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[2020] ZACAC 2
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South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Massmart Holdings Limited and Another (111/CAC/Jun11) [2020] ZACAC 2; [2020] 10 BLLR 1041 (CAC); (2020) 41 ILJ 2403 (CAC); [2020] 2 CPLR 564 (CAC) (7 July 2020)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE COMPETITION
APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
CAC
CASE NO: 111/CAC/Jun11
In the matter between:
SOUTH AFRICAN
COMMERCIAL, CATERING
AND
ALLIED WORKERS UNION & OTHERS
APPLICANT
and
MASSMART
HOLDINGS LIMITED
FIRST RESPONDENT
THE
COMPETITION COMMISSION
SECOND RESPONDENT
Heard:
14 February 2020
Delivered:
7 July 2020 (by email to the parties
and release to SAFLII)
J U
D G M E N T
Mnguni JA (Rogers and
Mabindla-Boqwana JJA concurring):
[1]
On 9 March 2012, this court approved the merger between Wal-Mart
Stores Inc (Wal-Mart)
and Massmart Holdings Limited (Massmart) in
terms of s 16(2)
(b)
of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the
Competition Act) subject
to certain conditions, one of which was the
following:
‘
2.1.2
The merged entity is required to reinstate the 503 employees who were
retrenched in 2009 and June 2010 and
must take account of these
employees’ years of service in the Massmart Group.’
[2]
The issue, which arises for determination before us, is whether,
properly interpreted,
this court’s reinstatement order of 9
March 2012 is retrospective in effect. The applicant (SACCAWU)
accepts that the reinstatement
order does not expressly make
provision for back pay. It, however, contends that it was implicit in
the order that the reinstatement
of the employees must be
retrospective and seeks to have this part of the order interpreted as
requiring the payment of back pay
to the date of retrenchments (in
2009 and June 2010) and seeks orders directing Massmart to make
payment of such back pay.
[3]
The issue arising in this application will be better understood
against the background
that follows. During 2009 and 2010, and prior
to the merger, Massmart retrenched 503 employees who worked for Game
stores in Nelspruit
and several other locations as well as at a
number of Massmart’s regional distribution centres, citing
operational reasons.
On 27 September 2010, Massmart announced that
Wal-Mart intended to acquire a controlling interest in the company by
virtue of an
acquisition of 51 percent of the ordinary share capital
of Massmart. The transaction came to the attention of the retrenched
employees
and SACCAWU. SACCAWU took the view that while there was no
direct evidence in that regard, the only reasonable inference to be
drawn was that, given the timing of the retrenchment viewed with the
process of merger negotiations, the retrenchments were merger
related.
[4]
Prior to the commencement of the merger proceedings before the
Tribunal in May 2011,
SACCAWU filed a notice of its intention to
intervene in the proceedings in order to represent its members’
interests in the
proposed transaction on a number of issues,
including the interests of the 503 retrenched employees, contending
that their retrenchments
were merger related. The merged entity
contested SACCAWU’s position, contending that the decision to
implement the regional
distribution structures, which gave rise to
the retrenchment of the 503 employees, was made in 2002, while the
decision to build
a particular distribution centre was made in 2008,
before any suggestion of a merger with Wal-Mart.
[5]
The Tribunal concluded that there was insufficient evidence before it
to support the
conclusion that the employees’ retrenchment had
been merger specific. On 31 May 2011, it approved the merger subject
to a
number of conditions. With regard to the retrenched employees,
the Tribunal imposed the condition that ‘the merged entity
must, when employment opportunities become available within the
merged entity, give preference to the re-employment of the 503
employees that were retrenched during 2010 and must take into account
those employees’ years of service in the Massmart Group’.
[6]
Aggrieved, SACCAWU launched an appeal against the Tribunal’s
decision before
this court in which it challenged the Tribunal’s
findings and a number of conditions that the Tribunal had imposed on
the
merger, including the Tribunal’s failure to approve the
merger conditional upon the reinstatement of the 503 retrenched
employees.
On this particular condition, SACCAWU persisted with its
contention that the retrenchments were merger related and continued
to
seek as a primary remedy the reinstatement of the retrenched
employees.
[7]
On 9 March 2012, this court delivered its judgment and order in which
it approved
the merger subject to a number of conditions. This court
concluded that given the timing of the retrenchments, the merged
entity
had failed to rebut the inference that the retrenchments had
been in anticipation of the merger. It set aside the condition
imposed
by the Tribunal relating to the 503 retrenched employees and
replaced it with the condition foreshadowed in para 1 above.
[8]
After the judgment, the parties engaged one another to give effect to
the conditions
in the court order under the supervision of the second
respondent (the Commission). As early as April 2012, controversy
between
SACCAWU and Massmart arose on whether or not the
reinstatement order was retrospective. Their views diverged.
Massmart’s
stance was that it was not retrospective, whereas
SACCAWU’s stance was that it was. On 15 July 2013, the
Commission weighed
in on the debate and issued a letter expressing
its view on the meaning of the term ‘reinstate’ in the
order. Its stated
view was that ‘the reinstatement is not
retrospective and does not include back pay’.
[9]
In the same letter, the Commission raised concerns about the merged
entity’s
compliance with the reinstatement order, recording
that the merged entity’s efforts to locate and contact all the
retrenched
employees were insufficient. Pursuant to that letter,
Massmart prepared a remedial plan, which was implemented subject to
periodic
review by the Commission and engagement with SACCAWU. The
remedial plan did not provide for retrospective reinstatement or back
pay. On 15 August 2014, the Commission issued a letter to Massmart,
which it copied to SACCAWU, dealing with the merged entity’s
compliance with the reinstatement order and terms of reinstatement as
set out in para 4.1 of the letter (annexure AA2 to the answering
affidavit). In para 5.2 of annexure AA2, the Commission recorded that
upon fulfilment of the terms in para 4.1 of annexure AA2,
Massmart
would have complied with the reinstatement order of this court.
[10]
On 27 March 2019, the Commission issued a letter (annexure AA3 to the
answering affidavit) in
respect of the ‘termination of
conditions imposed in the merger’ in which it confirmed that it
was satisfied, after
considering the information contained in various
compliance reports, that the merged entity had complied with the
conditions imposed
by this court’s order of 9 March 2012.
Throughout the course of Massmart reinstating the 503 retrenched
employees, which
commenced shortly after this court order of 9 March
2012, Massmart did so without paying them back pay.
[11]
Massmart opposes this application on four grounds. The first and
second grounds are interrelated.
The basis of the opposition on these
two grounds is that SACCAWU failed to bring the application within a
reasonable time from
the delivery of the order, and that given the
delay in bringing the application, SACCAWU was obliged to bring a
condonation application
providing an adequate explanation for its
delay. With a view to achieving finality and certainty, Massmart
abandoned these two
grounds during the course of argument.
[12] The third
ground of opposition is that once a court has duly pronounced a final
judgment or order, it has itself
no authority to correct, alter, or
supplement it because it is functus officio. Its jurisdiction in the
case having been fully
and finally exercised, its authority over the
subject matter has ceased. The court may only clarify its judgment or
order if, on
a proper interpretation, the meaning is obscure,
ambiguous or otherwise uncertain. The fourth ground, which is
advanced in the
alternative, is that even if this court were to find
that the meaning of the term ‘reinstatement’ is
ambiguous, the
term does not in its ordinary sense connote
retrospectivity and that there is no merit in SACCAWU’s
assertion that the 503
retrenched employees were unfairly and
unlawfully retrenched (a circumstance on which SACCAWU relied for
interpreting ‘reinstatement’
here as being
retrospective).
[12]
Although SACCAWU does not expressly say so in its papers, it became
clear in the course of oral
argument that its application is anchored
in
s 66
(b)
of the
Competition Act, which
makes provision for the Tribunal or
this court, ‘acting of its own accord or on application of a
person affected by a decision
or order’ to ‘vary or
rescind its decision or order . . . in which there is ambiguity, or
an obvious error or omission,
but only to the extent of correcting
that ambiguity, error or omission’. As observed by this court
in
Mike’s
Chicken (Pty) Ltd & others v Astral Foods Limited &
another
,
[1]
this
section is modelled on Uniform
Rule 42(1)
, with the counterpart to
s 66
(b)
being
rule 42(1)
(b)
,
and the principles developed in regard to
rule 42
provide guidance in
the interpretation of
s 66
(b)
.
[13]
SACCAWU’s contention is that the relief sought in this
application falls within the ambit of one of the well-recognised
exceptions to the functus officio rule which is that this court ‘may
clarify its judgment or order, if, on a proper interpretation,
the
meaning thereof remains obscure, ambiguous or otherwise uncertain, so
as to give effect to its true intention, provided that
it does not
thereby alter “the sense and substance” of the judgment
or order’.
[2]
In
this regard, SACCAWU contends that reinstatement granted outside the
ambit of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) is
always
retrospective in effect unless the order making provision for the
reinstatement expressly provides otherwise, and that since
the order
is silent in respect of its retrospective effect, it therefore
follows as a matter of law that the 503 retrenched employees
are
entitled to back pay.
[13]
Not so, argues Massmart. It contends that the order is nothing of the
sort because both in terms
of its ordinary meaning and as a term of
art in labour law ‘reinstate’ or ‘reinstatement’
carries no automatic
retrospective connotation. Massmart contends
that in the absence of any ambiguity in the order, this court does
not have the power
to entertain the application because it is functus
officio.
[14]
The basic principles applicable to construing documents also apply to
the construction of a court’s
judgment or order. The court’s
intention is to be ascertained primarily from the language of the
judgment or order as construed
according to the usual, well-known
principles.
[3]
.
As stated in
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
,
[4]
a
sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible
or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose
of the
order.
[15]
It is trite that once a court has duly pronounced a final judgment or
order, it has itself no
authority to correct, alter, or supplement
it, that that court thereafter becomes functus officio. The
exceptions to this rule
are few and concern accessory or
consequential matters such as costs or interest; cases where the
judgment or order is obscure,
ambiguous or otherwise uncertain as is
alleged in this instance; correction of clerical, arithmetical or
other errors, and questions
relating to costs.
[5]
[16]
As already stated, on SACCAWU’s contention, this court’s
order, properly interpreted, is retrospective in effect.
SACCAWU’s
counsel submitted that reinstatement means the restoration of the
status quo ante, and that in the case of a dismissed
employee this
translates into restoration of the original contract of employment as
if the dismissal had not occurred. As authority
for this proposition,
she relied on a number of interrelated decisions. The one which she
contends is most saliently in her favour
is Zondo J’s dictum in
National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa obo
Fohlisa
& others v Hendor Mining
Supplies
(a division of Marschalk Beleggings (Pty) Ltd
[6]
where
the learned justice
said:
‘
Another
point that supports the proposition that paragraph (a) of Cele AJ’s
order is not a prospective reinstatement order
is this. Outside of
the LRA, if a court were to make an order that someone be reinstated
in a certain position from which he or
she had been unlawfully
removed, that order would mean both that that person should be put
back into the position he or she occupied
before his or her removal,
and, that he or she should be paid whatever money or financial
benefit he or she would have been entitled
to during the intervening
period had he or she not been removed from the position. This would
be the meaning and effect of that
reinstatement order without the
court having to include a separate order to the effect that the order
will operate with retrospective
effect as is required in the case of
an order of reinstatement under section 193 if the Labour Court or
another appropriate tribunal
wants to ensure that an employee does
not, or employees do not, lose out on backpay or other benefits to
which they would have
been entitled in the intervening period had
they not been dismissed.
[7]
[17]
She submitted that it was by reason of the meaning of reinstatement
and its consequences that
the courts have ruled that the back pay to
which a dismissed employee ordinarily becomes entitled when an order
for reinstatement
is made cannot be equated with compensation, and
that the retrospectivity of a reinstatement order is, therefore, not
to be limited
to either 12 months in the case of an ordinary
dismissal or 24 months in the case of unfair dismissal
[8]
She submitted that this court’s reinstatement order operates
with retrospective effect as a matter of law on its proper
interpretation and was not linked to or dependent on a finding that
the retrenchments were unlawful or unfair. She submitted that
in any
event the absence of an explicit finding in this court’s
judgment that the retrenchments were unlawful was not fatal
because
such a finding could be and was on the facts implicit in the judgment
and order. She pointed out in this regard that retrenchments
are only
permitted in law if they are based on operational requirements which
s 213 of the LRA defines to include economic, technological,
structural or similar needs of an employer.
[18]
By contrast, Massmart’s counsel submitted that at the level of
contract law, the alleged
unlawful
termination of a contract
of employment, which is what Zondo J postulated in the passage from
Hendor Mining
relied upon by SACCAWU’s counsel, affords
the employee an election either to accept it and sue for damages or
reject it and
seek specific performance. He submitted that where
specific performance is sought and granted, the contract endures as
if it were
never terminated, which effectively produces the
consequences described by Zondo J in
Hendor Mining
.
[19]
He submitted that where a dismissal occurs in breach of a material
statutory provision outside
of the LRA, it is susceptible to being
declared invalid. In that instance the dismissal is a nullity and is
taken never to have
occurred, with the result that the employee has
never been dismissed, and to speak of reinstatement in that case is,
strictly speaking,
a contradiction in terms. He pointed out correctly
that this matter does not involve an unfair, unlawful or invalid
dismissal;
instead, it involves an order of reinstatement as a
condition to a merger in the public interest. Here the ordinary
meaning of
the term ‘reinstatement’ must apply. In regard
to the ordinary meaning of ‘reinstatement’, he referred
us inter alia to the judgment of McNally JA
in
Chegutu Municipality v Manyora
(1997)
18 I
LJ 323 (ZSC).
[20]
In
Equity
Aviation
Services
(Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration &
others
[9]
Nkabinde
J, writing for a unanimous court, concluded that:
‘
The
ordinary meaning of the word “reinstate” is to put the
employee back into the same job or position he or she occupied
before
the dismissal, on the same terms and conditions. Reinstatement is the
primary statutory remedy in unfair dismissal disputes.
It is aimed at
placing an employee in the position he or she would have been but for
the unfair dismissal. It safeguards workers’
employment by
restoring the employment contract. Differently put, if employees are
reinstated they resume employment on the same
terms and conditions
that prevailed at the time of their dismissal. As the language of s
193(1)
(a)
indicates, the extent of retrospectivity is dependent upon the
exercise of a discretion by the court or arbitrator. The only
limitation
in this regard is that the reinstatement cannot be fixed
at a date earlier than the actual date of the dismissal. The court or
arbitrator may thus decide the date from which the reinstatement will
run, but may not order reinstatement from a date earlier than
the
date of dismissal. The ordinary meaning of the word “reinstate”
means that the reinstatement will not run from
a date after the
arbitration award. Ordinarily then, if a Commissioner of the CCMA
order the reinstatement of an employee that
reinstatement will
operate from the date of the award of the CCMA, unless the
Commissioner decides to render the reinstatement
retrospective. The
fact that the dismissed employee has been without income during the
period since his or her dismissal must,
among other things, be taken
into account in the exercise of the discretion, given that the
employee’s having been without
income for that period was a
direct result of the employer’s conduct in dismissing him or
her unfairly.’
[10]
(Footnotes
omitted.)
[21]
Section 193(1)(
a
) of the LRA provides that if the Labour Court
or an arbitrator finds that a dismissal is unfair, the court or the
arbitrator may
‘order the employer to reinstate the employee
from a date not earlier than the date of the dismissal’.
Consequently,
the retrospectivity of an order of reinstatement
granted in terms of the LRA is not automatic. There is, therefore, a
discretion
to be exercised in relation to the period of
retrospectivity of a reinstatement order, and a reinstated employee’s
entitlement
to back pay and other benefits may be limited. The
ordinary meaning of ‘reinstatement’, in accordance with
Equity Aviation
, is that the reinstated employee ‘resumes’
his or her service from the date of the order on the same contractual
terms
that applied when his or her services were terminated. It is in
this respect that the remedy of ‘reinstatement’ differs
from the remedy of ‘reemployment’, since the latter does
not require the employer to allow the dismissed employee to
resume
employment on the terms which previously applied.
[22]
Massmart’s counsel correctly observed that Zondo J’s
remarks stand in contrast to
those in
Equity
Aviation
and
were obiter in circumstances where the court was concerned with the
meaning of the term ‘reinstatement’ in the labour
law
context. He pointed out, correctly, that the learned justice had
qualified this obiter remark by stating that reinstatement
would
carry connotations of retrospectivity ‘if a court were to make
an order that someone be reinstated in a certain position
from which
he or she had been
unlawfully
removed’
[11]
(my
emphasis).
[23] It is perhaps
necessary to observe that in
Hendor Mining
the Constitutional
Court split evenly in its reasoning though not in the outcome. Three
justices concurred in the judgment of Zondo
J while three concurred
in the judgment of Madlanga J. For present purposes, there is thus no
binding ratio. Madlanga J, in para
36 of his judgment, cited the
meaning of ‘reinstatement’ given by the unanimous court
in
Equity Aviation
.
[24] SACCAWU’s
counsel referred us to para 39 of Madlanga J’s judgment where
the learned justice said:
‘
I
am not suggesting that, upon reinstatement, payment of remuneration
for this period is not in accordance with the employment contract.
It
is. After all, it is the employment relationship that retrospectively
comes back to life. Therefore, everything capable of retrospective
performance, like payment of remuneration, must be done in terms of
the contract. But the obligation to pay remuneration for this
period
retains its essential character.’
[25] This passage
must be seen in the context of what the court was being asked to
decide. The question was one of prescription
of reinstated employees’
right to back pay, and the answer was thought to depend on whether,
as from the date of the reinstatement
order, the reinstated
employees’ right to remuneration was a judgment debt or an
ordinary contractual claim. Madlanga J held
that it was a judgment
debt. (Zondo J disagreed with that view but found, for other reasons,
that the contractual claim had not
prescribed.) Madlanga J took the
view that where there was an order that employees be reinstated, the
reinstatement only occurred
when the employer actually took the
dismissed employees back into service. In
Hendor Mining
there
was, because of intervening appellate procedures, a gap of more than
two years between the date of the reinstatement order
and the actual
reinstatement.
[26] The
point Madlanga J was making was that when the employer eventually
took the dismissed employees back into service,
the employment
contract retrospectively came back to life, ie from the date of the
reinstatement order, but the right to the remuneration
retained its
essential character as a judgment debt. The learned justice was not
concerned with the question whether a reinstatement
order was
retrospective in the sense of operating from a date earlier than the
date of the order. In
Hendor Mining
there had been an express
retrospectivity order, but the aspect that was controversial was the
character of the reinstated employees’
rights as from the date
of the reinstatement order until the date they were actually taken
back into service. (As applied to the
facts of our case, Madlanga J’s
statement in para 39 would mean that where, pursuant to this court’s
order, retrenched
employees were actually taken back into service
later than 31 May 2011 (the date of the substituted Tribunal order),
the reinstated
employment contracts would retrospectively come into
life as from 31 May 2011. This says nothing about whether the order
would
operate retrospectively to a date earlier than 31 May 2011.)
[27] I cannot
accept SACCAWU’s counsel’s submission that it is implicit
in this court’s judgment that the
503 retrenched employees had
been ‘unlawfully’ or even ‘unfairly’
dismissed. This court’s reasoning
was that, on the facts, a
‘negative inference’ could be drawn that the
retrenchments were merger specific, that the
evidential burden had
shifted to the merging parties to rebut the inference, and that the
merging parties’ evidence was not
sufficient to rebut the
inference. This enquiry was undertaken in the context of determining
whether the retrenchment was sufficiently
related to the merger to
warrant, as a matter of public interest, the imposition of an
employment-related condition for merger
approval. This court was not
sitting as a court applying the LRA with a view to determining
whether some remedy under that Act
should be granted. There is no
evidence that the retrenchments were, at the time they were made,
attacked as being unlawful or
unfair. Nowhere in this court’s
judgment is it said that the retrenchments were unlawful or unfair.
The sorts of matters
which would have been canvassed in a labour
forum with a view to determining unlawfulness or unfairness do not
feature in this
court’s judgment.
[28] In my
view, what militates against SACCAWU’s contention is that while
specifically providing for the recognition
of the employees’
length of service with Massmart, the court set no other reinstatement
conditions in relation to back pay
or otherwise.
[29] This point
gains added force when one compares para 1.2 of the Tribunal’s
order with para 2.1.2 of this court’s
order. The condition in
para 1.2 of the Tribunal’s order stated that when employment
opportunities became available within
the merged entity, the entity
had to give preference to the ‘reemployment’ of the 503
retrenched employees ‘and
must take into account those
employees’ years of service in the Massmart Group’. It is
clear that in terms of this
order a retrenched employee’s
service would only recommence when such employee was actually
reemployed. The requirement that
such employee’s years of
service be taken into account was plainly intended to mean that,
although there would be a break
of service between the date of
retrenchment and the date of reemployment, the actual years of
service up to the date of retrenchment
should be added to the service
as from the date of reemployment in determining such employee’s
‘years of service’.
Clearly nothing would be added in
respect of the period from the date of retrenchment to the date of
reemployment.
[30] In the
condition contained in para 2.1.2 of this court’s order, this
court replaced the first part of para
1.2 of the Tribunal’s
order (preferential reemployment) with a requirement that the merged
entity ‘reinstate’
the 503 employees, but this court
retained the second part of the condition (‘and must take
account of these employees’
years of service in the Massmart
Group’). It seems to me that the second part of the condition
of this court’s order
fulfils precisely the same function as in
the Tribunal’s original order. This part of the condition
recognises that there
would be a gap in service from the date of
retrenchment to the date on which the service contracts resume
pursuant to reinstatement.
Upon reinstatement, the years of service
up to the date of retrenchment had to be taken into account in
determining the years of
service of the reinstated employees. If the
‘reinstatement’ was intended to mean that the
retrenchments were unlawful
and should be regarded as never having
happened, there would have been no break in service and no
requirement for the second part
of the condition.
[31] Having
carefully considered the matter, I am satisfied that the order
permits only one interpretation, namely resumption
of service with no
implication of retrospectivity. In the circumstances, I am not
disposed to depart from the authority of
Equity Aviation
on
the strength of the obiter dictum of Zondo J. I may add that all
three judges who authored or concurred in this court’s
judgment
of 9 March 2012 serve or used to serve as judges of appeal in the
Labour Appeal Court. They would have known that in the
labour sphere
reinstatement orders are not retrospective unless expressly so
specified. I cannot conceive that they would have
failed to include
an express provision for retrospectivity if this is what they had
intended. This conclusion renders it unnecessary
to consider the
fourth ground of objection. Hence, the application cannot succeed.
[32]
What remains to be considered is the question of costs. The general
rule is that in the ordinary
course costs follow the result. I am
unable to find any circumstances which persuade me to depart from
this rule. Both sides accepted
that the costs of two counsel were
justified.
Order
[25]
In the result, the following order shall issue:
The
application is dismissed with costs such costs to include costs of
two counsel.
____________________
Mnguni
JA
Appearances
Heard:
Delivered:
For the Applicant: Ms H
Barnes SC
Assisted by: Mr K
Turner
INSTRUCTED BY: Dockrat
Attorneys
REF.:
kajal@dockrat.co.za/gia@dockrat.co.za
TEL.:
011-618 22 47
For the 1st Respondent:
Mr AT Myburgh SC
Assisted by:
Mr R Itzkin
INSTRUCTED BY: Edward
Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc.
REF: D
Masher/H van Wyk/ 0462163
TEL:
011-269 76 00
[1]
Mike’s
Chicken (Pty) Ltd & others v Astral Foods Limited & another
[2004] 1 CPLR 40
(CAC) para 13.
[2]
Firestone
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro AG
1977
(4) SA 298
(A) at 307A-B.
[3]
Ibid
at 304D-H.
[4]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) para 18.
[5]
Firestone
at 306H-307H.
[6]
National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa obo Fohlisa & others v
Hendor Mining Supplies (a division of Marschalk Beleggings
(Pty) Ltd
[2017] 6 BLLR 539 (CC).
[7]
Ibid
para 97.
[8]
See
Equity
Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration & others
2009
(1) SA 390 (CC).
[9]
Footnote
8 above.
[10]
Ibid
para 36.
[11]
Hendor
Mining
para
97.