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[2021] ZAGPPHC 444
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Eris Property Group (Pty) Ltd v HL Kroon Property Developments (Pty) Ltd and Others (58910/2019) [2021] ZAGPPHC 444 (8 July 2021)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 58910/2019
In
the matter between:
ERIS
PROPERTY GROUP (PTY) LTD
Plaintiff
and
HL KROON PROPERTY
DEVELOPMENTS (PTY) LTD
First Defendant
PURE
CONSULTANTS
Second Defendant
HANS VAN
WAMELEN
Third Defendant
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
BHOOLA
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The plaintiff in
this action, institutes a claim against the first, second
and third
defendants; jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved, for damages arising from a written building
contract
including various addendums attached to the contract.
[2]
The alleged damages arose out of an incident which occurred on the
21
st
October 2016 when gusts of wind caused the roof of the building
described in the main contract to lift, causing amongst other things,
structural damage to the building as well as the destruction of the
roof canopy;
[3]
The plaintiff alleges that the damage was caused as a direct result
of
the following primary reasons:
3.1
latent defects in respect of the design specifications; and
3.2
patent defects in respect of the execution of the works in regards to
the roof design, structure and affixing
to the building of the
property;
[4]
The second defendant filed and served a notice of intention to defend
on the 29
th
August 2019. On the 6
th
January 2020, the second defendant delivered a notice in terms of
Rule 23(1) of Uniform Rules to the plaintiff. Essentially, the
second
defendant complains that the plaintiff’s particulars of claim
annexed to the summons is vague and embarrassing in
that it fails to
disclose a cause of action alternatively it lacks averments necessary
to sustain a cause of action against the
second defendant;
[5]
In spite of receiving the notice in terms of Rule 23(1) on the 6
th
January 2020, from the second defendant, to remove the causes of
complaint, the plaintiff was insistent that there was nothing
amiss
to its particulars of claim and refused to accede to the second
defendant’s request to remove the cause of complaint.
[6]
Consequently, the second defendant (hereinafter referred to as the
excipient)
delivered its exception on 30 January 2020 and the
plaintiff opposes such exception alleging that there is nothing
defective in
its pleading.
FACTS
COMMON
CAUSE FACTS
[7]
The common cause factual matrix of this proceedings are as follows.:
[7.1]
All three defendants were involved in a building project at the Dawn
Park Shopping Centre;
7.2]
The second defendant is identified as the structural engineer of the
project, who attended to the design specifications of
the roof and
its structure in relation to the Centre and responsible for the
inspection of the work carried out;
[7.3]
The main agreement signed between the plaintiff and first defendant,
together with the necessary addendums, relating to the
contract is
attached to the summons;
[7.4]
The roof of the aforesaid shopping centre was damaged on 21 October
2016 as a result of a gust of wind.
[8]
According to the pleadings, the damage to the Centre was caused by
latent defects
in respect of design specifications and patent defects
in respect of the execution works.
[9]
The allegations against the Excipient are incorporated in paragraphs
13 to 15 and
paragraphs 27 to 30 of the particulars of claim. The
plaintiff alleges:
[9.1]
The excipient failed to attend to the work in a workmanlike manner to
ensure
that
the roof was properly fastened.
[9.2]
The design specifications which were approved by the excipient
provided that the roof structure
is to be anchored to the building
with bolts to meet a minimum depth requirement of 125mm.
[9.3]
The excipient was sued in the main for a contractual
claim for poor workmanship for failing to ensure, upon inspection,
that the correct specified required length bolts and medium were not
utilised and consequently, the roof structure was not sufficiently
anchored to the specified depth.
[9.4]
The alternative claim preferred was a
delictual claim whereby it is alleged that
the excipient
as result of its professional duty, owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff and it breached its duty of care in that
it failed to
properly inspect the building works, more particularly, the roof
structure and inspected bolts.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION
[10]
Whether the exception has merit;
[11]
Whether the particulars of claim set out a complete cause of action
that can be answered by the
defendants.
LAW
[12]
Exceptions are regulated by Rule 23 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
There are generally
two forms of exceptions:
12.1
The pleading is vague and embarrassing;
12.2
The pleading lacks the averments to sustain a cause of action or a
defence.
[1]
VAGUE
AND EMBARRASING
[13]
When a pleading is considered to be vague and embarrassing it usually
involves a two-fold consideration:
13.1
The first is whether the pleading lacks particularity to the extent
that it is vague; and
13.2
the second is whether the vagueness causes embarrassment of such a
nature that the excipient is prejudiced.
[14]
When considering an exception of this nature, the three enquiries
formulated by Heher J (as he
then was) are helpful in explaining the
approach to be adopted.
[2]
14.1
Firstly, an enquiry has to be made into whether the exception
goes to the heart of the claim (or as
Innes CJ puts it, the validity
of the summons as a whole.);
[3]
Applying
the principles laid down in the decision of
Jowell
V Bramwell-Jones at 899F-G,
which
quoted from the decision of
Carelsen
v Fairbridge, Arderne and Lawton
[4]
,
such
an
exception cannot be directed at a particular paragraph within a cause
of action, but ought to be directed at the whole cause
of action. In
such instance, it is the duty of the defendant or excipient to
persuade the court that upon every interpretation
of the pleading it
can reasonably bear, particularly the document upon which it is
based, it does not disclose a cause of action
or defence, for the
exception to be upheld;
14.2
Secondly, an enquiry into whether it is vague and embarrassing to the
extent that the defendant does not know the
claim he has to meet; and
14.3
Thirdly, in the event of it being found that an exception on any
ground fails, an enquiry is to be
made to ascertain whether the
particulars identified by the defendant are strictly necessary in
order to plead and, if so whether
the material facts are
unequivocally set out.
[5]
[15]
The
nature and extent of this type of exception was also considered
by McCreath J in the decision of
Trope
v South African Reserve Bank and Two Other Cases
[6]
,
which was cited with approval by Heher J in the decision of
Jowell
v Bramwell-Jones and Others
[7]
,
where the court laid out the following general principles regarding
exceptions:
"(a)
minor blemishes are irrelevant;
(b)
pleadings must be read as a whole; no paragraph can be read in
isolation;
(c)
a distinction must be drawn between the facta probanda, or
primary factual allegations which every plaintiff must make,
and the
facta probantia, which are the secondary allegations upon which the
plaintiff will rely in support of his primary factual
allegations.
Generally speaking, the latter are matters for particulars for trial
and even then are limited. For the rest, they
are matters for
evidence;
(d)
only facts need be pleaded; conclusions of law need not be
pleaded;
(e)
bound up with the last-mentioned consideration is that
certain allegations expressly made may carry with them. implied
allegations and the pleading must be so read: cf Coronation Brick
(Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) ltd
1982 (4) SA 37
1 (D)
at 377, 3798. 3790--H.'"
[8]
[16]
It is permissible to take exception to an alternative claim. The
caveat to this is that the alternative
claim must arise out of
different causes of action;
[9]
[17]
It is trite that a plaintiff is entitled to rely on mutually
contradictory averments in his particulars
of claim, provided that it
is clear from the manner of pleading them, that he is only relying on
the one in the event that the
other is not sustainable;
[10]
[18]
Where an exception is based on the fact that the pleading does
not disclose a cause of
action or a defence, it is not necessary to
afford the opponent an opportunity to remove the cause of complaint
first; and the
exception must be delivered within the pleading
allowed for filing of any subsequent pleadings. However, the
excipient has
the duty to persuade the Court that upon every
interpretation which the pleading in question, can reasonably bear,
no cause of
action is disclosed.
[11]
[19]
In such an exception, the particulars must contain every fact
(facta
probanda)
-substantive law and not procedure
[12]
that is necessary for the plaintiff to prove. It does not, and is not
required to, contain every piece of evidence
(facta
probantia)
that is required to prove the fact.
[13]
[20]
The general approach to exceptions must be viewed within the context
of the following comment by Harms JA:
[14]
“
Exceptions
should be dealt with sensibly. They provide a useful mechanism to
weed out cases without legal merit. An over-technical
approach
destroys their utility. To borrow the imagery employed by Miller J,
the response to an exception should be like a sword
that cuts through
the tissue of which the exception is compounded and exposes its
vulnerability.”
APPLICATION
OF LAW TO FACTS
FIRST
EXCEPTION
[21]
The excipient’s complaint is that the plaintiff’s
claim against the excipient is
based on an agreement (
referring to paragraphs 27 to 30 of the particulars of claim) and
requires the excipient to indulge in
speculation.
[22]
The excipient argues, from a reading of paragraphs 27 to 28, it
can be assumed that the source of these
averments are based on
contract and the excipient justifies this by alluding to the
fact that paragraphs 29 to 30 of the
particulars of claim is a claim
in delict, in the alternative.
[23]
Counsel for the excipient submits if the claim by the plaintiff is
one advanced in contract, then all the
excipient has to say about the
agreement is that the excipient was
the presiding
firm of
engineers whom attended inter alia to the design specifications of
the roof and its structure and that the excipient “as
the
appointed structural engineer was responsible for all aspects of the
structural engineering design and quality control”.
[24]
The excipient submits that a contract is an agreement between
parties, entered into with the
intention of creating binding
obligations, to perform according to the terms agreed.
[15]
The plaintiff does not say
:
w
ho
the contracting parties were and who represented them?, when and
where was the agreement concluded?, what were the terms
of the
agreement and whether the agreement was oral, written or tacit?
Excipient
submits this renders the particulars of claim vague and embarrassing
because the excipient does not know what case
is advanced
against it in contract
[16]
and the excipient cannot take instructions on the alleged agreement
and plead meaningfully thereto. Subsequently, excipient submits,
in
essence, the plaintiff did not comply with Rule 18(6) and the
excipient is embarrassed and prejudiced which makes it impossible
for
him to plead.
[25]
In response thereto, the plaintiff submits that upon a
contextual reading of the relevant paragraphs
it is apparent
that the excipient is liable to the plaintiff on two levels:
25.1
the first being as a result of its appointment in terms of the
agreement entered into between
the plaintiff and with the first
defendant; and
25.2
secondly, by virtue of his appointment as the structural engineer, he
is bound by the obligations as
set out in the acceptance of its
appointment read with the obligations pleaded in the particulars of
claim.
[26]
Additionally, the plaintiff prefers an alternative claim against the
excipient in respect of delictual
damages. The excipient had
duties to perform which entailed a legal obligation on him to
inspect of the items and the
alleged failure to inspect them,
- must be, in the context of the pleadings, read with or
construed as the failure to properly
design the roof.
[27]
The Plaintiff argues, if the excipient is able to identify the above
causes of action from the particulars of claim,
then the
excipient can plead thereto. Plaintiff submits, there exists no merit
in the two exceptions raised and that the
complaints raised by the
excipient are over technical and should not be permitted. He submits
further, that this causes no
serious prejudice to the excipient
as he can plead in respect of this issue.
[17]
[28]
The excipient is fundamentally, relying on Rule 18(4) of the
Uniform Rules
[18]
and
Rule
18(6) of the Uniform Rules.
[19]
Rule
18 essentially deals with principles required in pleadings generally.
[29]
In considering Rule 18(4), from a reading of the summons and
particulars of claim together with the annexures
appended, I find
that the excipient, having been able to precisely and concisely
crystalise what case it has to meet against the
plaintiff, is able to
plead exactly what he has excepted to. I say so for the
following reasons: applying
Jowell
V Bramwell-Jones at 899F-G,
which
quoted from the decision of
Carelsen
v Fairbridge, Arderne and Lawton
,
an exception that is vague and embarrassing cannot be directed at a
particular paragraph within a cause of action, but ought to
be
directed at the whole cause of action
[20]
.
A pleading based on the ground that it is vague and embarrassing,
strikes at the formulation of the cause of action and not its
legal
validity.
[21]
[30]
Attached to the particulars of claim is the main agreement between
the plaintiff and first defendant
and a plethora of addendums which
makes reference to all three defendants and the duties that each of
them had to perform. Each
of their duties are chronologically and
distinctly set out by the plaintiff. I am not convinced that the
excipient
persuaded me that upon every interpretation of the
pleadings and the documents annexed to the pleadings that plaintiff’s
summons does not disclose a cause of action.
[22]
[31]
I accordingly find the plaintiff’s pleadings contain
clear and concise statements of the
material facts and contains
sufficient particularity to enable the excipient to reply thereto and
that the excipient was not embarrassed
by this issue and was not
prejudiced.
[32]
I turn now to the issue pertaining to non-compliance with Uniform
Rule 18(6). The excipient argues
the plaintiff did
not comply with this rule as alluded to in paragraph 22 above and
therefore the plaintiff’s pleadings are
vague and embarrassing,
the excipient is prejudiced.
[33]
The plaintiff in argument submitted,
all the documents regarding the contract are attached to the
particulars of claim and from
a reading of the particulars of claim,
there exists a nexus between the plaintiff and all three defendants.
He submits the agreement
pleaded between plaintiff and first
defendant reflects the existence of a causal connection between the
defendants. From the reading
of all the agreements and following the
chronology of the events in the particulars of claim the excipient
can determine who is
responsible for what and plead to this
exception. If the first defendant cannot plead because the
provisions of Rule 18(6)
are lacking, then it must be stated
accordingly in the plea.
[34]
I find from a reading of the summons and the particulars of claim,
that
ex facie
the pleadings, the main contract and all the
necessary addendums to the main contract are properly referred to in
the particulars
of claim. In the plaintiff’s particulars of
claim the sequence of how the events unraveled can easily be
followed, the nexus
and the causal connection and links between all
parties are clearly identified in the pleadings.
[35]
Paragraph 5 of the particulars of claim refers to the agreement
entered into between the plaintiff
and the first defendant. That
agreement was attached to the particulars of claim. The particulars
of claim clearly identifies each
defendant and what each of
their responsibilities were.
[36]
In paragraph 8 of the particulars of claim reference is made to the
contract data EC, which is also
attached to the summons.
[37]
According to paragraph 9.4 of the particulars of claim, the excipient
was identified as an agent, and
the structural engineer.
[38]
According to paragraphs 14 and 15, the allegations against the
excipient are alluded to and then when
one refers to paragraphs 27 to
30 it is apparent as to what case the second defendant has to meet. A
reading of paragraphs 37 to
38 deals with the breaches by the
defendants’ being jointly and severally liable the one paying
the other to be absolved.
[39]
I accordingly find from a holistic reading of the
pleadings, that the plaintiff has complied with rule
18(6). I
am not persuaded that the excipient cannot plead to this exception.
I find that the pleadings are not
vague and do not
embarrass nor prejudice the excipient; quite the contrary, the
excipient knows very well the case it has to meet.
Excipient
must distinguish between the
facta
probanda,
or primary factual allegations which every plaintiff must make, and
the
facta
probantia
,
which are the secondary allegations upon which the plaintiff will
rely in support of his primary factual allegations. Generally
speaking, the latter are matters for particulars
[23]
for trial and even then are limited. For the rest, they are matters
for evidence. Should the second defendant require any further
particulars for preparation for trial that information may be
requested
[40]
This ground of exception is therefore dismissed.
THE
SECOND GROUND OF EXCEPTION
[41]
The excipient submits that the claims against first defendant and the
excipient are not pleaded in the alternative.
[42]
In response thereto, plaintiff’s Counsel submitted concurrent
claims in contract and delict
are possible if the facts support both
the contractual and delictual claims. Counsel for plaintiff submitted
that the plaintiff
made an election to procced on the contract in the
main and in the alternative to proceed in delict as he was of the
view it was
relevant and alternative claims may exist.
[24]
He submitted further that the claims are pleaded in the alternative.
[43]
The issue of alternative claims was discussed at length in
Trio
Engineering Products and Pilot Crush Tec International (Pty) Ltd
[25]
.
The
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Holtzhausen
v ABSA Bank Ltd
2008 (5) SA 630
(SCA) at 633 -634 emphasised
that “Liillicrap
[26]
is not authority for the general proposition that an action cannot be
brought in delict if a contractual claim is competent.
The same facts
may support an action in contract and in delict, permitting the
plaintiff to elect which action to pursue, or to
pursue each in the
alternative”.
[44]
Excipient in its heads of argument, allege that the claims
against the first and second defendants
are not pleaded in the
alternative. From the perusal of the summons and particulars of
claim, reference to paragraph 22 and
28 provides the
contractual claim against the first defendant and
excipient and paragraph 23 and 29 provides
for the delictual claims
in the alternative. I find the submissions made by the excipient
regarding the claims not pleaded in the
alternative has no
merit
[27]
.
[45]
Excipient submits further, that the installation complaint against
first defendant and the design complaint
against the excipient cannot
be advanced simultaneously because they contain mutually destructive
or contradictory averments. The
excipient then proceeds to explain
the two mutually contradictory versions in paragraph 42 to 47 of its
heads of argument, dealing
with substantive law to the effect that
for the plaintiff to succeed with the installation complaint, it must
prove that the design
specifications were not defective and vice
versa. Counsel for the excipient submits the (irreconcilable)
hostility between the
cases advanced by plaintiff is plain in that
excipient does not understand the case it has to
meet.
[46]
In response thereto, the plaintiff submits there exists two
obligations on the excipient, the first
was to design the roof
structure and the second was to inspect its works. There were
sufficient particulars provided in this regard
in that the design was
faulty and the second defendant failed to properly inspect the works.
The excipients can plead to this and
it will be amplified at the
hearing with evidence. The excipient may request further particulars
if he contends that the allegations
are not sufficient. Plaintiff
submits that there is no merit in this ground of exception as it is
of technical in nature.
[47]
I am in agreement with plaintiff that from a contextual reading,
excipients duties in so far as its
involvement in the project was
merely to design and to inspect the work done thereafter. If the
excipient is able to distinguish
between two mutually contradictory
versions, then the excipient can state this in his plea. I find
that the issues raised
in this exception is over- technical in
nature and request for further particulars for trial or
evidence can be led at the
trial to cure any misconceptions that
exist. I do not believe that this warrants an
exception to be raised due
to its technical nature. In the case of
Trans- African Insurance Co Ltd v
Maluleka
1956 (2) SA 273
the court held “ technical objections to less than
perfect procedural steps should not be permitted, in the absence
of
prejudice, to interfere with the expeditious and, if possible,
inexpensive decision of cases on their real merits.
[48]
I find that the excipient has failed to show vagueness amounting to
embarrassment, and as such excipient
failed to persuade me that the
embarrassment amounts to serious prejudice
[28]
The second exception is accordingly dismissed.
THE THIRD GROUND OF
EXCEPTION
[49]
Excipient in this ground submits that plaintiff does not plead that
the breaches of the agreement by
excipient or the breaches of the
alleged duty of care by the excipient, caused the damage suffered by
it nor does it in consequence
plead how such breaches are causally
connected to the alleged loss. There are simply no allegations made
by plaintiff which results
in the case that excipient has to meet
being incomprehensible. This complaint is exacerbated by
Plaintiff’s’
failure to plead that it owned the Centre or
that bore the risk of damage or loss to the Centre.
[50]
In response thereto, the plaintiff’s directed the court to the
relevant paragraphs 34 and 38
read with paragraph 40 of the
particulars of claim where it is evident that there is no merit in
this exception. Plaintiff’s
counsel submitted that the
excipient can plead to this averment. The excipient can answer by
admitting or denying the averments
in these paragraphs.
[51]
He submitted further that the nature of excipients submission is that
excipient will not be seriously
prejudiced should the allegations not
be expunged as per
Francis
and
Trope’s
cases
alluded to above.
[52]
I agree with the plaintiff regarding this ground of exception.
Paragraph 34 provides for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff.
Paragraph 37 provides for the damages that flow as a direct result of
the defendants’ failures
and breaches and paragraph 38 provides
as a consequent of the aforesaid, the plaintiff claims jointly and
severally from the defendants,
the one paying the other to be
absolved.
[53]
I find that in so far as this ground of exception is concerned, , it
is not vague and it does disclose
a cause of action .
Consequently, the excipient is not embarrassed is prejudiced.
I accordingly find that the third
ground of exception is without
merit and must also be dismissed
RULING
[54]
In considering the matter in its totality, I find all three
exceptions raised
do not have any merit. I find that the particulars
of claim set out a complete cause of action that can be answered by
the excipient.
[55]
I find that the excipient did not persuade me that the three
exceptions raised
are vague and embarrassing alternatively that they
do not disclose a cause of action.
[56]
Consequently, I find that the plaintiff’s pleadings do not
cause any embarrassment to the
excipient and that the excipient is
not prejudiced in any way and can plead to the plaintiff’s
particulars of claim.
ORDER
[57]
In the result I make the following order.
[57.1]
The excipient’s first to third exceptions dated 29
th
January 2020 are dismissed with costs;
[57.2]
The excipient is directed to file its plea to the plaintiff’s
particulars of claim within twenty
(20) days from the date the
judgment being uploaded on CaseLines.
________________________
C.
B. Bhoola
Acting
Judge of the
High
Court of South Africa
Gauteng
Division, Pretoria
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judges whose names is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 08 July 2021.
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the Applicant
: Advocate A Govender
Instructed
by
: Clyde and Co Attorneys
Counsel
for the Respondent
: Advocate IL Posthumus
Instructed
by
: Whalley and Van Der Lith
Inc
Date
of Hearing
: 25 May 2021
Date
of Judgment
: 08 July 2021
[1]
Jowell
v Bramwell-Jones and Others
1998 (1) SA 836
(W) at p 905H-I (Jowell)
[2]
Ibid
[3]
Liquidators
Waipio Shipping Co v Lurie Bros
1923 AD 69
at p 73
[4]
1918
TPD 306
at 309
[5]
It
has been emphasized by the Appellate Division (as it was previously
known) that the more complex the case the greater the particularity
that is required. See Imprefed (Pty) Ltd v National Transport
Commission
1993 (3) SA 94
(A) 107.
[6]
1992
(3) SA 208
(T) at 211
[7]
Jowell
Ibid 1
[8]
Jowell
Ibid 1 at 9021 - 9030
[9]
See
in general the matter of Du Preez v Boetsap Stores (Pty) Ltd 1978
(2) 177 SA NC contrasted to Dharumpal
Transport
v Dharumpal
1956 (1) SA 700
A
[10]
Feldman
NO v EMI Music SA (Pty) Ltd; Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA
(Pty) Ltd
2010 (1) SA 1
(SCA) at
para
11.
[11]
Lewis
v Oneanate (Pty) Ltd and Another
[1992] ZASCA 174
;
1992 (4) SA 811
(A) at 817; H v
Fetal Assessment Centre
2015 (2) SA 93
(CC)
at 199B.
[12]
Alphedie
Investments (Pty)Ltd v Greentops (Pty)Ltd
1975 (1) SA 161
(T) at
161H
[13]
McKenzie
v Farmers’ Co-operative Meat Industries Ltd
1922 AD 16
at 23;
Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980
(2)
SA 814 (A) at 838E-F
[14]
Telematrix
v Advertising Standards Authority SA
2006 (1) SA 461
SCA
[15]
KwaZulu-Natal
Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal
2013 (4)
SA 262
(CC) at para 35
[17]
Trans
– African Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka 1956(2) SA 273(AD)
[18]
“
every
pleading shall contain a clear and concise statement of the material
facts upon which the pleader relies for
his claim ….
with sufficient particularity to enable the opposite party to reply
thereto”
.
[19]
“
a
party who in his pleading relies upon a contract shall state whether
the contract is written or oral and when, where and by
whom it was
concluded, and if the contract is written a true copy thereof or of
the part relied on in the pleading shall be annexed
to the
pleading.”
[20]
See
Jowell Ibid 1 V Bramwell-Jones at 899F-G, which quoted from
the decision of Carelsen V Fairbridge, Arderne
and
Lawton
1918 TPD 306
at 309.
[21]
Trope
and Others v South African Reserve Bank, Ibid 5
[22]
See
Makali Plant & Construction (Pty)Ltd and Setheo Engineering
(Pty) Ltd
(96735/2016)
[2018] ZAGPPHC 62 (20 February 2018) which citing with
approval Gallagher Group Ltd and Another
v 10 Tech Manufacturing
(Pry) Ltd and Others
2014 (2) SA 157
(GNP) at par (20], citing with
approval the decisions in Theunissen en Andere v Transvaale
Lewendehawe Koop Bpk
1988 (2) SA 493
(A) at 500E -F, et al.
[23]
Trope
v South African Reserve Bank and Two Other Cases
1992 (3) SA 208
(T)
at 2 11
[24]
Liillicrap
and Wassener v Pilkington Brothers
1885 (1) SA 475
(A)
Holtzhausen and Absa Limited 2008 (5) SA,
360
SCA, Trio Engineered and Pilot Crush International 2019 (3) SA 580
[25]
2019(3)SA
580
[26]
Ibid
24
[27]
Trio
Engineering Products and Pilot Crush Tec International (Pty) Ltd
,Ibid 26
[28]
Freedom
Property Fund Ltd and another v Stavridis and Others
[2018] 3 All SA
550
(ECG)