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[2020] ZAGPPHC 26
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Nawe v Road Accident Fund (72734/2017) [2020] ZAGPPHC 26 (12 February 2020)
SAFLII
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Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO:
72734/2017
In
the matter between:
LOUWIS
MAKTHUTLE NAWE
PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
DEFENDANT
Coram:
Sardiwalla J
Motor
vehicle Accident - Quantum
– plaintiff under a statutory duty to satisfy the
requirements
as contemplated in
S 17(1)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56
of
1996
that there must be negligence of the insured vehicle in order to
establish liability of the Road
Accident
Fund
JUDGMENT
SARDIWALLA
J
:
[1]
The plaintiff instituted a claim for damages in terms of the Road
Accident Fund Act
56 of 1996
("the Act")
against the
defendant. This claim arises from the injuries the plaintiff
sustained in a motor vehicle collision which occurred on
31 July 2016
at the intersection of Bok and Thabo Mbeki Streets in Polokwane when
the motor vehicle with registration number [….]
driven at the
time by Mohale Raliyjatji
("the insured vehicle')
collided
with the plaintiff who was a pedestrian.
[2]
The defendant admitted full liability for the proven or agreed
damages suffered by
the plaintiff in the accident. The defendant has
tendered an undertaking in terms of section 17(4)(a) of the Act in
settlement
of future hospital, medical and ancillary expenses which
the plaintiff has accepted.
[3]
The remaining heads of damages for
determination are the plaintiff’s past and future loss
of
earnings or earning capacity and general damages.
The
plaintiff contends that he has suffered a loss of earnings or earning
capacity and that a contingency deduction of 15% for past
loss and
100
in
respect
future
loss should be applied.
COMMON
CAUSE FACTS
[4]
The parties have agreed to
the following common cause facts and circumstances between them:
4.1 That the·
plaintiff was 22 years old and was employed as a financial management
intern at the time of the accident. He
is currently 25 years old and
is unemployed. He never returned to employment other than completing
his internship.
[5]
The parties have further agreed that as a result of the collision the
plaintiff sustained
the following injuries:
5.1
A traumatic brain injury
described by the neuropsychologist as a mild severity with
significant neuropsychological
sequelae
including depression and anxiety;
5.2
Left knee
dislocation with instability;
5.3
An open book
fracture of the pelvis;
5.4
A fracture of the
left radius;
5.5
A fracture of the
right radius;
5.6
A supracondylar
fracture of the left humerus (upper arm);
5.7
A popliteal artery
injury to the right leg which resulted in an amputation of the knee
for vascular insufficiency on 9 August 2016;
5.8
Psychological shock
and trauma with psychological
sequelae
.
[6]
They further agreed upon the following
sequelae
resulting from
the injuries:
6.1
The plaintiff was
hospitalised and admitted to the Polokwane hospital from 31 July 2016
to 19 September 2016. He had an amputation
of his right leg;
6.2
In addition, he
underwent surgery to both forearms and his left elbow consisting of
open reductions and fixations;
6.3
The plaintiff
mobilises with crutches due to his amputation and due to a poor
fitting of a prosthesis and a left drop foot (neurological
injury)
which requires a splint;
6.4
His WPI has been
calculated at 46% from an orthopaedic perspective only and will not
be able to engage in activities of daily living
such as prolonged
walking, standing, heavy lifting of weights and the use of both lower
limbs;
6.5
The plaintiff
suffers stiffness in his right and left elbow as a result of the use
of crutches. These difficulties are compounded
by the pain in both
forearms and in the elbows;
6.6
He has prominent
large scars on his right and left forearms, left elbow and right
thigh;
6.7
The fixatives in
both his forearms still require surgical removal and he may also need
surgical revision of his stump due to neuromas;
6.8
The plaintiff’s
occupational records various debilitating difficulties such as
dressing himself and exhibits poor balance.
He has limited use of his
arms and was unable to meet the lowest range set for his age and
gender in respect of hand function in
both hands.;
6.9
Plaintiff
experiences phantom pains;
6.10
His cognitive, behavioural
and affective/mood difficulties are likely to be permanent and
suffers from depression and anxiety.
[7]
The plaintiff’s combined whole person impairment (" WP/')
rating for all
the disciplines is 51%.
[8]
The Plaintiff admitted the
reports of the following experts:
8.1
Dr Kumbirai, Orthopaedic
Surgeon;
8.2
Dr Mureriwa, Clinical
Psychologist;
8.3
Dr W.M Kumalo, Educational
psychologist;
8.4
Dr Doran, Occupational
Therapist;
8.5
K Ramusi, Industrial
Pyschologist;
8.6
Mr RJ Koch, an actuary (in
so far as it relates to the correctness of the calculations and the
basis thereof, not that the amounts
are what the plaintiff is
entitled to).
[9]
The defendant did not submit any expert reports.
[10]
The legal position relating to a claim for
diminished earning capacity is trite.
The
mere fact of physical disability does not necessarily reduce the
estate or patrimony of the person injured. Alternatively, it
does not
follow from proof of a physical injury which impaired the ability to
earn an income that there was in fact a diminution
in earning
capacity.
[1]
[11]
In
Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd
1979 (2) SA 904
(A) the
principle was articulated in the following terms:
“
In
our law, under the lex Aquilia, the defendant must make good the
difference between the value of the plaintiff’s estate
after
the commission of the delict and the value it would have had if the
delict had not been committed. The capacity to earn money
is
considered to be part of a person’s estate and the loss or
impairment of that capacity constitutes a loss if such loss
diminishes the estate. This was the approach in Union Government
(Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke
1911
AD 657
at
665 where the following appears:
“
In
later Roman law property came to mean the universitas of the
plaintiff’s rights and duties, and the object of the action
was
to recover the difference between the universitas as it was after the
act of damage and as it would have been if
the
act had not been committed (Greuber at 269). Any element of
attachment or affection for the thing damaged was rigorously
excluded.
And this principle was fully recognised by the law of
Holland.”
[12]
A person’s all round capacity to earn money consists
inter
alia
,
of an individual’s talents, skill, including his/her present
position and plans for the future and of course external factors
over
which a person has no control. In
casu
,
the court must calculate the total present monetary value of all that
the plaintiff would have been capable of bringing into his
patrimony
had he not been injured, and, the total present monetary value of all
that the plaintiff would be able to bring into
his patrimony after
sustaining the injury. The difference between the two (if any) will
be the extent of the patrimonial loss.
[13]
At the same time the evidence may establish that an injury may in
fact have no effect on earning
capacity, in which event the damage
under this head would be nil. In order to determine therefore
whether, as a result of the injury
sustained, the plaintiff’s
earning capacity has been compromised the evidence adduced needs to
be considered and evaluated
in order to decide whether the onus has
been discharged.
[14]
The plaintiff relies on the evidence of the several expert
witnesses. A court’s approach
to expert testimony was
succinctly formulated in
Michael
and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another
[2]
where
the court stated-
“
[36]
. . . what is required in the evaluation of such evidence is to
determine whether and to what extent their opinions advanced
are
founded on logical reasoning. That is the thrust of the decision of
the House of Lords in the medical negligence case of Bolitho
v City
and Hackney Health Authority
[1997]
UKHL 46
;
[1998]
AC 232
(HL
(E)). With the relevant dicta in the speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson
we respectfully agree. Summarised, they are to the following
effect.
[37]
The Court is not bound to absolve a defendant from liability for
allegedly negligent medical treatment or diagnosis just because
evidence of expert opinion, albeit genuinely held, is that the
treatment or diagnosis in issue accorded with sound medical practice.
The Court must be satisfied that such opinion has a logical basis, in
other words, that the expert has considered comparative risks
and
benefits and has reached ‘a defensible conclusion’ (at
241G-242B). . . .
[40]
Finally, it must be borne in mind that expert scientific witnesses do
tend to assess likelihood in terms of scientific certainty.
Some of
the witnesses in this case had to be diverted from doing so and were
invited to express prospects of an event’s occurrence,
as far
as they possibly could, in terms of more practical assistance to the
forensic assessment of probability, for example, as
a greater or
lesser than fifty per cent chance and so on. This essential
difference between the scientific and the judicial measure
of proof
was aptly highlighted by the House of Lords in the Scottish case of
Dingly v The Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police
200
SC (HL) 77
and
the warning given at 89D-E that
‘
(o)ne
cannot entirely discount the risk that by immersing himself in every
detail and by looking deeply into the minds of the experts,
a Judge
may be seduced into a position where he applies to the expert
evidence the standards which the expert himself will apply
to the
question whether a particular thesis has been proved or disproved
–
instead
of assessing, as a Judge must do, where the balance of probabilities
lies on a review of the whole of the evidence
.”
(emphasis
added)
[15]
Dr Peter T. Kumburai, an Orthopaedic Surgeon is of the view that the
plaintiff’s injuries resulted
in serious long-term
impairment/loss of body function and permanent serious disfigurement
due to the above knee amputation on right
lower limb. He noted that
the plaintiff would not be able to compete fairly for a job on the
open labour market and deferred his
opinion to the occupational
therapist and Industrial psychologist. He further confirmed that the
screws and plates in the left
and right radius would need to be
removed to prevent them from acting as a focus for sepsis should the
claimant become immune-compromised.
In respect of the knee amputation
he recommended that the plaintiff be evaluated by an orthoptist for
provision of a prosthetic
leg. His calculation of the plaintiff’s
WPI is 46% and therefore will not be able to engage in normal
activities such as
prolonged walking, standing, lifting of heavy
weights and the use of both lower limbs.
[16]
The Clinical Psychologist opined that the plaintiff’s overall
performance on the neuropsychological
tests was low with several
scores on the average range. The normal performance on many subtests
suggested that the plaintiff was
of at least average pre-accident
neurocognitive capacity. The plaintiff’s worst performance was
on tests of speed. The poor
performance on these tests suggest that
the injuries sustained have given significant rise in slowing of
responses. The overall
slightly impaired test performance and the
below average performance test for speed, is consistent with a mild
traumatic brain
injury which the plaintiff has sustained. The
clinical features of his injuries place the plaintiff in class 2
(15%WPI) which when
combines with the 46% WPI calculated by Dr
Kumbirai becomes 51% WPI.
[17]
The Educational Psychologist Mr M Kumalo stated that
psycho-educational testing revealed persisting
difficulties with
slowed mental processing speed, sustained attention difficulties,
memory difficulties, and visuo-motor coordination
difficulties and
abstract reasoning. He stated that it is possible that the identified
emotional difficulties such as Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder and
depression affected his cognitive functioning considering that he did
not sustain a head injury. He deferred
his opinion to the
Occupational Therapist and Industrial Psychologist.
[18]
The Occupational Therapist, Ms M Doran noted that the plaintiff in
relation to the Right and left
upper extremities the plaintiff was
unable to meet the required rates set for the open labour market and
falls below the indicated
standard. She observed that he cannot stand
upright without the use of external assistance even with the
prosthetic device on.
Therefore, his accommodation would need to be
adequately adapted to suit his needs.
[19]
Regarding the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity, Ms Doran
concluded that the plaintiff’s
future work prospective has been
affected. According to her, the injuries suffered by the plaintiff
has led to subsisting consequences,
affecting Mr Nawe’s general
functioning in daily life, inclusive of affecting amenity, enjoyment
and capacity for earning
a viable income. Further that he would be
better suited for work that falls mainly within the parameters of a
sedentary physical
range and that does not require bilateral manual
dexterity. He would need to avoid work environments with slippery
surfaces, cluttered
areas, stairs which will aid in reducing risk for
stump complications and will keep him employed for longer periods.
She confirmed
that the plaintiff does retain the physical capacity
for his trained profession as a Financial Manager in supply chain, as
it requires
exertion of a mainly sedentary physical nature but
accepts that the he is slower at the current time and that pain,
discomfort
and emotional response could significantly contribute to
poor performance. Therefore, extra time for re-integration and a case
manager to assist with employment and re-integration is necessary and
may still suffer periods of absence from work to undergo further
surgical interventions for removals of the plates and screws.
[20]
This brings me to the report of Mr K B Ramusi, the Industrial
Psychologist. He is of the view that
the plaintiff would have been
able to reach his normal retirement age pre-accident employment but
that post-accident he is likely
to remain unemployed for the
remainder of his work life unless he is able to find a sympathetic
employer in which case he will
not likely attain his premorbid career
objectives. He has lost capacity for both physical and cognitive
premorbid occupational
prospects. He concludes that the plaintiff
should be compensated for past and future accident related treatment,
pain and discomfort.
Plaintiff's claim
for pass loss of earnings
[21]
As a result of the uncontested evidence of the Industrial
Psychologist, there are only two remaining
issues, the first is
whether the plaintiff suffered any past loss of earnings and the
second is whether there is evidence substantiating
the plaintiff's
loss of earnings or earning capacity. In my view there is no use
raising the second issue without leading evidence
to counter. The
evidence of the plaintiff is unchallenged in this regard. After the
accident the plaintiff returned to work only
to complete his
internship but has remained unemployable as he could no longer return
to his pre-accident functionality because
of the difficulties he
experienced as a result of his injuries. He did not receive a stipend
during his recuperation and earned
a mere R 1200 per month during his
internship. The period of his internship had to be extended to
accommodate his recuperation
and therefore instead of completing the
training in 18 months he completed it in 21 months. However, the
plaintiff would likely
have been permanently employed at the end of
his training and therefore on the basis of this information I find
that the plaintiff
has suffered past loss of earnings.
Future loss of
earnings and/or loss of earning capacity
"But
for" the accident
[22]
The plaintiff holds a Grade 12 school
qualification and an N6: Financial Management. He was expected to
have graduated with a National Diploma in Financial Management (NQF
Level 6) and indicated that he intended registering for a B.com
Accounting degree (NQF level 7) some year or two after graduating.
Considering the findings Mr Kumalo was of the opinion that he
would
have likely registered and passed his desired qualification.
"Having
Regard" to the accident
[23]
According to Dr Kumirai, the Orthopaedic Surgeon, the plaintiff will
not be able to fairly compete in the
open labour market. His loss of
work capacity in this type of work at the moment is in the region of
9% and is not expected to
improve over time. Ms Doran is of the view
that the plaintiff does meet the demands of his pre-accident
employment. According to
her, although the plaintiff’s
employment is mostly sedentary, his pain and emotional responses
could result in poor performance.
It is Ms Doran’s view that
the plaintiff’s reduced upper limbs functioning; reduced
co-ordination and discomfort could
impact on his work speed and
productivity. Regarding the plaintiff’s loss of earning
capacity, Ms Doran concluded that the
plaintiff’s future work
prospective has been affected. I am persuaded by the reports that the
plaintiff cannot perform daily
activities such as prolonged walking,
standing without external assistance despite the use of a prosthetic
and that the plaintiff
presents with cognitive or perceptual
problems. Mr Kumalo’s conclusion that the plaintiff suffered
slow mental processing
is consistent mild traumatic brain suffered by
the plaintiff is in line with all other expert opinions of depression
and anxiety.
Conclusion re
loss of earnings
[24]
Actuarial calculations were made on the basis of the opinion and
postulations made by the plaintiffs Industrial
Psychologist who
relied on the reports of the plaintiff’s other experts. The
defendant admitted the assumptions used by the
plaintiff’s
actuary. On the basis of the information provided and on the basis
that overtime and allowances would have averaged
5,37% of the
plaintiff basic salary had the accident not occurred the actuary
assumed a marginal rate of taxation for the Tax year
ending 2018/2019
until the calculation date arriving at a net past loss of R178 938
with no application of a contingency allowance.
[25]
For purpose of calculating the plaintiffs claim for future loss of
earnings regard must be had to the report
of the plaintiff’s
actuary dated 18 September 2018, more particularly the that the
plaintiff is assumed to never work again.
The plaintiff's uninjured
earnings amount to R182 538.00 and his injured to R3 600.00. This is
before the application of any contingencies.
It is trite that
contingency deductions are within the discretion of the court and
depend upon the judge's impression of the case.
Contingencies are the
normal consequences of life, which beset every human being and which
directly affect the amount which the
plaintiff would have earned. See
Southern Insurance v Bailey
1984 (1) SA 98
(A). General
contingencies cover a wide range of consideration which may vary from
case to case and may include early death, loss
of employment and
promotion prospects.
[26]
Having taken into consideration the usual factors to be considered it
is my view that the evidence in this
case supports the grant of a 15%
contingency application resulting in the plaintiff's net future loss
of R3,302,683. The grant
of 5% contingency application for net past
loss which is R169 991.00 with a total net loss of R3,481
621.00.
GENERAL DAMAGES
[27]
It is clear on a consideration of all the evidence before Court that
the plaintiff suffered pain, discomfort
and loss of amenities of
life. There is no doubt that the plaintiff sustained a mild brain
injury and various orthopaedic injuries
of some significance as
stated by the Orthopaedic Surgeon. His injuries require prolonged
treatment. Multiple forms of future medical
and surgical treatment
regimens are foreseen (including removal of the fixatives in both
upper arms, plastic and reconstructive
surgery for scars with partial
improvement).
[28]
The plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer severe
impairments and losses in terms of amenities
of life including severe
curtailments in his participation in physical activities. The
plaintiff's combined whole person impairment
("WPI') rating for
all the disciplines is 51%.
[29]
The plaintiff was hospitalised for almost two months and underwent a
number of surgical procedures to his
upper limbs, right femur
amputation and pelvis fracture. All the experts agree that the
plaintiff should be compensated for the
injuries he sustained in the
accident. For all the reasons stated above the plaintiff now has to
be compensated adequately and
fairly in the form of general damages.
[30]
In determining general damages the court is called upon to exercise
its discretion to award what it considers
to be fair and adequate
compensation having regard to a broad spectrum of facts and
circumstances connected to the plaintiff and
the injuries he
sustained including their nature, permanence, severity and their
impact on his lifestyle. In
Sandler v Wholesale Coal Supplies Ltd
1941 AD 194
the court held:
"The amount
to be awarded
as
compensation
can only be determined by the broadest general considerations and the
figure arrived at must necessarily be uncertain,
depending upon the
judge's view of what is fair in all the circumstances of the case."
[31]
That still remains the legal position. The award of general damages
is trite; there is no hard and fast
rule of general application
requiring the court to consider past awards. Such awards are seldom
on all fours with the facts of
the case under consideration. It
therefore becomes necessary that each case must be considered on its
own merits.
[32]
Based on the above principles I have assessed what I consider to be a
fair compensation of the plaintiff
in this case. I have also taken
into consideration that whilst the plaintiff must be sufficiently and
properly compensated for
the injuries he sustained in the accident,
the defendant should not be unnecessarily burdened with an inordinate
high· award
despite the recent tendency by courts to pitch the
awards higher than in the past. See
De Jongh v Du Pisanie NO
(2004] All SA 565 (SCA)
. The injuries sustained by the
plaintiff in the accident and the
sequelae
thereof have been
stated above. Whilst the plaintiffs brain injury is classed as mild,
all the experts highlighted the severity
and permanency of the
results, all of which are not disputed.
[33]
The plaintiff has claimed the sum of R1,700 000 to R 1 900 000
whilst the defendant argued that the
plaintiff's general damages
should be assessed at R900 000,00. In this regard both have referred
me to various decided cases on
the subject dealing with past awards
made in comparable cases.
[34]
Counsel for the plaintiff especially referred me to the following
cases with regard to a mild to moderate
brain injury with orthopaedic
injuries:
[35]
Mofokeng v Road Accident Fund
2014 (784) QOD 12
(GSP)
. In this case an amount of R700 000, 00 was awarded for
soft tissue injuries of the back and neck and a moderately severe
brain
injury. This is worth R940 000 in the current value. In my
view, the plaintiff’s orthopaedic injuries and the permanent
sequelae
thereof are distinguishable from those of the
plaintiff in the case of
Mofokeng.
[36]
In the unreported case of
Mofulatse v Road Accident Fund
(Case Number 77/2010) in the North Gauteng High Court Molefe J
awarded R1, 2 million as general damages in June 2014 (now worth
R1
416 923, 00) where the plaintiff suffered a brain injury with various
fractures to the legs, of which resulted in fairly severe
neuropsychological
sequelae
and likely knee replacement
surgery in the future. The plaintiff in that case also sustained a
fracture of the left wrist.
[37]
The defendant referred the court to the following case:
Mthetwa
v Road Accident Fund
V1,
E2-15 where the plaintiff was awarded R800 000 for general
damages in 2010 equivalent to R 1 271 000 in 2019. The
plaintiff
is this case sustained an amputation of the upper part of her left
tibia and fibula. She also underwent amputation of
her upper arm and
lower leg, was fitted with ill-fitting artificial limbs and walked
with difficulty using crutches. She also experienced
phantom pains
sustained with neurocognitive and neuropsychological
sequelae.
It
is my view that this case is the most comparable to that of the
plaintiff in that she sustained mild to moderate brain injury
with
serious
sequelae.
[38]
Whilst there may be certain similarities between
some of the cases and the present, fact of the matter is
each
decision differs on the facts and the considerations raised therein
from the present. Past awards serve no more than to give
some
indication or guidance as to what sort of awards are appropriate on
the facts of a particular case. To the extent that guidance
may be
derived from these matters, I have given careful consideration to
them.
[39] Whilst
the plaintiff's brain injury is classified as mild, each expert
highlighted the severity of the result
thereof. The plaintiff suffers
pain in several areas as described and will suffer such pain in all
likelihood for the rest of his
life. His scarring on several places
is very severe and can only partially be addressed by plastic
surgery. He suffers and will
continue to suffer depression with a
poor prognosis to treatment. He has permanent severe
neuropsychological
sequelae
which will impair his ability to
further his education.
[40]
On a consideration of all the facts of the present matter and
previous awards made in similar
matters it is my considered view that
an award of R950 000,00 is a fair and reasonable compensation.
[41]
In the result the following order is made:
41.1
The defendant shall
pay the sum of R4 431 621.00 (FOUR MILLION FOUR HUNDERED AND THIRTY
ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND TWENTY ONE
RAND) to the plaintiffs’
attorneys, in full and final settlement of the plaintiffs claim;
41.2
The defendant shall
furnish plaintiff with an undertaking in terms of section 17(4)(a) of
the Road Accident Fund Act,56 of 1996,
for 100% of the costs of the
future accommodation of the plaintiff in a hospital or treatment or
rendering of a services to him
or supplying of goods to him arising
out of the injuries sustained by him in the motor vehicle collision
that occurred on 31 July
2016 after such costs have been incurred and
upon proof thereof;
41.3
The defendant must
make payment of the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party and party
costs on the High Court scale, which costs
shall include, but not be
limited to, the following:-
41.3.1
The cost of Senior
Counsel on the High Court Scale, and;
41.3.2
The reasonable
taxable costs of obtaining all expert/medico-legal RAF4 Serious
Injury Assessment ratings and actuarial reports from
the Plaintiff's
experts which were furnished to the Defendant;
41.3.3
The reasonable
taxable preparation, qualification, travelling and reservation fees,
if any, of the experts witnesses;
41.3.4
The reasonable
taxable accommodation and transportation costs incurred by or on
behalf of the plaintiff in attending medico-legal
consultations with
the parties' experts, consultations with the legal representatives
and the court proceedings, the quantum of
which is subject to the
discretion of the Taxing Master;
[42]
The following provisions will apply with regards to the determination
of the aforementioned taxed or agreed
costs:-
42.1
The plaintiff shall
serve the notice of taxation on the Defendant's attorney of record;
42.2
The Plaintiff shall
allow the defendant 14 (FOURTEEN) court days to make payment of the
taxed costs from date of settlement or taxation
thereof;
42.3
Should payment not
be effected timeously, plaintiff will be entitled to recover interest
at applicable statutory rate on the taxed
or agreed costs from date
of allocation to date of final payment.
SARDIWALLA J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
For the
Applicant
: Advocate W P DE WAAL SC
Instructed
by
: VZLR INC
For the
Respondent
: Advocate T M MALATJI
Instructed
by
: Moduka Attroneys.
Date of
hearing
: 20 August 2019
Date of
Judgment
: 12 February 2020
[1]
Union & National Insurance Co
Ltd v Coetzee
1970(1) SA
295 (A) at 300A;
Santam
Versekering Maatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt
1973 (2) SA 146
(A);
Dippenaaar
v Shield Insurance Co Ltd
1979 (2) SA 904
(A);
Krugell
v Shield Ins. Co Ltd
1982
(4) SA 95
(T) at 99E;
Rudman
v RAF
2003 (2) SA 234
(SCA);
Prinsloo v RAF
2009(5) SA 406 (SE).
[2]
2001
(3) SA 1188
(SCA)