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[2021] ZAGPJHC 474
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Morwanqana and Another v The Minister of Police (18693/2017) [2021] ZAGPJHC 474 (5 October 2021)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
REVISED:
Date:
5
th
October 2021
CASE
NO
:
18693/2017
DATE
:
5
th
October 2021
In
the matter between:
MORWANQANA
,
VUYOKAZI CYNTHIA
First Plaintiff
MATSHAKA
,
NOMATAMZANQA EUNICE
Second Plaintiff
and
THE
MINISTER OF
POLICE
Defendant
Coram:
Adams J
Heard
:
30 and 31 August 2021, 1, 2 and 3 September 2021.
Delivered:
5 October 2021 – This judgment
was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
representatives by email, by
being uploaded to
CaseLines
and by release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed
to be 11:00 on 5 October 2021.
Summary:
Criminal law and procedure – delict – unlawful
arrest and detention – arrest, without a warrant, on a charge
of
robbery –
s 40(1)(b)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977
– whether arresting officer held a reasonable suspicion
that appellants had committed an offence listed in Schedule 1 to the
Act – robbery – what enquiry is police officer required
to conduct when suspects are pointed out by the victim months
after
the alleged robbery.
ORDER
(1)
Judgment is granted in favour of the first plaintiff against the
defendant
for: -
(a)
Payment of the sum of R250 000;
(b)
Payment of interest on R250 000 at the applicable legal rate of
interest
of 9% per annum from date of service of the summons, namely
21 September 2015, to date of final payment;
(c)
Costs of suit.
(2)
Judgment is granted in favour of the second plaintiff against the
defendant
for: -
(a)
Payment of the sum of R290 000;
(b)
Payment of interest on R290 000 at the applicable legal rate of
interest
of 9% per annum from date of service of the summons, namely
22 September 2015, to date of final payment;
(c)
Costs of suit.
JUDGMENT
Adams J:
[1].
The first plaintiff and the second plaintiff
were complete strangers to each other. They had never met until, in a
cruel twist of
fate, their paths crossed on Friday, 3 October 2014,
at the bus terminus at Park Station in Johannesburg. Both of them
were on
their way to their respective hometowns in the Eastern Cape
and were about to board the same bus. The first plaintiff, who had
recently been retrenched from her employment as a security guard in
Johannesburg, was about eight months pregnant, and was on her
way to
her family home, where she was to give birth. She was travelling all
by herself and was carrying big heavy bags. The second
plaintiff, a
primary school teacher at the time, who was also traveling by
herself, saw that the first plaintiff was not having
it easy, took
pity on her and, out of the goodness of her heart, offered to assist
her with her luggage. They then spent some time
in each other’s
company whilst waiting in the queue for their bus to arrive. This
random act of kindness by the second plaintiff
unfortunately and
regrettably turned out with dire consequences for the pair.
[2].
Also at the bus terminus at the time was the
complainant in a robbery charge, which dated back to Monday, 27
January 2014. On that
day, the complainant had been robbed of cash
and other valuables worth about R30 000 by two ladies, who
seemingly fitted the
description of the two plaintiffs – the
one small and petit and the other of a bigger built. This incident
happened in Centurion
and, as already indicated, occurred some eight
months prior to the
dramatis personae
in this matter encountering each other at Park Station. The said
complainant was convinced that the other two ladies – being
the
first and second plaintiffs – who she happened to see in each
other’s company at the terminus, were the same persons
who
robbed her of her belongings and cash all those many months ago. She
had little doubt about this and she alerted the police
to this fact,
which resulted in the plaintiffs being hauled off the bus whilst en
route and arrested by the flying squad in Vanderbijlpark.
[3].
The plaintiffs were arrested at about 19:30 on
Friday, 3 October 2014, by Warrant Officer Werner Henning (Warrant
Officer Henning)
of the South African Police Service (SAPS) without a
warrant, on a charge of robbery. The second plaintiff was detained
until shortly
after her court appearance on Monday, 6 October 2014,
after posting bail at the Kgosi Mampura Prison in Pretoria at about
19:00.
The first plaintiff was only able to post bail on the next
day, being Tuesday, 7 October 2014, whereupon she was released at
about
mid-morning
. They contend that
their arrest and subsequent detention was wrongful and unlawful and
they issued two separate summonses against
the defendant (the
Minister) out of this court for damages. The Minister admits that the
plaintiffs were arrested without a warrant,
but denied that it was
wrongful or unlawful. He contended that the arrests had been effected
in terms of
s 40(1)(b)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
as
they were reasonably suspected of having committed an offence
referred to in Schedule 1 (robbery).
[4].
The issue to be decided in this action is
simply whether, in the circumstances of the matter, the police acted
reasonably in arresting
and detaining the plaintiffs, it being common
cause that all of the other jurisdictional requirements for an arrest
without a warrant
were satisfied.
[5].
During
the trial, the Minister presented the evidence of the investigating
officer from the Wierdabrug Police Station, Constable
Sithole, and
the arresting officer, Warrant Officer Henning, as well as the
evidence of the complainant herself, whereas the plaintiffs
gave
evidence in support of their cases. The evidence led during the trial
indicate that the facts in the matter are by and large
common cause
mainly because the material aspects of the evidence by the plaintiffs
are uncontested and unchallenged. In those instances,
where there is
a factual dispute between the version of the Minister and that of the
plaintiffs, I accept the version of the plaintiffs
and I do so for
the reasons mentioned later on in this judgment and on the basis of
the
ratio
decidendi
in cases such as
Stellenbosch
Farmers' Winery Group Ltd and Another v Martell and Others
[1]
,
National
Employers' General Insurance Co Ltd v Jager
[2]
and
Govan
v Skidmore
[3]
.
All of these cases settled the law and the approach to be adopted
when a court is faced with factual disputes and, in particular,
mutually destructive versions relating to the same event.
[6].
So,
for example, the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Stellenbosch
Farmers' Winery Group
[4]
,
explained the approach to be adopted as follows:
‘
To
come to a conclusion on the disputed issues a court must make
findings on:
(a)
the credibility of the various factual witnesses;
(b)
their reliability; and
(c)
the probability or improbability of each party's version on each of
the disputed issues.
In
light of the assessment of (a), (b) and (c), the court will then, as
a final step, determine whether the party burdened with
the onus of
proof has succeeded in discharging it. The hard case, which will
doubtless be a rare one, occurs when a court's credibility
findings
compel it in one direction and its evaluation of the general
probabilities in another. The more convincing the former,
the less
convincing will be the latter. But when all factors equipoised
probabilities prevail.’
[7].
In
Govan v
Skidmore
, it was held that a court,
in making factual findings in a civil action, should, by balancing
probabilities, select a conclusion
which seems to be the more natural
or plausible conclusion from amongst several conceivable ones, even
though that conclusion may
not be the only reasonable one.
[8].
A summary of the events which gave rise to the
arrests is as set out above. Additionally, the evidence also
indicated that the complainant
noticed the plaintiffs for the first
time at Park Station, whilst they were all waiting to board the bus
to the Eastern Cape, and,
as luck would have it, she saw them in each
other’s company. She assumed that they were travelling together
and, as I indicated
above, they, presumably as a pair, looked, to the
complainant, like the two ladies who robbed her in January 2014. She
alerted
police officers at the bus terminus to this fact. The police
officers thereupon confronted the plaintiffs with the fact that the
complainant accused them of having robbed her during January 2014.
Needless to say, the plaintiffs were astounded by this accusation
and
drew to the attention of the police officers at the bus terminus the
fact that they did not even know each other. How then,
so they
protested, could they have robbed the complainant. The police
officers at Park Station conducted a mini enquiry by requesting
one
of the plaintiffs to call the other’s cell number, which, for
the police, confirmed that they did not know each other.
The one’s
cell number did not register as a contact on the other’s cell
phone.
[9].
The plaintiffs were thereupon allowed to board
the bus, but was warned not to talk to the complainant, who also
boarded the same
bus. The complainant, still convinced that these two
ladies were her robbers in January 2014, was not satisfied with the
outcome
of the ‘proceedings’ at the bus terminus and
contacted her husband, who, in turn, communicated with the Wierdabrug
Police Station, where the charge of robbery had initially been laid.
This then set in motion the processes which resulted in the
arrests
of the plaintiffs.
[10].
Warrant Officer Henning of the SAPS Flying
Squad, who had been contacted by the Wierdabrug Police Station,
intercepted the bus in
Vanderbijlpark, spoke to the complainant, who
again pointed out one of the plaintiffs, who in turn was required to
point out the
other. They were thereupon requested to disembark. Once
outside the bus, both plaintiffs were advised that they were being
arrested
for robbery of the complainant, who, upon being asked by
Warrant Officer on at least two occasions as to whether she was sure
that
the plaintiffs were the robbers, confirmed so. She was adamant,
despite a plea by the second plaintiff that she needed to have a
closer look, because, so the second plaintiff told her, she was
mistaken. The complainant would have none of that and remained
adamant that the first and second plaintiffs were the ones who robbed
her. The plaintiffs were shocked, dismayed and dumbfounded
all at
once – not to speak of the embarrassment of having been yanked
off the bus in front of a busload of passengers, who
no doubt saw
them as trouble makers and the ones responsible for disrupting what
should have been a leisurely and carefree bus
trip to the Eastern
Cape.
[11].
The plaintiffs soon realised that despite their
protestations to the contrary, the police were not going to listen to
their explanations
as they had clearly accepted the claim by the
complainant that they had robbed her. It bears emphasising that the
complainant evidently
was adamant that the plaintiffs were the
culprits and she made no provision for the possibility that she may
have been mistaken.
[12].
In the end, Warrant Officer Henning was
satisfied that the plaintiffs should be arrested and he thereupon
effected the arrests.
He asked the bus driver to off load the luggage
of the two plaintiffs and he booked them into the police cells at the
Vanderbijlpark
Police Station. The next day, Saturday, 4 October
2014, at about 11:00, they were collected from the Vanderbijlpark
Police Station
and transferred to the Wierdabrug Police Station by
Constable Sithole from the latter Police Station. They were detained
on the
Saturday and Sunday nights and taken to court on Monday, where
bail for each of them were set at R2000 each. The case was postponed
and later the charges against the plaintiffs were withdrawn
ostensibly because the complainant was not giving her co-operation
and was not coming to court to give evidence.
[13].
As already indicated, the issues requiring
adjudication in this action is: (1) Whether the members of the
SAPS reasonably suspected
that the plaintiffs had committed the
robbery of the complainant during January 2014 in Centurion; and (2)
Whether the plaintiffs
were wrongfully and unlawfully arrested and
detained by members of the SAPS.
[14].
The Minister admitted the arrests, and
subsequent detention, and contended that the arrests were justified
and therefore lawful,
in terms of
s 40(1)(b)
of the
Criminal
Procedure Act (the
CPA).
Section 40(1)(b)
provides:
‘
(1)
A peace officer may without warrant arrest
any person-
. .
.
(b)
whom he reasonably suspects of having committed an offence referred
to in Schedule
1, other than the offence of escaping from lawful
custody.’
[15].
Robbery is an offence listed in Schedule 1 of
the CPA. And it is accepted by the parties that Warrant Officer
Henning, who effected
the arrests of the plaintiffs, was a peace
officer at the time of the arrest.
[16].
The Minister’s plea is a confession and
avoidance, which attracts the onus to prove the justification
pleaded, that is, the
lawfulness of the arrests in terms
s 40(1)(b)
,
on a balance of probabilities. In order to discharge this onus, the
Minister was required to establish that Warrant Officer Henning
in
fact entertained a suspicion that the plaintiffs had committed the
offence of robbery of the complainant on 27 January 2014
and that the
suspicion rested upon reasonable grounds. Once these jurisdictional
facts have been established the arrestor has a
discretion whether or
not to carry out an arrest.
[17].
As I have indicated, a charge of robbery had
been laid by the complainant and she informed the Warrant Officer –
some eight
months after the fact – that the perpetrators were
the two persons whom she had by chance stumbled onto at a bus
terminus.
Having been briefed by the Investigating Officer and having
required confirmation from the complainant personally that the two
plaintiffs were the persons who robbed her, there can be little doubt
that Warrant Officer Henning would have held a suspicion that
the
plaintiffs had perpetrated the robbery of the complainant. However,
s
40(1)(b)
of the CPA requires more. The question is whether, all
things considered, this suspicion was reasonably held. ‘Suspicion’
implies an absence of certainty or adequate proof. Thus, a suspicion
might be reasonable even if there is insufficient evidence
for a
prima facie
case against the arrestee.
[18].
The plaintiffs’ contention is that the
evidence did not establish that Warrant Officer Henning had
reasonable grounds to suspect
that they (the plaintiffs) were the
ones who perpetrated the robbery of the complainant. He relied solely
and exclusively on the
fact that the complainant had fingered them as
the culprits and the complainant did so rather convincingly and
adamantly. He had
no regard, so the plaintiffs contend, to their
explanations that they could not possibly have been the pair who
robbed the complainant
as they did not even know each other before
they met at the bus terminus on that particular day, which is a fact
which could easily
have been verified by the police officer. In fact,
this is exactly what the police officers at Park Station did.
[19].
Moreover, the police officer failed to have
regard to the fact that the robbery occurred months prior to the
identification, which
increased – quite dramatically –
the possibility that the complainant may have been mistaken. I find
myself in agreement
with these submissions on behalf of the
plaintiffs. The point is that the arresting officer was required to
have regard to all
of the facts and circumstances at his disposal,
including the fact that the plaintiffs flatly denied their
involvement in the robbery,
as well as their contention that they
only met at the bus terminus. Where reasonably possible, the Warrant
Officer was also required
to satisfy himself of the merit of the
contention by the plaintiffs, which he clearly failed to do.
[20].
It
is trite that police officials who purport to act in terms of
s
40(1)(b)
of the CPA should investigate an exculpatory explanation
offered by a suspect before they can form a reasonable suspicion for
the
purposes of a lawful arrest. (
Louw
& Another v Minister of Safety and Security & Others
[5]
).
A peace officer who suspects that a crime has been committed must
first, if he has the opportunity, take the trouble to either
confirm
his suspicion or allow it to dissipate. This must be done especially
where the suspicion is somewhat unfounded. A peace
officer who fails
to substantiate his suspicion even though he has the opportunity to
do so, does not act reasonably if he acts
on that suspicion. See
State
v Purcell-Gilpin
[6]
.
[21].
I interpose here to deal briefly with a factual
dispute between the plaintiffs and the Minister relating to what was
said by the
plaintiffs to Warrant Officer Henning after the
plaintiffs had alighted from the bus at his request. His evidence was
that the
plaintiffs, on being confronted with the accusation that
they had robbed the complainant during January 2014, simply told him
that
they knew nothing about that case and then – bizarrely –
just left it at that. Their attitude, so he testified, was
rather
blasé, which he found rather peculiar – as do I, but I
shall revert to this aspect shortly. The plaintiffs
did not tell him
anything about what had transpired at Park Station and they elected
not to elaborate on why they denied any involvement
in the incident
in January 2014. His story stands in direct contrast to that of the
plaintiffs, whose version was that they had
told the two police
officers who hauled them off the bus that they had been confronted by
police at Park Station, at the instance
of the complainant, with the
very same unfounded accusations and that the police there were
convinced of their innocence and let
them go. They also explained to
the police officers – two of them, according to the plaintiffs
– that they did not
know each other and only met at the bus
terminus at Park Station.
[22].
I do not accept the version of Warrant Officer
Henning. He himself admits, rather unwittingly, that his story is
improbable. He
said that in all his years as a police officer he has
never seen anything like this – arrestees refusing to explain
why they
deny any involvement in the crime. This, to me, sounds like
the very definition of inherent improbably. He also got the distinct
impression that they did not care about the case. On the other hand,
the second plaintiff, in particular, testified that she told
the
police about the incident at Park Station and that they were let off
the hook by the police officers there. She also confronted
the
complainant in the presence of the police in Vanderbijlpark and
begged of her to take a closer look at her, because, so she
explained, it could not possibly have been her that robbed her.
[23].
I reiterate that the version of Warrant Officer
Henning, if regard is had to all of the evidence on that point, is an
improbable
one. The simple fact of the matter is that it seems so
very unlikely and unnatural and even more implausible that the
plaintiffs
would not mention to the police in Vanderbijlpark the
incident at Park Station, which, in all likelihood, was their ticket
out
of being arrested. Moreover, the complainant’s evidence
corroborates the version of the plaintiff and contradicts that of
the
Warrant Officer. The Complainant confirmed that in Vanderbijlpark,
the second plaintiff protested her innocence rather vociferously.
It
is for these reasons that I reject the Minister’s version on
this aspect of the case and accept that of the plaintiffs.
[24].
In any event, the Minister bears the onus to
prove that the arresting officer acted reasonably. The version of the
plaintiffs cannot
possibly be said to be less probable than that of
the Minister. At best for the Minister, the two versions are equally
probable.
So, even if my rejection of the Minister’s version is
incorrect, the matter should still be adjudicated on the basis of the
plaintiffs’ version – the Minister would not have proved
his version if the probabilities are equally balanced.
[25].
In my judgment, the reasonable thing for
Warrant Officer Henning to have done would have been to accept the
explanation by the plaintiffs
that they could not have been
responsible – as partners in crime – for the robbery of
the complainant, as they did
not know each other. All that he needed
to do was to obtain their full details and particulars, including
their full names, addresses
(home and work) and identity numbers,
which would have enabled the investigating officer to verify their
story. Even at 19:30 on
a Friday night, he probably could have called
the principal at the school at which the second plaintiff worked as a
teacher to
verify her story. This should have been done without
arresting the plaintiffs.
[26].
The question, whether the suspicion of
the person affecting the arrest is reasonable, must be approached
objectively. Accordingly,
the circumstances giving rise to the
suspicion must be such as would ordinarily move a reasonable person
to form the suspicion
that the arrestee had committed a first
schedule offence. As I have indicated above, the way I see things,
all of the information
before Warrant Officer Henning, when he
effected the arrest, did not demonstrate that the actual suspicion
held by him was founded
upon reasonable grounds. I am therefore of
the view that the Minister did not establish that there were
reasonable grounds to suspect
that the plaintiffs committed the
robbery. The arrests and subsequent detention were therefore
unlawful.
[27].
It bears emphasising that the arresting police officer, once faced
with the plaintiffs’
claim that they could not possibly be the
persons who robbed the complainant, was required, before arresting
the plaintiffs, to
conduct a ‘mini investigation’. At the
very least, he ought reasonably to have made a telephone call to a
colleague
of the second plaintiff, which probably would have revealed
the true state of affairs and would have exonerated the plaintiffs.
Alternatively, he should have done a little test as was done by the
police officers at Park Station.
[28].
In sum, I am of the view that the arresting officer acted
unreasonably, which means that the
arrest and detention was unlawful.
[29].
As regards, the quantum of the damages to be awarded to the
plaintiffs, they testified that
when they were held overnight at the
Police Cells in Vanderbijlpark on the Friday night, conditions were
intolerable. They were
traumatised, understandably so. The cell was
dirty and the ablution facility was disgusting. Although, they were
offered something
to eat at about 20:00 on the Friday night, both of
them were not able to eat due to the stress.
[30].
Their detention in the Wierdabrug Police cells from Saturday, the 4
th
of October 2014, to the Monday, the 6
th
October 2014, when
they appeared in court, was just as unpleasant. The first plaintiff,
it should not be forgotten, was eight months
pregnant and for her the
situation would have been worse. She also spent one additional night
in custody at the Kgosi Mampura Correctional
Facility. They felt
particularly hurt and their feelings injured by the fact that they
were looking forward to a pleasant trip
to the hometown, only to be
unceremoniously pulled off a bus and arrested. The embarrassment they
would have suffered as a result
is unimaginable.
[31].
As was said
in
Minister
of Safety and Security v Seymour
[7]
:
‘
[20]
Money can never be more than a crude
solatium
for the
deprivation of what in truth can never be restored and there is no
empirical measure for the loss. The awards I have referred
to reflect
no discernible pattern other than that our courts are not extravagant
in compensating the loss. It needs also to be
kept in mind when
making such awards that there are many legitimate calls upon the
public purse to ensure that other rights that
are no less important
also receive protection.’
[32].
In
Minister
of Safety and Security v Tyulu
[8]
,
Bosielo JA said the following at para 26 of the judgment:
‘
In
the assessment of damages for unlawful arrest and detention, it is
important to bear in mind that the primary purpose is not
to enrich
the aggrieved party but to offer him or her some much-needed
solatium
for his or her injured feelings. It is therefore crucial that serious
attempts be made to ensure that the damages awarded are commensurate
with the injury inflicted. However, our courts should be astute to
ensure that the awards they make for such infractions reflect
the
importance of the right to personal liberty and the seriousness with
which any arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty is
viewed in our
law. I readily concede that it is impossible to determine an award of
damages for this kind of injuria with any kind
of mathematical
accuracy. Although it is always helpful to have regard to awards made
in previous cases to serve as a guide, such
an approach if slavishly
followed can prove to be treacherous. The correct approach is to have
regard to all the facts of the particular
case and to determine the
quantum on such facts.’
[33].
Because it is always helpful to use as a guide awards made in
previous cases, I shall refer
briefly to previous judgments relating
to the appropriate quantum to be awarded as damages.
[34].
In
Minister
of Safety and Security and Another v Johannes Francois Swart
[9]
,
an amount of R50 000 was considered appropriate for a claimant,
who was unlawfully arrested and detained for four and a half
hours.
In
Van
der Westhuizen v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
[10]
,
the arrestee was awarded R400 000 by Kgomo J for an arrest and
detention for a period of thirty two hours.
[35].
In
Woji
v The Minister of Police
[11]
the plaintiff was arrested as a result of mistaken identity and
imprisoned for a period of thirteen months. He was placed in an
overcrowded prison and was subjected to a gang that sodomised other
prisoners. He was raped twice and as a result experienced difficulty
in having sexual relations with his girlfriend. He also witnessed
another prisoner being stabbed which made him fear for his life.
He
was allocated a single cell after eight months and as a result was
isolated and lonely. He was awarded damages by the Supreme
Court of
Appeal of the amount of R500 000.
[36].
The arrest and detention of the plaintiffs were undoubtedly a
traumatic experience for both
of them. They were on the way to their
hometowns, and the last thing they would have expected was to get
incarcerated for something
that they did not do. The first night they
spent in the Police Cells in Vanderbijlpark, they cried the whole
night. Even after
their release, they were probably still subjected
to emotional trauma as there was always that suspicion by others that
they were
likely involved in the robbery.
[37].
In all the circumstances, and having regard to previous awards for
unlawful arrest and detention,
I have come to the conclusion that,
considering the length of period for which the plaintiffs were
detained and the prevailing
conditions under which they were
incarcerated, it would be appropriate to award the first plaintiff
the sum of R250 000 and
the second plaintiff an amount R290 000
as damages for unlawful arrest and detention.
Order
[38].
Accordingly, I make the following order: -
(1)
Judgment is granted in favour of the first plaintiff against the
defendant
for: -
(a)
Payment of the sum of R250 000;
(b)
Payment of interest on R250 000 at the applicable legal rate of
interest
of 9% per annum from date of service of the summons, namely
21 September 2015, to date of final payment;
(c)
Costs of suit.
(2)
Judgment is granted in favour of the second plaintiff against the
defendant
for: -
(a)
Payment of the sum of R290 000;
(b)
Payment of interest on R290 000 at the applicable legal rate
interest
of 9% per annum from date of service of the summons, namely
22 September 2015, to date of final payment;
(c)
Costs of suit.
L R ADAMS
Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng
Local Division, Johannesburg
HEARD
ON:
30
th
and 31
st
August, 1
st
, 2
nd
and 3
rd
September 2021.
JUDGMENT
DATE:
5
th
October 2021 – judgment handed down
electronically
FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS:
Advocate Mancha Manaka
INSTRUCTED
BY:
M N Mkanzi, Roodepoort
FOR THE
DEFENDANT:
Advocate S Kunene
INSTRUCTED
BY:
The State Attorney, Johannesburg
[1]
Stellenbosch
Farmers' Winery Group Ltd and Another v Martell and Others
2003 (1) SA 11 (SCA).
[2]
National
Employers' General Insurance Co Ltd v Jager
1984 (4) SA 437
(ECD).
[3]
Govan
v Skidmore
1952 (1) SA 732 (N).
[4]
At
para 5.
[5]
Louw
& Another v Minister of Safety and Security & Others
2006 (2) SACR 178 (T).
[6]
State
v Purcell-Gilpin
1971 (3) SA 548.
[7]
Minister
of Safety and Security v Seymour
2006 (6) SA 320 (SCA)
[8]
Minister
of Safety and Security v Tyulu
2009 (5) SA 85 (SCA)
[9]
Minister
of Safety and Security and Another v Johannes Francois Swart
(194/11)
[2012] ZASCA 16
(22 March 2012).
[10]
Van der
Westhuizen v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
Case No 14013/2010 SGHC (9 October 2012).
[11]
Woji v
The Minister of Police
(92/2012)
[2014] ZASCA 108
(11 September 2014).