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[2021] ZAGPPHC 473
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Liberty Group Limited v Plumifon (Pty) Ltd TA Sally Williams Ice Cream and Others (11560/2019) [2021] ZAGPPHC 473 (23 July 2021)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 11560/2019
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
REVISED
22/07/2021
In
the application between:
LIBERTY
GROUP
LIMITED
Applicant
(Herein
represented by JHI RETAIL (PTY) LTD
and
PLUMIFON
(PTY) LTD T/A SALLY WILLIAMS
ICE
CREAM
First
Respondent
GEORGE
ANTHONY
SINOVICH
Second
Respondent
MARK
SACK
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
This
matter has been heard in terms of the Directives of the Judge
President of this Division dated 25 March 2020, 24 April 2020
and 11
May 2020. The judgment and order are accordingly published and
distributed electronically. The date and time of hand-down
is deemed
to be 09h30 on 23 July 2021.
LENYAI
AJ
[1] This
is a claim for damages suffered by the applicant as a result of the
respondents holding over of property
belonging to the applicant after
the cancellation of a lease agreement.
[2] In
this application the following order is sought against the
respondents:
(a)
That
judgment be granted against the Second and Third respondents, jointly
and severally the one paying the other to be absolved,
in the sum of
R257 184.86.
(b)
That the Second and Third respondents pay the costs of
this application on the scale as between attorney and client, jointly
and
severally the one paying the other to be absolved.
[3] The
applicant brought an application for condonation for the late filing
of the replying affidavit. After reading
the papers and having heard
the parties I was satisfied that the applicant has shown good cause
and I granted the condonation.
[4] The
third respondent also brought an application for condonation for the
late filing of the heads of argument.
After reading the papers and
having heard the parties I was satisfied that the third respondent
has shown good cause and I granted
the condonation.
[5] On
the 19
th
of
February 2019 the applicant instituted action proceedings against the
respondents in which they sought confirmation of cancellation
of the
lease agreement, payment of R117 366.03 for arrear rentals, interest
on the aforesaid sum at the rate of 10.25 %
per
annum a tempore morae,
eviction of the first
respondent and/or other occupant from the leased premises and a claim
for damages
[6] On
the 4
th
of July
2019, summary judgment was granted against the third respondent,
jointly and severally with any order which may be granted
against the
first and second respondents and the applicant’s claim for
damages was postponed
sine die.
[7] On
the 10
th
of July 2019, default judgment was granted
against the first and second respondents jointly and severally and
the applicant’s
claim for damages was postponed
sine die.
[8] This
is now the applicant’s claim for damages which serves before
the court.
[9] The
applicant avers that its action against the respondents arose from a
breach of a commercial lease agreement
by the first respondent for
non-payment of rental and other charges payable under the lease
agreement.
[10] The
second and third respondents are cited in their capacities as
sureties and co-principal debtors.
[11] The
applicant cancelled the contract on the 19
th
of February 2019 as a result of the breach.
[12] The
applicant avers that the First Respondent did not vacate the premises
as ordered and remained in unlawful
occupation until subsequently
liquidated on the 1
st
of
August 2019.
[13] The
applicant further avers that it was able to procure a new tenant from
1 November 2019.
[14] The
applicant accordingly, claims damages for the period 1 March 2019
till 30 October 2019 in the amount of
R258 554,15.
[15] The
applicant contends that it has quantified its damages firstly by a
factual affidavit deposed to by its
official and secondly by an
expert in the field of market related rental who has verified the
damages claimed by the applicant
in the amount of R257 184, 86.
[16] The
applicant avers that the lease agreement provides for costs to be
paid on the scale as between attorney
and client.
[17] The
second and third respondents raised two points
in
limine
in their answering
affidavits and the third respondent raised a further two points which
were not raised by the second respondent.
[18] The
second and third respondents aver that the applicant brought a
substantive application wherein it seeks
damages as a result of the
first respondent’s breach of a lease of agreement, concluded
between first respondent and the
applicant.
[19] The
first respondent was placed in voluntary liquidation on 1 August 2019
and two liquidators were appointed.
The respondents aver that the
applicant was obliged to cite the liquidators in the application and
they have not done so.
[20] The
second and third respondents contend that as a result of the
applicant’s non-joinder of the first
respondent’s duly
appointed liquidators, all parties are not properly before court, and
consequently the application stands
to be dismissed.
[21] The
applicant contends that when it instituted this application on the
31
st
of October
2019 was not aware that the first respondent had gone into voluntary
liquidation. In the matter of
Bowring NO v
Vrededorp Properties CC & another
2007
(5) SA 391
(SCA)
para [21] it was held that
“
The substantial test is whether the
party alleged to be a necessary party for purposes of joinder has a
legal interest in the subject-matter
of the litigation, which may be
affected prejudicially by the judgment of the Court in the
proceedings concerned …”
[22] This
principle has been formulated over years as is evident in the matter
of
Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister
of Labour
1949 (3) SA 637
(A)
where the court held that “
Indeed
it seems clear to me that the Court has consistently refrained from
dealing with issues in which a third party may have a
direct and
substantial interest without either having that party joined in the
suit or, if the circumstances of the case admit
of such a course,
taking other adequate steps to ensure that its judgment will not
prejudicially affect that party’s interests.”
[23] Having
been convinced by the authorities, the applicant decided to withdraw
its claim against the first respondent
and cured the non-joinder
complaint by delivery of the amended notice of motion.
[24] The
applicant contends that to the extent that the second and third
respondents allege that it cannot proceed
against them without the
first respondent, the second and third respondents in their answering
affidavit confirmed that they are
cited herein and have bound
themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors.
[25] The
applicant further contends that in the deed of suretyship, the second
and third respondents waived the
benefit of excussion. It is trite
that once the principal debtor’s estate has been declared
insolvent, does not release the
surety and co-principal debtor from
his obligations.
[26] This
principle was confirmed in the matter of
Neon
and Cold Cathode Illuminations (Pty) Ltd v Ephron
1978
(1) SA 463
(A)
at 472B-C where the court held
that “
From the above and other
authorities it appears that generally the only consequence (albeit an
important one) that flows from a
surety also undertaking liability as
a co-principal debtor is that vis-à-vis the creditor he
thereby tacitly renounces the
ordinary benefits available to a surety
, such as those of excussion and division, and he becomes liable
jointly and severally
with the principle debtor (see, for example,
Caney, Law of Suretyship, 2
nd
ed .,p 51; Wessels on Contract , 2
nd
ed., paras . 4087, 4088, and 4124; Voet, 46.1.16 and
24 (Gane’s trans., vol. 7 , pp. 38-9, 48-9; Pothier on
Obligations ,
paras. 408, 416 (Evans’ trans., pp 330, 335-6)”.
At
472C-D, the court emphasised that: “
However,
he retains the right, on paying the creditor, to obtain a cession of
the latter’s rights and securities in order
to recover the full
amount from the principal debtor.”
This
principle of right of recourse was further cemented in the matter of
Zungu-Elgin Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Jeany
Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others
(1138/2019)
[2020] ZASCA 160
(3 December 2020)
.
[27] The
authorities are clear and it is trite that a surety becomes liable
for the debts of the principal debtor
as a co-principal debtor and
the defence or benefit of excussion and division are not available as
he is deemed to have tacitly
renounced them. I am of the view that
the point
in limine
of
non-joinder stands to be dismissed.
[28] The
second and third respondents aver that the current monetary limit for
Regional Magistrate court is R400
000,00.
[29] They
further aver that the applicant is claiming substantially less from
the respondents than the limit referred
to above. The applicant’s
election to have launched this application in the High Court amounts
to an abuse of process, a
practice which has been frowned upon by the
Honourable Court.
[30] The
second and third respondents contend that the court should not
countenance the applicant’s conduct
and make an order that the
applicant’s current application be transferred to the Regional
Court to be further deliberated
there, along with an appropriate cost
order.
[31] The
applicant contends that the point
in limine
of abuse of process by the respondents is without merit.
This claim for damages flows from the postponement of damages
sine
die
by this court in respect of the default
judgment against the first and second respondents and the summary
judgment against the third
respondent on the 4
th
and 10
th
of
July 2019 respectively.
[32] The
applicants aver that the second and third respondents seek to
transfer the claim for damages to the Regional
court, notwithstanding
that the cancellation, eviction and arrear rental claims have been
adjudicated by this court.
[33] The
applicants contend that the claim for damages is a pending claim and
is appropriately before the court.
A transfer of the claim to the
Regional court would only inconvenience the Regional court, but also
this court has all the pleadings
and documents in the court file
before it and has already adjudicated the aforesaid issues in July
2019.
[34] This
court has concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts and it is
correct that the High court frowns
upon litigants approaching it
where claims fall within the realm of a lower court. I am however of
the view that in certain circumstances
the court must decide each
case on its merits in order to arrive at a just and fair decision.
The circumstances of this case arose
from a postponement by this
court of the damages claim of the applicant
sine
die
in July 2019. The court has all the
pleadings and documents on CaseLines and it makes perfect sense for
this court to conclude the
matter and put it to rest. To transfer the
matter would only drag the matter on indefinitely and that is not
desirable, as the
saying goes, justice delayed amounts to justice
denied. To finalise the matter in this court does not prejudice any
of the parties
and the court is willing and ready to finalise this
matter. The Supreme Court of Appeal in the matter of
The
Standard Bank of SA Ltd and Others v Thobejane and Others (38/2019 &
47/2019) and the Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Gqirara
N O and another
(999/2019)
[2021] ZASCA 92
(25 June 2021)
confirmed
this conclusion wherein it held that “
The
High Court must entertain matters within its territorial jurisdiction
that fall within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates’
Courts,
if brought before it, because it has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Magistrates’ Court”
. This point
in limine
of abuse of
process stands to be dismissed.
[35] The
third respondent avers that before referring a matter to arbitration
or a court for adjudication of the
dispute between the parties
(clause 50.2), the applicant was required to comply with clause 50.1
of the lease agreement.
[36] The
third respondent further avers that, the applicant was required to
approach the first respondent’s
CEO and communicate with the
latter with a view to resolving all issues relating to the lease. It
is only pursuant to the expiry
of 5 days after the dispute has been
placed in the hands of the appointed executives for landlord and
tenant that either party
may invoke clause 50.2 mentioned above where
resolution was impossible.
[37] The
third respondent contends that the applicant has neither pleaded it
in the action which preceded this
application nor anywhere in its
founding papers whether it complied with clause 50.1. Failure to
comply with clause 50.1 renders
the issue of this application
premature, necessitating its dismissal with costs.
[38] The
applicant contends that subsequent to the court cancelling the lease
agreement, ordering the eviction
of the first respondent, ordering
the payment of arrear rentals by the respondents and most
importantly, postponing the claim for
damages
sine
die
, the point
in
limine
of premature application can only be
described as disingenuous.
[39] The
applicant further contends that a call for arbitration after the
material issues of cancellation and eviction
have been determined by
the court cannot be sustained.
[40] I
am of the view that the respondents have squandered their opportunity
to raise this defence earlier when
this matter started in 2019 before
the summary judgment and default judgement were granted and cannot
now cry foul. This point
in limine
of premature application stands to be dismissed.
[41] The
third respondent avers that the applicant has launched an application
and purports to rely upon a contract
and/or security document. Each
month claimed relating to a lease constitutes a separate cause of
action and it was necessary for
this court to be privy to all
documents upon which the applicant relies.
[42] The
third respondent further avers that the applicant has failed to
allege and/or aver and /or attach material
facts relating to the
lease and security documents. These omissions render the application
defective, attaching an extract from
a lease agreement and court
orders in previous proceedings without any basis is insufficient and
therefore the applicant has not
made out a case against him. Based on
this point
in limine
of
no cause of action alleged, the application stands to be dismissed
with costs.
[43] The
applicant contends that both the second and third respondents accept
in their answering affidavits that
they are before this court in
their capacities as sureties and co-principal debtors. The
respondents also rely on certain provisions
of the lease agreement in
their answering affidavit.
[44] The
applicant reiterates that this application arises from the orders
granted on the 4
th
and
10
th
of July 2019
in which this claim for damages was postponed
sine
die
as part of the orders. As a corollary,
the pleadings which include the lease agreement and the deed of
suretyship, form part of
the documents before this court in the
adjudication of the claim for damages. This application is brought
under the same case number
and is not a new matter, it is an
ancillary application which flows directly from the pleadings,
documents and orders are before
this court.
[45] The
applicant contends that not only is the cause of action defined in
the founding papers, but the second
and third respondents are fully
acquainted with the case they have to meet based on their own version
put up in their answering
affidavits.
[46] On
careful reading and consideration of the papers and having heard the
parties I am satisfied and agree with
the applicant that this matter
is proper before this court. This matter has been adjudicated on by
this court before and we are
merely dealing with the part that was
postponed being the claim for damages. All the pleadings and
documents are on CaseLines and
I have seen and read them all. In
light of the above, I am of the view that this point
in
limine
of no cause of action stands to be
dismissed.
[47] The
second and third respondents aver that the applicants elected to
approach the court on notice of motion
for a relief for unliquidated
damages by adducing the evidence of an expert whose evidence cannot
be tested through cross examination.
[48] They
aver that the applicant is claiming damages in the sum of R257 184,66
for rental and other charges
in terms of the lease agreement for the
period 1 March 2019 to October 2019. In support of its claim, the
applicant attached an
expert affidavit of Mr Avery to the founding
affidavit.
[49] The
applicant further attaches an affidavit by its general manager which
it alleges should be construed as
a certificate as stipulated in
clause 28 of the lease agreement, which shall be
prima
facie
evidence as to the correctness of its
claim.
[50] The
respondents rely on the matter of
Economic
Freedom Fighters v Manuel
2020 JDR
2773 (SCA) at para 105
where it was held that
“
Motion proceedings are particularly
unsuited to the prosecution of claims for unliquidated damages,
whether in relation to defamation
or otherwise.”
[51] However
in the proceedings for final relief, the approach to determine the
facts was clearly set out in the
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984
(3) SA 623
(A)
at 634H-635C where the court
held that:
“
It is correct
that, where in proceedings on notice of motion disputes of fact have
arisen on the affidavits, a final order, whether
it be an interdict
or some other form of relief, may be granted if those facts averred
in the applicant’s affidavits which
have been admitted by the
respondent, together with the facts alleged by the respondent,
justify such an order. The power of the
Court to give such final
relief on the papers before it is, however, not confined to such a
situation. In certain instances the
denial by respondent of a fact
alleged by the applicant may not be such as to raise a real, genuine
or bona fide dispute of fact
… If in such a case the
respondent has not availed himself of his right to apply for the
deponents concerned to be called
for cross-examination under Rule
6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules of court … and the Court is
satisfied as to the inherent credibility
of the applicant’s
factual averment, it may proceed on the basis of the correctness
thereof and include this fact among those
that it determines whether
the applicant is entitled to the final relief which he seeks …
Moreover, there may be exceptions
to this general rule, as, for
example, where the allegations or denials of the respondent are so
far-fetched or clearly untenable
that the Court is justified in
rejecting them merely on the papers …”
[52] The
matter of
Wightman t/a JW Construction v
Headfour (Pty) Ltd & another
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008
(3) SA 371
(SCA)
paras [11]-[13]
,
dealt with how courts should decide on the
adequacy of a respondent’s denial in motion proceedings for
purposes of determining
whether a real, genuine or
bona
fide
dispute of fact has arisen. It was held
that:
“
[11] The
first task is accordingly to identify the facts of the alleged
spoliation on the basis on which the legal
disputes are to be
decided. If one is to take the respondents’ answering affidavit
at face value, the truth about the preceding
events lies concealed
behind insoluble disputes. On that basis the appellant’s
application was bound to fail. Bozalek J thought
that the court was
justified in subjecting the apparent disputes to closer scrutiny.
When he did so he concluded that many of the
disputes were not real,
genuine or bona fide. For the reasons which follow I respectfully
agree with the learned judge.
[12] Recognising
that the truth almost always lies beyond mere linguistic
determination the courts have said that
an applicant who seeks final
relief on motion must, in the event of conflict, accept the version
set up by his opponent unless
the latter’s allegations are, in
the opinion of the court, not such as to raise a real, genuine or
bona fide dispute of fact
or are so far-fetched or clearly untenable
that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers …
[13] A
real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the
court is satisfied that the party who
purports to raise the dispute
has in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact
said to be disputed. There will
of course be instances where a bare
denial meets the requirements because there is no other way open to
the disputing party and
nothing more can therefore be expected of
him. But even that may not be sufficient if the fact averred lies
purely within the knowledge
of the averring party and no basis is
laid for disputing the veracity or accuracy of the averment. When the
facts averred are such
that the disputing party must necessarily
possess knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer (or
countervailing evidence)
if they be not true or accurate but, instead
of doing so, rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial the court
will generally
have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied.
I say ‘generally’ because factual averments seldom stand
apart
from a broader matrix of circumstances all of which needs to be
borne in mind when arriving at a decision. A litigant may not
necessarily
recognise or understand the nuances of a bare or general
denial as against a real attempt to grapple with all relevant factual
allegations made by the other party. But when he signs the answering
affidavit, he commits himself to its contents, inadequate as
they may
be, and will only in exceptional circumstances be permitted to
disavow them. There is thus a serious duty imposed upon
a legal
adviser who settles an answering affidavit to ascertain and engage
with facts which his client disputes and to reflects
such disputes
fully and accurately in the answering affidavit. If that does not
happen it should come as no surprise that the court
takes a robust
view of the matter.”
[53] Turning
to the matter before me, the applicant avers that the second and
third respondents accept in their
answering affidavits that motion
procedures are competent if no
bona fide
dispute of fact exists which was reasonably foreseen.
The respondents seemingly take issue with the amount of damages as
stated
by the applicant’s attorney in the amount of R281 179.50
as opposed the lesser amount indicated by the expert in the amount
of
R257 184,66.
[54] I
find the respondent’s behaviour to be quite peculiar, instead
of placing expert evidence of their
own before court to dispute the
damages determination of Mr Avery, such as to raise a real, genuine
or
bona fide
dispute
of fact, they have chosen to be evasive and accusatory towards the
applicant. The respondents have not availed themselves
of their right
to apply for Mr Avery to be called for cross-examination under Rule
6(5)(g) of the uniform rules of Court if they
seriously believed that
there is a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of fact.
[55] The
applicant in its heads of argument aver that the respondents contend
that due to the applicant’s
alleged failure to mitigate its
damages for September and October 2019, its damages are to be reduced
to R123 535,52. The applicant
avers that although there is no merit
that lies in this contention by the respondents, it is interestingly
and inherent to this
contention is an acceptance of the balance of
the applicant’s damages as computed by the Mr Avery, the
applicant’s
expert.
[56] The
respondents in my view have squandered their opportunity to raise a
real, genuine or
bona fide
dispute
of fact as set out in the
Plascon-Evans
case. Instead they have chosen to duck dealing with the
facts raised by the applicant by raising technical issues which are
not
assisting their case or the court in any way, as well as alleging
that the applicant has not clearly set out a case against them.
The
respondents are well aware of the facts alleged by the applicant and
should have rather placed before the court countervailing
evidence to
persuade the court to see their point of view.
[57] I
am not convinced that in the matter before me there is a real,
genuine or
bona fide
dispute
of fact and am satisfied that the respondents have not met the
requirements set in cases of
Plasco-Evans
and
Wightman supra.
[58] In
the matter of
Hyprop Investments Ltd and
Another v NCS Carriers and Forwarding
CC
and Another
2013 (4) SA 607
(GSJ)
in consideration of whether a damages claim from a
cancelled lease is liquid or not, the court held that: “
However
Nestadt J pointed out (in the same passage) that there is a
significant qualification to applying the lease rental figure,
namely
that: ‘it is only in the absence of evidence to the contrary
that the rental value of the premises is assumed to be
the rental
paid under the lease (Cooper op cit at 208)’. The reference is
to Cooper The South African Law of Landlord and
Tenant ( see now 1994
2 ed at 243 ) and the cases there cited.
If
there is evidence to the contrary, then the claim is illiquid with
the result that it cannot support motion proceedings.
Unlike
most cases where the liquidity or otherwise of ordinary damages is
classified by reference to the claim made, the liquidity
of a holding
over claim for a market value rental is dependent on the pleaded
response. The reason is to be found in the effective
deeming of a
market rental value to be the same as the rent provided for in the
agreement unless there is evidence to the contrary.
If
there is no legally effective challenge to the landlord’s
allegations that the rental provided for in the lease is the
market
rental value, then the damages are readily ascertainable and
therefore liquidated. This appears to be the most sensible
approach
because without countervailing evidence the agreement struck by the
parties reflects the amount at which willing and able
parties are
prepared to conclude their transaction. It also enables a landlord to
use the expedited processes of motion proceedings
and summary
judgment to pursue a damages claim based on holding over.”
[59] The
applicant contends that a lessor is obliged to take reasonable steps
to mitigate its damages or loss,
this principle was formulated in the
matter of
Hazis v Transvaal and Delagoa Bay
Investment Co Ltd
1939 AD 372
at
388. The court held that: “
This rule
about mitigating damages relates not to what the claimant in fact
did, but to what he should have done. It is in essence
a claim based
on negligence - neglect to do what a reasonable man would do if
placed in the position of the person claiming damages.
The defendant
in such claim says ‘admitting that in fact you suffered those
damages, you have only yourself to blame for
having suffered so much,
or at all, because you did not take reasonable steps to protect
yourself and, therefore me.’”
In
the premise I am convinced that this matter before me is indeed a
liquid claim for damages and it is proper before this court.
[60] The
respondents contend that the applicant ought to have accepted as
lessee from 1 September 2019 a new tenant
procured by the respondent.
They contend that they had advised the applicant of a potential
tenant, Café Rider, for the
premises.
[61] The
applicant contends that the facts upon which the ambit, nature and
terms of Café Rider’s
willingness to be a lessee relies
solely on the credibility of its authorised representative. The
respondents have not produced
an affidavit deposed to by a
representative of Café Rider in support of their contention
and this evidence cannot be accepted
by a court as it amounts to
inadmissible hearsay evidence.
[62] The
SCA in
Monyetla Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd
v IMM Graduate School of Marketing (Pty) Ltd and another
(20023/2014)
[2015] ZASCA 32
;
2017 (2) SA 42
(SCA)
(25 March 2015)
the court has cemented the
general principle in relation to the measure of damages of lessor as
well as mitigation of damages, and
held that “
In
the context of a lease cancelled by the lessor due to a breach by the
lessee, the prima facie measure of damages is the rental
that would
have been paid for the premises over the remaining period of the
lease less any amounts received which would not have
accrued had the
lease not been cancelled - and of course a lessor who cancels is
obliged to take reasonable steps , such as reletting
the premises, in
order to mitigate its loss
.”
[63] The
applicant contends it took reasonable steps to mitigate its damages
and procured a new tenant two months
after the first respondent
vacated the premises.
[64] I
am not convinced by the submission by the respondents that they
procured a tenant for the applicant from
1 September 2019. There is
no evidence placed before court to corroborate their statement and
the court cannot rely on their word
alone. In the premise I find the
applicant’s contention reasonable.
[65] In
the premises, the following order is made:
(a)
That
judgment is granted against the Second and Third respondents, jointly
and severally the one paying the other to be absolved,
in the sum of
R257 184.86.
(b)
That
the Second and Third respondents pay the costs of this application on
the scale as between attorney and client, jointly and
severally the
one paying the other to be absolved.
M.M.D. LENYAI
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER: 11560/2019
HEARD
ON: 26
April 2021
FOR
THE APPLICANT: ADV.
G.T. AVVAKOUMIDES
INSTRUCTED
BY: Mark
Efstratiou Inc
FOR
THE SECOND RESPONDENT: George
Anthony Sinovich
Fish
Hoek, Cape Town
FOR
THE THIRD RESPONDENT: ADV.
J.M. HOFFMAN
INSTRUCTED
BY: Swartz
Weil van der Merwe Greenberg
Inc
, Melrose Estate
c/o
Friedland Hart Solomon & Nicolson
Monument
Park, Pretoria
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 23
July 2021