulations prescribes the method for the assessment of a
serious injury. Regulation 3(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) prescribes
the
criteria for the assessment of a serious injury:
“
(ii)
If the injury resulted in 30 per cent or more Impairment of the Whole
Person as provided in the AMA Guides,
the injury shall be assessed as
serious.
(iii) An
injury which does not result in 30 per cent or more Impairment of the
Whole Person may only be
assessed as serious if that injury:
(aa) resulted in a
serious long-term impairment or loss of a body function;
(bb) constitutes
permanent serious disfigurement;
(cc) resulted in
severe long-term mental or severe long-term behavioural disturbance
or disorder; or
(dd) resulted in
loss of a foetus.”
[26]
In
terms of Regulation 3(3)(c) the RAF shall only be obliged to
compensate a third party for non-pecuniary loss if a claim is
supported
by a serious injury assessment report (RAF Form 4) and the
RAF is satisfied that the injury has been correctly assessed as
serious
in terms of the method provided in Regulation 3. In terms of
Regulation 3(3)(dA) the RAF must, within 90 days from the date on
which the serious injury assessment report was delivered, accept or
reject the serious injury assessment report or direct that the
third
party submit himself or herself to a further assessment. Regulation
3(4)(a) determines that if the RAF rejects the serious
injury
assessment report, a third party has 90 days within which to lodge a
dispute resolution form (RAF Form 5).
[27]
In
terms of Regulation 3(8)(a) the Registrar shall within 60 days refer
the dispute for consideration by an appeal tribunal paid
for by the
RAF. Regulation 3(8)(b) provides for the appeal tribunal to consist
of three independent medical practitioners with
expertise in the
appropriate areas of medicine, appointed by the Registrar, who shall
designate one of them as the presiding officer.
[28]
In
terms of Regulation 3(10) a hearing is afforded to a party under the
following circumstances:
“
(a)
If it appears to the majority of the members of the appeal tribunal
that a hearing for the purpose of considering
legal arguments may be
warranted, the presiding officer of the appeal tribunal shall notify
the Registrar to this effect in writing,
stating reasons.
(b) When
the Registrar receives the notification he or she shall request the
chairperson of the bar council,
alternatively the chairperson of the
law society, of the jurisdictional area concerned, to appoint an
advocate of the High Court
of South Africa, or an attorney of the
High Court of South Africa, with at least five years of experience in
practice.
(c) The
advocate or attorney, once appointed, shall consider the reasons
submitted to the Registrar by the presiding
officer of the appeal
tribunal and shall within 10 days of his or her appointment make a
recommendation in writing on whether a
hearing is warranted.
(d) The
appeal tribunal shall consider the recommendation made by the
advocate or attorney and determine,
in writing, whether the nature of
the dispute warrants a hearing for the purpose of considering legal
arguments.”
[29]
In
terms of Regulation 3(11) an Appeal Tribunal has the following
powers:
“
(a)
Direct that the third party submit himself or herself, at the cost of
the Fund or an agent, to a further assessment
to ascertain whether
the injury is serious, in terms of the method set out in these
Regulations, by a medical practitioner designated
by the appeal
tribunal.
(b)
Direct, on no less than five days written notice, that the third
party present himself or herself in
person to the appeal tribunal at
a place and time indicated in the said notice and examine the third
party's injury and assess
whether the injury is serious in terms of
the method set out in these Regulations.
(c)
Direct that further medical reports be obtained and placed before the
appeal tribunal by one or more
of the parties.
(d)
Direct that relevant pre- and post-accident medical, health and
treatment records pertaining to the
third party be obtained and made
available to the appeal tribunal.
(e)
Direct that further submissions be made by one or more of the parties
and stipulate the time frame within
which such further submissions
must be placed before the appeal tribunal.
(f)
Refuse to decide a dispute until a party has complied with any
direction in paragraphs (a) to
(e) above.
(g)
Determine whether in its majority view the injury concerned is
serious in terms of the method set out
in these Regulations.
(h)
Confirm the assessment of the medical practitioner or substitute its
own assessment for the disputed
assessment performed by the medical
practitioner, if the majority of the members of the appeal tribunal
consider it appropriate
to substitute.
(i)
Confirm the rejection of the serious injury assessment report by the
Fund or an agent or accept
the report, if the majority of the members
of the appeal tribunal consider it is appropriate to accept the
serious injury assessment
report.”
DISCUSSION
Points in
Limine
[30]
Insofar
as the respondent submits that the applicant doesn’t rely on
the provisions of PAJA in bringing the application, I
find that the
applicant indeed relies thereon. Albeit not always in the clearest
terms, the applicant does refer to and relies
on the relevant
provisions of PAJA in bringing the application.
[31]
In
respect of the point in limine concerning the non-joinder of the
Appeal Tribunal, I find that the applicant should have cited
the
chairperson of the Appeal Tribunal, instead of the individual members
of the Appeal Tribunal, in their capacity as such
[1]
.
In the
Safcor Forwarding
matter
[2]
the
citing of the incorrect person was dealt with by Corbett JA as
follows:
“
The
position then is that appellant ought to have cited the chairman of
the Commission, as representative of the Commission; instead
it
merely cited the Commission. Did this merit the dismissal of the
application with costs? In my opinion, it did not. I am
whole-heartedly
in agreement with the view of SCHREINER JA that:
'... technical objections to
less than perfect procedural steps should not be permitted, in the
absence of prejudice, to interfere
with the expeditious and, if
possible, inexpensive decision of cases on their real merits.'
…
In
this case there is no suggestion of prejudice. In fact the notice of
motion directed to the Commission effectively brought it
before the
Court and the only defence raised in the opposing affidavit was the
jurisdictional point. … The learned Judge
a quo also seems to
have proceeded on the finding that 'the wrong person (was) before the
Court' (judgment a quo at 1117B). In
my opinion, the Judge a quo
erred. In all the circumstances a formal application for condonation
was unnecessary, particularly
as it was contended by appellant's
counsel that the application complied with Rule 53 (1) and
condonation could only arise if this
were held to be incorrect. The
various factors which I have mentioned - the practice in the past,
the absence of prejudice and
the minimal difference between citing
the chairman as representative of the Commission and the Commission
itself - amply provide
good cause. And finally it was not a case of
the wrong person being before the Court, but a case of the right
person having been
incorrectly cited.
In my view, therefore, this
slight deviation from Rule 53 (1) ought to have been condoned and the
objection based on the non-citation
of the chairman of the Commission
dismissed.”
[32]
I
am prepared to condone the non-citing of the correct person, the
chairperson of the Appeal Tribunal. The fact the applicant instead
cited the individual members of the Appeal Tribunal, in their
capacity as such, means that the Appeal Tribunal, including its
chairperson, has effectively been cited as a party. It is not a case
of the wrong person being before the Court, but a case of the
right
person having been incorrectly cited. The applicant’s failure
to cite the correct person is a less than perfect procedural
step
which I am prepared to condone.
[33]
Furthermore,
there has been no prejudice. The second respondent answered on behalf
of the Appeal Tribunal, including its chairperson.
[34]
Insofar
as the point in limine regarding the misjoinder of the Registrar and
RAF is concerned, it is of course so that the RAF has
a direct and
substantial interest in the litigation and is a necessary party to
the litigation. The first respondent, being responsible
for the
implementation of the provisions of Regulation 3, has an interest in
the subject matter of the litigation. As such he has
not
unnecessarily been joined.
[35]
Accordingly
I dismiss the points in limine.
Merits
discussion
[36]
In
order to interpret the Regulations one must follow the now familiar
process of assessing the text, context and purpose of the
provision
[3]
.
[37]
The
Regulations circumscribe the circumstances whereunder a party may
attend and present submissions to an Appeal Tribunal. The
Regulations
do not provide for a third party requesting attendance or
automatically being entitled to attend an Appeal Tribunal
hearing and
to make representations. The initiative for attendance of the third
party and his representative emanates from an Appeal
Tribunal.
[38]
The
Regulations provide for an attenuated right to procedural fairness.
Why is this so?
[39]
De
Ville
[4]
deals
with the context-sensitive nature of the right to procedural
fairness as follows:
“
The
courts have frequently emphasised the flexibility and
context-sensitive nature of the requirements of procedural fairness
(pointing
out that a hearing is not always a requirement). The closer
a decision approximates the judicial process, the stricter the
application
of the requirements of procedural fairness. On the other
end of the spectrum lie issues that are of a highly policy nature.
The
closer one gets to this end of the spectrum, the more minimal the
requirements of procedural fairness. Action which qualifies as
“administrative action” takes up part of the spectrum,
but does not exhaust it. This is in line with the approach in
other
Commonwealth countries where the emphasis has shifted away from an
enquiry into the scope of application of the requirements
of
procedural fairness, to its content in specific cases.”
[40]
In
mandating the enactment of national legislation to give effect to the
constitutional right to administrative justice, section
33(3)(c) of
the Constitution requires that such legislation must “
promote
an efficient administration
”
[5]
.
[41]
The
legislature prescribes that the determination of a serious injury
assessment dispute be undertaken by a tribunal consisting
of
independent experts, instead of leaving it in the hands of our
courts. Such determination is furthermore done with reference
to a
specialist document, the AMA Guides. Under limited circumstances an
attorney or advocate may be called in to assist with the
determination of the dispute.
[42]
The
legislature has entrusted the determination of the dispute to a
system of independent peer experts for a reason. It has done
so to
effect an expeditious and effective system of dispute determination,
in order to promote efficient administration. In order
to achieve the
expeditious and effective determination of the dispute by independent
peer experts, third parties and the RAF are
not automatically
entitled to attend an appeal hearing, and have limited rights of
attendance.
[43]
The
Regulations do not provide for a fully blown hearing with all
attendant rights. The Regulations do not provide for automatic
attendance by a third party or that a third party be provided with
reasons if he is not called upon to attend the Appeal Tribunal
hearing and make submissions.
[44]
The
applicant has furthermore not requested any declaratory relief in
respect of the Regulations. I accordingly decide the application
of
the Regulations and not their possible invalidity.
[45]
I
find that the applicant has not made out a case in terms of the
Regulations entitling him to attend the Appeal Tribunal hearing
and
make representations. As such I find no merit in the applicant’s
submissions regarding non-attendance at the Appeal Tribunal
hearing.
[46]
This
leaves me to consider the applicant’s submissions concerning
the members of the Appeal Tribunal failing to consider relevant
considerations and not
having
regard to the full contents of Dr Preddy’s reports.
[47]
The
fact that the Appeal Tribunal did not have regard to the full
contents of Dr Preddy’s reports, does not equate to the
Appeal
Tribunal failing to consider relevant issues. Failing to have regard
to the full contents of Dr Preddy’s reports,
or that Dr Preddy
differed from Dr Birrell, does not in itself constitute a ground for
this court to review and set aside the Appeal
Tribunal’s
finding.
[48]
In
the matter of
MEC
for Environmental Affairs and Development Planning v Clarison’s
CC
[6]
the review ground of failing to consider relevant considerations was
dealt with as follows:
“
[18]
We think it apparent from the extracts from her judgment we have
recited, and the judgment read as a whole, that the learned
judge
blurred the distinction between an appeal and a review. It bears
repeating that a review is not concerned with the correctness
of a
decision made by a functionary, but with whether he performed the
function with which he was entrusted. When the law entrusts
a
functionary with a discretion it means just that: the law gives
recognition to the evaluation made by the functionary to whom
the
discretion is entrusted, and it is not open to a court to
second-guess his evaluation. The role of a court is no more than
to
ensure that the decision-maker has performed the function with which
he was entrusted. Clearly the court below, echoing what
was said by
Clairisons, was of the view that the factors we have referred to
ought to have counted in favour of the application,
whereas the MEC
weighed them against it, but that is to question the correctness of
the MEC’s decision, and not whether he
performed the function
with which he was entrusted…
[20] It has always been the law,
and we see no reason to think that PAJA has altered the position that
the weight or lack of it
to be attached to the various considerations
that go to making up a decision, is that of the decision-maker. As it
was stated by
Baxter:
‘
The court will merely
require the decision-maker to take the relevant considerations into
account; it will not prescribe the weight
that must be accorded to
each consideration, for to do so could constitute a usurpation of the
decision-maker’s discretion.’
[21] That was expressed by this
court as follows in Durban Rent Board and Another v Edgemount
Investments Ltd, in relation to the
discretion of a rent board to
determine a reasonable rent:
‘
In determining what is a
reasonable rent it is entitled and ought to take into consideration
all matters which a reasonable man
would take into consideration in
order to arrive at a fair and just decision in all the circumstances
of the case …. How
much weight a rent board will attach to
particular factors or how far it will allow any particular factor to
affect its eventual
determination of a reasonable rent is a matter
for it to decide in the exercise of the discretion entrusted to it
and, so long
as it acts bona fide, a Court of law cannot interfere’.
[22] What was said in Durban
Rent Board is consistent with present constitutional principle and we
find no need to re-formulate
what was said pertinently on the issue
that arises in this case. The law remains, as we see it, that when a
functionary is entrusted
with a discretion, the weight to be attached
to particular factors, or how far a particular factor affects the
eventual determination
of the issue, is a matter for the functionary
to decide, and as he acts in good faith (and reasonably and
rationally) a court of
law cannot interfere. That seems to us to be
but one manifestation of the broader principles explained – in
a context that
does not arise in this.”
[49]
The
applicant has not made it clear what relevant considerations the
Appeal Tribunal has failed to consider. Dr Preddy, despite
his
unequivocal view in the RAF 4 Form that the applicant suffers from a
serious injury in terms of paragraph 5.1, that the injury
to the left
knee has resulted in a serious long-term impairment or loss of a body
function, is more equivocal in his comprehensive
expert report.
Therein he
opines
that the applicant may benefit from a manipulation under anaesthesia
of his left knee to try and regain full movement as
well as that he
may require a lengthening procedure of the left quadriceps to regain
full movement. T
he
full contents of Dr Preddy’s reports
point towards the opposite end of what the applicant contends.
[50]
It
is not open to this court to second-guess the Appeal Tribunal’s
evaluation. The role of a court is to ensure that the decision-maker
has performed the function with which it was entrusted. I am
satisfied that the Appeal Tribunal has fulfilled its task and that
there is no merit in the applicant contending that the Appeal
Tribunal has failed to consider relevant considerations.
ORDER
Accordingly,
I order as follows:
The application is dismissed with costs.
_
M VAN STADEN
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE OF
HEARING: 13 FEBRUARY 2020
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 19 FEBRUARY 2020
ATTORNEY
FOR APPLICANT:
BOVE ATTORNEYS INC
ADVOCATE
FOR APPLICANT:
ADV A POLITIS
ATTORNEY
FOR RESPONDENTS: DYASON ATTORNEYS
ADVOCATE
FOR RESPONDENTS: ADV M AUGOUSTINOS
[1]
Safcor
Forwarding (Johannesburg) (PTY) Ltd v National Transport Commission
1982
(3) SA 654 (A).
[2]
673A to H
.
[3]
Natal Joint Municipal
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012
(4) SA 593
(SCA) at para 19;
Cloete
and Another v S and a Similar Application
2019 (4) SA 268
(CC) at para 28.
[4]
Judicial
Review of Administrative Action in South Africa, p221.
[5]
Joseph and Others v
City of Johannesburg and Others
2010 (4) SA 55
(CC) at footnote 19.
[6]
(408)/2012)
[2013] ZASCA 82
(31 May 2013).