Silouette Investments Ltd. v Virgin Hotels Group Ltd. (116/2008) [2009] ZASCA 40; 2009 (4) SA 617 (SCA) ; [2009] 3 All SA 172 (SCA) (31 March 2009)

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[2009] ZASCA 40
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Silouette Investments Ltd. v Virgin Hotels Group Ltd. (116/2008) [2009] ZASCA 40; 2009 (4) SA 617 (SCA) ; [2009] 3 All SA 172 (SCA) (31 March 2009)

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THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case No: 116/08
SILOUETTE INVESTMENTS
LIMITED
….......................................................................
Appellant
and
VIRGIN HOTELS GROUP
LIMITED
….......................................................................
Respondent
Neutral citation:
SILOUETTE
INVESTMENTS LTD v VIRGIN HOTELS GROUP LTD
(116/08)
[2009] ZASCA 40
(31 MARCH 2009)
Coram:
FARLAM, NAVSA,
MTHIYANE, MLAMBO et
CACHALIA JJA
Heard:
17 FEBRUARY 2009
Delivered:
31 MARCH 2009
Summary:
Extinctive
Prescription – whether debtor 'outside the Republic' in terms of s
13(1)(b) of
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
– whether interruption of
prescription effected by service of summons lapsed in terms of
s
15(2)
of the Act when summons amended so as to substitute new
plaintiff, after which summons re-amended so as to re-introduce
original
plaintiff.
______________________________________________________________
ORDER
On appeal from:
High Court
Johannesburg (Joffe J sitting as a court of first instance).
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including those
occasioned by the employment of two counsel.
JUDGMENT
FARLAM JA (NAVSA, MTHIYANE, MLAMBO et CACHALIA JJA
concurring)
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an appeal from a judgment of Joffe J,
sitting in the Johannesburg High Court, in which he upheld a special
plea of prescription
raised by the respondent, Virgin Hotels Group
Limited,
against a
claim for R561 308-41 brought against it by the appellant, Silouette
Investments Limited.
FACTS
[2] In 2001, the appellant, together with its
co-plaintiff, Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd, instituted action
against the respondent
for amounts owing under a written agreement
for the sale of shares in a company, Investment Facility Company
Forty (Pty) Ltd. Separate
amounts were claimed by the appellant and
Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd.
[3] On 16 November 2004 the appellant and its
co-plaintiff gave notice of their intention to amend the particulars
of claim by (a)
substituting one John Brook Dyer as the plaintiff and
(b) alleging that Mr Dyer during 2003 had acquired, by cession, their
claims
against the respondent. The amendments sought were effected on
15 April 2005.
[4] The respondent pleaded to the amended particulars of
claim. One of the defences raised in the plea was that in terms of
the
sale agreement the sellers, ie, the appellant and its erstwhile
co-plaintiff, were not entitled to cede any of their rights.
[5] This defence led to a further amendment to the
particulars of claim in terms of which the appellant was substituted
for Mr Dyer
as the plaintiff in the action and the appellant claimed
its share of the amount outstanding (its claim for which it had
purported
to cede to Mr Dyer). Notice of this amendment was given in
October 2006 and the amendment was effected on 10 November 2006.
[6] The respondent then pleaded to the re-amended
particulars of claim, raising a special plea of prescription as well
as pleading
defences on the merits (with which it is unnecessary to
deal in this judgment).
[7] The special plea of prescription was based on
s
11(d)
of the
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
. The averments pleaded in
support thereof may be summarised as follows:
(a) the debt was due on or before 30 September 2001;
(b) during April 2006 the appellant and its co-plaintiff
were replaced by Mr Dyer as the plaintiff;
(c) during November 2006 Mr Dyer was replaced by the
appellant as the plaintiff;
(d) the question as to whether the appellant's claim has
prescribed must be determined by reference to the amendment which
most
recently made it a party to the proceedings, ie, the amendment
effected on 10 November 2006.
[8] At the commencement of the trial Joffe J ruled
mero
motu,
in terms of
rule 33(4)
, that the
special plea be determined before any other issues.
[9] After argument, the learned judge gave judgment
upholding the special plea. Before his judgment is summarised it will
be convenient
if the relevant provisions of Act 68 of 1969 are set
out.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[10] Section 11(d) provides that the period of
prescription in respect of a debt such as the one presently under
consideration shall
be three years.
[11] Section 12(1) provides that subject to subsections
(2) and (3), which are not relevant in this case, prescription shall
commence
to run as soon as the debt is due.
[12] Section 13 deals with circumstances in which
completion of prescription is delayed. Subsection (1) provides as
follows:
'(1) If─
(a)
the creditor is a minor
or is insane or is a person under curatorship or is prevented by
superior force including any law or any
order of court from
interrupting the running of prescription as contemplated in section
15(1); or
(b)
the debtor is outside the
Republic; or
(c)
the creditor and debtor
are married to each other; or
(d)
the creditor and debtor
are partners and the debt is a debt which arose out of the
partnership relationship; or
(e)
the creditor is a
juristic person and the debtor is a member of the governing body of
such juristic person; or
(f)
the debt is the object of
a dispute subjected to arbitration; or
(g)
the debt is the object of
a claim filed against the estate of a debtor who is deceased or
against the insolvent estate of the debtor
or against a company in
liquidation or against an applicant under the Agricultural Credit
Act, 1966; or
(h)
the creditor or the
debtor is deceased and an executor of the estate in question has not
yet been appointed; and
(i)
the relevant period of
prescription would, but for the provisions of this subsection, be
completed before or on, or within one
year after, the day on which
the relevant impediment referred to in paragraph
(a),
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)
or
(h)
has ceased to exist,
the period of prescription shall not be completed before
a year has elapsed after the day referred to in paragraph
(i).'
[13] Section 15, as far as is material, provides as
follows:
'(1) The running of prescription shall, subject to the
provisions of subsection (2), be interrupted by the service on the
debtor
of any process whereby the creditor claims payment of the
debt.
(2) Unless the debtor acknowledges liability, the
interruption of prescription in terms of subsection (1) shall lapse,
and the running
of prescription shall not be deemed to have been
interrupted, if the creditor does not successfully prosecute his
claim under the
process in question to final judgment or if he does
so prosecute his claim but abandons the judgment or the judgment is
set aside.
. . .
(6) For the purposes of this section, "process"
includes a petition, a notice of motion, a rule
nisi,
a pleading in reconvention, a third party
notice referred to in any rule of court, and any document whereby
legal proceedings are
commenced.'
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A
QUO
[14] The only point considered by the learned judge in
the court
a quo
related to the question as to whether the service of the original
summons in this matter, in terms of which the appellant together
with
Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd claimed monies from the respondent,
interrupted prescription. In his view it did not because,
as he put
it, they 'did not prosecute their claim until final judgment.' When
the amendment introducing Mr Dyer as the plaintiff
was effected, he
held, the appellant and Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd
'fell out the proceedings. Furthermore in terms of s
15(2) of the act, the summons issued by them did not have the effect
of interrupting
prescription.'
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[15] In its application for leave to appeal (which Joffe
J granted) the appellant sought leave to appeal on the ground that
the
proceedings which were commenced by way of summons at the
instance of the appellant and Ajubatis Properties (Pty) Ltd were not
terminated by the substitution of Mr Dyer as the plaintiff and that
the re-introduction of the appellant as the plaintiff in the
place of
Mr Dyer did not constitute a fresh action which commenced only after
the debt allegedly owing by the respondent to the
appellant had
prescribed.
[16] In the heads of argument filed on behalf of the
appellant by counsel (who had not appeared in the High Court) the
judgment
of the court
a quo
was
attacked on two grounds: the ground on which leave was granted and a
new ground to the effect that the prescription of the appellant's

claim had been interrupted, in terms of s 13(1)(b) of the Act,
because at all material times the respondent had been outside the

Republic. This submission was based on the fact that the respondent
is a foreign company, incorporated and registered in the United

Kingdom, with its chosen
domicilium citandi et
executandi
at an address in London. The
appellant applied at the hearing of the appeal for leave to file a
replication to the respondent's
special plea in which this ground was
specifically pleaded. The respondent not having opposed the
application, the application
was granted.
[17] The appellant's replication reads as follows:
'1.At all times material hereto:
1.1. The defendant's citation has been as pleaded in the
particulars of claim, namely, the defendant has been incorporated and
registered
in accordance with the Laws of England and Wales under
registration number 2857671, and with its chosen domicilium citandi
et executandi
at 120 Campden Hill Road, London, V87AR, United
Kingdom.
1.2. The defendant has accordingly been outside the
Republic, as contemplated by section 13(1)(b) of the Prescription
Act, 68 of
1969 ("the Act").
2. At no stage has the above impediment ceased to exist,
for the purposes of section 13(1)(i) of the Act.
3. In the premises, any period of prescription relied
upon by the defendant has not been completed.
WHEREFORE the plaintiff prays that the defendant's
special plea be dismissed with costs.'
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
[18] In argument before this court counsel for the
appellant contended that the court
a quo
erred
in two respects. Its first error was the result, so it was contended,
of its failure to have regard to the fact that the respondent
debtor
is a British company and accordingly that s 13(1)(b) of the Act
applied so as to delay the completion of the period of prescription.

It was contended further that the respondent, being a peregrine
company, was
ex facie
the
admitted facts on the pleadings at all relevant times absent from the
Republic. It was pointed out that the respondent is not
an external
company with its memorandum registered in this country as was the
case in
Dithaba Platinum (Pty) Ltd v
Erconovaal Ltd
1985 (4) SA 615
(T).
[19] Counsel also contended that the fact that the
respondent was amenable to the jurisdiction of the South African
court, either
by owning property in this country or by consenting to
the jurisdiction of the High Court, does not detract from the fact
that
the respondent remained absent from the Republic: in support of
this submission counsel referred to
Grinaker
Mechanicals (Pty) Ltd v Societé Francaise Industriale et D'Equipment
1976 (4) SA 98(C)
, esp at 102A-H.
[20] Since the respondent has at all material times been
absent from the Republic, the argument proceeded, and the respondent
itself
led no evidence nor suggested that that was not the case, the
running of prescription could not be completed before one year had

elapsed after the respondent ceased to be absent from the Republic –
'if that were ever to occur.' It was accordingly submitted
that as
the relevant impediment never ceased the period of prescription
provided in s 13 has never been completed.
[21] The court
a quo's
second
error, according to the argument of counsel for the appellant,
consisted in holding that s 15(2) of the Act applied. Counsel

submitted that it was not in dispute on the common cause facts that
by the institution of the original proceedings in 2001 the
running of
prescription in respect of the claim against the respondent was
interrupted. They contended that, despite the substitution
of Mr Dyer
as the plaintiff in 2005 and the subsequent re-substitution of the
appellant in 2006 as the plaintiff in respect of
part of the original
claim, 'the process that commenced with the institution of action [in
2001] is in substance the same process
that was being conducted at
the instance of the appellant when the matter came before Joffe J'
and 'section 15(2) of the . . .
Act could have had no application.'
[22] They went on to submit that the significance of the
phrase 'the process in question' is apparent if regard is had to the
memorandum
on the draft bill prepared for the South African Law
Commission by the late Professor JC de Wet in which the mischief at
which
s 15(2) is directed is set out. The memorandum in question is
published in JC de Wet:
Opuscula Miscellanea:
Regsgeleerde Lesings en Adviese
(1979) at pp
77
et seq.
In the
passage on which counsel relied (at p 128) Professor De Wet said that
the service of a summons ought
'sy stuitende werking te verloor indien die skuldeiser
die proses nie aan die gang hou nie,
anders kan dit gebeur dat die skuldeiser telkens deur dagvaarding die
loop van verjaring stuit en daardeur die toestand van onsekerheid

verleng. Indien my voorstel aanvaar word sal die diening van
dagvaarding sy stuitende werking verloor
indien
die skuldeiser die dagvaarding
intrek,
aliter
Djaperides v
Federal Insurance Corporation of SA Ltd
1955
(2) SA 396
(W) of the hof die gedaagde van die instansie absolveer,
aliter
Pistorius & Kie v Steyn
1958
(3) SA 440
(T).'
[23] Counsel argued that the appellant had acted
diligently in instituting the proceedings in 2001, that the
substitution of Mr
Dyer as plaintiff and its resubstitution did not
evince a subjective intention on the part of the appellant, which at
all times
remained the creditor, to release the respondent from the
debt owed and that 'the same proceedings (as that expression is
generally
used) were still
in esse
before
Joffe J.' Although there had been a substitution of plaintiff the
same debt had throughout been pursued by way of the same
litigation.
The appellant, they submitted, had continued to prosecute its claim
'under the process in question' (viz the summons
issued in 2001) and
there had accordingly been no lapsing of the interruption of
prescription.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
[24] Counsel for the respondent submitted that on a
proper construction of s 13(1)(b) of the Act the respondent was not
'outside
the Republic'. It was pointed out that the original summons
in this matter was served in South Africa on the respondent in the
following circumstances:
(a) the respondent agreed to accept service care of its
South African attorneys; and
(b) the shareholders' agreement on which the appellant's
cause of action is based provided that the parties thereto submitted
themselves
to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Johannesburg High
Court for the purposes of any proceedings arising out of or in
connection
with the agreement.
[25] Pointing to the fact that the absence of a debtor
from the Republic is described in s 13(1)(i) as an 'impediment', they
submitted
that at no stage was the registration of the respondent as
a foreign company an impediment to the service of summons in South
Africa.
[26] They contended further that the argument raised by
the appellant leads, as they put it, to the 'absurd conclusion' that
despite
the respondent's having consented to be sued in South Africa,
the appellant's claim against the respondent will never prescribe

because the respondent will always be absent from the Republic.
[27] With regard to the contention raised by the
appellant's counsel based on s 15(2) of the Act counsel for the
respondent submitted
that the appellant did not prosecute its claim
under the original summons to final judgment and accordingly the
interruption of
prosecution by that process lapsed.
[28] Referring to the fact that the amendment of October
2006, in which notice was given that the appellant was to be
substituted
for Mr Dyer as the plaintiff, qualifies as process under
s 15(6) (see
Mias de Klerk Boerdery (Edms) Bpk
v Cole
1986 (2) SA 284
(N) at 287I-288B),
counsel for the respondent submitted that this is the process whereby
it now claims the debt and under which,
if it were to obtain judgment
in its favour, it would successfully prosecute its claim to final
judgment. Without the October 2006
notice of amendment the appellant
could not have claimed payment of the debt.
[29] Counsel for the respondent contended further that
if their argument on this point were to be upheld this would not be
at variance
with the mischief s 15(2) was designed to prevent. This
was because the appellant had not kept its original process going.
[30] It followed, so they submitted, that the second
point raised by the appellant also had to be rejected.
DISCUSSION
(i)
Was the respondent 'outside
the Republic' in terms of s 13(1)(b)?
[31] As appears from s 13 read as a whole the fact that
a debtor is outside the Republic (as a result of which the completion
of
prescription is delayed) is regarded by the legislature as an
'impediment'. The various impediments listed in s 13(1) are
circumstances
which, as Professor M M Loubser puts it in his work
Extinctive Prescription
at
p 117, 'have in common some legal or practical problem which makes it
difficult or undesirable for a creditor to institute proceedings
for
the enforcement of his claim against the debtor.' See also
ABP
4x4 Motor Dealers (Pty) Ltd v IGI Insurance Co Ltd
1999
(3) SA 924
(SCA) at 930I-931A, where it was said that '(t)he word
impediment . . . covers a wide spectrum of situations ranging from
those
in which it would not be possible in law for the creditor to
sue to those in which it might be difficult or awkward, but not
impossible,
to sue.' Where, as in the present case, the debtor has
not only consented to the jurisdiction of the South African Court but
also
agreed to accept service of process care of its South African
attorneys
1
there is no circumstance which gives rise to a problem which creates
a difficult or undesirable situation for a creditor seeking
to
institute legal proceedings against the debtor in this country. Is it
likely that Parliament would have intended the completion
of
prescription to be delayed in those circumstances? The only purpose
that it would serve would be to prevent prescription from
ever being
completed against the respondent, which as the respondent's counsel
submitted, would lead to an absurd conclusion. It
certainly would not
advance the evident purpose of the provision, which is to assist a
creditor which has a legal or practical
problem in relation to the
institution of legal proceedings in South Africa against its debtor.
[32] I think that to interpret the phrase 'outside the
Republic' as covering a case where, although the debtor itself is
physically
outside the Republic, it has consented to the jurisdiction
of the South African courts in respect of a claim and has a
representative
here whom it has authorised to receive service on its
behalf of any process in which the claim in question is sought to be
enforced
would give a meaning to the provision under consideration
which Parliament could never have intended.
[33] The first South African statute which provided for
the completion of prescription to be delayed while the debtor was
'absent
from the Colony' was s 6 of the Prescription Amendment Act 6
of 1861 (Cape), which was based on s 19 of the Act for the Amendment

of the Law and the better Advancement of Justice, 4&5 Anne, c 16,
passed by the English Parliament in 1705. Similar legislation
to the
Cape act was passed in Natal (s 10 of Law 14 of 1861), the Orange
Free State (s 6 of Chapter XXIII of the Law Book) and
the Transvaal
(s 11(2) of Act 26 of 1908). The pre-Union statutes were repealed by
the Prescription Act 18 of 1943, which provided
in s 7(1)(c) for the
suspension of prescription 'during the absence of the debtor from the
Union for a period exceeding six months'
and in s 10 that '(w)hen the
debtor is absent from the Union extinctive prescription shall not
begin to run until the date of his
return' (which was interpreted as
meaning the date when the debor ceased to be absent: see
Grinaker's
case,
supra,
at
100C to 102A, and the authorities there referred to).
[34] The provision in the statute from Queen Anne's
reign on which s 6 of the Cape Act of 1861 was based was also copied,
with various
forms of wording, in the various states of the United
States of America, where suspending or stopping the running of a
statute
of limitations is called 'tolling' ('it is analogous to a
clock stopping then restarting', 51
American
Jurisprudence
2d, para 169). A very
informative annotation headed 'Absence as Tolling Statute of
Limitations' is to be found in 55 American Law
Reports 3d at p 1158
et seq.
It is an
annotation on
Byrne v Ogle
(1971
Alaska) 55
ALR 3d 1151, a decision of the Supreme Court of Alaska.
The annotation collects and discusses American cases considering
whether
and under what circumstances a provision 'tolling' the
statute of limitations while a party is outside the jurisdiction
applies
where, notwithstanding such absence, the party remains
amenable to service of process which subjects him to the personal
jurisdiction
of the state.
2
As is to be expected, the American courts have not spoken with one
voice on the topic, nor have the statutory provisions considered
been
uniformly drafted. Many of the cases discussed have turned on the
particular wording of the statutes under consideration.
In others,
however, general considerations apart from the construction of
particular tolling provisions have been discussed and
these cases
raise points which have relevance in the present context. In
particular at pp 1186-1187 Kenneth J Rampino, the author
of the
annotation, refers to a series of cases, the latest of which was
Byrne v Ogle, supra,
in
which it was held that the purpose of the statute of limitations,
that of eliminating stale claims, would be contravened if the
running
of the period were suspended during mere physical absence of a party
who remained subject to personal jurisdiction by some
form of
substituted process.
[35] The present case is, of course, stronger than the
American cases to which I have referred because here it was possible
for
the appellant to serve the original summons served on the
respondent not by substituted service but by service on its own
attorneys
who were authorised to receive service on its behalf.
[36] As I have said the appellant's counsel relied
strongly on the decision in
Grinaker
Mechanicals Ltd, supra,
which was cited as
authority for the proposition that
'(t)here is nothing in the wording of sec 10 [of the
1943 Prescription Act] to justify the conclusion that the Legislature
intended
to confer the benefit of prescription upon a debtor who,
despite his continued absence from the Republic, became amenable to
be
sued in respect of his debt in a Republican Court. If that was the
intention of the Legislature it certainly has not been made apparent

in the terms of sec 10.'
[37] The debtor in
Grinaker's
case was a company incorporated according to
the laws of France and carrying on business in Paris. At all relevant
times it was
physically absent from the Republic. In an action
brought against it for moneys due under a contract for work and
labour it filed
a special plea that the plaintiff's claim had
prescribed as the cause of action arose prior to 1 October 1968 and
the summons was
served on 4 December 1974, although it had been
issued on 13 January 1969. In response to a request for particulars
by the plaintiff
the defendant stated that it was a
peregrinus
and had never been present in the Republic of South Africa. The
plaintiff took exception to the plea on the ground that as the

defendant had at all material times been absent from the Republic
within the meaning of s 10 of the 1943 Prescription Act the period
of
extinctive prescription had not begun to run against the plaintiff.
[38] The defendant then sought to amend its special plea
by inserting an averment to the effect that on 18 December 1968 and
by
order of the Cape Provincial Division the plaintiff attached
property of the defendant
ad fundandam
jurisdiction,
from which date the plaintiff's
right of action against the defendant became enforceable in the Cape
Provincial Division.
[39] The application to amend the special plea was
refused and the exception taken to it was upheld on the basis that
the insertion
of the averment summarised above would not save it from
being excipiable. The reason for this conclusion is set out in the
passage
cited above.
[40] It is thus clear that the amenability to the
court's jurisdiction which was held not to lead to the conclusion
that the debtor
was no longer 'absent' was based on the attachment
ad
fundandam jurisdictionem
of its property. As
is well known, an attachment of a debtor's property to found
jurisdiction does not render the debtor personally
liable to the
court's jurisdiction. A judgment obtained on the strength thereof
only binds the property attached and has no extra-territorial
force
and obligation:
Jamieson v Sabingo
2002
(4) SA 49
(SCA) at 58G-H. On the other hand a judgment founded on
voluntary submission to jurisdiction by a debtor would bind the
debtor
personally and would be internationally enforceable:
ibid
at 58H. The amenability to jurisdiction
discussed in the
Grinaker
case
only concerned jurisdiction based on an attachment to found
jurisdiction. Other considerations may well apply where the
amenability
to jurisdiction arises from a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction by the debtor. Indeed it has been decided in the United
States 'by the great weight of authority' that the suspension of the
running of the statute of limitations is not prevented by the
fact
that the absent defendant had property in the state which might have
been subject to attachment before the expiration of the
period of
limitation, without the necessity of personal service on the
defendant: see Annotation at
119 ALR 331
at 337
et
seq.
[41] It is not necessary, however, in this case to
decide whether amenability to jurisdiction over the debtor personally
in circumstances
where a judgment can be given which can be enforced
against him internationally will lead to the conclusion that he is
not to be
regarded as 'outside the Republic' for the purposes of s
13(1)(b) of the Act. I say that because I am satisfied that the
combined
effect of the submission by the respondent to the court's
jurisdiction and the authorisation to its attorneys to accept service

of the summons clearly leads to the conclusion, for the reasons I
have stated, that it would go beyond the purpose of s 13(1)(b)
if it
were held that the respondent in this matter, despite what it had
done to remove any difficulty or awkwardness which the
appellant
might otherwise have encountered in an attempt to institute
proceedings against it to claim the debt allegedly owing
in this
matter, was 'outside the Republic'. It follows that the first
contention advanced by the appellant's counsel must fail.
(ii)
Does s 15(2) apply?
[42] In regard to the second point raised by counsel for
the appellant I agree with the argument of counsel for the respondent
that
if the appellant were to obtain final judgment in its favour in
this matter, the process under which it would obtain such judgment

would be the notice of amendment of November 2006. It follows that s
15(2) of the Act applied and the interruption of prescription
brought
about by service of the original summons lapsed. In the circumstances
the second point raised by the appellant's counsel
must also fail.
ORDER
[43] The following order is made:
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including those
occasioned by the employment of two counsel.
……………
.
IG FARLAM
APPEARANCES:
FOR APPELLANT: J J GAUNTLETT
SC
J C BUTLER SC
Instructed by Routledge Modise
in Association with Eversheds Johannesburg
McIntyre & Van der Post
Bloemfontein
FOR RESPONDENT: A F BHAM SC
W PYE
Instructed by Bowman Gilfillan
Inc Johannesburg
Lovius-Block
Bloemfontein
1
On the face of the original summons the following
appears after the name and address of the respondent: 'who has
agreed to accept
service care of its attorneys, Bowman Gilfillan
Incorporated, 9
th
Floor, Twin Towers West, Sandton City, Sandton, Johannesburg.'
2
After their attention had been drawn to the
American authorities on the point, counsel on both sides submitted
supplementary heads
of argument dealing therewith, for which I wish
to express my gratitude.