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[2021] ZAGPJHC 685
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Andreini and Others v Mbunu and Others (28918/2019) [2021] ZAGPJHC 685 (17 August 2021)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE: 17/8/21
CASE NUMBER: 28918/2019
In
the matter between: -
ANDREA
PIETER
ANDREINI
First applicant
ANDREINA
GIOVANNA
SCARAMAL
Second applicant
NAMM
(PTY)
LTD
Third applicant
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 2019/559715/07)
and
KALULA
MBUNU
First respondent
(IDENTITY
NUMBER: [….])
MKHULULI
DUBE
Second respondent
(PASSPORT
NUMBER: [….])
LILLIAN
NDLOVU
Third respondent
(IDENTITY
NUMBER: [….])
LIZNET
SIBONILE
LINDA
Fourth respondent
(IDENTITY
NUMBER: [….])
ALL
OTHER OCCUPANTS OF ERF [….]
,
JOHANNESBURG
Fifth respondent
THE
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Sixth respondent
J U D G M E N T
DELIVERED
:
This judgment
was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
legal representatives by e mail and publication
on CaseLines.
The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on 17
August 2021.
F. BEZUIDENHOUT AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The
first and second applicants (“
the
applicants
”)
seek an order evicting the first to fourth respondents (“
the
respondents”
)
and all persons occupying through and under them, the immovable
property situated at [….] Johannesburg (“
the
property”
)
in terms of section 4(1) of The Prevention of Illegal Eviction
From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 19 of 1998 (“
PIE
”).
[2]
The
third applicant was cited as an interested party by virtue of the
fact that it has concluded an offer to purchase with the applicants
with the intention of acquiring the property.
[3]
The
respondents opposed the application and filed an answering affidavit
together with a supplementary answering affidavit.
[4]
Heads
of argument on behalf of the respondents were filed late. In
fact, it was filed shortly before the hearing of this application.
An application for condonation was filed on my insistence. The
applicants do not oppose the condonation application and wish
to
finalise the matter. I therefore condone the late filing of the
heads of argument.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION
[5]
Whether
the eviction application should have been instituted in the
Magistrate’s Court because the parties agreed in terms
of
clause 17 of the lease agreement that any dispute that would
arise out of the lease agreement would be instituted in the
Magistrate’s Court.
[6]
Whether
the applicants lawfully cancelled the lease agreement.
[7]
Whether
the applicants are entitled to remain in occupation of the property
on the basis that they made payment of municipal charges
on behalf of
the applicants and have not been refunded.
[8]
Whether
the applicants complied with the provisions of PIE.
[9]
Whether
the applicants are entitled to an order for the eviction of the
respondents.
[10]
Whether
the personal circumstances of the respondents preclude the court from
granting an eviction order.
FACTS
ADVANCED BY THE APPLICANTS
[11]
The
applicants are the registered co-owners of the property. This
is not disputed by the respondents.
[12]
The
applicants concluded fixed term lease agreements with the respondents
on different occasions. On each occasion the respondents
agreed
to pay monthly rentals and for water and electricity consumption
charges. All four respondents remained in occupation
of the
property on the termination of the fixed term lease period with the
consent of the applicants and as a result, the lease
agreements
continued to operate on a month-to-month basis, subject to the same
terms and conditions as the original lease agreements.
[13]
On
29 October 2019 the applicants concluded an offer to purchase with
the third applicant for the purchase of the property.
On the
7
th
of April 2019 the second applicant attended at the property and
informed the first to fourth respondents that the property
had been
sold and that they were required to vacate by the 30
th
of June 2019. On the 13
th
of April 2019 the applicants addressed a notice to vacate to the
respondents confirming that they were required to vacate the property
by the 30
th
of June 2019. The respondents were specifically advised
that the rental for the following three months would remain
due and
payable.
[14]
On
12 June 2019 the second applicant was contacted by a Mr Makweng
who advised that he was from the City of Johannesburg and
that he was
requested by the respondents to approach the applicants to discuss
the reasons for their eviction. The respondents
informed
Mr Makweng that they had made certain payments on behalf of the
applicants and that they were being evicted notwithstanding
the fact
that they had been paying rent. This was not correct because
the respondents had failed to pay rental for the remaining
three-month period of the lease and therefore breached the terms of
their respective leases.
[15]
On
the 19
th
of June 2019 the respondents were called upon in writing to
remedy their breach and a letter was addressed to Mr Makweng
by
the applicants’ legal representatives alerting him to the
provisions of
section 5(5)
of the
Rental Housing Act, 50 of 1999
which provides that if on the expiration of the lease the tenant
remains in occupation, the parties are deemed to have entered
into a
periodic lease on the same terms and conditions as the expired lease,
except that at least one month’s written notice
must be given
of the intention by either party to terminate the lease.
[16]
Despite
demand, the respondents did not remedy their breach. Mr Makweng
did not contact the applicants again.
[17]
On
28 June 2019 the applicants’ attorneys notified the
respondents in writing that the leases were cancelled.
The
respondents were in terms of the cancellation notice required to
vacate the property by no later than the 30
th
of June 2019.
[18]
Despite
affording the respondents a period of three months to vacate the
property, they have failed to do so.
THE
RESPONDENTS’ CASE
[19]
The
respondents allege that they were never informed that the lease
agreements were cancelled. They also allege that the applicants
must refund them their deposits and the amounts they have paid to the
municipality in order to assist the applicants.
[20]
In
their supplementary answering affidavit the respondents raise the
issue of jurisdiction for the first time. They allege
that in
terms of clause 17 of the lease agreement the parties agreed
that any dispute arising from the lease agreement would
be instituted
in the Magistrate’s Court.
[21]
The
respondents also furnished details regarding the personal
circumstances of the occupants. I will deal with this aspect
in
more detail later.
[22]
In
reply, the applicants aver that whilst parties may agree to the
jurisdiction of a particular court, a party cannot be precluded
from
approaching any other court with competent jurisdiction. The
applicants reiterate that written demands were addressed
to the
respondents to remedy their breach and when they failed to do so,
written cancellation letters were sent them. Accordingly
they
maintain that the lease agreements were lawfully cancelled.
[23]
In
respect of the allegation that the respondents paid monies to the
municipality on behalf of the applicants and that monies are
owed to
the respondents, the applicants explain that the respondents
intermittently fell into arrears, not only with their rental
payments, but with payments towards the water and electricity
consumption. As a result, the municipal account of the property
accumulated a substantive arrear amount and as a consequence, the
municipality threatened to terminate the electricity and water.
In order to avoid this, the applicants informed the respondents of
the position and provided them with a copy of the acknowledgement
of
debt that the applicants had signed, which reflects the amount
outstanding. The applicants also advised the respondents
to
make payment of the arrears, water and electricity charges in order
to avoid the termination of supply. It is for this
reasons, the
respondents started paying off the arrears, the applicants allege.
[24]
In
an attempt to mitigate the ever-increasing municipal account, the
applicants installed prepaid meters to the property, however,
the
respondents illegally bypassed the meters and are receiving services
to the property without paying for it.
FINDING
[25]
I
am satisfied that the lease agreements were lawfully cancelled.
All that is contained in the answering affidavits is a bare
denial.
The respondents fail to deal in any way with the documentary
evidence comprising the breach and cancellation letters
attached to
the applicants’ founding affidavit. This is fatal to the
respondents’ opposition.
[26]
In
any event, on their own version the respondents stopped paying rental
because they believe they are entitled to do so because
of what is
owed to them by the applicants. This is inherently a concession that
they did in fact breach the lease agreements.
[27]
The
respondents do not deny that they were liable to pay for water and
electricity consumption. Therefore, what they paid to the
municipality is simply what they contractually agreed to. They
made no effort to refute the allegations made by the
applicants that
the respondents intermittently made partial payments in respect of
the rental, as well as the water and electricity
consumption charges.
I therefore do not find any merit in this argument either.
[28]
The
jurisdiction point raised by the respondents does not assist them
either in my view. I have already found that the lease
agreements were lawfully cancelled. The respondents’
reliance on the jurisdiction clause contained in the lease agreements
is therefore misguided. Moreover, even if they were correct in
their contention that the applicants were bound to the jurisdiction
of the Magistrates’ Court, it will merely delay the inevitable
as the respondents have no disclosed any defence on the merits
of the
matter.
[29]
As
in all motion proceedings the trite principles enunciated in
Plascon-Evans
Paints (Pty) Limited v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Limited
[1]
apply also in this matter:
“…
where
in proceedings on notice of motion disputes of fact have arisen on
the affidavits, a final order, whether it be an interdict
or some
other form of relief, may be granted if those facts averred in the
applicant's affidavits which have been admitted by the
respondent,
together with the facts alleged by the respondent, justify such
an order. The power of the Court to give such
final relief on the
papers before it is, however, not confined to such a situation. In
certain instances the denial by respondent
of a fact alleged by the
applicant may not be such as to raise a real, genuine or bona
fide dispute of fact (see in this
regard Room Hire Co (Pty)
Ltd v Jeppe
Street
Mansions (Pty) Ltd
1949
(3) SA 1155
(T)
at
1163
-
5; Da Mata v Otto NO
1972 (3) SA 858
)”
[30]
Also
in
Stellenbosch
Farmers' Winery Ltd v Stellenvale Winery (Pty) Ltd
[2]
the
court stated that:
"...
where there is a dispute as to the facts a final interdict should
only be granted in notice of motion proceedings if the
facts as
stated by the respondents together with the admitted facts in the
applicant's affidavits justify such an order... Where
it is clear
that facts, though not formally admitted, cannot be denied, they must
be regarded as admitted."
[31]
The
court held in
Room
Hire Co (Pty) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions (Pty) Ltd
[3]
that the crucial question is always whether there is a real dispute
of fact and that it does not appear that a respondent
is entitled to
defeat the applicant merely by bare denials such as he might employ
in the pleadings of a trial action, for the
sole purpose of forcing
his opponent in the witness box to undergo cross-examination, nor is
the respondent's mere allegation of
the existence of the dispute
of fact conclusive of such existence.
[32]
Also:
“
[I]n
every case the Court must examine the alleged dispute of
fact and see whether in truth there is a real issue of fact
which cannot be satisfactorily determined without the aid of oral
evidence; if this is not done, the lessee, against whom the ejectment
is sought, might be able to raise fictitious issues of fact and thus
delay the hearing of the matter to the prejudice of the lessor.”
[4]
[33]
Turing
to the facts of the matter, the respondents have simply denied the
cancellation of the agreements on the basis that they
did not now
that the agreements were cancelled. This flies in the face of copies
of delivered written demands and cancellation
letters attached to the
founding affidavit. In addition, as already highlighted, the
respondents are in terms of their agreements
with the landlords
obliged to pay rent and consumption charges. Yet they chose to pay
the one, but not the other, with no convincing
evidence in support.
[34]
In
the premises I find that the respondents opposed these proceedings
without any
bona
fide
defence
and that they are in unlawful occupation of the property.
[35]
In
determining a just and equitable date contemplated in
section 4(8)
of PIE, the court must have regard to all relevant factors, including
the period the unlawful occupier has resided on the land
in
question.
[5]
[36]
The
legislature did not limit the circumstances the court should consider
and neither did it arrange the circumstances in order
of priority.
It referred to “
all
the relevant circumstances”
and left it to the court to determine which circumstances are
relevant and to consider all those in conjunction. The fact
that the legislature referred specifically to the rights and needs of
the elderly, children, the disabled and households headed
by women
and, in certain instances, also the availability of alternative land,
does not mean that the legislature intended to elevate
these
circumstances to absolute prerequisites which have to be met before
an order may be granted.
If
the legislature intended such a consequence, it would have said so
specifically.
[6]
[37]
The
applicants suggested 30 (thirty) days as a just and equitable period
within which to vacate the property. The respondents
suggested
a period of 60 (sixty) days.
[38]
Therefore,
what remains is to deal with the respondents’ personal
circumstances.
[39]
Upon
signature of the respective lease agreements, the respondents
indicated and confirmed that they could afford monthly rental
payments in the amount of R3,250.00.
[40]
The
first respondent in her application confirmed that she was employed
as a doctor and that she earned a monthly income of R12,000.00.
She also confirmed that her husband was a businessman. The first
respondent apparently has a brother of 39 years old who is
wheelchair-bound
and disabled. However, it is also stated that
the first respondent travelled to Cape Town and it is not clear
whether the
brother resides at the property. It is stated by the
applicants that the first respondent sublets the unit, which is not
permissible.
[41]
The
second respondent is employed and earns a monthly income. The
Third respondent is employed as a domestic worker and also
earns a
monthly income.
[42]
All
of the respondents earn an income except for the fourth respondent,
who is alleged to have worked as a chef at a restaurant
in
Sandton, but due to the pandemic the restaurant owner had reduced
staff. She has a 32-year-old son who lives with her
and who
used to sell sweets and small things, but has not done so since the
lockdown. To the best of the applicants’
knowledge the
fourth respondent is employed as a waitress and similarly earns a
monthly income.
[43]
All
of the respondents have minor children.
[44]
The
applicants on the other hand explain that they are dependent on the
rental income received from the property and are suffering
severe
financial prejudice as a result of the respondents’ failure to
make payment and to vacate. As far as the utility
services are
concerned, all four tenants accumulated substantial amounts which the
applicants remain liable to pay.
[45]
As
far as the personal circumstances of the respondents are concerned,
the applicants point out a material discrepancy in the fourth
respondent’s personal circumstances. In the answering
affidavit deposed to by her husband he confirmed that they have
two
children, whereas in the supplementary answering affidavit the fourth
respondent alleges to have four. The fourth respondent
also
failed to mention that she is supported by her husband.
[46]
I
cannot ignore the fact that the lease agreements have been lawfully
cancelled and that the respondents remain in arrears and in
unlawful
occupation.
[47]
The
fact remains that the property has been acquired as an investment and
is rented out with the sole purpose of generating a steady
monthly
rental income. This is unachievable whilst the respondents remain in
occupation.
[48]
I
must also take into consideration that the respondents have been
afforded an opportunity for almost a year now to remedy their
breach.
[49]
A
material consideration in this matter is that of the evidential
onus. Provided the procedural requirements have been met,
the
applicants are entitled to approach this court on the basis of
ownership and the respondents’ unlawful occupation.
Unless the respondents oppose and disclose circumstances relevant to
the eviction order, the applicants, in principle, would be
entitled
to an order for eviction. The relevant circumstances are
without fail facts within the exclusive knowledge of the
respondents
and it therefore cannot be expected of an owner to negative in
advance facts not known to him and not in issue between
the
parties.
[7]
[50]
Also, the
respondents were legally represented throughout the proceedings. They
were afforded a second bite at the proverbial cherry
by the filing of
a supplementary affidavit where they set out their personal
circumstances. The respondents were no doubt
assisted in
preparing the supplementary answering papers and counsel was
instructed to prepare heads of argument and to appear
in court on
their behalf. I have no doubt that the respondents would have
been advised of the factual allegations they were
required to make
and the documentary evidence he had to furnish in order to discharge
the evidentiary onus. I therefore accept
that the best possible
and available evidence was placed before the court.
[51]
On the facts, all
of the respondents earn an income or are married and have the
financial support of a spouse or live with a family
member who
generate and income. The respondents will therefore not be homeless
if evicted and would be in a position to financially
afford
alternative accommodation. For this reason also the intervention or a
report from the City of Johannesburg is not required.
[52]
Therefore, the
only consideration is what period of time would be regarded as just
and equitable to afford the respondents to vacate
the property.
[53]
In
arriving at a just and equitable date upon which the respondents
should vacate the property, I
have taken the following facts into consideration: -
[a]
The respondents
and their families have been occupying the property for a number of
years;
[b]
The lease
agreements were cancelled;
[c]
The respondents
earn income, but have dependents;
[d]
Save for the first
respondent’s brother who does not seem to live at the property,
none of the occupants are disabled;
[e]
The respondents
resorted to self-help and bypassed the electric metres installed by
the applicants. In doing so, the municipal account
is increasing
day-by-day.
[f]
The
applicants continue to suffer damages as a result of the unlawful
occupation, the non-payment of rental and the increase in
utility
services which similarly remain unpaid, as well as its inability to
lease the property to a paying tenant;
[g]
There
are various properties within the area available for rental at a
suitable rental rate.
[54]
In
the premises, having considered the factors advanced by both parties,
I find that a period of 30 (thirty) calendar days afforded
to the
respondents
to
vacate the property, would be just and equitable.
THE
DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2002
[55]
Ordinarily,
and having considered all the relevant factors, the determination of
a just and equitable date upon which upon which
the respondents are
to vacate the property, would be the end of the matter.
Nowadays,
the
position has been complicated by the onset of the worldwide COVID-19
pandemic. Various restrictions have been imposed upon
residential evictions in terms of the Regulations issued under
the
Disaster Management Act, 2002
.
[56]
Since
the hearing of this application, and due to a surge in infections,
the country was moved to adjusted alert level 4 on 25 June
2021 and
thereafter to adjusted alert level 3 on 25 July 2021.
[57]
In
Rathabeng
Properties (Pty) Limited v Mohlaol
i
[8]
this Court had occasion to consider the impact of the lockdown
regulations on evictions. I agree with the Court’s reasoning
and therefore consider this judgment as binding on me.
[58]
Under
the present Regulations for adjusted level 3 a curfew is in place
which requires persons to return to their residence by a
specific
time, otherwise risk being arrested.
[9]
[59]
Some
assistance can be gleaned from a comparison of the Regulations in
relation to each alert level provided for in the Regulations
that
were published on 29 April 2020
[10]
and
which have been amended from time to time, the most recent amendment
in relation to the hearing date being on 25 July
2021 which
substituted Chapter 4 to provide for an "
Adjusted
Alert Level 3
".
[60]
Chapter
3 of the Regulations provides for alert level 4 and in
regulation 19
provides for a
'prohibition
on evictions'
as
follows:
"A
competent court may grant an order for the eviction of any
person from land or a home in terms of the provisions
of the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 62 of 1997
and the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act,
19 of 1998: Provided that any order
of eviction
shall
be
stayed and suspended until the last day [sic] Alert Level 4, unless a
court decides that it is not just and equitable to
stay and suspend
the order until the last day of the Alert Level 4 period.
"
(my emphasis)
[61]
This
prohibition, as also found in
Rathabeng
,
is clear enough in providing that such order of eviction as
may be granted by a court shall be stayed and suspended
until the end
of Alert Level 4, unless the court decides that it is not just and
equitable to so stay and suspend the order. The
stay and suspension
are linked to the end of Alert Level 4.
[11]
The severity of COVID-19 was sufficient that the Minister of
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, in consultation with
the relevant Cabinet members, promulgated a stay and suspension of
an eviction order as the default position i.e. unless
the
court ordered otherwise.
[62]
Chapter
4 of the Regulations, which introduced alert level 3 with effect from
1 June 2020 provided in regulation 36 that a person
may not be
evicted from his or her land or home during the period of Alert Level
3 period, however a competent court may grant
an order for
the eviction of a person from his or her land or home in
terms of the provisions of the Extension of Security
of Tenure Act,
1997 (Act 62 of 1997) and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act,
1998 (Act 19 of 1998), provided
that an order of eviction may be stayed and suspended until
the last day of Alert Level
3 period, unless a court decides that it
is not just and equitable to stay and suspend the order until the
last day of the Alert
Level 3 period.
[63]
The
default position under adjusted alert level 3 appears to be that a
person may not be evicted from his home during the period
of adjusted
alert level 3, unless the court decides that it is not just and
equitable to so stay and suspend the order.
[64]
The
introduction of Chapter 5 into the regulations providing for Alert
Level 2, provides for more extensive regulations. The relevant
regulation, Regulation 53, is no longer headed
"Prohibition
on evictions"
but
rather
"Eviction and
demolition of places of residence"
and
reads:
"53. Eviction and
demolition of places of residence.— (1) A person may not be
evicted from his or her land
or home or have his or her place of
residence demolished for the duration of the national state
of disaster unless a
competent court has granted an order
authorising the eviction or demolition.
(2)
A competent court
may
suspend or stay any order
for eviction or demolition contemplated in subregulation
(1) until after the lapse or termination
of the national state
of disaster unless the court is of the opinion that it is
not just or equitable to suspend or stay
the order having regard, in
addition to any other relevant consideration, to—
(a)
the need, in the public interest for all persons to have access to a
place of residence
and basic services to protect their health and the
health of others and to avoid unnecessary movement and gathering with
other
persons;
(b)
any restrictions on movement or other relevant restrictions in place
at the relevant time
in terms of these regulations;
(c)
the impact of the disaster on the parties;
(d)
the prejudice to any party of a delay in executing the order and
whether such prejudice
outweighs the prejudice of the person who will
be subject to the order;
(e)
whether any affected person has been prejudiced in his or her ability
to access legal services
as a result of the disaster;
(f)
whether affected persons will have immediate access to an alternative
place of residence
and basic services;
(g)
whether adequate measures are in place to protect the health of any
person in the process
of a relocation;
(h)
whether any occupier is causing harm to others or there is a threat
to life; and
(i)
whether the party applying for such an order has taken reasonable
steps in good faith,
to make alternative arrangements with all
affected persons, including, but not limited to, payment arrangements
that would preclude
the need for any relocation during the national
state of disaster.
(3)
A court hearing any application to authorise an eviction or
demolition may, where appropriate and in addition to any
other report
that is required by law, request a report from the responsible member
of the executive regarding the availability
of any emergency
accommodation or quarantine or isolation facilities pursuant to these
Regulations.”
(my
emphasis)
[65]
Ultimately
the power whether to suspend or stay the eviction order
remains discretionary.
[66]
As
the court stated in
Rathabeng
common
sense should compel the conclusion that the restrictions provided for
in Levels 1 and 2 should be less onerous than those
for Level 3 and 4
where the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic are less than they
would be under Level 3.
[67]
Judicial
notice in my view can be taken of the fact that since the
'third wave' of the pandemic arrived in South Africa, there
has been
some decline in new infections and that Government is making every
effort to ensure that vaccinations are administered
at a rapid pace.
Nonetheless one cannot ignore the highly infectious Delta variant of
the corona virus either.
[68]
Based
upon such relevant factors I am of the view that it would be just and
equitable to stay or suspend the eviction order
until after
the end of adjusted level 3. This means that the respondents and
other occupants of the property will have two weeks
after the end of
adjusted level 3 to vacate the property, failing which
the eviction order may be carried out a further
two weeks
thereafter. This effectively affords the respondents and other
occupants a month to vacate the property once the present
adjusted
level 3 ends.
[69]
The
stay of the eviction order shall be a condition as
envisaged in terms of section 4(12) of PIE, which will enable either
of the parties to approach the court in terms of that subsection, on
good cause shown, for a variation of the eviction order.
This allows for the exigencies that may arise, such as a resurgence
in the spread of the COVID-19 virus. “
The
regulations themselves are in a state of flux and therefore too an
order of suspension cannot be so cast in stone that it cannot
be
revisited should it be necessary to do so if a change in
circumstances so requires.
”
[12]
[70]
As
far as the question of costs is concerned, I find no special
circumstances
urging
me to deviate from the normal principle that costs should follow the
result.
ORDER
I therefore make the following
order: -
[1]
The first to fifth respondents and any
person occupying through them the
immovable
property situated at [….]
,
Johannesburg
(“
the
property”
), shall vacate the
property within 30 (thirty) calendar days from date of service of
this order on the first to fifth respondents.
[2]
On condition, as envisaged in section
4(12) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act, 1998, that the present adjusted
level 3 under the Regulations issued in terms of section 27(2) of
the Disaster Management Act,
2002 ("the
Regulations") has ended, the first to fifth respondents, and all
those that occupy through, by or under them
are ordered to vacate the
property within fourteen days on the condition being fulfilled.
[3]
The sheriff and/or deputy sheriff,
assisted by such persons as he or she requires including the South
African Police Services, are
authorised and directed to give effect
to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, including removing from the property the
first to fifth respondents
and any other occupants and/or their
belongings, no earlier after the fourteen days after the period
specified in paragraph 2 above,
in the event the property is not
vacated within the period specified in paragraph 2 above.
[4]
The first to fifth respondents shall pay
the costs of the application, jointly and severally, the one paying
the others to be absolved.
F
BEZUIDENHOUT
ACTING JUDGE OF
THE HIGH
COURT
DATE OF
HEARING:
28 APRIL 2021
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
17 AUGUST
2021
APPEARANCES:
On
behalf of applicants:
Attorney C M Laurent
SSLR Incorporated
Cell: 076-478-2912
claire@sslr.co.za
On
behalf of respondents:
Adv N Sibanyoni
076-599-3529
Instructed
by:
Seloane Vincent Attorneys
(010) 109-6301
vincent@seloaneattorneys.co.za
[1]
1984
(3) SA p623
[2]
1957
(4) SA 234 (C)
at
235E - G
[3]
1949
(3) SA 1155
(T)
p
1163
[4]
Peterson
v Cuthbert & Co., Ltd
.1945
AD 420 at p. 428
[5]
Groen
Gras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd and Others v Elandsfontein Unlawful
Occupants and Others
2002 (1) SA 125 (T).
[6]
Groen
Gras Eiendomme
(
supra
)
paragraph [32].
[7]
Ndlovu
v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika
2003 (1) SA
193 (SCA).
[8]
2021
JDR 0275 (GJ)
[9]
Regulation
33; GN 650 and 651 of GG 44895
[10]
GNR
480 of GG43258, 29 April 2020.
[11]
See
Anchorprops
31 (Pty) Ltd v Levin
[2020]
ZAGPJHC 183 (28 May 2020), para 40 as an example of the application
of regulation 19.
[12]
Rhatabeng
par. 62