About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2021
>>
[2021] ZAGPJHC 163
|
|
Solomon and Another v Junkeeparsad (37003/2019; 37456/2019) [2021] ZAGPJHC 163; 2022 (3) SA 526 (GJ) (2 September 2021)
HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
COMMERCIAL
COURT
REPORTABLE:
Yes.
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes.
REVISED:
Yes
Case
No: 37003/2019
Case
No: 37456/2019
In
the matters between
RICHARD
ALAN
SOLOMON
First Applicant
ARLETTE
MARY MACMANUS
Second Applicant
and
VISHAL
JUNKEEPARSAD
Respondent
Case
Summary
:
Advocate
- Fees - Whether attorney liable for fees charged by advocate whom he
or she has instructed - Developments in the regulation
of the legal
profession subsequent to the
Bertelsmann
v Per
1996
(2) SA 375
(T) decision have evolved the ‘professional practice
or trade usage’ that the attorney is liable for the fees
charged
by the advocate he or she has briefed
to
a hardened rule of law that must be implied in the contract between
the attorney and advocate as a matter of law, if not so expressly
agreed. Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (LPA) - Code of Conduct for All
Legal Practitioners, Candidate Legal Practitioners and Juristic
Entities published under GenN 168 in
GG
42337 on 29
March 2019 under authority of s 36 of the LPA.
JUDGMENT
MEYER
J
[1]
The hearing of two applications, which have been instituted under
case numbers 37003/19
(the Marimuthu application) and 37456/19 (the
Isseri application), has been consolidated. The applications have
been instituted
by two members of the Johannesburg Bar, Adv Richard
Alan Solomon SC and Adv Arlette Mary MacManus (who are cited as the
first and
second applicants in each application), against Mr Vishal
Suresh Junkeeparsad (who is cited as the respondent in each
application).
He is a practising attorney and the sole director of
Vishal Junkeeparsad and Company Inc., Umhlanga, Durban.
[2]
In the Marimuthu application the first applicant seeks payment in the
amount of R1
653 880.00 plus interest and the second applicant seeks
payment in the amount of R829 399.50 plus interest from the
respondent,
being outstanding fees owed to them as counsel in respect
of legal services they rendered to his client, Mr Marimuthu, and
members
of his family. In the Isseri application the first applicant
seeks payment in the amount of R1 016 640.85.00 plus interest and the
second applicant seeks payment in the amount of R657 642.00 plus
interest from the respondent, being outstanding fees owed to them
as
counsel in respect of legal services they rendered to his client, ‘Dr
Isseri, and various corporate entities controlled
by or through him
and of which he is the controlling mind’.
[3]
Instead of filing answering affidavits, the respondent elected to
file notices in
terms of r 6(5)(d)(iii) of the Uniform Rules of Court
of his intention to only raise a question of law in each application
and
setting out such question of law, which is identical in each
application. Subsequently the respondent sought condonation for his
failure to also have filed answering affidavits within the time fixed
by an order of this court and that he be granted an extension
of time
to file them. I dismissed his interlocutory application for
condonation and extension of time:
Junkeeparsad v Solomon and
another
(37003/2019; 37456/2019) [2021] ZAGPJHC 48 (7 May 2021).
What remains to be determined in each application, therefore, is the
point
of law raised by the respondent. The allegations in the
applicants’ founding affidavits must be taken as established
facts:
Boxer Superstores Mthatha and another v Mbenya
2007 (5)
SA 450
(SCA) para 4.
[4]
The question set forth in each of the respondent’s amended
notices in terms
of r 6(5)(d)(iii) is this:
‘
The
question of law that the above Honourable Court will be called upon
to determine at the hearing of the above application is
whether or
not:
4.1
the Respondent in his personal capacity can be sued and a judgment
entered against his personal
name; alternatively
4.2
the Respondent be held directly and personally liable for the alleged
obligations of a separate
and distinct juristic entity, namely the
registered professional firm that briefed the Applicants, without
suing the said professional
firm; and
4.3
the privity of contract exists as between the Applicants and the
Respondent or whether it
lies as between the Applicants and the
clients.’
[5]
The advocates profession in South Africa was largely
self-regulatory in the
past, in the sense that no statutory or other
body had the power to prescribe rules of professional conduct to
members of the profession.
The practice, in the past, had been for
voluntary associations of advocates to regulate the conduct of their
members by laying
down rules of professional conduct:
General
Council of the Bar of South Africa v Van der Spuy
1999
(1) SA 577
(T) at 599D-E. The General Council of the Bar of South
Africa is an umbrella organisation of various constituent Bars in
South
Africa, including the Johannesburg Society of Advocates (the
Johannesburg Bar). The ethical rules of the Johannesburg Bar in
particular
include the rules that an advocate may not be briefed by a
member of the public, an advocate may not receive payment directly
from
a client, and that fees charged for any professional services
rendered by an advocate may only be paid by or through an attorney,
or by the Legal Aid Board. There are certain exceptions to these
rules which are not applicable in this case. It is contrary to
the
etiquette of the Johannesburg Bar for an advocate to sue an
attorney for fees; his or her remedy being contained in the
ethical
rules. In special circumstances an advocate may apply to the
Johannesburg Bar Council for leave to sue an attorney for
outstanding
fees. The applicants
in
casu
applied to and
obtained the permission from the Johannesburg Bar Council to sue the
respondent.
[6]
From my own experience as a member of the Johannesburg Bar (21
years), I can only
echo what Southwood J (Smit J concurring)
said in
Bertelsmann
v Per
1996 (2) SA
375
(T), that he knows from his
‘
own
experience at the Bar (some 22 years) that attorneys have invariably
paid [his] fees and [he] always accepted that that was
the practice,
if not the law.’ What counsel is to charge is the
subject-matter of an agreement between counsel and attorney,
not
between counsel and the client. The client does not approve what
counsel charges; that is the function of the attorney who
is liable
to pay the fees: Sutherland J in
Fluxmans
Incorporated v Lithos Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd and
another (No 1)
2015
(2) SA 295
(GJ) para 35. In their minority judgment in
General
Council of the Bar of South Africa v Geach and Others
2013
(2) SA 52
(SCA) paras 144-145, Wallis JA (Leach JA concurring) said
the ‘[a]ttorneys may be obliged to procure services for their
clients,
such as the services of the sheriff, an advocate or an
expert witness. However, those services are rendered to the
client,
not the attorney. . . . The fact that advocates look to their
instructing attorney for payment of their fees does not affect this’.
[7]
Our case law illustrates that an advocate may be suspended from
practice or struck
from the roll of advocates even if he or she is
not subject to the rules of the General Society of Advocates and even
if the constitution
of his or her own professional body allows
receiving instructions and payment from members of the public.
Van der Spuy
is an example. There, Swart J (Du Plessis J concurring) said this
(608A-F):
‘
The
present state of our law is that, subject to exceptions referred to
above, an advocate may not accept instructions directly
from a lay
client. It is not necessary to decide whether an agreement between an
advocate and his client that the former's
fees are to be paid in
advance might in law be possible. However, as our law presently
stands, such an agreement, is highly undesirable.
The practice
insofar as it is relevant, flowing from the fact of a divided Bar, is
and has been that the advocate in the first
instance looks to the
attorney for payment of his fees. To take payment directly from
the client negates the essential role
of the attorney as the
principal representative of the client with a general duty to attend
to the interests of the client, including
liaising on behalf of the
client with the advocate concerning his fees. To negate the role of
the attorney would be to deprive
the lay client of essential
protection. In view of the fact that respondent states that where
work is accepted directly from a
client, payment from the same
source will be a natural concomitant, it will also be a natural
concomitant that the advocate will
take a deposit to cover his fees
and possible expenses. Respondent has not stated whether this was
done. If such deposit is taken,
it does not go into a legally
designated trust fund, does not constitute trust moneys which do
not fall into the estate of
the advocate and which are protected
against the advocate's creditors and the client does not have
recourse to a fidelity fund
in case of theft. In addition, the
advocate is not liable to keep proper books of account and the client
does not enjoy the protection
which he has
vis-à-vis
an
attorney in that the Law Society is entitled to inspect his books.’
[8]
In
Bertelsmann
at 380D-381H, Southwood J said the following:
In
Minister
of Finance and Another v Law Society, Transvaal
[1991] ZASCA 88
;
1991 (4) SA
544
(A) eminent counsel (R S Welsh QC) advanced the following
propositions in argument with regard to the relationship between
attorney
and counsel and the attorney's liability for counsel's fees
(at 552D-553D):
“
The
appellants sought to mount a case that attorneys engage advocates as
principals. The advocate is, in other words, engaged as
subcontractor
to the attorneys; as between the attorney and his client, the
advocacy service is one rendered by the attorney to
his client
through his subcontractor, the advocate. This contention is erroneous
on the facts and in law. The advocate only has
one client and that is
the litigant for whom he acts. That fact should not be obscured
by the machinery created by the payment
of his fee: (1) In
Roman-Dutch law, counsel was entitled to sue his client for his fee.
(2) English law does not recognise any
contractual relationship
between a barrister and either his instructing solicitor or his
client. He can accordingly sue neither.
The solicitor is bound to pay
the barrister's fees only under the rules of etiquette of his
profession.
Halsbury's
Laws of England
4th
ed vol 4 at 664 paras 1198 and 1201. (3) The Cape practice in the
previous century was initially for counsel's fees to
be prepaid. That
practice was, however, ultimately found to be impractical. The
practice increasingly became for counsel to look
to his instructing
attorney for his fee. That practice has by now probably hardened into
law, which would mean that the advocate
is today entitled to sue
either his client or his instructing attorney for his fee once the
necessary permission has been obtained
from his professional body.
Van Zyl 'Can an Advocate Sue for his Fees?' 1896
CLJ
169
at 174-5 and 181; Joubert (ed)
Law
of South Africa
vol
14 at 213 para 230, and at 248-50 para 257. (4) The practice that has
developed whereby the attorney impliedly agrees
to stand good for
payment of the fee owed by the client to counsel does not mean that
the attorney has replaced the client as contracting
party
vis-à-vis
counsel.
There is no reason to infer that the contractual relationship
between counsel and client recognised in Roman-Dutch
law has changed
in any way. It remains open to counsel to sue his client. The only
change has been that the attorney has interposed
to stand good for
the client's debt owed to counsel. The appellants would have it that
the attorney acts only as principal and
not also as his client's
agent when instructing counsel. On that construction, the attorney
contracts with his client to provide
the services rendered by
counsel, and then subcontracts those services to counsel. That
construction is untenable.
It
would constitute an unwarranted departure from Roman-Dutch law. It
would mean that the attorney is an independent middle man
between the
client and counsel. He would be liable to his client in contract for
the advocacy service rendered by counsel. He would
in his charge to
his client be entitled to add his own mark-up or profit margin to
counsel's fees, something which attorneys have
hitherto not been
entitled to do. He would no longer be obliged to retain in trust
payments received from his client on account
of counsel's fees, but
would be entitled to deal with the money so received once the
services had been rendered, whether or not
counsel has been paid. See
s 78 of the Attorneys' Act 53 of 1979. There would no longer be
privity of contract between counsel
and client. That would have
implications for both of them. The client would not have a claim in
contract against counsel for breach
of his duties. Counsel would no
longer be entitled to sue the client for his fee. All these
implications are so foreign to
the relationship between client,
attorney and counsel as we understand it today that the construction
from which they flow contended
for by the appellants, cannot be
correct.”
The
comments relating to the liability of the attorney for counsel's fees
coincide with my own understanding of the position. It
is also
significant that no reference was made in the very comprehensive
heads of argument to any rule of law, common or statutory,
or to any
judgment of any Court stating that an attorney is as a matter of law
liable for advocates' fees.
In
giving the judgment of the Court in
Minister of Finance and
Another v Law Society, Transvaal (supra
) Goldstone JA said (at
556I-557B):
“
The
moneys now in question are in nowise paid to the attorney, notary or
conveyancer for a service rendered by him. They are paid
in respect
of the service rendered by counsel, correspondent attorney, notary or
conveyancer, expert witness, deputy sheriff or
messenger of the
court, as the case may be, on behalf of the client. The moneys may
not be claimed from the client by the instructing
attorney, notary or
conveyancer save in respect of the service performed by the third
party. In no way does the fee or other amount
accrue to and in no way
is it received by the attorney, notary or conveyancer for a service
rendered by him. The fact that because
of a professional practice or
a contract the attorney, notary or conveyancer may be personally
liable to pay for the service performed
by the third party in no way
has as a consequence that the attorney, notary or conveyancer himself
performs that service. The respondent
correctly accepts that the
fee charged by an attorney, notary or conveyancer for the work
performed by him in relation to instructing
counsel or other third
party is properly to be regarded as part of the fee of such attorney,
notary or conveyancer and that the
levy would be payable thereon.”
It
would seem that the Appellate Division regarded the arrangement that
an attorney is liable for the fees charged by the advocate
he
has briefed as something arising from contract or as a professional
practice.’
[9]
The
Minister of Finance
judgment to which Southwood J referred
dealt with the question whether certain moneys received by an
attorney for disbursements
amounted to a ‘consideration’
for taxation purposes. Southwood J continued by rejecting counsel’s
argument that
the practice that exists between attorneys and
advocates has evolved to such an extent that it has become a hardened
rule of law
and accordingly that attorneys are liable for counsel's
fees. He concluded as follows:
‘
I
am not satisfied that the term contended for must be implied in the
contract as a matter of law. It depends upon the existence
of a
professional practice or trade usage which would have to be
established by evidence.’
[10]
While regarding himself bound by the
Bertelsmann
decision, Jordaan
JA in dealing with the liability of an attorney for the fees of an
advocate in
Serrurier
and another v Korzia and another
2010
(3) 166 (W), opined that an attorney would always be liable for
counsel’s fees in view of the following (p 180G-181A):
‘
1.
The obligation to pay fees must flow from an agreement between
parties.
2.
This agreement can either be an express agreement or by necessary
implication.
3.
Counsel is not allowed in terms of his ethical rules to receive
instructions or payment from a client.
General Council of the
Bar of South Africa v Van der Spuy
(supra); and
De
Freitas and Another v Society of Advocates of Natal and Another
2001
(3) SA 750
(2001 (6) BCLR 531).
These two cases illustrate that an
advocate will be suspended from practice even if he is not subject to
the rules of the General
Bar Council and even if the constitution of
his own professional body allows receiving instructions and payment
from members
of the public.
4.
If there is not an express agreement between counsel and attorney the
necessary implication is therefore that it can never be
an implied
term of the agreement that counsel look to the client to pay his
fees.
5.
Counsel will not be permitted to conclude an express agreement that
his fees be paid by anyone else than his attorney.
6.
It therefore in my view follows logically that an attorney
will always in our law be liable for counsel's fees, even in
the
event of the client not paying him.’
[11]
I respectfully subscribe to the view expressed by Jordaan AJ in
Serrurier
that the attorney would always be liable for the fees charged by an
advocate whom he or she has instructed. Nevertheless, developments
in
the regulation of the legal profession subsequent to the
Bertelsmann
decision have
evolved the ‘professional practice or trade usage’ that
the attorney is liable for the fees charged by
the advocate he or she
has briefed
to a
hardened rule of law that must be implied in the contract between the
attorney and advocate as a matter of law, if not so expressly
agreed.
[12]
The advocates' profession in South Africa is no longer
self-regulatory. The Legal Practice Act
28 of 2014 (the LPA), which
commenced on 1 November 2018, created a single unified statutory
body, the South African Legal Practice
Council (the Council), that
now regulates all legal practitioners and all candidate legal
practitioners. In terms of s 34(2)
(a)
(i)
of the LPA, an advocate may only render legal services in expectation
of a fee, commission, gain or reward upon receipt of a
brief from an
attorney. Only an advocate who,
inter
alia
, is in
possession of a Fidelity Fund Certificate may, in terms of s
34(2)
(b)
,
render legal services upon receipt of a request directly from a
member of the public. The Council determines the standards of
professional and ethical conduct of all legal practitioners and all
candidate legal practitioners. In terms of s 36 of the LPA,
the
Council
must develop a
code of conduct that applies to all legal practitioners and all
candidate legal practitioners and may review and
amend such code of
conduct. The code of conduct and every subsequent amendment must be
published in the
Gazette
and
the rules. It serves as the prevailing standard of conduct, which
legal practitioners, candidate legal practitioners and
juristic
entities must adhere to, and failure to do so constitutes misconduct.
[13]
Under the authority of s 36 of the
LPA, a Code of Conduct for All Legal Practitioners, Candidate Legal
Practitioners and Juristic
Entities was published under GenN 168 in
GG
42337
on 29 March 2019 (the Code of Conduct).
It
serves as the prevailing standard of conduct and will be enforced by
the Council. It consists of the following parts: (I) Definitions;
(II) Code of conduct: general provisions; (III) Conduct of attorneys;
(IV) Conduct of advocates contemplated in section 34(2)
(a)
(i)
of the LPA; (V) Conduct of advocates contemplated in section
34(2)
(a)
(ii)
of the LPA; (VI) Conduct of legal practitioners and candidate legal
practitioners in relation to appearances in court and before
tribunals; and (VII) Conduct of legal practitioners not in private
practice. Failure to adhere to the Code of Conduct will constitute
misconduct and transgressors will be subjected to disciplinary
proceedings in terms of the rules promulgated under sections 95(1),
95(3) and 109(2) of the LPA in
Government
Gazette
41781
of 20 July 2018.
[14]
Paragraph 1 of the Code of Conduct defines ‘advocate’ to
mean ‘a legal practitioner
who is admitted and enrolled as such
under the [LPA]’, ‘attorney’ to mean ‘a legal
practitioner who is
admitted and enrolled as such under the [LPA]’,
and ‘counsel’ to mean ‘an advocate referred to in
section
34(2)
(a)
(i)’.
We are
in casu
not
concerned with an advocate practising as such referred to in s
34(2)
(a)
(ii)
of the LPA. That is an advocate who
inter
alia
is in
possession of a Fidelity Certificate and who may render legal
services upon receipt of a request directly from a member of
the
public.
[15]
Paragraph 27.2 of the Code of Conduct provides that ‘[c]ounsel
shall accept a brief only
from an attorney, and counsel shall not
accept a brief directly from any other person or entity for either
litigious or non-litigious
work of any kind, save that counsel may
accept a brief . . . from a justice centre . . . [or]
perform professional services on
brief from an attorney or legal practitioner in another country,
including the equivalent of a
state attorney or the attorney general
or director of public prosecutions, without the intervention of a
South African attorney’.
[16]
It is clear from the provisions of para 26 of the Code of Conduct
that counsel may only decline
the acceptance of an offer of a brief
in certain circumstances,
inter alia
, ‘if agreement
between counsel and the instructing attorney cannot be reached on the
fee to be charged by counsel’
(para 26.5). Counsel undertakes
to perform legal professional services in court-craft and knowledge
of the law only upon the offer
and acceptance of a brief (para 27.1).
Counsel shall receive fees charged only from or through the
instructing attorney who gave
the brief to counsel, except where such
attorney, for reasons of insolvency or any other reason, is unable to
pay, in which circumstances,
with leave from the Provincial Council,
counsel may receive fees due from another source ‘in discharge
of the indebtedness
of the attorney’ (para 27.4).
[17]
Paragraphs 34.2 and 34.3 of the Code of Conduct provide that
‘[c]ounsel shall render accounts
to the instructing attorney .
. . and shall receive payment only from the instructing attorney’
and ‘shall not submit
an account directly to a client except by
agreement with the instructing attorney and client and on condition
that the same account
is simultaneously submitted to the instructing
attorney, nor receive payment directly from a client’. And para
35 provides
that ‘[c]ounsel may sue an attorney . . . for fees
due and payable to him or her’.
[18]
Paragraph 18.18 of the Code of Conduct reads thus:
‘
An
attorney shall pay timeously, in accordance with any contractual
terms or, in the absence of contractual terms, in accordance
with the
standard terms of payment, the reasonable charges of an advocate whom
he has instructed to provide legal services to or
on behalf of a
client; such liability shall extend to every partner of a firm or
member of an incorporated practice, and if the
firm is dissolved or
the incorporated practice is wound up, liability shall remain with
each partner or member, as the case may
be, the one paying the other
to be absolved.’
Furthermore,
para 21 provides
inter alia
that the failure of an attorney to
comply with the Code of Conduct or any rule with which it is the
attorney’s duty to comply
constitutes misconduct.
[19]
By virtue of the LPA and the Code of Conduct made and promulgated in
terms s 36 thereof, an attorney,
as a rule of law, is liable for the
fees charged by the advocate he or she has briefed. What counsel is
to charge is the subject-matter
of an agreement between counsel
and attorney, not between counsel and the client. It is the attorney
who offers the brief
to counsel and counsel who accepts the brief or
declines the acceptance of the offer of the brief,
inter
alia, if agreement
between counsel and the instructing attorney cannot be reached on the
fee to be charged by counsel. Fees owed
to counsel are the
indebtedness of the attorney. The attorney’s liability for
payment of counsel’s fees who he or she
has instructed, also
extends to every partner of a firm of
attorneys or member of an incorporated firm, and if the firm is
dissolved or the incorporated
firm is wound up, such liability
remains with each partner or member. Also, where such attorney, for
reasons of insolvency or any
other reason, is unable to pay, counsel
may, with leave from the Provincial Council, receive the fees due to
him or her from another
source ‘in discharge of the
indebtedness of the attorney’.
[20]
I am not suggesting that there is not also privity of contract
between counsel and the client
for whom counsel is briefed to render
legal services, or that such client would not have a claim in
contract against counsel for
breach of his or her duties. Those are
matters I need not decide
in
casu
. The
acceptance by counsel of an offer by
an attorney of a brief, what counsel is to charge and the legal
liability for payment of the
fees charged by counsel are the
subject-matter of a contract between the instructing attorney and
counsel alone. The client for
whom counsel is to render the legal
services is not in privity of that contract, although counsel renders
the professional services
to the client, and not the instructing
attorney.
[21]
The applicants do not rely on any contractual terms contemplated in
para 18.18 of the Code of
Conduct. The respondent, therefore, is
liable to pay their reasonable charges timeously. Their allegations
that the respondent,
in his professional capacity as an attorney,
instructed them, in their professional capacities as advocates, to
provide legal services
to or on behalf of his clients, and that it
was an express, implied or tacit term of their agreement that the
respondent would
be liable for payment of their fees charged in
respect of such legal services rendered by them, must be taken as
accepted facts.
Their allegations that they indeed rendered such
professional services to or on behalf of his clients, that their fees
charged
and claimed in the present applications were for such
professional services rendered, and that all such fees are due, owing
and
payable to them, must also be taken as accepted facts. The
reasonableness of the applicants’ charges for the professional
services they rendered has not been challenged.
[22]
The respondent as the ‘attorney’ who instructed the
applicants in their capacities
as advocates to provide legal services
to or on behalf of his or his incorporated firm’s clients,
therefore, is liable to
pay the reasonable charges of the applicants,
although his liability also extends to every member of his
incorporated firm, if
there are any other member or members. The
applicants need not sue the respondent’s incorporated firm or
any other member
thereof. He may legally be sued personally and a
judgment can legally be entered against him.
[23]
In the result the following orders are made:
(a)
In case no: 37003/2019:
(i)
The respondent is to
pay to the first applicant the amount of R1 653 880.00 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 10.25%
per annum
a
tempore morae
from
24 October 2019 until date of payment.
(ii)
The respondent is to
pay to the second applicant the amount of R829 399.50 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 10.25% per
annum
a
tempore morae
from
24 October 2019 until date of payment.
(iii)
The respondent is to
pay the costs of this application, including those of senior counsel.
(b)
In case No: 37456/2019:
(i)
The respondent is to
pay to the first applicant the amount of R1 016 640.85 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 10.25% per
annum
a
tempore morae
from
29 October 2019 until date of payment.
(ii) The respondent is to
pay to the second applicant the amount of R657 642.00 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 10.25%
per annum
a tempore morae
from 29 October 2019 until date of payment.
(iii)The respondent is to
pay the costs of this application, including those of senior counsel.
P.A.
MEYER
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Judgment:
02 September 2021
Heard:
01 September 2021
Applicants’
Counsel:
Adv P Stais SC
Instructed
by:
Ian Levitt & Associates, Sandton, Johannesburg
Respondent’s
Counsel: Adv DJ Saks
Instructed
by:
Mohamed Hassim Attorneys, Musgrave, Durban