Orica Mining Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Elbroc Mining Products (Pty) Ltd (233/2016) [2017] ZASCA 48; [2017] 2 All SA 796 (SCA) (31 March 2017)

85 Reportability
Intellectual Property

Brief Summary

Intellectual Property — Patent Infringement — Interpretation of claims — Appellant, Orica Mining Services, sought an interdict against Elbroc Mining Products for alleged infringement of South African Patent No. 2001/10382 concerning a portable self-supporting drill rig. The central issue was the interpretation of the term "between" in the patent claims, which Elbroc argued meant "linearly between," thus claiming no infringement as their rig's carriage was offset. The court a quo ruled in favor of Elbroc, finding no infringement based on this interpretation. On appeal, the SCA held that the interpretation of "between" should consider the context of the patent specification, concluding that Elbroc's rig did infringe the patent, and upheld Orica's appeal with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against a decision of the Court of the Commissioner of Patents. The appeal concerned an action for patent infringement under the Patents Act 57 of 1978, in which the patentee sought an interdict and related relief to restrain alleged infringement.


The appellant was Orica Mining Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“Orica”), the proprietor of South African Patent No 2001/10382, entitled “Portable Drilling Apparatus”. The respondent was Elbroc Mining Products (Pty) Ltd (“Elbroc”), a competing supplier of mining equipment.


In the court of first instance (Mabuse J, sitting as Commissioner of Patents), Orica’s infringement claim was dismissed with costs. Elbroc had also delivered a counterclaim for revocation of the patent on the basis of obviousness, but the parties agreed to a separation of issues, and the revocation counterclaim was postponed sine die. As a result, only the infringement dispute, and more particularly the proper construction of the word “between” in the claims, was decided.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was the scope of protection conferred by patent claims, and whether Elbroc’s drill rig fell within the claims of Orica’s patent, given a disagreement about whether the drill carriage had to be “linearly between” two telescopic props or merely “between” them in a broader spatial sense.


2. Material Facts


Orica was granted the patent on 19 December 2001 under the Patents Act 57 of 1978. The invention concerns a portable self-supporting drill rig (a roof bolter rig) used in underground mining to drill holes in a mine’s hanging wall for the placement of roof bolts or other stabilising attachments. The rig is designed to enable drilling in confined spaces while reducing the need for manual holding and positioning, and it improves safety by using extendable props to support the hanging wall during drilling.


The patent (in its preferred embodiment) uses two extendable telescopic props with a carriage that supports a drill, and the carriage is described in the relevant claims as being “between” the props. The props are fluid-operated and are structurally described as including cylinders, pistons, bases, and bracing features.


It was common cause that Elbroc sold roof bolter rigs in South Africa that performed the same function as Orica’s roof bolter rig. Orica alleged that Elbroc’s product infringed claims 1, 16, 17 and 18 of the patent.


The principal disputed fact (in the sense relevant to infringement) did not concern whether Elbroc’s rig performed roof bolting or contained many of the claimed features. The dispute turned on whether one claimed integer—namely that the drill carriage is located “between” a pair of telescopic props—was present in Elbroc’s rig. Elbroc accepted that the other integers of the asserted claims were present, but denied infringement on the basis that its drill carriage was offset relative to the notional line between the two props.


In the court a quo, the Commissioner adopted a dictionary-derived interpretation of “between” as meaning “linearly between”, found that Elbroc’s carriage was not positioned in that linear space, and therefore concluded that there was no infringement. The Commissioner also held that Orica’s broader interpretation would amount to an impermissible extension of the claim language.


On appeal, Orica maintained that a proper construction required only that the carriage be located in the space between the props, even if not located in the same linear plane as the props. Orica also relied on the context of the specification, including language indicating that the drill need not be located linearly between the props but may be generally between them, particularly where additional props are used.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were, first, how the word “between” in the relevant patent claims should be construed when the claims are read in context of the specification as a whole; and secondly, applying that construction, whether Elbroc’s drill rig incorporated all the integers of the asserted claims so as to amount to infringement within the meaning of section 45(1) of the Patents Act 57 of 1978.


The dispute was primarily one of law, namely the interpretation of the patent claims, but it also involved the application of law to fact, in that the construed meaning of “between” had to be applied to the configuration of Elbroc’s drill rig to determine whether the integer was present.


A further dimension of the interpretive question was whether the court should adopt a narrowly literal approach (focusing on a selected dictionary meaning) or a contextual and purposive approach to construction in determining whether “linearly between” was an essential requirement of the claim.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Supreme Court of Appeal approached the matter from the established premise that the extent of patent protection is determined by the wording of the claims, construed as part of the specification read as a whole. The court accepted that section 45(1) confers protection against unauthorised making, using, disposing of, or offering to dispose of the invention, but emphasised that the invention must be identified through proper interpretation of the claims.


Relying on the established South African approach to patent interpretation, the court reiterated that the claims define the monopoly, but they are not construed in isolation. The court referred to authority emphasising that the claims “derive their colour” from the specification and that courts should guard against an overly “textual” approach that may allow a party to take the substance (or “pith and marrow”) of an invention while evading infringement by departing in an inessential respect.


Against that framework, the court rejected Elbroc’s submission that the body of the specification may be consulted only where the claim language is ambiguous, and endorsed the view that even apparently plain words must be understood as a reasonable skilled addressee would understand them in context. The court considered that dictionary meanings are only a guide and are not decisive, because the controlling enquiry is what meaning is applicable in the context of the particular document.


In assessing Elbroc’s reliance on dictionary definitions, the court noted that Elbroc had advanced multiple possible definitions of “between,” including one that required collinearity. The court found no justification for privileging the “linearly between” meaning and considered a relational meaning—“with something on each side”—to be more sensible in context, because it does not depend on the geometry of the objects in the restricted manner implied by collinearity.


Contextual indicators in the specification were central to the court’s analysis. The court highlighted that the detailed description expressly stated that the drill need not be located linearly between the pair of props, but may be generally between them, and that this would be more likely where additional props are used. This statement was treated as an explicit disavowal of the notion that linear positioning is an essential limitation of the claimed invention. The court reasoned that if more than two props are used and are not arranged in a straight line, a carriage can still be “between” the props without being linearly between them, which undermines a rigid collinearity requirement.


The court also considered the expert evidence. Importantly, Elbroc’s own expert understood “between” to allow for the carriage to be offset or off-centre relative to the notional line between the props. Although both experts viewed a linearly centred carriage as an optimal solution, the court treated “optimal” as not synonymous with “essential,” and did not accept that the claims should be confined to only the optimal geometric arrangement.


The court then addressed purposive interpretation explicitly, referring to the approach associated with Catnic Components Limited and another v Hill & Smith Limited. It drew parallels between the present case and Catnic in that the alleged infringer had taken all but one feature and the variation had no demonstrated material effect on the way the invention worked. Applying this approach, the court considered whether strict compliance with a “linearly between” requirement would be understood by the skilled addressee as essential to the invention’s operation. It found no indication in claim 1 that Orica intended linear positioning to be essential, nor that the word “between” was used as a word of precise meaning that excluded offset arrangements.


In dealing with Elbroc’s reliance on Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd and others; Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd and others v Kirin-Amgen and others, the court held that the reliance was misplaced. It read Kirin-Amgen as consistent with purposive interpretation and as rejecting an artificial exercise that treats claim words as having meanings “in themselves” divorced from context and audience. The court therefore treated purposive construction as part of the accepted interpretive method, not as an impermissible extension of claim language.


Finally, the court connected the interpretation to the function and advantage of the invention as described in the specification: the telescopic props provide support to the hanging roof and to the drill assembly located “between” them, enabling remote operation and enhanced safety. The court considered that this was precisely what Elbroc’s rig sought to achieve, and that the offset arrangement did not take the rig outside the monopoly as properly construed. On this basis, the court concluded that construing “between” as “linearly between” was unjustified, and that Elbroc’s rig infringed the patent.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and set aside the Commissioner’s order dismissing the infringement action.


It substituted the order with an interdict in terms of which Elbroc was interdicted from infringing South African Patent No 2001/10382 by selling or offering for sale in South Africa Elbroc’s drill rig.


Elbroc was ordered to pay Orica’s costs, including the costs of two counsel, both in the appeal and in the substituted order relating to the court a quo.


Cases Cited


Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A).


Harrison v Anderson Foundry Company (1876) 1 AC 574 (HL).


Multotec Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Screenex Wire Weaving Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 709 (A).


Electrical and Musical Industries v Lissen Ltd (1938) 56 RPC 23 (UK).


Marine 3 Technologies Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Afrigroup Investments (Pty) Ltd and another [2014] ZASCA 208; 2015 (2) SA 387 (SCA).


Monsanto Co v MDB Animal Health (Pty) Ltd (formerly MD Biologics CC) 2001 (2) SA 887 (SCA).


De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka 1980 (2) SA 191 (T).


Selas Corporation of America v Electric Furnace Co 1983 (1) SA 1043 (A).


Aktiebolaget Hässle and another v Triomed (Pty) Ltd 2003 (1) SA 155 (SCA).


Catnic Components Limited and another v Hill & Smith Limited [1982] RPC 183.


Kirin-Amgen Inc and others v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd and others; Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd and others v Kirin-Amgen and others [2005] 1 All ER 667.


Legislation Cited


Patents Act 57 of 1978, section 45(1).


Patents Act 9 of 1916, section 16(3).


Patents Act 9 of 1916, section 27(1)(g).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the scope of protection conferred by the patent had to be determined by construing the claims in context, and that interpreting the word “between” in the claims to mean “linearly between” was unjustified when read against the specification and the claims as a whole.


On the proper construction, the claims required that the drill carriage be between the props in a spatial and functional sense, and did not require strict collinearity. The offset positioning of Elbroc’s carriage did not take its rig outside the patent’s monopoly as claimed. Consequently, Elbroc’s drill rig infringed South African Patent No 2001/10382, and Orica was entitled to an interdict and costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Patent infringement is determined by first construing the claims, because the claims define and limit the monopoly for which protection is sought, and the patentee obtains no monopoly for subject-matter not claimed.


Although the language of the claims is decisive in defining the prohibited field, the claims are construed as part of the specification read as a whole, and the meaning of claim language may be informed by the context provided in the body of the specification. Dictionary meanings are a guide but are not determinative; the controlling enquiry is the meaning that the notional skilled addressee would attribute to the words in their context.


Courts should avoid an overly literal or “textual” approach that would permit appropriation of the substance of the invention through departure from an inessential feature. A purposive interpretation may treat strict compliance with particular words as non-essential where the skilled addressee would understand that a variant does not materially affect the way the invention works, and where the claim language in context does not indicate an intention to insist on precision in that respect.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
2017
>>
[2017] ZASCA 48
|

|

Orica Mining Services SA (Pty) Ltd v Elbroc Mining Products (Pty) Ltd (233/2016) [2017] ZASCA 48; [2017] 2 All SA 796 (SCA); 2017 BIP 1 (SCA) (31 March 2017)

THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
No: 233/2016
In
the matter between:
ORICA
MINING SERVICES SA (PTY)
LTD
APPELLANT
and
ELBROC
MINING PRODUCTS (PTY)
LTD                                                  RESPONDENT
Neutral
Citation:
Orica
Mining Services v Elbroc Mining Products
(233/2016)
[2017] ZASCA 48
(31 March 2017)
Coram:
Maya
AP, Swain and Dambuza JJA and Nicholls and Mbatha AJJA
Heard:
24
February 2017
Delivered:
31 March 2017
Summary:
Intellectual
property: claim for patent infringement: s 45
Patents Act 57 of
1978
: extent of protection determined by wording of claims: claims to
be read in the context of the patented specification: interpretation

of ‘between’ in claim to mean "linearly between"
unjustified in context of specification as well as claims:
purposive
interpretation: "linearly between" not essential for
functionality of invention.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Court
of the Commissioner of Patents (Mabuse J, sitting as court of first
instance):
1
The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel;
2
The order of the court a quo is set aside and replaced with the
following:

(a)
The defendant is interdicted from infringing South African Patent
number 2001/10382 by way of the sale or offering for sale
in South
Africa of the defendant’s drill rig.
(b)
The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs, including the
costs of two counsel.’
JUDGMENT
Dambuza
JA (Maya AP, Swain JA and Nicholls and Mbatha AJJA concurring):
[1]
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of the
Commissioner of Patents, (Mabuse J). The court dismissed with costs,

an action by the appellant, Orica Mining Services South Africa (Pty)
Ltd (Orica) as plaintiff, for an interdict and ancillary relief,

against the respondent, Elbroc Mining Products (Pty) Ltd (Elbroc) as
defendant. The object of the interdict was to restrain Elbroc
from
infringing South African patent number 2001/10382, entitled "Portable
Drilling Apparatus" (the patent) held by Orica.
[2]
Elbroc counterclaimed for revocation of the patent on the grounds of
obviousness. However, the parties agreed and the court
ordered
separation of the issues. Elbroc’s counterclaim was postponed
sine die
. Consequently, only the alleged infringement and more
particularly, the meaning of the word ‘between’ in the
patent
claims, which was central to Orica’s claim, was before
the court a quo.
The
appeal is with the leave of the court a quo.
[3]
The parties are South African companies which conduct business as
suppliers of materials and equipment used in the mining industry.

Orica was granted the patent on 19 December 2001 under the Patents
Act 57 of 1978 (Patents Act) for a drill rig. The rig is used
to
drill holes on the hanging roof (or wall) of a mine for purposes of
placing roof-bolts or other securing attachments into the
wall –
to reinforce and stabilise the hanging wall. The invention is
therefore referred to as a roof bolter rig. It enables
drilling of
holes in confined spaces such as stopes, without having to manually
hold and maintain the machine in position. It is
a self-supporting
drill rig. In its preferred design it consists of two extendable
telescopic props – onto which is mounted
a drill carriage. The
props support the surface of the hanging wall during drilling thus
reducing the risk of the hanging wall
collapsing onto the rig user.
The machine enhances safety in the mining industry.
[4]
Each prop has a pair of cylinders joined at either end by a brace and
a base. A hydraulically operated piston slides into each
cylinder to
extend from the end of the cylinder. The free end of the piston forms
a point and a conical stud extends centrally
from the outer surface
of the base.
[5]
Below is a diagram of the Patent No 10382/2001.
[See
PDF for diagram]
The
diagram shows, amongst other things, extendable props (2) with a
drill (3) secured thereto. Each prop (2) has a pair of cylinders
(5)
joined at either end (6, 7) by a brace (8) and a base (9) with a
hydraulically operated piston (10) slidably secured within
each
cylinder (5) to extend from the end (6). The free end (11) of each
piston (10) forms a point and a conical stud (12) extends
centrally
from the outer surface (13) of the base (9).
[6]
It is common cause that Elbroc sold roof bolter rigs that perform the
same function as Orica’s to the mining industry
in South
Africa. This led to the allegation of infringement by Orica. Before
the court a quo, Orica contended that Elbroc had infringed
claims 1,
16, 17 and 18 of the patent. In these claims the invention is
described as:

1.
A portable self-supporting drill rig comprising a pair of spaced
apart telescopic props with a carriage between them, the
carriage
movable along an axis substantially parallel to those of the props
and supporting a drill mounted on the carriage…
[1]

16.
A portable self-supporting drill rig comprising a pair of spaced
apart fluid operated telescopic props with a carriage between
them,
the carriage movable along an axis substantially parallel to those of
the props and supporting a drill mounted on the carriage,
with the
props each secured to a base and braced apart.
17.
A portable self-supporting drill rig comprising a pair of spaced
apart fluid operated telescopic props with a carriage between
them,
the carriage movable along an axis substantially parallel to those of
the props and supporting a drill mounted on the carriage,
with the
props each secured to a base and braced apart and the carriage
movable by an extendable piston mounted on the base.
18.
A portable self-supporting drill rig comprising a pair of spaced
apart telescopic props with a carriage between them, the carriage

movable along an axis substantially parallel to those of the props
and supporting a drill mounted on the carriage, the props each

including a cylinder with one end secured to a base, the cylinders
each having a fluid operated piston slidably secured therein
to
extend from the other end thereof, and the cylinders braced apart.’
[7]
Elbroc contended that one of the integers of the claims in the patent
was not present in its drill rig. This was, according
to Elbroc, the
description of the drill carriage as located
between
a pair of
telescopic props. Elbroc contended that this meant that the drill
carriage in the Orica rig was located
linearly between
the
props – which was not the case with its (Elbroc’s) rig.
For this reason, whilst admitting the presence of all the
other
integers of the patent in its drill rig Elbroc maintained that its
rig fell outside the patent claims. This argument is graphically

illustrated by the top view of Elbroc’s drill rig.
[See
PDF for image]
Top
view of the Elbroc rig
[8]
Having considered the claims of the patent the Commissioner found
that the Elbroc drill rig did not infringe the patent as its
carriage
equipment was not located ‘between’ its two props. In
interpreting the word ‘between’ the learned
judge adopted
the dictionary meaning ‘linearly between,’ and found that
because the carriage in Elbroc’s drill
rig was offset from the
linear space between the props there had been no infringement of the
patent. He also held that Orica’s
interpretation of the word
‘between’ amounted to an impermissible extension of the
meaning of the word because it sought
‘to include a carriage
which is offset at a right angle to the co-linear line between the
pair of telescopic props at an
undefined and unspecified distance
from the space between the two props’.
[9]
In this court Orica persisted in its contention that on a proper
construction the patent claims required only that the drill
carriage
be located in the space between the two props, even if not in the
same linear plane as the props. It was submitted on
behalf of Orica
that Elbroc’s argument incorrectly equated the word ‘space’
with the word ‘line’
and ignored the context of the
specification and the three dimensional configuration of the props,
together with the space separating
them.
[10]
On the other hand counsel for Elbroc submitted that the correct
approach is to use ‘the language of the claims’,
that
being the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ‘between’.
[11]
Section 45(1)
of the
Patents Act provides
for protection of a
patentee against the making, using, exercising, disposing or offering
to dispose of or importing of the patentee’s
invention. The
protection endures for the duration of the patent.
[2]
The invention is defined in the patent and the courts have indeed
held that the exact nature and scope of the invention and the

monopoly claimed for it by a patentee (the essential constituent
features of the patent) must be determined by interpreting the
patent
claims.
[3]
In the well know case of
Gentiruco
AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd
[4]
this court noted that in dealing with aspects, relating to patent
infringements, its first task is to ‘ascertain the nature
of
the invention as claimed and its precise scope. Accordingly the
specification, and especially the claims, have to be construed;
it
is, after all, the instrument on which the letters patent were
applied for and granted and it must therefore necessarily govern

those issues.’
[5]
It was pointed out that ‘if the object of the claims is borne
in mind, their meaning, as ascertained from their own language,
must
prevail over the rest of the specification’ because that is
where those to whom the patent is addressed, will look to
determine
if they are trespassing.
[6]
[12]
The correct approach to interpreting the claims in the context of the
patent as a whole, has been described in the following
terms. In
Harrison v Anderson Foundry Company
(1876) 1 AC 574
(HL) the
court held:

The
office of a claim is to define and limit with precision what it is
which is claimed to have been invented and therefore patented.
Where
a claim is clearly and distinctly made, there can be no necessity for
a patentee to distinguish between what is disclaimed
and what is
claimed. It is enough to say to Lord Gifford’s suggestion that
everything which is not claimed is disclaimed.’
In
Multotec Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Screenex Wire Weaving
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
1983 (1) SA 709
(A) at 721C-E, Corbett JA
observed that:

[T]he
Court should always guard against too "textual" an approach
in the interpretation of claims in a patent specification.
It is true
that it is in the claims that a patentee stakes out and defines his
monopoly; and that the claims must be looked at
in order to determine
whether an infringement has taken place. But by peering too closely
at the language of a claim the Court
may overlook an infringement
which takes the substance of the invention. . . . In this context it
is often said that an infringer
who takes the "pith and marrow"
of the invention commits an infringement even though he omits an
inessential part or
substitutes for that part a mechanical
equivalent. . . . Where the alleged infringer has deviated in regard
to some feature from
the invention as literally claimed in the
specification, it may often be a matter of considerable difficulty to
determine whether
the deviation relates to an essential or a
non-essential feature of the relevant claim or claims. In relation to
this I would favour
the approach stated by Lord Diplock in . . .
Catnic Components Ltd and
Another v Hill and Smith
1981 Fleet Street Reports 60 . . . (at 65 – 66).’
[13]
In
Electrical and Musical Industries v Lissen Ltd
(1938)
,
56 RPC 23
[UK] at 39 Lord Russell of Killowen whilst highlighting
the function served by patent claims, clearly stated that the claims
derive
their colour from the context set out in the body of the
specification. The Learned Judge held:

The
function of the claims is to define clearly with precision the
monopoly claimed, so that the others may know the exact boundaries
of
the area within which they will be trespassers. Their primary object
is to limit and not to extend monopoly. What is not claimed
is
disclaimed. The claims must undoubtedly be read as part of the entire
document, and not as a separate document; but the forbidden
field
must be found in the language of the claims and not elsewhere. It is
not permissible in my opinion, by reference to some
language used in
the earlier part of the specification, to change a claim, which, by
its own language is a claim for one subject-matter,
which is what you
do when you alter the boundaries of the forbidden territory. A
patentee who describes an invention in the body
of a specification
obtains no monopoly unless it is claimed in the claims…
A
claim is a portion of the specification which fulfils a separate and
distinct function. It and it alone defines the monopoly;
and the
patentee is under a statutory obligation to state in the claims
clearly and distinctly what is the invention which he seeks
to
protect.’
[14]
In
Gentiruco
AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd
[7]
this court, confronted with a contention by Firestone that certain
claims were irresolvably ambiguous and therefore invalid, considered

the provisions of s16(3) of The Patents Act 9 of 1916 which read:

A
complete specification (1) must fully describe and ascertain the
invention and the manner in which it is to be performed, and
(2) must
end with a distinct statement of the invention claimed.’
Trollip
JA remarked that ‘[s 16(3)] entrenched a method of drawing
specifications that had been evolved in practice,
i.e., of
incorporating into the patent’s specification claims that
defined clearly and with precision the invention claimed
as a
monopoly’
[8]
and went on
to hold that:

The
wording of the second part of the sub-section does not effect a legal
severance of the claims from the rest of the specification;
“distinct
statement” there means, not a separate statement but a clear
one (see Dutch version, “duidelike opgawe”);
the claims
do not constitute a separate document in any sense; they remain part
of the specification which must be read as a whole.
. . . Moreover,
as the function of the claims is to define with clarity and precision
the scope of the invention claimed as a monopoly,
they must of
necessity also serve to describe and ascertain the invention; indeed,
as will presently appear, they are not only
an important but also a
decisive part of its description and ascertainment.’
[9]
[15]
The court also held that:

Both
must therefore be regarded to ascertain whether or not the complete
specification sufficiently discloses or explains the invention.

Indeed the influence of s 16 (3) on s 27 (1)
(g)
,
is such that the words “the invention” in the latter
section must mean ‘the invention as claimed’. For
a
patentee may claim something less than he has invented. Thus, if he
predicates in the body of the specification an invention
comprising
(a),
and
(b)
but
he claims only
(a
),
the inquiry into sufficient disclosure etc. under the section would
be confined to
(a)
and would not also extend to
(b)
.’
[10]
[16]
More recently in
Marine
3 Technologies Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Afrigroup Investments (Pty)
Ltd
[11]
this court said:

Generally
the first task of a court in the determination of an issue such as
the present is to construe the claims in the patent
(
Gentiruco
AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd
1972
(1) SA 589
(A)). According to Harms JA (
Monsanto
Co v MDB Animal Health (Pty) Ltd (formerly MD Biologics CC)
2001
(2) SA 887
(SCA) para 8:

The
rules relating to the interpretation of patents have often been
stated and do not need any reformulation. The problem lies in
their
sensible application in any given case. For present purposes the
following rules as they appear in
Gentiruco
AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd …
at 614A-616D may be emphasised:
(a)
a
specification should be construed like any other document, subject to
the interpreter being mindful of the objects of a specification
and
its several parts;
(b)
the
rule of interpretation is to ascertain, not what the inventor or
patentee may have had in mind, but what the language used in
the
specification means, ie
what
the intention was as conveyed by the specification, properly
construed;
(c)
to
ascertain that meaning the words used must be read grammatically and
in their ordinary sense;
(d)
technical
words of the art or science involved in the invention must also be
given their ordinary meaning, ie as they are ordinarily
understood in
the particular art or science;
(e)
if it
appears that a word or expression is used, not in its ordinary sense,
but with some special connotation, it must be given
that meaning
since the specification may occasionally define a particular word or
expression with the intention that it should
bear that meaning in its
body or claims, thereby providing its own dictionary for its
interpretation;
(f)
if a
word or expression is susceptible of some flexibility in its ordinary
connotation, it should be interpreted so as to conform
with and not
to be inconsistent with or repugnant to the rest of the
specification; and
(g)
if it
appears from reading the specification as a whole that certain words
or expressions in the claims are affected or defined
by what is said
in the body of the specification, the language of the claims must
then be construed accordingly.”’
[17]
Regarding the language used in the claim Elbroc contended that Orica
would be entitled to invoke the content of the body of
the
specification only if the word ‘between’, read in
context, was ambiguous or had a peculiar technical or scientific

meaning. But in the absence of such ambiguity the word ought to be
accorded its ordinary meaning and the body of the specification
could
not be invoked, so it was argued. Indeed, if the meaning of a claim,
properly constructed, is sensible, clear and unambiguous,
it is
decisive and cannot be restricted or extended by anything else stated
in the body and title of the specification.
[12]
But Elbroc advanced three dictionary meanings of ‘between’.
These were: ‘[across] the space separating two things’,
[13]
‘with something on each side’,
[14]
and ‘a point B is said to lie between points A and C where A,
B, and C are distinct collinear points.’
[15]
It is important to highlight that a number of rules of interpretation
of patents have developed over time, and the dictionary meaning
of a
word is only a guide; it is not decisive of the meaning of a
word.
[16]
The appropriate
question being the meaning applicable in the context of the
particular document under consideration – as
even definitions
must be read in context.
[17]
[18]
There was no explanation for Elbroc’s choice of the dictionary
meaning selected. In my view the definition, ‘with
something on
each side’ is the most sensible. It accords with the relational
nature of the word ‘between’ and
is not dependant on the
configuration of the objects under comparison. On the other hand, as
submitted on behalf of Orica the definition
‘linearly between’
is restricted to a situation where the objects compared are of
similar configuration. Counsel for
Orica pointed out that during
preparation for operation of the preferred embodiment of the patent,
particularly during insertion
of the drill into the carriage, a
portion of the carriage at times is off-set from a linear line
between the two props.
[19]
With regard to context, the advantage of the invention is the
enhanced safety as a result of the support provided by the telescopic

props. Further, the detailed description of the invention in the
specification, specifically disavowed a restriction to linear

positioning of the carriage between the props and a limitation to two
props. It provides that ‘the drill need not be located
linearly
between the pair of props, but may be
generally between
them.
This would more likely be the case where an additional prop or
additional props are used’. Once there are more than
two props
which are not configured in a straight line, the carriage may be
located between the props, without being linearly between
them.
[20]
Both parties led expert evidence with regard to the understanding of
persons skilled in the art. Elbroc’s expert understood
the word
‘between’ to mean that the carriage could be offset from
the linear line between the props and could also
be off centre. Both
experts understood the ‘linearly between’ position of the
carriage to be the optimal solution to
the problem that the patent
solved. Needless to say the optimal solution is not the only
solution.
[21]
Turning to purposive interpretation, Orica’s argument in this
regard was raised as an alternative to the above stated
submissions.
Within the context of patent construction, unlike literalism, this
approach takes into account the practical knowledge
and experience of
the person skilled in the kind of work in which the invention is
intended to be used.
[18]
It
considers that a person skilled in the art would understand whether
strict compliance with a particular word or phrase was intended
and
whether a variant of a word would have an effect upon the way the
invention works, such that the impugned object would fall
outside the
monopoly protected in the claims and there would be no
infringement.
[19]
[22]
The facts in this appeal bear a striking resemblance to
Catnic
Components Limited & another v Hill & Smith Limited
[20]
which was the leading English authority on purposive construction
prior to the enactment of the UK Patents Act in 1977.  Firstly,

similarly to the defendant in
Catnic,
Elbroc
admitted to having taken all but one of the essential features of
plaintiff’s patent. Secondly, there is no evidence
that the
variant integer that features in Elbroc’s drill rig has any
material effect on the functioning of the Orica drill
rig.
[23]
In
Catnic
the
plaintiffs were the registered proprietors of a patent for novel,
commercially successful steel lintels invented by the second

plaintiff. The defendants, intending to enter the market for
galvanised steel lintels, obtained a copy of the plaintiffs’

experimental lintel drawings from which they (the defendants) made
their lintels. On being cited for infringement of the patent
the
defendants produced a lintel which differed from their first one and
from the plaintiffs’ only in that its rear support
member,
instead of being perpendicular to the base, was inclined 6 or 8
degrees from the vertical position. Claim 1 of the patent
required
the rear member to ‘extend vertically’. The angle of 6 to
8 degrees in the defendants’ lintel reduced
the load bearing
capacity of the rear member by 0.6 and 1.2 per cent respectively.
This reduction had a negligible effect on the
functioning of the
member. The Court held that it would not have been the understanding
of persons with the relevant practical
knowledge and experience that
strict compliance with the words ‘extending vertically’
was intended by the patentee.
Moreover, ‘extending vertically’
was, in context, capable of meaning, ‘
near
enough to vertical to enable the back plate to perform satisfactorily
all the functions that it could perform if it were precisely

vertical’
.
[21]
(My emphasis.)
[24]
There is nothing in claim 1 of the patent to show that Orica intended
that a drill carriage located only linearly between the
props was
essential to its invention, or that a person skilled in the art would
understand that the word ‘between’
was intended to be
used as a ‘word of precise meaning’.
[22]
Moreover Elbroc’s expert, Mr Johannes Fourie admitted that
although the Elbroc drill carriage is located off the notional
line
between the props it was the Elbroc drill rig was still located
sufficiently close to the line to be able to gain support
from the
props.
[25]
Counsel
for Elbroc relied upon the decision in
Kirin-Amgen
Inc & others v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd.
[23]
In support of Elbroc’s contentions regarding the interpretation
of claims in a patent. For the reasons set out below I do
not agree
with the submission.
[26]
In
Kirin-Amgen,
the issue was whether the claims of a European patent granted to
Kirin-Amgen Inc in relation to a protein which stimulates production

of red blood cells in the bone marrow, were infringed by
Transkaryotic Therapies Inc. and Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd, in
circumstances
where there was striking similarity between the
technologies used by the two parties for producing the hormone
erythropoietin.
The Court found no infringement on the facts of the
case. Indeed, the Court held that patent claims are the decisive
basis for
determining the extent of protection.
[24]
But it also approved the basic principles of patent interpretation
enunciated in
Catnic
.
The court considered Articles 69 and 84 of the European Patent
Convention (EPC). Article 84 provides that:

T
he
claims shall define the matter for which protection is sought. They
shall be clear and concise and supported by the description.’
Article
69 states:

The extent of the protection
conferred by a European patent or European patent application shall
be determined by the terms of the
claims. Nevertheless the
description and the drawings shall be used to interpret the claims.’
[27]
Lord Hoffman then sketched the background of these provisions,
explaining that Article 69 was the result of a compromise between

what was viewed as the unduly narrow and literal construction
approach of the United Kingdom, and the other contracting European

States whose approach had been to look at the essence of the
invention. The learned judge held that Article 69 should be
interpreted
as ‘defining a position between these extremes
which combines a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable
degree
of certainty for third parties.’
[28]
The learned judge referred to the earlier approach in interpreting
English rules which prescribed that the body of the specification

could only be considered where claims had been found to be ambiguous
and not where the claims had plain meaning in themselves.
He remarked
that to avoid possible injustice, judges were generally astute to
finding the necessary ‘ambiguity’ which
enabled them to
interpret the document in its proper context and said: ‘indeed,
the attempt to treat the words of the claim
as having meanings “in
themselves” and without regard to the context in which or the
purpose for which they were used
was always a highly artificial
exercise.’ (at 679.)
[29]
Having referred with approval to the purposive approach adopted in
Catnic
, the learned judge held (at 680):

Construction,
whether of a patent or any other document, is of course not directly
concerned with what the author meant to say.
There is no window into
the mind of the patentee or the author of any other document.
Construction is objective in the sense that
it is concerned with what
a reasonable person to whom the utterance was addressed would have
understood the author to be using
the words to mean. Notice, however,
that it is not, as is sometimes said, "the meaning of the words
the author used",
but rather what the notional addressee would
have understood the
author
to mean by using those words. The meaning of words is a matter of
convention, governed by rules, which can be found in dictionaries
and
grammars. What the author would have been understood to mean by using
those words is not simply a matter of rules. It is highly
sensitive
to the context of and background to the particular utterance. It
depends not only upon the words the author has chosen
but also upon
the identity of the audience he is taken to have been addressing and
the knowledge and assumptions which one attributes
to that audience.’
[30]
The reliance placed by Elbroc on
Kirin-Amgen
is therefore
misplaced. Purposive interpretation is not an undue extension of the
language of patent claims. In my view to interpret
the word ‘between’
as meaning linearly between the props is not in accordance with a
purposive interpretation of the
specification, as delineated by the
claims. The advantage of the invention is that the telescopic props
give support not only to
the hanging roof of the stope, but also to
the drill located "between" them, so that it may be
operated remotely. This
is precisely what the respondent’s
drill rig seeks to achieve.
[31]
In the result, the following order is made:
1 The appeal is upheld
with costs, including the costs of two counsel;
2 The order of the court
a quo is set aside and replaced with the following:

(a)
The defendant is interdicted from infringing South African Patent
number 2001/10382 by way of the sale or offering for sale
in South
Africa of the defendant’s  drill rig.
(b)
The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs, including the
costs of two counsel.’
_________________
N DAMBUZA
JUDGE OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
For
the Appellant: R Michau SC and K Iles
Instructed
by: Dessington & Associates Inc.
Pretoria
c/o
Symington & De Kok Attorneys
Bloemfontein
For
the Respondent: A J Bester SC
Instructed
by: McCallum Rademeyer & Freimond
Pretoria
c/o
Honey Attorneys
Bloemfontein
[1]
Claims two to six
provide:

2.
A drill rig as claimed In claim 1 in which the drill is pivotally
mounted on the carriage.
3.
A drill rig as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2 in which the carriage
is supported by the props.
4.
A drill rig as claimed in claim 3 in which the carriage Is movable
along the props.
5.
A drill rig as claimed in claim 3 or claim 4 in which the carriage
is mounted on a pair of fluid operated cylinders on the
outside of
the props.
6.
A drill rig as claimed – in claim 5 in which the carriage has
a pair of members spaced apart along the length of the
cylinders –
the lower member providing the pivot mounting for the drill and the
upper member providing a releasable lock
assembly for fixing the
drill In alignment with the props.’
[2]
The Law of South Africa
2
nd
edition Vol 20 at 179.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty)
Ltd
1972 (1) SA 589 (A).
[5]
Ibid at 613F-H.
[6]
Ibid at 615C.
[7]
Gentiruco AG v
Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd
1972
(1) SA 589
(A)
at
611A-C.
[8]
Ibid at 610 C-D.
[9]
Ibid at 611 A-D.
[10]
Ibid at 612B-C.
[11]
Marine 3
Technologies Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Afrigroup Investments (Pty) Ltd &
another
[2014]
ZASCA 208
;
2015 (2) SA 387
(SCA) para 10.
[12]
Gentiruco
ibid at 615E-F.
[13]
Based on a definition in the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary 6 ed (2007) in terms of which ‘between’
is defined
as a synonym for interjacent, which, in turn, is defined
as ‘to lie in between’; ‘in between’ being
defined
as ‘ the middle point on the line: the space between
two points in position’.
[14]
MacMillan Dictionary.
[15]
Wolfram and MathWorld.
[16]
De
Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka
1980
(2) SA 191
(T). See also:
Monsanto
Co v MDB Animal Health (Pty) Ltd (Formerly MD Biologics CC)
2001 (2) SA 887
(SCA) paras 9-10.
[17]
Lawsa ibid para
184 at 181.
[18]
Selas
Corporation of America v Electric Furnace Co
1983 (1) SA 1043
(A) at 1052G-1053F.
[19]
See
Aktiebolaget
Hässle & another v Triomed (Pty) Ltd
2003 (1) SA 155
(SCA) para 8.
[20]
Catnic Components Limited &
another v Hill & Smith Limited
[1982]
RPC183 at 244.
[21]
Ibid at 185.
[22]
Ibid
at 237.
[23]
Kirin-Amgen Inc
& others v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd & others; Hoechst
Marion Roussel Ltd & others v Kirin-Amgen
& others
[2005] 1 All ER 667.
[24]
At 667.