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[2017] ZASCA 29
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New Adventure Shelf 122 (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services (310/2016) [2017] ZASCA 29; [2017] 2 All SA 784 (SCA); 2017 (5) SA 94 (SCA); 79 SATC 233 (28 March 2017)
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case No: 310/2016
In the matter between:
NEW ADVENTURE SHELF 122 (PTY)
LTD APPELLANT
and
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE
SERVICES RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
New Adventure Shelf 122 v
Commissioner : SARS
(310/2016)
[2017]
ZASCA 29
(28 March 2017)
Coram:
Shongwe, Leach, Wallis, Mocumie JJA
and Nicholls AJA
Heard:
19 February 2017
Delivered:
28 March 2017
Summary:
Revenue: capital gains tax arising from
the sale of immovable property: sale cancelled more than three years
after assessment of
capital gains tax but before purchase price paid
in full: seller not entitled to have assessment reconsidered in the
light of the
subsequent cancellation: regard to be had to the
cancellation in assessing a capital gain or capital loss in year of
cancellation.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
The Western Cape Division
of the High Court, Cape Town (Binns-Ward J sitting as court of first
instance), judgment reported as
sub nom
New Adventure Shelf 122 (Pty) Ltd v
Commissioner for South African Revenue Service
Case
No: 7007/2015; 17 February 2016;
(2016) 78 SATC 190:
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the costs of
two counsel.
JUDGMENT
Leach
JA (
Shongwe, Wallis and Mocumie JJA and
Nicholls AJA
concurring)
[1]
The issue in this appeal relates to the consequences in regard to
capital gains tax where the sale of an asset is cancelled
before the
seller has been paid in full, with the unpaid balance of the proceeds
of the sale being forfeited and the asset being
returned to the
seller. During the 2007 tax year, the appellant company sold a piece
of immovable property near Stilbaai at a price
which resulted in it
receiving a substantial capital gain as envisaged in the Eighth
Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962
(the Act). This capital
gain was taken into account in the assessment of the appellant’s
liability for tax in respect of
that year. Unfortunately, the
purchaser thereafter paid only a portion of what it had agreed to
pay, which led to the sale being
cancelled by agreement several years
later. In terms of the cancellation agreement, the property was
returned to the appellant
who retained what payments had been made by
the purchaser as predetermined damages for breach of contract.
[2]
In these circumstances, as it had in fact received much less than the
agreed price at which it had sold the property, the appellant
attempted to persuade the respondent, the Commissioner of the South
African Revenue Services (SARS) to withdraw its tax assessment
for
the 2007 tax year and to reduce its tax liability for that year.
This, SARS was not prepared to do. When its attempts failed,
the
appellant applied to the Western Cape Division of the High Court,
Cape Town seeking an order reviewing SARS’s decision
and
directing it to do so. The matter came before Binns-Ward J who
dismissed the application. The appeal to this court is with
leave of
the court a quo.
[3]
The background facts are common cause. In 1999 the appellant, a
company with its registered address in Riversdal, Western Cape,
purchased the property at a price of R185 000. Subsequently, on
20 September 2006, a date which fell within the appellant’s
2007 tax year of assessment, the appellant concluded a written deed
of sale in terms of which it sold the property to Kalipso Twintig
(Pty) Ltd (Kalipso) at an agreed price of R17 720 000.
The deed of sale required Kalipso to pay the purchase price
by way of
a deposit of R1 200 000 (which had already been paid on 13
November 2005), with a further sum of R1 million
to be paid on the
date of registration of transfer. It provided for Kalipso to register
a bond over the property on transfer in
order to secure payment of
the balance R15 520 000. This was to be paid by way of
three equal annual instalments of R500 000
commencing on 31
October 2007, with a final payment of R14 020 000 to be
made on 31 October 2010. Pursuant to this agreement,
the property was
duly transferred to Kalipso and the envisaged bond was registered
over it.
[4]
In the light of these events, in respect of the 2007 tax year
the appellant declared a taxable capital gain of R9 746 875
as envisaged in Schedule Eight to the Act derived from the agreed
sale price (I shall return to statutory provisions relating to
the
taxation of capital gains in more detail in due course.) In an
assessment issued on 1 August 2008, SARS accepted this as being
correct and assessed the appellant as being liable to pay tax of
R1 587 277.54 for the 2007 tax year. Of this, R1 413 006.73
related to ‘normal tax’ – being the amount levied
on the capital gain less R 1 000 in respect of a loss
–
with the balance, an amount of R174 270.81, being interest
imposed under s 89
quat
of the Act.
[5]
The appellant accepts that these amounts were
correctly calculated. Importantly, it raised no objection to the
assessment which
therefore became final and conclusive under s
81(5) of the Act. For completeness I should mention that the
appellant failed to
pay the tax so assessed and had still not done so
when the application which is the subject of this appeal was heard in
the court
a quo in February 2016. Presumably this is due at least in
part to its only asset having been the property which it had sold to
Kalipso and for which it was not paid as had been agreed.
[6]
Kalipso had purchased the property for purposes of effecting a
residential development. For various reasons, including a failure
to
have the property re-zoned, these plans went awry. More importantly
for present purposes, it did not honour its obligations
in regard to
payment. Despite an extension having been granted, by November
2011 Kalipso had paid the appellant only R4 549 082
rather
than the full purchase price of R17 720 000. This breach
led to the appellant negotiating a written agreement
with Kalipso on
18 November 2011, in terms of which the sale was cancelled, with
Kaliso undertaking to restore registered title
of the property to the
appellant (this was done on 19 April 2012). Further provision was
made for the appellant to retain the payments
Kalipso had made as
agreed damages and for no further amount to bowing due to the
cancellation.
[7]
As a result of this saga, the appellant in fact received only
R4 549 082 from the sale and not the R17 720 000
Kalipso had agreed to pay.
Its
problem was that it had been taxed on a capital gain that it had not
received and that all it could obtain as a result of the
cancellation
of the sale was an assessed capital loss, with no corresponding gain
to set off against the loss.
This led to
the appellant seeking to have its unpaid tax liability for the 2007
year revised and reduced. On 12 March 2012 the appellant,
by way of
what purported to be an objection to the 2007 assessment, essentially
applied to
SARS to
withdraw that assessment under
s 98(1)
(d)
of
the
Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011
– which at the time
provided for an assessment being withdrawn should SARS be satisfied,
inter alia, that it imposed ‘an
unintended tax debt in respect
of an amount that the taxpayer should not have been taxed on’
or that the recovery of the
debt under the assessment ‘would
produce an anomalous or inequitable result’.
[1]
This attempt was unsuccessful as SARS took the view that the 2007
assessment had to be regarded as final and could not be re-opened.
[8]
The appellant then took various further steps to obtain relief. These
included asking the Legal Delivery Unit of SARS to reconsider
the
matter, an approach to the Tax Omsbud, and having a tax consultant
making representations on its behalf. It is unnecessary
for present
purposes to detail the negotiations that ensued and the various
submissions made on behalf of the appellant, although
it must be
mentioned that both sides placed considerable reliance upon the
Tax
Administration Act of 2011
. However, they now accept that the
relevant events occurred before that Act came into effect on 1
October 2012 and that its provisions
do not apply to their current
dispute.
[9]
In any event, the negotiations came to nought and, eventually, on
14 April 2015, the appellant gave notice under
s 11(4)
of the
Tax Administration Act of its
intention to institute proceedings in
the High Court. And in due course, on 21 April 2015, it instituted
review proceedings in
the court a quo, seeking an order setting aside
the assessment for the 2007 tax year and certain ancillary relief.
The refusal
of such relief led to this appeal.
[10]
In the light of this background, I turn to consider the appellant’s
contention that on the facts described above its
2007 tax assessment
ought to have been re-opened, revised and reduced. So called ‘capital
gains tax’ was introduced
into this country with effect from 1
October 2001 by way of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. Simply put,
the essential factor to
which regard is had is the difference between
the amount at which a person acquires a capital asset and the amount
of the proceeds
received on its subsequent disposal. Should such
proceeds exceed the amount at which it was acquired, there is a
capital gain;
conversely, should they be less, there will be a
capital loss. The aggregate of capital gains and capital losses are
then taken
into account to calculate a net capital gain (this being
the difference between the aggregate capital gain of a year and the
aggregate
capital loss of the previous year)
[2]
and a percentage then applied to the net capital gain to calculate
the taxable capital gain for the year of assessment.
[3]
In terms of s 26A of the Act, that taxable capital gain then falls to
be included in the taxable income of the person concerned.
[11]
The learned authors of
Silke on South African Income Tax
comment as follows upon the provisions of this scheme:
‘
Although
one refers colloquially to the terms “capital gains tax”
or the “capital gains tax provisions”,
in truth, it is
not a separate tax. Taxable capital gains do not constitute “gross
income” or “income”,
but are added directly to a
taxpayer’s other taxable income and subjected to normal
(income) tax. This result is achieved
by the charging provision, s
26A, which includes in a person’s taxable income for any year
of assessment a percentage of
his taxable capital gains, as
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Eighth Schedule.
The effective consequence is
that the taxable capital gains are
aggregated with other taxable income and taxed according to the
normal (income) tax rates.’
[12]
The essential starting point of the scheme is the
so called
‘base cost’ of an asset. Although paragraph 20 of the
Eighth Schedule provides in considerable detail for
the determination
of base cost in particular circumstances, it is in simple terms set
out in paragraph 20(1)
(a)
as being ‘the expenditure
actually incurred in respect of the cost of acquisition or creation
of that asset’. However,
capital gains fall only to be assessed
from 1 October 2001, the so called ‘valuation date’ when
capital gains tax was
introduced. Accordingly, in respect of assets
acquired before that date – referred to as ‘pre-valuation
date assets’
– and in order to levy capital gains tax
only on increments in value occurring after the valuation date, the
legislature
devised a scheme in paragraph 25 of the Eighth Schedule
to exclude any increment in value of an asset that may have taken
place
before the valuation date.
[13]
For purposes of this judgment it is unnecessary to have regard to the
considerably detailed provisions prescribed in Schedule
Eight in
order to achieve this end.
[4]
Suffice it to say that the parties are agreed that although the
appellant bought the property for R185 000 in 1999 (it was
therefore a pre-valuation date asset), its base cost for purposes of
determining its taxable capital gain when sold to Kalipso
in the 2007
tax year
[5]
was a sum in excess of R7m.
And
although certain of the instalments due in
respect of the purchase price were to be paid after the conclusion of
the 2007 tax year,
by reason of paragraph 35(4) of the Eighth
Schedule, these fell to be ‘treated as having accrued to [the
appellant]
during that year’. This led to the calculation of
the appellant’s capital gains tax liability for the 2007 year
as
already set out above.
[6]
[14]
In the light of the appellant’s failure to object to its 2007
assessment for more than three years, the initial obstacle
the
appellant has to overcome is to be found in s 81 of the Act. Under s
81(1) a taxpayer aggrieved by an assessment may object
‘in the
manner and under the terms and within the period prescribed by this
Act’. Section 81(2)
(b)
goes on to provide that the
prescribed period for objections may not be extended ‘where
more than three years have lapsed
from the date of the assessment’
whilst, as already mentioned, s 81(5) provides that should no
objections be made to an assessment,
it ‘shall be final and
conclusive’. Consequently, the now disputed assessment
seemingly had become final and conclusive
under s 81, and if that is
so it is fatal to the relief the appellant seeks.
This
was SARS’s simple answer to the appellant’s claims.
[15]
The appellant’s argument as I understood it, however, was that
this did not apply in respect of tax levied on a capital
gain. This
argument was founded in the main upon paragraph 35 of the Eighth
Schedule which, inter alia, provided:
‘
35(1)
Subject to subparagraphs (2), (3) and (4), the proceeds from the
disposal of an asset by a person are equal to the amount
received by
or accrued to, or which is treated as having been received by, or
accrued to or in favour of, that person in respect
of that disposal .
. .
(2) . .
.
(3)
The proceeds from the disposal of an asset by a person, as
contemplated in subparagraph (1) must be reduced by –
(a)
any amount of the proceeds that must be or was
included in the gross income of that person or that must be or was
taken into account
when determining the taxable income of that person
before the inclusion of any taxable capital gain;
(b)
any amount of the proceeds that has been repaid or has become
repayable to the person to whom that asset was disposed of; or
(c)
any reduction, as the result of the cancellation, termination or
variation of an agreement or due to the prescription or waiver
of a
claim or release from an obligation or any other event of an accrued
amount forming part of the proceeds of that disposal.’
[16]
In the light of these provisions, the appellant argued as follows:
Under paragraph 3 of the Schedule, a person’s capital
gain is
calculated with reference to the proceeds received or accrued from a
disposal of an asset.
The capital gain received or
accrued is calculated in terms of paragraph 35(1) of the Eighth
Schedule. That paragraph includes sub-paragraph
35(3), which says
that the gain is to be reduced by certain amounts. One of these is
that contained in paragraph 35(3)
(c)
,
namely, any reduction in those proceeds as the result of the
cancellation, termination or variation of an agreement. This is what
occurred here. In almost all instances falling within this
sub-paragraph, the reduction of proceeds by virtue of cancellation or
the like will occur in a later year of assessment. Paragraph 25(2)
requires the taxpayer, in those circumstances, to re-determine
the
base cost of the asset and the capital gain in the light of the
change in circumstances. That can only relate to the original
assessment. Accordingly, so the argument went, it is the original
assessment that must be re-opened and revised in the light of
the
redetermination of the base cost and the amount of the capital gain.
[17]
The appellant sought to buttress its argument that there should be
such a redetermination of the capital gain by arguing that
unlike
‘normal’ income tax (in respect of which s 81 would
clearly apply) the assessment of capital gains tax was not
necessarily an annual event.
It argued that the
only way that there can be a matching of capital gains arising in one
tax year and capital losses arising out
of the same transaction in a
later tax year, is to allow such a redetermination, the mechanism of
which lies in paragraph 25 of
the Eighth Schedule.
Sub-paragraph
25(1) provides a scheme to exclude any increment in value of a
pre-valuation date asset that may have taken place
prior to the
valuation date. Sub-paragraphs 25(2) and (3) go on to provide:
‘
(2)
If a person has determined the base cost as contemplated in
subparagraph (1) of a pre-valuation date asset which was disposed
of
during any prior year of assessment and in the current year of
assessment─
(a)
any amount of proceeds is
received or accrued in respect of that disposal which has not been
taken into account in any prior year
in determining the capital gain
or capital loss in respect of that disposal;
(b)
any amount of proceeds which
was taken into account in determining the capital gain or capital
loss in respect of that disposal
has become irrecoverable, or has
become repayable or that person is no longer entitled to those
proceeds as a result of the cancellation,
termination or variation of
any agreement or due to the prescription or waiver of a claim
or a release from an obligation
or any other event during the current
year;
(c)
any amount of expenditure is
incurred which forms part of the base cost of that asset which has
not been taken into account in any
prior year in determining the
capital gain or loss in respect of that disposal; or
(d)
any amount of base cost of
that asset that has been taken into account in any prior year in
determining the capital gain or capital
loss in respect of that
disposal, has been recovered or recouped,
that
person must redetermine the base cost of that asset in terms of
subparagraph (1) and the capital gain or capital loss from
the
disposal of that asset, having regard to the full amount of the
proceeds and base cost so redetermined.
(3)
The amount of capital gain or capital loss redetermined in the
current year of assessment in
terms of subparagraph (2), must
be taken into account in determining any capital gain or capital loss
from that disposal in that
current year, as contemplated in paragraph
3 (1)
(b)
(iii) or 4 (1)
(b)
(iii).’
[18]
There are a number of difficulties confronting this argument. Bearing
in mind the provisions of the basic scheme under which
capital gains
tax is levied, the assessment of capital gains tax is, an annual
event in the sense that, if any occurrences during
a tax year render
the provisions of Schedule Eight applicable to an accrual of a
taxable capital gain, the amount thereof is to
be included in the
taxpayer’s taxable income for that year. This is in line
with the general principle that income
tax is an annual fiscal event
so that, as was stated by Botha JA in
Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v
Secretary for Inland Revenue
1975 (1) SA 665
(A) at 677H-678A:
‘
.
. .
events which may have an effect upon a
taxpayer's liability to normal tax are relevant only in determining
his tax liability in
respect of the fiscal year in which they occur,
and cannot be relied upon to re-determine such liability in respect
of a fiscal
year in the past.’
[19]
Consequently, the fact that in a particular year there may not
be any events which lead to the accrual of a taxable capital gain
is
no reason to find that when they do occur, and when a taxable capital
gain is included in a taxpayer’s taxable income,
provisions
relating to an assessment of tax liability such as those in s 81
should not apply.
[20]
In addition, the appellant’s argument requires paragraph 35 of
the Eighth Schedule to be construed as applying not only
to the
determination of capital gains in a particular year, but also to
require a redetermination in a later year of a capital
gain already
accrued. But that is inconsistent with the overall scheme of
paragraph 35(3). In the first place the sub-paragraph
relates to the
determination of the proceeds of a disposal ‘during a year of
assessment’. It provides that the proceeds
in that year, and
that year alone, are to be reduced by three items.
[21]
The first of these is any amount of the proceeds of the disposal of
the asset that have already been taken into account in
the taxpayer’s
gross income. That can only apply during the year in which the
disposal occurs. It is directed at the situation
where the accrual
constitutes gross income as would be the case with a disposal by a
person who deals in shares or the disposal
by a property developer of
all or part of the development. As that is the income-earning
activity of those taxpayers the proceeds
from such disposals
constitute gross income. They must accordingly be excluded from the
calculation of capital gains.
[22]
The second item deals with the situation where the taxpayer has to
repay part of the price, or other proceeds of disposal,
to the party
to whom the disposal was made. This deals with a number of
commonplace situations, such as the redetermination of
the purchase
price of a business in the light of a post-sale determination of the
value of stock on hand or book debts. Another
would be a refund of
portion of the price to address a complaint that the goods sold were
defective. A third would be the need
to meet warranty claims. Again
these are events that will ordinarily come to light in the year in
which the disposal occurs.
[23]
The third item, a reduction of the proceeds of the disposal caused by
a cancellation or variation of an agreement, is also
likely to occur
in the same year as the disposal. Thus all three situations envisaged
by the sub-paragraph are directed at ensuring
that where a disposal
occurs in a particular tax year, events during that year that operate
to diminish the proceeds received by
the taxpayer in that year are
taken into account to reduce those proceeds and hence the capital
gain arising from the disposal.
That is the ordinary and natural
construction to be given to paragraph 35 and I agree with the
argument by SARS that the amendments
effected in 2015 with effect
from 2016, which clearly spell that out to be the case, are
confirmatory of that construction.
[7]
[24]
Moreover, the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4 and 25 of the Eighth
Schedule do not support the appellant’s argument. As
set out in
paragraph 25(2), the base cost of a pre-valuation date asset
which was disposed of during any prior year of assessment,
as well as
the capital gain or capital loss from the disposal of that asset, is
to be redetermined ‘in the current year of
assessment’
should certain events occur. Paragraph 25(3) further provides that if
such events take place, the amount of the
redetermined capital gain
or capital loss ‘in the current year of assessment . . . must
be taken into account in determining
any capital gain or capital loss
from that disposal in that current year, as contemplated in
paragraph 3
(b)
(iii) or 4
(b)
(iii).’ As
appears from this, should there be a redetermination of a capital
gain or a capital loss that occurred in a prior
year of assessment,
that redetermination is to be taken into account in the determination
of a capital gain or a capital loss,
not in the prior year but in the
current year ie in the tax year in which the events giving rise to
the redetermination take place.
[25]
This conclusion is reinforced by the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4
to which paragraph 25(3) refers. They read:
‘
3
A person's capital gain for a year of
assessment, in respect of the disposal of an asset
(a)
. . .
(b)
in a previous year of assessment, is
equal to
(i)
so much of any amount received by or accrued to that person during
the current year of assessment, as constitutes part of the
proceeds
of that disposal which has not been taken into account
(aa)
during any year in determining the
capital gain or capital loss in respect of that disposal;
(bb)
in the redetermination of the
capital gain or capital loss in terms of paragraph 25(2); or;
(ii)
. . . or
(iii)
the sum of
(aa)
any capital gain redetermined in
terms of paragraph 25(2) in the current year of assessment in respect
of that disposal; and
(bb)
any capital loss (if any) determined
in respect of that disposal in terms of paragraph 25 for the last
year of assessment during
which that paragraph applied in respect of
that disposal.
4
A person's capital loss for a year of
assessment in respect of the disposal of an asset
(a)
. . .
(b)
in a previous year of assessment, is
equal to
(i)
so much of the proceeds received or accrued in respect of the
disposal of that asset that have been taken into account during
any
year in determining the capital gain or capital loss in respect of
that disposal
(aa)
as that person is no longer entitled
to as a result of the cancellation, termination or variation of any
agreement, or due to the
prescription or waiver of a claim or a
release from an obligation or any other event during the current year
of assessment;
(bb)
as has become irrecoverable during
the current year of assessment; or
(cc)
as has been repaid or has become
repayable during the current year of assessment, and which have not
been taken into account in
the redetermination of the capital gain or
capital loss in terms of paragraph 25(2);
(ii)
. . . or
(iii)
the sum of
(aa)
any capital loss redetermined in
terms of paragraph 25(2) in the current year of assessment in respect
of that disposal; and
(bb)
any capital gain (if any) determined
in respect of that disposal in terms of paragraph 25 for the last
year of assessment during
which that paragraph applied in respect of
that disposal.’
[26]
As clearly appears from their terms,
the provisions of
paragraphs 3
(b)
and 4
(b)
are of application only in a
current year of assessment. They establish convincingly that should
any events occur which require
the redetermination of a capital gain
or a capital loss which accrued in a previous year, such redetermined
capital gain or capital
loss is to be taken into account in
determining the taxpayer’s capital gain or capital loss in the
current year in which
those events occur. That being so, the argument
that paragraph 35(3) entitles the taxpayer to have a confirmed
tax assessment
of a previous year re-opened as a result of a
cancellation, termination or variation of an agreement which reduces
an accrued amount
forming part of the proceeds of an earlier disposal
of an asset, is wholly inconsistent with the provisions of the Eighth
Schedule
and is, quite simply, unsustainable.
[27]
The court a quo dealt extensively with the manner in which the
cancellation agreement was to be taken into account in respect
of the
2010 tax year for purposes of the assessment of capital gains tax. In
doing so it endorsed a calculation of the appellant’s
capital
gains tax liability for that year handed up in argument by counsel
for SARS to the effect that as a result of the cancellation
a capital
loss of some R7.7 million had accrued to the appellant. It is
unnecessary for purposes of this judgment either to do
the
arithmetic, or to express any opinion either on how it should be
performed or the resultant outcome. Suffice it to say that
if there
is indeed an accrued capital loss arising from the cancellation which
the appellant can use to set off against any future
aggregate capital
gain, this to a large extent militates against the appellant’s
argument that reducing its tax liability
for the 2007 tax year is the
only way in which it could be fairly treated. An assessed capital
loss is a valuable asset in the
hands of a taxpayer. Whether it is
ever used to off-set a future capital gain is a matter entirely
within the control of the taxpayer.
[28]
In any event, even if in certain instances it may seem ‘unfair’
for a taxpayer to pay a tax which is payable under
a statutory
obligation to do so, there is nothing unjust about it. Payment of tax
is what the law prescribes, and tax laws are
not always regarded as
‘fair’. The tax statute must be applied even if in
certain circumstances a taxpayer may feel
aggrieved at the outcome.
[29]
In summary, the cancellation of the sale did not entitle the
appellant to have his tax liability for the 2007 year re-assessed.
The cancellation and its consequences were factors relevant to an
assessment of any capital gain or, more likely, capital loss
that
accrued during that current tax year and not the year that the
capital gain had initially accrued. Consequently, the court
a quo
correctly concluded that the appellant was not entitled to the relief
that it sought. The appeal must therefore fail. There
is no reason
for costs not to follow the event.
[30]
The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to
include the costs of two counsel.
________________
L
E Leach
Judge
of Appeal
APPEARANCES
For
Appellant: T S Emslie SC
Instructed
by: Shepstone & Wylie
Attorneys, Cape Town
Phatshoane Henney, Bloemfontein
For
Respondent: M Janisch SC (with him T S Sidaki)
Instructed
by:
The
State Attorney, Cape Town
The
State Attorney, Bloemfontein
[1]
This section has since been amended.
[2]
Paragraph 8
(a)
of the
Eighth Schedule.
[3]
Paragraph 10 of the Eighth Schedule.
[4]
For those who might be interested see De Koker and Urquart
Income
Tax in South Africa
par 5A.4.4.
[5]
Arrived at by applying the time-apportionment method of calculating
base cost set out in paragraph 30 of the Eighth Schedule
and having
regard to certain expenses.
[6]
See para 4.
[7]
Patel v Minister of the
Interior & another
1955
(2) SA 485
(A) at 493A-D and
National
Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union v University of
Cape Town & others
2003 (3) SA 1
(CC) para 66.