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[2021] ZAMPMBHC 61
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Vipcon (Pty) Ltd v Thaba Chweu Local Municipality and Others (4629/2021) [2021] ZAMPMBHC 61 (13 December 2021)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(MPUMALANGA DIVISION,
MBOMBELA)
CASE
NO: 4629/2021
NOT
REPORTABLE
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
REVISED
13/12/2021
In
the matter between:
VIPCON
(PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
THABA
CHWEU LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
First
Respondent
DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT:
MPUMALANGA PROVINCE
Second
Respondent
MPUMALANGA
ECONOMIC GROWTH AGENCY
Third
Respondent
REGISTRAR
OF DEEDS: MBOMBELA
DEEDS
REGISTRY
Fourth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MASHILE
J:
INTRODUCTION
[1] On
urgent basis, the Applicant, Vipcon (Pty) Ltd (“Vipcon”),
seeks relief that the First Respondent,
Thaba Chweu Local
Municipality, (“the Municipality”), be interdicted and
restrained in the respects described below:
1.1 M
marketing,
negotiating a sale, selling or in any other way disposing or
alienating; and/or
1.2 Attempting
to pass transfer of the following immovable properties for which the
Municipality has by Notice
Number 10/2021-2022 given notice of its
intention to dispose:
1.2.1
476 stands in Mashishing Extension 6;
1.2.2
250 stands in Lydenburg Extension 108;
1.2.3
206 stands in Lydenburg Extension 109; and
1.2.4
800 stands in Lydenburg Extension 110.
1.3 The
Municipality be ordered to immediately cease any and all
advertisements or marketing representing
that it is entitled to
dispose of the immovable properties described in Paragraphs 1.2.1 to
1.2.4 above for which it has by Notice
Number 10/2021 - 2022 given
notice of its intention to dispose;
1.4 The
Fourth Respondent, Registrar of Deeds: Mbombela Deeds Registry, (“the
Registrar”) (“be
interdicted and restrained from
registering transfer of the immovable properties mentioned in
Paragraphs 1.2.1 to 1.2.4 above for
which the Municipality has by
Notice Number 10/2021 – 2022 given notice of its intention to
dispose to any third party without
the written consent
of
Vipcon
;
1.5 The
opposing Respondents be ordered to pay the costs of this application.
[2] The
application is not opposed by any of the remaining Respondents, the
Second (“the Department”),
the Third (“MEGA”)
and the Registrar respectively. The Department and MEGA have merely
been cited as a result of the
interest that they may have in these
proceedings. As such, no relief is sought against them save in the
event that they choose
to oppose this application. Similarly, no
costs will be sought against the Registrar unless he opposes the
application. The Department,
MEGA and the Registrar will henceforth,
depending on the context, together be referred to as Respondents
otherwise, their actual
names will be used.
[3] The
application is challenged on a number of grounds. Firstly, the
Municipality is firm that the application
is not urgent or that
if
it is, such urgency was self – created.
Secondly, Vipcon has no
locus standi
to bring this application. Thirdly, Vipcon has not satisfied the
requirements for final interdict.
FACTUAL
MATRIX
[4] On
or about 13 December 2007 and at or near Mashishing, the Municipality
and Mpumalanga Housing Finance Company
(
"the
Finance Company "
), concluded a
written Land Availability & Services Agreement (
"the
Land Availability Agreement"
). The
Land Availability Agreement concerned development of erven in
Mashishing. In terms of the Land Availability Agreement, the
Municipality made certain land owned by it available to the Finance
Company for development and establishment of townships.
[5] In
terms of Clause 6.4 of the Land Availability Agreement, The Finance
Company would be responsible for the
construction of infrastructure,
including external and internal services. The Department would
contribute an amount of R19 271
206.00 towards the provision of
internal services in respect of the Portion 2 land and the Finance
Company would be responsible
to procure the balance of the funding
required for the provision and installation of external and internal
services.
[6] Clause
7.1.1 of the Land Availability Agreement provides that the Finance
Company would be entitled to dispose
and/or develop the erven in the
townships apart from public open spaces. Clause 7.1.4 entitles The
Finance Company to determine
the disposal price of erven. In terms of
Clause 7.4, the price for which the erven are disposed would accrue
to the Finance Company
subject to payment of the land costs to the
Municipality.
[7] Clause
7.1.3 stipulates that 100 of the low income serviced erven in Portion
2 land would be sold at a price
not exceeding the development cost of
those erven. Clause 7.1.4 prescribes that 10% of all fully serviced
erven would be transferred
to the Municipality to a maximum of 450
erven. Clauses 8.5 and 8.6 lay down that the Finance Company shall
conclude agreements
of sale with purchasers and attend to
registration of transfer of the land to various purchasers utilizing
conveyancers appointed
by it.
[8] In
2010, the Finance Company and Mpumalanga Agricultural Development
Corporation merged to form the present
MEGA. Following its formation,
MEGA appointed Vipcon as preferred developer for the integrated
housing development in Mashishing
(Tender No. MEGA/2014/06) in terms
of a letter dated 25 July 2014. The Tender concerns development to be
done in terms of the Land
Availability Agreement. Vipcon accepted the
appointment.
[9] Subsequently,
in 2016 and at Mashishing, Vipcon and MEGA entered into a written
Service Level Agreement for
Housing Development Services (
"the
Service Level Agreement"
). In
terms of the Service Level Agreement Vipcon agreed to provide
services in respect of the land made available by the Municipality
to
the Finance Company (and it successor in title, MEGA). In a letter
dated 25 April 2016 addressed to the Municipal Manager of
the
Municipality, MEGA reconfirmed its obligations in terms of clause
6.4.6 of the Land Availability Agreement. The clause pertains
to
funding of external and internal services by MEGA.
[10] On
25 May 2016, the Council of the Municipality confirmed and accepted
the appointment of Vipcon as implementation
agent of MEGA in terms of
the Land Availability Agreement. As the implementation agent, Vipcon
was authorized to sign all documents
and to do all things necessary
to:
10.1
Open the township registers for Lydenburg Extension 108 to 116 and to
give effect to the registration of
transfer of the following erven
into the names of the various beneficiaries to be nominated by the
Municipality in writing as set
out in the Land Availability
Agreement:
10.1.1
Erf 7274 to 7954 Lydenburg
Extension 108;
10.1.2 Erf
7955 to 8192 Lydenburg Extension 109;
10.1.3 Erf
8193 to 9092 Lydenburg Extension 110;
10.1.4 Erf
9093 to 90515 Lydenburg Extension 111;
10.1.5
Erf 9516 to 9838 Lydenburg
Extension 112;
10.1.6 Erf
9839 to 1024 Lydenburg Extension 113;
10.1.7 Erf
10422 to 10854 Lydenburg Extension 114;
10.1.8 Erf
10855 to 11070 Lydenburg Extension 115;
10.1.9 Erf
11071 to 11165 Lydenburg Extension 116;
10.2
Give effect to the registration of Portions 1 to 482 of Erf 5438
Lydenburg Extension 6, as indicated on Plan
S.G. No 882/2008, into
the names of the various beneficiaries to be nominated by the
Municipality in writing as set out in the
Land Availability
Agreement;
10.3
Conclude Agreements of Sale with Purchasers;
10.4
Register transfer of ownership through conveyancers appointed by it
and attend to all legal work pertaining
to the sale and transfer.
[11] The
beneficiaries to be nominated by the Municipality in writing only
pertained to the 450 erven that had
to be transferred to the
Municipality in terms of clause 7.1.4 of the Land Availability
Agreement.
[12] On
14 December 2016, at Mbombela Vipcon, the Municipality and the
Department concluded a written agreement
for the purchase of 1 000
serviced sites at Extension 108 and 110, Mashishing (
"the
Purchase Agreement"
). In terms of
Clause 6.1.8 of the Purchase Agreement, Vipcon would transfer the
fully serviced stands in Extensions 108 and 110,
Mashishing to the
legitimate beneficiaries at a cost approved by the National
Department of Human Settlements. Vipcon performed
in line with the
obligations imposed upon it by the agreements and resolution.
[13] The
Municipality has, under Notice Number 10/2021 - 2022, given notice of
its intention to dispose of the
following properties:
13.1
476 stands in Mashishing Extension 6;
13.2
250 stands in Lydenburg Extension 108;
13.3
206 stands in Lydenburg Extension 109; and
13.4
800 stands in Lydenburg Extension 110.
[14] The
notice was published in the Lydenburg News and also affixed to the
offices of the Municipality in Mashishing,
Sabie and Graskop. The
Municipality has advertised that the immovable properties are on
tender and that the general public can
tender for them.
[15] Vipcon
alleges that its attention was first drawn to the notice on 6 October
2021. It immediately approached
its attorneys for assistance and
advice. In a letter dated 7 October 2021 addressed to the Municipal
Manager of the Municipality,
the Applicant's attorneys demanded the
following undertakings before close of business on 15 October 2021:
15.1
An unconditional written undertaking that the Municipality would
immediately remove any and all advertisements
representing that it is
entitled to sell the immovable properties;
15.2
an unconditional written undertaking that the Municipality would
immediately cease marketing, selling, or
in any other way alienating
the aforementioned properties without the written consent of Vipcon;
15.3
an unconditional written undertaking that the Municipality would not
attempt to pass transfer of any property
referred to in the letter;
15.4
an unconditional written undertaking that the Municipality would
comply with the resolution adopted on 25
May 2016, which will include
(but not be limited to) informing Vipcon of any beneficiaries it may
wish to nominate as per the Land
Availability & Services
Agreement.
[16] The
letter advised that the High Court would be approached for an
interdict to protect the right of Vipcon
should the Municipality fail
to furnish the required undertakings. When the Municipality failed to
respond, Vipcon allowed it more
time to revert until it could not
grant any unilateral indulgence and instructed its attorneys on 25
October 2021 to prepare and
launch this application.
ASSERTIONS
OF THE PARTIES
[16] Vipcon
maintains that it is common cause that the stands referred to in the
notice, more specifically those
identified in paragraphs 13.1 to 13.4
above, relate to stands to be marketed and transferred by Vipcon.
Vipcon is also entitled
to determine the disposal price of erven in
accordance with clause 7.1.4 of the Land Availability Agreement and
the disposal price
would accrue to Vipcon subject to payment of the
land costs to the Municipality as provided for in clause 7.4 of the
Land Availability
Agreement.
[17] Vipcon
is firm that it will perform its obligations arising from the various
agreements with the Municipality
as and when their execution becomes
due. Vipcon contends further that the Municipality has made no
attempt to reverse its invalid
activities concerning the withdrawal
of the advertisement of the erven. Its actions leave Vipcon
vulnerable to a possible sustenance
of damages because the
municipality can register transfer of ownership of the stands without
reference to it. The above is so because
the Municipality is
currently the registered owner of all the immovable properties.
[18] The
Respondents argue that this matter is not urgent because Vipcon has
failed to mention
in the founding affidavit that the stands
have been invaded since 2010. Vipcon having not approached this Court
when the stands
were invaded in 2010 to protect its rights in respect
thereof, it should have been before court shortly following the
incursion.
Against that background, to the extent that the stands
have been occupied by unlawful tenants, contends the Municipality,
‘the
horses have bolted’.
[19] Secondly,
the Municipality argues that Vipcon has not met the requirements for
a final interdict in particular,
it has not demonstrated that it has
a clear right that requires protection from this Court. The
Respondents are placing heavy reliance
on the belief that Vipcon was
not party to the Land Availability Agreement from which, they
maintain, the rights of Vipcon would
have flown if it were a party
thereto. That being the position, it should follow that Vipcon cannot
suffer any irreparable harm
if it has no right to defend.
[20] Regarding
availability of alternative adequate remedy, the Respondents argue
that Vipcon has not shown that
it will have no alternative adequate
remedy. The attitude of the Respondents is that damages remain a
practical alternative remedy
in case Vipcon sustains a loss as a
result of the actions of the Municipality.
ISSUES
[21] The
issues for consideration are as follows:
21.1
The urgency of the application;
21.2
Establishment of the requirements of a final interdict by Vipcon; and
21.3
Whether or not Vipcon has established
locus standi
. I will
probably discuss this issue in conjunction with the second issue
described above as the two seem to be inextricably connected.
URGENCY
[22] The
respondents would have this Court believe
that
Vipcon
should have brought this application in 2010 when the
land in question was invaded by the unlawful tenants. The argument is
disingenuous
and needs to be exposed for what it is. If it is true
that the ‘horses have bolted’ because the unlawful
tenants have
taken occupation, it is hard to appreciate how the
Municipality can turn around and hope to recover what it has lost as
a result
of the unlawful occupation. If the Municipality hopes to
recuperate its costs regardless of the unlawful occupation by selling
the erven, what will stand in the way of Vipcon from doing the same?
The argument is as such, self-destructive
[23] The
clock for Vipcon began to tick on 6 October 2021 when its attention
was drawn to the publication of Notice
Number 10/2021 – 2022.
As stated by Vipcon, it is beside the point that the land
Availability Agreement was concluded in
December 2007 or that the
land was invaded and occupied in 2010. What is significant though is
that the Municipality was afforded
opportunity to make certain
commitments, which it failed to do. Even after it had been granted
unilateral indulgence until 25 October
2021, it still would not
provide any guarantees of withdrawal of the advertisement.
[24] In
circumstances where a party to proceedings, such as Vipcon, engages
the other before approaching court,
it cannot be censured for having
been dilatory or self-created the urgency. This was the essence of
the decision in
Nelson
Mandela
Metropolitan
Municipality
v Greyvenouw
CC
2004 (2) SA 81
(SE)
at 94C – D.
The
principle articulated in that case has been confirmed by the
Constitutional Court in
South African
Traders Forum and Others v City of Johannesburg
and Others
2014
(4) SA 371
(CC).
This application was
only launched when Vipcon realized, after two letters of demand, that
it would not elicit a response from the
Municipality. I cannot falter
Vipcon for having held back before approaching court.
[25] The
Municipality has also argued that Vipcon has not shown that it will
not receive substantial redress were
this matter to be heard in the
ordinary course. I agree that if this matter were to be allowed to
follow the normal course, the
Municipality might market, sell and
register transfer of the erven into the name of the purchasers
without involving Vipcon. The
prejudice to Vipcon is real insofar as
it may not be able to reverse the transactions because firstly, it
would have been a valid
contract concluded between two legally
competent parties. Secondly and contrary to what the Municipality
would have this Court
believe, Vipcon cannot reverse the process of
registration of the transfer as it is legally sanctioned.
[26] In
the circumstances, I am satisfied that the matter was sufficiently
urgent warranting the immediate intervention
of this Court. The delay
between the 6
th
of October 2021, the date of acquisition of knowledge of the
publication of Notice Number 10/2021 – 2022, and the 11th of
November 2021, the date on which the application was ultimately
launched, was not unconscionable given the two letters seeking
the
Municipality to commit and its failure to do so. Furthermore, Vipcon
stands to suffer prejudice if directed to await being
afforded
opportunity in the normal course.
LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
[27] A
final interdict is one that is intended to make an ultimate
pronouncement on the rights of parties to a
controversy. A party
seeking a final interdictory relief must satisfy a court of the
existence of a clear right, an injury actually
committed or
reasonably apprehended and the absence of an alternative adequate
remedy. See,
Setlogelo v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221
at page 227
and
Akoo & others v Master of the High
Court & others
(5612/11)
[2012] ZAKZPHC 45 at paragraph 14.
Against that background, I proceed to discuss the three prerequisites
for a final interdict below.
APPLICATION
AND EVALUATION
A
CLEAR RIGHT
[28] In
deciding whether or not an applicant has a clear right, a court ought
to be mindful that:
“
Whether
an applicant has a right is a matter of substantive law. Whether that
right is clear is a matter of evidence. In order therefore
to
establish a clear right the applicant has to prove on a balance of
probabilities facts which in terms of substantive law establish
the
right relied upon.” See, the Setlogelo case supra and
LAWSA,
Second Edition
VOL
11 at para 397.
[29] It
is manifest from the above factual matrix that Vipcon was appointed
to be the implementation agent. It is settled
that an agent may
maintain an action on a contract in respect of which it acquired
rights in its own name. It was in that regard
that the court in
Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Co of
Chicago v Greek Seamen’s Pension Fund
1989 (2) SA 515
(D) at 538 – 539
stated the following:
“
As a g
general
rule,
a
person
is
not
entitled
to
sue
in
his
own
name
on
a contract
in
respect
of
the
performance
of
which
he
is
a
mere
agent.
The
agent would, however, be
entitled to
maintain an
action
on
a
contract in
respect of which he has acquired
rights. In Commaille
v Jamaloodien
1917 CPD 656
certain classes
of
agents
are
mentioned
who
do have
the right
to sue in their
own
name on the
contract.
It
is only
necessary
to mention
here
that
an
agent
would
have
a right to sue in his own name on a
contract where the contract
was
made with him personally,
where
he has acquired
a special
interest
under
the contract
(Wessels Law of Contract
s 2196) or where there is a special
stipulation
in the contract
that the agent may sue on it."
[30] MEGA
IS the result of a merger between the Finance Company and the
Mpumalanga Agricultural development Corporation.
As such, it is a
successor in title of the Finance Company. The Land Availability
Agreement entered into between the Finance Company
and the
Municipality became relevant to Vipcon and MEGA on 25 July 2014 when
the latter appointed Vipcon as the preferred developer
for the
integrated housing development in Mashishing. The tender awarded to
Vipcon was Tender No. MEGA/2014/06, which relates to
development to
be executed in terms of the Land Availability Agreement. Clearly
therefore, the appointment s aforesaid gives Vipcon
the clear right
mentioned herein.
[31] Additionally,
the service level agreement concluded between the parties in 2016 is
crucial. The agreement
was for housing development services. Vipcon
agreed to provide services in respect of the land made available
through the Land
Availability Agreement to the Finance Company and
therefore MEGA, the successor in title of the Finance Company. The
agreement,
insofar as it refers back to the Land Availability
Agreement, endows Vipcon with a clear right. On 25 May 2016, the
Council of
the Municipality confirmed and accepted the appointment of
the Applicant as implementation agent of MEGA in terms of the Land
Availability
Agreement.
[32] In
the letter of 25 May 2016, MEGA reconfirmed its obligations arising
from clause 6.4.6 of the Land Availability
Agreement. The clause
pertains to funding of external and internal services by MEGA. As the
implementation agent, Vipcon was allowed
to sign all documents and to
do all things necessary to execute all the matters mentioned under
paragraph 10
supra.
Of course this also means that Vipcon has
locus
standi
to sue in its own name as it has
through the various contractual instruments acquired rights from MEGA
and/or the Department and/or
the Municipality. The status of Vipcon
as an implementation agent ousts the relevance of the Municipality’s
argument that
Vipcon was not a party to the land Availability
Agreement.
[33] The
last contractual instrument that gives Vipcon a clear right is the
purchase agreement entered into between
Vipcon, the Municipality and
the Department on 14 December 2016 for the purchase of 1 000 serviced
sites at Extension 108 and 110,
Mashishing. Clause 6.1.8 of that
Agreement provides that Vipcon would transfer the fully serviced
stands in Extensions 108 and
110, Mashishing to the legitimate
beneficiaries at a cost approved by the National Department of Human
Settlements. It is not disputed
that Vipcon discharged its
obligations imposed by the agreement and resolution. Accordingly, the
assertion that Vipcon has failed
to demonstrate a clear right and
locus standi
is
bereft of any merit and it is rejected.
AN
INJURY ACTUALLY COMMITTED OR REASONABLY APPREHENDED
[34] The
test in this regard is that in circumstances where countenancing the
subject matter of the application
under consideration to endure
culminates in a permanent injury to an applicant, a court should
grant the relief sought. See Setlogelo
supra.
That being so, it is trite that the existence of a clear right does
not have to coincide with irreparable injury in an application
for
interdict. A significant and profound question to consider in this
regard is whether or not an actual injury has occurred or
that it is
reasonably apprehended. Having regard to the facts of this matter,
the answer is unquestionably in the affirmative.
[35] The
Municipality argued that Vipcon will not suffer irreparable harm if
registration of transfer of the erven
were to take place. This, the
Municipality contends, is because Vipcon has not shown that it has
invested any capital in the development
of the project. Vipcon found
this argument objectionable because it is not foreshadowed anywhere
in the papers of the Municipality
other than its heads of argument.
[36] That
said, Vipcon stated that the Municipality did not deny the allegation
in the founding affidavit that
Vipcon has complied with the
obligations imposed by the Land Availability Agreement together with
the resolution. That means that
the Municipality accepted or accepts
that Vipcon will pay the amount of approximately R130 000 000.00
referred to in
the letter of appointment of Vipcon.
[37] Quite
apart from the aforegoing, Vipcon has acquired the rights to attend
to the transfer of the erven referred
to in paragraph 10 above.
Vipcon will suffer irreparable harm should the Municipality be
permitted to market, sell and register
transfer of the erven to the
general public without the participation of Vipcon envisaged in the
agreements.
[38] The
above is because Vipcon will not be able to recover a predetermined
amount from the Municipality and
neither will it be able to
recuperate any losses it might have suffered from the transferees
because they would have acquired ownership
legitimately. Perceived in
this manner, the apprehension of irreparable harm occurring is
reasonably tangible. The clear right
that Vipcon has established is
as such, worthy of protection from the impending harm.
LACK
OF ALTERNATIVE ADEQUATE REMEDY
[39] Here
I agree with the Respondents that the alternative
remedy must:
39.1
Be adequate in the circumstances; See,
Free
State Gold Areas Ltd v Merriespruit (Orange Free State) Gold Mining
Co Ltd and another
1961 (2) SA
505
(W) at 524-525;
39.2
Be ordinary and reasonable; See,
Martin
v Kiesbeampte Newcastle Afdeling
1958
3 All SA 41
(N); 1958 2 SA 649 (D) 654;
39.3
Be a legal remedy; See,
Francis
v Roberts
1973
(1) SA 507
(RA);
39.4
Grant similar protection. See,
Cape Town
Municipality v Abdulla
1974 4
All SA 311
(C); 1974 4 SA 428 (C) 440.
[40] It
is the Municipality’s argument that the general rule is that a
court should not grant this kind of
an interdict where it can be
shown that an applicant can receive appropriate relief by suing for
damages. In short, the Municipality
maintains that this is such an
application. Vipcon’s case is that it will be impossible or
extremely difficult to allege
and prove its loss should the
Municipality be allowed to proceed with its plans as evinced in the
advertisement for the sale of
the erven.
[41]
In
the case of
Wynberg
Municipality
v Dreyer
1920
AD
439
;
Tullen
Industries
Ltd
v A
de
Sousa
Costa
(Pty) Ltd
1976 (4) SA,
a case to which I was referred to by Vipcon, it was held that a Court
will generally grant an interdict where the injury is a continuing
violation of the applicant’s
rights or where the damages
will be difficult to assess. Vipcon
submitted that it is indeed in a position no different from that
described in Wymberg Municipality
supra
.
It submitted that its exclusion from the process of selling the erven
means that it will be difficult to assess its damages against
the
Municipality because the process will necessarily involve valuation
of the erven at different times.
[42] Since
the threatened
breach
cause
injury
of
a
constant
nature
to Vipcon, a claim for damages would, in the circumstances, be
inappropriate. This is to say that there exists no alternative
adequate remedy. For this reason, I can perceive no reason why it
should not succeed with its application for the relief that it
seeks.
COSTS
[43] The
Municipality has contended in this respect that it should be excused
from paying costs if the ruling
goes against it. The rule is that
costs follow result. In an attempt to justify why this should not
pertain in this instance, the
Municipality stated that inherent in
the prayer for costs against it is to intimidate it not to defend
lest it will be mulcted
with costs. The rationale behind the prayer
was explained by Vipcon as being to avoid a party coming to court
without necessarily
wanting to defend a matter but solely for the
purpose of arguing costs. I accept the explanation and as such, do
not see need to
depart from the establish rule that costs must follow
result.
ORDER
[44] In
the circumstances, the application succeeds and I make the following
order:
1. The
forms, service and periods for filing provided for in the Uniform
Rules of Court is dispensed
with in terms of Rule 6(12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court and this application is heard as one of
urgency.
2. The
Municipality is interdicted and restrained from:
2.1 marketing,
negotiating a sale, selling or in any other way disposing or
alienating; and/or
2.2 attempting
to pass transfer of the following immovable properties for which it
has given notice of intention
to dispose under notice number 10/2021
- 2022:
2.2.1
476 stands in Mashishing Extension 6;
2.2.2
250 stands in Lydenburg Extension 108;
2.2.3
206 stands in Lydenburg Extension 109; and
2.2.4
800 stands in Lydenburg Extension 110 without the prior obtained
express written consent of the Applicant.
3. The
Municipality is ordered to immediately cease any and all
advertisements or marketing representing
that it is entitled to
dispose of the following immovable properties for which it has given
notice of intention to dispose under
notice number 10/2021 - 2022:
3.1 476
stands in Mashishing Extension 6;
3.2 250
stands in Lydenburg Extension 108;
3.3 206
stands in Lydenburg Extension 109; and
3.4 800
stands in Lydenburg Extension 110.
4. The
Registrar is interdicted and restrained from registering transfer of
the following immovable
properties for which the Municipality has
given notice of its intention to dispose under notice number 10/2021
- 2022:
4.1 476
stands in Mashishing Extension 6;
4.2 250
stands in Lydenburg Extension 108;
4.3 206
stands in Lydenburg Extension 109; and
4.4 800
stands in Lydenburg Extension 110 to any third party without the
written consent of the Applicant.
5. The
Municipality is ordered to pay the costs of this application.
B
A MASHILE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION,
MBOMBELA
This judgment was
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties and/or
parties’ representatives by email. The date
and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 13 December 2021 at 10:00.
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicant: Adv
R Grundlingh
Instructed
by:
SCHEEPERS
& AUCAMP ATTORNEYS
Counsel for the First
Respondent: Adv L Zwane
Instructed
by: Nkosi
Attorneys
Date
of Judgment: 13
December 2021