Manyatshe v M & G Media Ltd and Others (415/08) [2009] ZASCA 96 (17 September 2009)

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[2009] ZASCA 96
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Manyatshe v M & G Media Ltd and Others (415/08) [2009] ZASCA 96 (17 September 2009)

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THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case number: 415/08
In the matter between:
MAANDA MANYATSHE APPELLANT
and
M & G MEDIA LIMITED FIRST RESPONDENT
FERIAL HAFFEJEE SECOND RESPONDENT
STEFAANS BRUMMER THIRD RESPONDENT
SAM SOLE FOURTH RESPONDENT
MEDIA 24 LTD FIFTH RESPONDENT
NICHOLAS DAWES SIXTH RESPONDENT
Neutral citation:
Manyathse v M &
G Media Ltd
(415/2008)
[2009] ZASCA 96
(17
September 2009)
CORAM: Navsa, Brand, Mlambo, Mhlantla JJA
et
Bosielo AJA
HEARD: 1 September 2009
DELIVERED: 17 September 2009
SUMMARY
: Appeal against
dismissal of application seeking to prevent publication of allegedly
defamatory newspaper article – article
published prior to hearing
of appeal – held that judgment on appeal would have no practical
effect – held further that appeal
raised no important question of
law – consequently appeal dismissed with costs under s 21A of
Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.
ORDER
On appeal from
: High Court,
Johannesburg
(Snyders J sitting as
court of first instance.)
1. By virtue of s 21A of the Supreme Court Act 59
of 1959 the appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs
occasioned
by the employment of two counsel.
JUDGMENT
BRAND JA
(Navsa,
Mlambo, Mhlantla JJA
et
Bosielo AJA concurring)
[1]
During
September 2006 the appellant, Mr Maanda Manyatshe, brought an urgent
application in the Johannesburg High Court for an interim
interdict,
pending a return day, against the publication of an article in the
Mail & Guardian which he alleged was defamatory
of him. Those
cited as the respondents included the owner, editor, distributor and
two journalists of the Mail & Guardian.
The matter came before
Snyders J who dismissed the application with costs. Publication of
the article then took place. Despite
the fact that publication had in
fact taken place, the appellant sought and obtained leave to appeal
against that judgment from
the court a quo on the basis that the
matter involves legal principles of considerable importance
concerning the freedom of the
press and the administration of
justice.
[2] At the time of the application the appellant was the
chief executive officer of a major cellular phone company, MTN South
Africa
(Pty) Ltd. Before that, from 1999 until October 2004, he had
been the chief executive officer of the SA Post Office Ltd. The
impending
offensive article related to his time at the Post Office.
It came to his notice when he was presented, shortly before
publication,
with a questionnaire from the two journalists,
containing serious allegations to which he was invited to respond.
The questionnaire
commenced as follows:
‘
It has come to our attention
that charges have been laid with the South African Police Service by
the chief executive officer of
the SA Post Office, Mr Khutso
Mampeule, against four entities, Namely:
Miko No 167 t/a Vision Design
House whose principals are Mandla Msimang and Joseph Ynclan;
Maanda Manyatshe, former CEO of
the Post Office and current CEO of MTN Southern Africa;
Geoffrey Mabote, former head of
retail at the Post Office;
Francis Matabane, former head of
transformation at the Post Office.'
[3] The questionnaire continued to state that the
allegations set out in the complaint by Mampeule were lengthy, but
included those
that follow. The Post Office, so the story began, had
invited tenders for the 'New Image' upgrading of its retail outlets
all over
the country. Though nineteen bidders were attracted, Vision
Design House was not amongst them. Nonetheless, Vision Design House

was appointed project manager, without a tender process, to commence
with the refurbishing of a whole series of New Image pilot
sites.
These appointments, so Mr Mampeule alleged, were driven by the
appellant, Mr Mabote and Mr Matabane. In the process, various

deviations from the normal tender procedure were motivated by Mabote
and approved by the appellant. In fact, so Mampeule contended,
the
appellant and Mabote were so concerned to have Vision Design House
appointed that they misrepresented the facts to the Post
Office Board
and ignored procedure. What is more, the two of them also engaged in
a series of piecemeal approvals which were within
the limits of the
appellant’s spending authority, so as to avoid the tender rules of
the Post Office. Eventually the appellant
presented the Post Office
Board with a draft resolution that would authorise him to use Vision
Design House as project manager
for the whole of the New Image
project, but the resolution was rejected by the Board. As it turned
out, so the allegations by Mampeule
went, the Post Office received
complaints about the high cost and poor quality of the work produced
by Vision Design House. Inspections
by the Post Office Property
Division then found the work generally substandard and completed at a
cost of R10 000 per square
metre. This was 285 per cent more
than the costs of early parts of the project, which was handled by
the property division itself.
‘In general’ so the questionnaire
stated, ‘the Post Office alleges that Messrs Manyatshe, Mabote,
Matabane and Msimang .
. . acted in concert as part of a deliberate
scam to perpetrate a massive fraud.’ When the appellant resigned as
chief executive
officer of the Post Office in October 2004, so the
questionnaire concluded, the matter was already under investigation.
[4] The appellant declined the invitation to comment.
Instead, he launched the urgent application for an interdict.
According to
his founding affidavit, he had no knowledge of any
criminal charges against him. In fact, he said, he telephoned the
chairperson
of the Post Office Board who told him that she also knew
nothing of any criminal charges laid against him by the Board. For
the
rest, he contented himself with a rather bald and general
assertion that ‘the allegations in the questionnaire relating to me

are untrue, unfounded and irresponsible’.
[5] From the respondents’ answering papers it emerged
that the contents of the questionnaire derived from an affidavit
deposed
to by the appellant’s successor as chief executive officer
of the Post Office, Mr Mampeule. The affidavit had been filed in the

Pretoria High Court, in response to a civil claim by way of motion
proceedings by Vision Design House against the Post Office.
A copy of
the affidavit was annexed to the respondents’ answering papers in
the present case. A further document annexed to the
respondents’
papers incorporated the findings in a disciplinary enquiry against Mr
Geoffrey Mabote, to whom reference is also
made in the questionnaire.
Although these disciplinary proceedings did not relate to the
appellant directly, many of the allegations
in Mampeule’s affidavit
were supported by these findings.
[6] In answer to the appellant’s allegation in the
present case, that he had no knowledge of criminal charges against
him, the
respondents annexed a resolution by the Post Office Board
with reference to the Vision Design House saga which ‘acknowledged
the fact that a criminal charge has been laid with the commercial
unit of the South African Police Services'. In conjunction with
this
resolution, the respondents placed before the court a quo an unsigned
affidavit by Mampeule, of which, they submitted, a signed
version had
been furnished to the police. Though this document had been prepared
in the form of a complaint supporting a criminal
charge, it is
essentially a duplicate of the affidavit that had been filed in
response to the Vision Design House claim in the
Pretoria High Court
referred to in the preceding paragraph. Finally, the respondents
annexed a draft article which they intended
to publish to their
answering papers. It appears to be less venomous than the
questionnaire. So for example, the direct allegation
that the
appellant was part of a massive fraud perpetrated on the Post Office
by Vision Design House, was not repeated. On the
other hand, it laid
greater emphasis on the substantial amounts of money involved in the
alleged fraud, for example, that Vision
Design House had already made
a secret profit of R8 million and that the project as a whole would
be worth an estimated R2,5 billion.
In the main, however, the content
of the draft article was essentially similar to the questionnaire.
[7] Despite the evidence collated by the respondents in
support of the allegations in the questionnaire and the draft
article, the
appellant chose not to deal with any of these
allegations in his replying affidavit. All he essentially said,
albeit in a rather
prolix way, is that he did not concede that all
the allegations in Mampeule’s affidavit were true; that he reserved
the right
to deal with these allegations ‘in subsequent
proceedings’; and that, in any event, these allegations could not
reasonably
be interpreted to support the imputation in the article
sought to be interdicted, that he was involved in a fraudulent
scheme.
[8] In
Hix Network Technologies v
System Publishers (Pty) Ltd
[1996] ZASCA 107
;
1997 (1) SA 391
(A) at 398I-J this court held that interim interdicts based on
defamation are governed by the same well known principles applicable

to interim interdicts in general, namely:
(a) a prima facie right;
(b) a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if
relief is not granted;
(c) that the balance of convenience favours the granting
of an interim interdict; and
(d) that the applicant has no other satisfactory remedy.
[9] As also appears from
Hix
(402F-H), an applicant who shows that the intended publication will
be defamatory, will satisfy the requirement of a prima facie
right,
unless the respondent who relies on some ground of justification laid
a sustainable factual foundation for that defence.
In determining the
balance of convenience, so it was explained in
Hix
(402 C-F), the court should have regard to
the consideration that freedom of the press is not to be overridden
lightly and weigh
that up against the applicant's countervailing
constitutional right to protection of his or her reputation. This is
essentially
how Snyders J approached the matter in the court a quo.
She found that the intended publication would be defamatory of the
plaintiff.
She then identified the grounds of justification relied
upon by the respondents as those of truth and public benefit and of
reasonable
publication, which has become known as the
Bogoshi
defence (with reference to
National Media Ltd
v Bogoshi
1998 (4) SA 1196
(SCA)). In
evaluating the facts, she came to the conclusion that the respondents
had set out a sustainable factual foundation for
the defences that
they raised. Essentially, her reasons for this conclusion appear to
be that, while the allegations in the questionnaire
and the draft
article were supported by the affidavit of Mampuele and the findings
of the disciplinary enquiry against Mabote,
they were met by no more
than bald and general denials on the part of the appellant. Following
the approach in
Hix
she
also found that the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.
In consequence, the application for an interim interdict
was refused.
[10] In this court the respondents raised the
preliminary contention that the appeal is moot in that, its outcome
will have no practical
impact, and that it should for that reason
alone be dismissed with costs. The factual basis for the contention
was, of course,
that the allegations which the appellant sought to
keep out of the public domain, have long since been published.
Moreover, so
the respondents contended, if the appellant suffered any
harm as a result of the publication, such harm cannot be undone by
reversing
the order of the court a quo. If the publication rendered
the appellant entitled to any relief, so the argument went, such
relief
should have been sought in an action for damages.
[11] The legal basis for the respondents’ preliminary
contention is to be found in s 21A(1) and (3) of the Supreme
Court
Act 59 of 1959. It provides:
‘
(1) When at the hearing of
any civil appeal to the [Supreme Court of Appeal] or any Provincial
or Local Division of the [High] Court
the issues are of such a nature
that the judgment or order sought will have no practical effect or
result, the appeal may be dismissed
on this ground alone.
. . .
(3) Save under exceptional
circumstances, the question whether the judgment or order would have
no practical effect or result, is
to be determined without reference
to consideration of costs.’
[12] As has been explained in earlier cases, s 21A
is in effect a reformulation of the well established common law
principle
that courts of law exist for the settlement of live,
concrete controversies and not to pronounce on hypothetical or
abstract questions
of law (see eg
Coin
Security Group (Pty) Ltd v SA National Union for Security Officers
[2000] ZASCA 137
;
2001 (2) SA 872
(SCA) at 875A-E;
Rand
Water Board v Rotek Industries (Pty )Ltd
2003
(4) SA 58
(SCA) para 26). On the facts of this case I think it is
plain that the appeal has indeed become moot. Even if we should find
that
on the facts of this case and interim interdict should have been
granted, it will not help the appellant because the publication
he
sought to prevent had taken place. It is water under the bridge. Nor
will it assist in the resolution of future factual disputes,
because
every future case will have to be decided on its own facts (see eg
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Smit
2002
(4) SA 241
(SCA) para 10;
Radio Pretoria v
Chairman, Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
2005
(1) SA 47
(SCA) para 40).
[13] But, of course, s 21A affords this court a
discretion to hear an appeal despite the absence of any practical
effect and
circumstances. Self-evidently, this discretion will again
be exercised with reference to the facts of every case. Efforts to
compare
or equate the facts of this case to those of reported cases
whether the court's discretion had been exercised one way or the
other
can therefore only result in a fruitless exercise. As a matter
of principle, it can, however, be said on good authority that an

appeal will be decided, despite being moot, where it ‘raises
important questions of law on which there is little authority and

[which] are bound to arise again’ (per Nugent JA in
Midi
Television t/a E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape)
[2007] ZASCA 56
;
2007 (5) SA 540
(SCA) para 4).
[14] Whether this is such a case, requires an
examination of the contentions raised on appeal. The appellant’s
first contention
relied on the majority judgment by Marais JA, in
Independent Newspapers Holdings Ltd v Suliman
2005 (7) BCLR 641
(SCA). According to the
interpretation of that judgment proffered by the appellant, Marais JA
held that, save in exceptional cases,
there is a ban on the
publication of the identity of a person facing criminal charges until
that person has actually appeared in
court. On the application of
this principle, so the argument went, the publication of the
appellant's identity as a person against
whom criminal charges had
been laid should have been interdicted, because he had not yet
appeared in court. Any evaluation of these
contentions, clearly
requires a closer examination of the
Suliman
case. What is crucial to the judgment of both
the majority and the minority in that case, as I see it, is the
precise identification
of the defamatory nature or the sting of the
offending newspaper articles. Both the majority and the minority
found the sting of
the articles in the allegation that Mr Suliman had
been arrested by the police as a suspect in connection with a
particularly odious
bombing of a restaurant where two lives were lost
and many seriously injured (see Marais JA (for the majority) paras 1
and 31;
Nugent JA (for the minority) para 75). The minority held that
the defamatory allegation was untrue and that in consequence the
defence of truth and public benefit relied upon, could not succeed
(paras 76-80).
[15] The majority, on the other hand, found that the
defamatory words were substantially true (paras 37 and 38). But, so
the majority
held, the publication of the true statement was not in
the public interest. In motivating this finding, Marais JA inter alia
said:
‘
I doubt that it can
never
be in the public
interest or for the public benefit for the media to name a suspect
and publish a photograph of him or her before
any court appearance.’
He then gave some examples (para 46) where, in his view,
the public may have an interest in such publication but it is clear
that
none of these examples have any bearing on this case. After that
Marais JA continued with the following statement (para 47) on which

the appellant set great store:
‘
That said, I think that the
consequence of a premature disclosure of the identity of a suspect
can be so traumatic for and detrimental
to the person concerned when
he or she may never be charged or appear in court and is, in fact,
innocent, that greater weight should
be assigned to the protection of
the constitutional right to dignity and privacy and the common-law
right of reputation, than to
the right of the press to freely impart
information to the public. It is not as if the press will be
permanently deprived of the
right to identify the suspect. Once he or
she appears in court his or her identity may be disclosed with
impunity.’
[16] As I see it, the interpretation of Marais JA's
judgment contended for by the appellant is far too wide. What was
found to be
defamatory was the statement that the plaintiff was
arrested by the police as a suspect of a crime. This was defamatory
because
it would lead the reasonable reader to infer that the police
believed, on reasonable grounds, that the arrested person committed

the crime for which he was arrested (as appears from the explanation
by Nugent JA in para 77). By contrast, the allegation that
a criminal
charge had been laid against someone would self-evidently, I think,
have a lesser impact on the reasonable reader. It
follows, in my
view, that the reasoning of Marais JA cannot, as the appellant would
have it, be extended willy-nilly to prevent
the publication of the
news that a criminal charge had been laid against an identified
person. In any event, I do not believe that
the principal formulated
by Marais JA was as immutable as contended for by the appellant. On
the contrary, he recognised that there
may be exceptions. It is true
that the examples of such exceptions that he gave do not find
application in this case. But that
is neither here nor there. Even if
the present case were therefore held potentially to be subject to the
Suliman
principle –
which in my view it is not - the further enquiry, whether it would
constitute an exception to the principle, would
be a question of
fact; it does not elevate this appeal to a case which raises
important questions of law.
[17] An alternative argument raised by the appellant was
that if the matter is not covered by the
Suliman
principle, we should, as a matter of law,
extend that principle so as to create a blanket ban against
publication of the identity
of a person against whom a criminal
charge had been laid, until he or she had appeared in court During
argument, counsel for the
appellant, however, conceded, rightly and
fairly in my view, that even a blanket ban on any reference to a
criminal charge would
not really assist his client. The reason is
that the sting of the publication he sought to prevent did not really
lie in the allegation
that a criminal charge had been laid. The sting
of the offending publication was that the appellant had been accused
of involvement
in tender fraud. The fact that this accusation had
been conveyed to the police in the form of a criminal charge was no
more than
an adjunct to the core allegation. In this light, counsel
for the appellant was compelled to argue for a blanket ban against
publication
of any disclosure that an identified person had been
involved in activity that could potentially give rise to a criminal
prosecution,
even if no pertinent reference was made to a criminal
charge.
[18] It strikes me, however, that an immutable rule of
such wide import would simply be untenable. Two important pillars of
our
democracy are the courts and a free press and the latter should
not be unduly hindered by the former in the performance of its vital

task. The rule contended for by the appellant would ban from
publication allegations of any involvement in corruption, dishonesty,

graft and so forth. This would bring the rule contended for in direct
conflict with the following statement of our law referred
to with
approval by the Constitutional Court in
Khumalo
v Holomisa
[2002] ZACC 12
;
2002 (5) SA 401
(CC) para 23:
'It is the function of the press
to ferret out corruption, dishonesty and graft wherever it may occur
and to expose the perpetrators.
The press must reveal dishonest mal-
and inept administration . . . . It must advance communication
between the governed and those
who govern.'
[19] The appellant's second contention on appeal was
that publication of the offending article should have been prevented
because
it would compromise the administration of justice in that it
could potentially interfere with his rights as an accused person in
a
criminal trial. As the legal basis for this contention the appellant
sought to rely on the decision of this court in
Midi
Television t/a E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape)
(supra)
which was not a defamation case. It
emanated from an application by the Director of Public Prosecution to
prevent the television
broadcasting of an interview by the
broadcaster with potential state witnesses in a forthcoming criminal
trial. The essential basis
of the application was that this could
prejudice or interfere with the proper administration of justice. In
the event, the appeal
against the pre-publication ban granted by the
High Court was upheld in this court. The principles underlying to the
judgement
are conveniently summarised by Nugent HA as follows (in
para 19):
'In summary, a publication will
be unlawful and thus susceptible to being prohibited, only if the
prejudice that the publication
might cause to the administration of
justice is demonstrable and substantial and there is a real risk that
the prejudice will occur
if publication takes place. Mere conjecture
or speculation that prejudice might occur will not be enough. Even
then publication
will not be unlawful unless a court is satisfied
that the disadvantage of curtailing the free flow of information
outweighs its
advantage. In making that evaluation it is not only the
interests of those who are associated with the publication that need
to
be brought to account, but, more important, the interest of every
person in having access to information.'
[20] The appellant gave no indication, either in his
founding or his replying papers as to how the administration of
justice will
be prejudicially affected by publication of the article
he sought to prevent. In this court it was suggested on his behalf
that
such publication could potentially interfere with his
fundamental rights as an accused person under s 35(3) of the
Constitution,
eg his right to silence. This, I think, places the
appellant’s argument squarely within the category of what Nugent JA
described
in
Midi Television
(para 19) as mere conjecture or speculation that publication might
prejudice the administration of justice. In fact, the appellant’s

contention strikes me as so wide that it is tantamount to the
proposition that the mere prospect of criminal prosecutions would

inevitably lead to a ban on publication of the background story, a
proposition I have already described as unsustainable. As appears

from
Midi Television
,
the question whether the administration of justice justifies a
limitation of press freedom by way of a pre-publication ban in
a
particular case, is entirely dependent on the facts of that case. It
follows that a decision one way or the other on the facts
of this
case will be of little, if any, consequence in future situations.
[21] The appellant's third was that the court a quo had
insufficient regard to two considerations of substantial import.
First,
to the appellant’s high public profile as the chief
executive officer of an internationally recognised company and the
enormous
prejudice he would consequently suffer through publication
of the articles. Secondly, to the notion of ubuntu which 'recognises

a person's status as a human being, entitled to unconditional
respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the
community,
that such a person may be part of' (per Jajbhay J in
Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya
2008
(3) BCLR 338
(W) para 2).
[22] The law of defamation requires a balancing act
between two rights, both highly valued, but often in conflict with
one another.
This has been recognised in numerous cases (see eg
Argus
Printing & Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen's Estate
1994
(2) SA 1
(A) 25B-E;
National Media Ltd v
Bogoshi (supra)
para 4 and the cases there
cited;
Khumalo v Holomia (supra)
paras
21-28). The two rights involved have since been enshrined in our
constitution. They are, of course, on the one hand, the right
to
freedom of expression, which includes freedom of the press (s 16)
and the right to human dignity and privacy (ss 10 and
14), on the
other. I think it goes without saying that the high profile of the
individual involved should be taken into account
in the balancing
process. In fact, it could potentially add weight to both sides of
the scale. Nor is there any doubt in my mind
that considerable
recognition should be given to the values embodied in the notion of
ubuntu, under the rubric of dignity. But
this has already been
acknowledged and confirmed, as appears, for example, from the
following statement by O'Reagan J in
Khumalo v
Holomia (supra)
para 27:
'The value of human dignity in
our Constitution is not only concerned with an individual's sense of
self-worth, but constitutes
and affirmation of the worth of human
beings in our society. It includes the intrinsic worth of human
beings shared by all people
as well as the individual reputation of
each person built upon his or her own individual achievements. The
value of human dignity
in our Constitution therefore values both the
personal sense of self-worth as well as the public's estimation of
the worth or value
of an individual.'
[23] It seems to me that anything we can say about what
should be taken into account in the balancing process that the law of
defamation
requires, had been said before. Whether the court a quo
afforded sufficient weight to the appellant's high profile or whether
it
had sufficient regard to the notion of ubuntu are clearly
questions of fact. Again they do not elevate this appeal to a case
which
raises important questions of law, as contended for by the
appellant. The principles the court below applied in relation to
pre-publication
interdicts are well-established (eg in
Hix
Network Technologies v Systems Publishers (Pty) Ltd (supra)
.
It follows that I can find no basis on which this court can exercise
the discretion admittedly bestowed upon it by s 21A
to decide
the merits in this case in a judgment which will have no practical
effect.
[24] What remains is the issue of costs. It emerges from
a contention raised by the appellant for the first time at the
hearing
of the appeal and then only in reply. In the result the
respondents had been afforded no fair warning nor adequate
opportunity
to answer. It amounted to this: because the appellant was
seeking to protect his constitutional rights, so it was argued, he
should
not be ordered to pay the respondent’s cost, neither in this
court nor tin the court a quo, albeit that he had been unsuccessful

in doing so. What the appellant therefore contended for was not that
this appeal falls within the narrow ambit of the exception

contemplated in s 21A(3), where the court embarks on an
adjudication of the merits in order to decide the question of costs.

His argument was that, even if the merits were rightly decided
against him, he should not be ordered to pay the respondents’

costs; neither in this court nor the court a quo. The answer to this
contention regarding the costs in the court a quo is quite
simple.
The court a quo had a discretion to determine costs. In the exercise
of that discretion the court obviously decided that
costs should
follow the event. It was never part of the appellant’s grounds of
appeal that the court had erred in doing so. In
consequence it is not
open to the appellant to object to that costs order at this belated
stage.
[25] As to the costs on appeal, I accept that the
respondent sought to protect a constitutional right. But this was not
a case against
a government agency as contemplated, for example, in
Trustees for the Time Being of the Biowatch
Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources CCT
80/80
[2009] ZACC 14
(3 June 2009) paras 21 et seq. The respondents are
private entities who likewise sought to protect their constitutional
rights.
Nonetheless, the appellant sought a costs order against them,
both in the court a quo and on appeal. Moreover, the respondents had

consistently maintained that this is an academic appeal which should
be dismissed for that reason alone. That did not deter the
appellant
from his course. The respondents were therefore compelled to continue
with their opposition of what they considered an
academic appeal to
defend the costs order in their favour in the court a quo and at the
same time, to avoid a costs order against
them on appeal. In these
circumstances I do not think it lies in the appellant’s mouth to
raise the contention that he did. Though
the principle that costs
should follow the event is not a law of the Medes and the Persians, I
can find no reason in this case
to deviate from that principle.
[26] It follows that by virtue of s 21A of the
Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 the appeal is dismissed with costs,
including the
costs occasioned by the employment of two counsel.
………………
F D J BRAND
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Counsel for Appellant:
V
MALEKA SC
T MOKABA SC
D MPOFU
Instructed by: LAWLEY SHEIN ATTORNEYS
JOHANNESBURG
Correspondents: MATSEPES ATTORNEYS INC
BLOEMFONTEIN
For Respondent: D I BERGER SC
T MANCHU
Instructed By: CHEADLE THOMPSON & HAYSOM INC
JOHANNESBURG
Correspondents: WEBBERS
ATTORNEYS
BLOEMFONTEIN