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[2021] ZAGPPHC 123
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Minister of Police v Nkanyani (22758/11) [2021] ZAGPPHC 123 (12 February 2021)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER: 22758/11
DATE:
12 February 2021
MINISTER
OF
POLICE
Applicant
V
NM
NKANYANI
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MABUSE
J
[1]
The applicant seeks an order in the following terms:
“
1.
That the order striking out the Applicant’s defence granted by
honourable Judge Collis on the 2
nd
day of March 2019 be and is hereby rescinded and set aside.
2.
That the default judgment on merits granted in favour of the
Respondent by the honourable
Acting Judge Bam on the 7
th
of August 2019 be and is hereby rescinded and set aside.
3.
That the Applicant’s defence contained in the plea dated the
4
th
of November 2011 duly served and filed, be and is
hereby reinstated.
4.
That the Respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this application
only in the event of
opposition.
5.
Further and/or alternative relief.”
[2]
This application, brought by Nokuthula Suzan Mahlangu in the name of
the Minister of Police, is
opposed by the Respondent. The
Applicant is the First Defendant in the main action from which the
current interlocutory application
has its genesis. He, and he
alone, is involved in this application.
[3]
The Respondent instituted legal proceedings for damages arising from
an alleged defamation against
the Applicant, the Second and Third
Defendants in the main action in April 2011. According to the
summons, the Applicant’s
liability is allegedly based on
vicarious liability. The alleged perpetrators of the defamation
in the main action are the
Second and Third Defendants. At all
material times they were employees of the Applicant. The
Respondent is also an
employee of the Applicant.
[4]
Immediately after service of a copy of the summons on the Defendants,
the Applicant, the Second
Defendant and the Third Defendant entered
an appearance to defend. It is apparent on the Notice of
Intention to Defend that
the Applicant and other Defendants were
represented by the State Attorney, Pretoria.
[5]
The three Defendants delivered a composite plea in terms of which all
of them denied liability.
In fact, the Second and Third
Defendants denied publishing any defamatory words against the
Respondent. The Applicant denied
in the plea that he is
vicariously liable for the alleged defamation, if it is proved that
the Second and Third Defendants did
publish the alleged defamatory
words with an intention to injure the reputation of the Respondent.
[6]
It is clear from the particulars of claim that the Respondent’s
case is that the said defamatory
words were allegedly uttered by the
Second and Third Defendants. It is the Respondent’s case,
furthermore, that the
Applicant’s liability is predicated on
the allegation that at the time they uttered the alleged defamatory
words, the Second
and Third Defendants were acting within their
course and scope of their employment with the Applicant. In
their plea, the
Defendants denied that the Second and Third
Defendants ever uttered those words. The pleadings were closed
after the Defendants
had delivered their plea.
[7]
Pre-trial meetings were held and eventually the matter was set down
for hearing on 19 August 2013.
The parties subpoenaed their
witnesses for that purpose.
[8]
On 6 June 2013 the Respondent delivered on the Applicant a notice in
terms of Rule 35(3) for the
discovery. In this Rule 35(3)
notice, the Respondent required the Applicant to discover the
following documents:
8.1
Content of the disciplinary investigation file containing the Second
and Third Defendants;
8.2
Investigation file with reference number S32/4/2(2)(667);
8.3
Application, notes, questionnaire and file content applicable and
used during the Plaintiff’s
top secret clearance vetting
process.
It
is the Respondent’s case that the application for further
discovery was made on 30 July 2013. The Applicant was not
present. The Applicant has failed to disclose this in his
affidavit.
[9]
The Applicant failed to comply fully with the Respondent’s
notice in terms of Rule 35(3)
in that he failed to furnish his
supplementary discovery affidavit in respect of the investigation
file with reference number S32/4/2(2)(667.
As a result of such
failure the Respondent launched an application to compel under Rule
35(7). The Applicant opposed it.
The application was heard on
30 July 2013. An order compelling all the three Defendants to
discover that document was granted.
Because of the
interlocutory application, the trial of the matter was removed from
the roll.
[10]
Seemingly the Defendant failed to comply with the court order.
I must pause here and remark that no
reasonable explanation was
furnished by the Applicant failed to comply with the court order or
to ask the Respondent for an extension
of time or to approach the
Court to extend the period within which to comply with the court
order. The Respondent then launched
an application in terms of
Rule 35(7) and sought an order in terms of which the Defendant’s
defence was struck out due to
the Applicant’s failure to comply
with the court order.
[11]
This notice in terms of Rule 35(7) was served on the Defendant’s
attorneys on 23 August 2013 and was
to be heard on 22 October 2013.
The Defendant filed a notice to oppose the application in terms of
Rule 35(7). On 3
February 2014, the Defendant’s attorneys
delivered the Defendant’s opposing affidavit. The said
application in
terms of Rule 35(7) was enrolled for hearing on the
opposed roll of 20 April 2014. But on 8 April 2014 the
Respondent’s
attorney removed the application from the roll of
10 April 2014. The notice to oppose the Respondent’s Rule
35(7) application
was only filed on 3 February 2014. It is not
known from the papers what happened on 22 October 2013 and why the
notice to
oppose the Respondent’s application in terms of Rule
35(7) was only filed on 3 February 2014.
[12]
The application was set down for hearing on 20 April 2014. The
Applicant complains about two things,
firstly, that the Respondent’s
attorneys furnished no reason whatsoever why a matter that had been
properly enrolled for
20 April 2014 was removed from the roll and
secondly, why the Respondent tendered no costs. The contention
by the Applicant
that the Respondent did not inform him why the
matter was removed from the roll appears to have no merit. The
Applicant was
informed by the Respondent’s new attorneys of
record, Messrs van Andel-Brink in an email dated 4 April 2014, that
“
we intend removing the matter from the roll as none of the
parties have (sic) filed heads of argument”
.
[13]
The matter was on the opposed roll of 20 April 2014. In terms
of the practice manual of Gauteng Division,
heads of argument are
required and must be filed in all the opposed applications. The
matter would not have been heard by
any Judge if no heads of argument
were filed. So, the Respondent’s attorneys were correct
in removing the matter from
the roll. With regard to costs,
neither of the parties was entitled to any order of costs since they
have both failed to
comply with the practice manual. At any
rate, nothing turns on this point.
[14]
According to the Applicant, the Respondent’s attorney set the
matter down for hearing on 10 November
2014 only to remove it again
from the roll. The Defendant was, on this occasion, ordered to
pay the Applicant’s costs.
The Respondent disputes this
allegation. She denies that the application was enrolled again
for hearing on 10 November 2014
and furthermore that it was removed
from the roll. ‘RA7’ to the founding affidavit
states that:
“
This
case which was on the roll for trial on 10 November 2014”
.
Quite
clearly it was the case, the main case, that was removed from the
roll and not the Rule 35(7) application. It is clear
that the
legal officer of the Applicants had incorrectly conflated the main
case and the application in terms of Rule 35(7) and
has thereby
misstated the facts. Again, nothing turns on this misstatement
of facts. Again, the application was re-enrolled
on the
unopposed roll of 21 November 2014 but was immediately thereafter
removed from the roll by notice of removal dated 12 November
2014
which was delivered on 18 November 2014. In a telefax dated 13
November 2014 the Respondent’s attorneys had furnished
reasons
why the application in terms of Rule 35(7) was removed from the
roll. That reason was that neither counsel nor attorney
would
be available on 21 November 2014. There is amongst the papers a
court order dated 10 November 2014 by which Ledwaba
DJP removed the
matter from the roll and ordered the Respondents, as Plaintiffs, to
pay the Defendants wasted costs.
[15]
After the notice of removal of 12 November 2014, there was a lull of
4 years during which nothing took place.
At the end of that
period of 4 years, the Respondent’s attorney served the
Applicant’s attorneys with the heads of
argument.
The Respondent denies that there was a lull of 4 years and points to
the fact that on 9 June 2016 the Applicant’s
attorneys were
served by the then Respondent’s attorneys with a notice of
withdrawal as attorneys of record.
[16]
On 18 December 2014 the Respondent served the State Attorney with a
notice of set down in terms of which
the Respondent’s
application in terms of Rule 35(7) would be heard on 14 March 2019, a
long time after the attorney, who
had been handling the matter in the
State Attorney’s office had left the State Attorney’s
employment. The matter
had to be assigned to another attorney.
[17]
Upon perusing the file, the new attorney, whose names have not been
disclosed, noticed that indeed the Applicant
had not complied with
the court order. In the opposing affidavit furnished by the
Second and Third Applicants the new attorney
had observed that both
of them had stated that they were not in possession of the documents
the Court had ordered them to furnish
the Respondents with but that
such documents were in the custody of the First Applicant. On
this basis they insisted that
their defence as contained in the plea
could not be struck out. The Applicant’s attorneys
submitted that the said documents
sought were classified documents
and had been classified and which required reclassification order for
them to be available.
[18]
On 1 March 2019 the Applicant’s attorneys complied with both
the Respondent’s request in terms
of Rule 35(3) and the court
order of 13 August 2013 by delivering a further discovery affidavit.
A copy of such supplementary
discovery affidavit is annexed to the
founding affidavit as ‘RA10’. This affidavit was
deposed to by a certain
Mudau Isaac Tladi, a legal officer in the
office of the State Attorney. He had stated that the facts
stated in that affidavit
were within his personal knowledge and that
he had been duly authorised to make the affidavit on behalf of the
Applicant.
He had further stated that the Defendants were not
in possession of the documents mentioned hereunder and did not know
their whereabouts.
Those documents were:
18.1
the content of the disciplinary investigation file against the Second
and Third Defendants;
18.2
the investigation file reference number S32/4/2(2)(667);
18.3
application, notes, questionnaire and file containing the application
and used during the Plaintiff’s top
secret clearance vetting
process.
[19]
The Applicant’s legal officer contends that for the reasons
disclosed hereunder the Court order of
Collis J, dated 7 May 2019 and
of the Acting Judge Bam of 9 March 2019 should be rescinded and set
aside for having been erroneously
sought and erroneously granted.
Despite the fact that the Applicant had complied with the order of
Sithole J of 13 February
2013, the Respondent proceeded nevertheless
to move for an order to strike out the Applicant’s defence on 7
March 2014.
The Respondent had alleged that the Applicant had
failed to comply with the order of Sithole J.
[20]
The Respondent accepted the affidavit and did not complain. The
Respondent contends that the Applicant
did not disclose this aspect
in the discovery affidavit. He never claimed that such
documents were justified.
20.1
This affidavit of Mudau Isaac Tladi, annexure ‘RA10’,
contradicted the following affidavit or was incomplete.
In
paragraph 11 of the founding affidavit a submission was made by the
deponent that “
the documents the Respondent sought were
classified documents for which in order for them to be availed they
required an internal
process for declassification.”
This
fact was not included in the affidavit of Mudau Isaac Tladi. No
explanation was furnished by the said attorney why the
explanation
was not contained in the affidavit.
20.2
The Respondent denies that the Applicant had complied with the court
order in as much as the affidavit, ‘RA10’,
was not served
on the Respondent’s attorneys. According to proof of
service, the said affidavit was served on 1 March
2019 on DJ
Swanepoel and Associates Inc at 84 Regency Drive, Route 21, Corporate
Park, Irene, 0062. This is despite a notice
of appointment of
attorneys of record served on the applicant’s attorneys on 8
April 2014 in which the Respondent’s
current attorneys were
appointed and the Applicants were duly notified thereof.
20.3
It is contended furthermore by the Respondent that even on 7 March
2019, when the Rule 35(7) application came before
Court the said
affidavit was not even before the Court. The attorneys acting
for the Applicant had a duty to ensure that
the affidavit was filed
with the registrar of the Court.
20.4
Another complaint raised against ‘RA10’ is that the
deponent did not state or indicate of the Applicant
and the
Defendants who was making the affidavit or on whose behalf was the
affidavit made.
20.5
Furthermore, the said affidavit, so it has been contended by the
Respondents, was in direct contradiction with
the affidavit filed on
behalf of the Second and Third Applicants. In the opposing
affidavit filed on behalf of the Second
and Third Applicants, they
had stated clearly that the First Applicant was in possession of the
documents requested by the Rule
35(3) notice.
20.6
The Applicant’s attorney, having read the answering affidavit
of the Respondent and having noticed his arrest**,
when and delivered
on 4 *** 2014 an affidavit. This was of course done prior to
the hearing of the application in terms of
Rule 35(7).
Seemingly there was a problem with the said affidavit. That
problem was drawn to the attention of the Applicant
in an email that
the Respondent’s attorneys sent to the Applicant’s
attorneys. The said email, referred to the
supplementary
discovery affidavit, went to enquire as follows:
“
It
is unclear from the affidavit on behalf of which defendant/respondent
affidavit is done.
Kindly
clarify.”
The
Applicant’s attorney did not respond to this email.
20.7
Now in the replying affidavit, the Applicant’s attorneys have
failed to deal with the Respondent’s
allegation that on 1 March
2019 they delivered the supplementary discovery affidavit to the
attorneys who were not on the roll
for the Respondent. They
kept quiet about it. They failed to acknowledge or accept that
they had made a mistake about
it. They failed to apologise for
that mistake. Secondly, they failed to explain why they did not
respond to the email
dated 4 March 2019, annexure ‘NMN11’,
to the opposing affidavit.
20.8
On 5 March 2019, the Respondent’s attorneys sent another email
to the Applicant’s attorneys.
Again, they requested
clarity the Defendant’s attorneys on whose behalf the affidavit
of 4 March 2019 was filed. Still
the Applicant’s
attorneys did not respond to the said email, annexure ‘NMN12’.
The Applicant’s attorneys
failed not only to respond to ‘NMN12’
but also to attend to Court, or to make any appearance arrangements
for Court
on 7 March 2019, or to furnish the Court with any
explanation.
20.9
As indicated somewhere above, when the Respondent’s application
in terms of Rule 35(7) came before Collis
J on 7 March 2019, Ms
Bouwer appeared for the Respondent for the purpose of moving the
application. For inexplicable reasons,
there was no appearance
for the Applicant. This was despite the fact that a notice of
set down for the Rule 35(7) application
had been served by the
Respondent’s attorneys on the Applicant’s attorneys on 18
December 2018. Therefore, the
Applicant’s attorneys knew
fully well that the application was on the roll; it has not been
removed; there was never an intention
on the part of the Respondent
to remove the application from the roll, that the Applicant’s
attorneys were never misled or
informed that the application would be
removed or postponed.
20.10
Despite alleging that he has read the answering affidavit, the
Applicant’s legal officer failed to explain in his replying
affidavit why there was no appearance for the Applicant on 7 March
2019. He regards this important matter as unimportant.
The conduct of this legal officer is disappointing.
[21]
WHAT HAPPENED AT COURT ON 7 MARCH 2019
21.1
The Court had regard to the affidavits that opposed the Rule 35(7)
application. It was satisfied that the
application had been
properly enrolled and that the Applicant’s attorneys were
properly notified. It was aware of the
opposing affidavit of
the Second and Third Respondents. It was explained by Ms Bouwer
to the Court that the opposing affidavit
was only in respect of the
Second and Third Defendants and that no such opposing affidavit was
filed in respect of the First Applicant.
It was explained
furthermore to the Court that the application in terms of Rule 35(7)
was only in respect of the Applicant.
No one was present for
the Applicant to explain why the Applicant had not complied with the
Court order. So, from this point
the Court understood that the
Applicant did not oppose the Respondents’ Rule 35(7)
application.
21.2
It was further explained by Ms Bouwer to the Court that there was an
attempt by the Applicant to file a supplementary
discovery
affidavit. That supplementary affidavit was emailed to the
Respondent’s attorneys on 28 February 2019.
It contained
an allegation that the Applicant or Defendant was not in possession
of the document requested. The problem with
the said
supplementary affidavit was that it failed to indicate the Defendant
on whose behalf it was made. There was no one
on behalf of the
Applicant to assist the Court or to clarify this issue to the Court.
21.3
The Court observed that the supplementary discovery affidavit that Ms
Bouwer referred to was not even in the court
file. A copy was
handed over to the Court for its perusal. She also informed the
Court that that was a copy of the
supplementary affidavit that was
not served on the Respondent’s attorneys but on a certain
Swanepoel Attorneys on 1 March
2019.
21.4
The Court also noted that the affidavit by Tladi failed to state that
the documents requested in terms of Rule
35(3) or the court order
that ordered the Applicant to furnish the Respondents were privileged
and that he did not have them in
his possession. The Court was
aware that in the affidavit it was only stated that they were not in
the possession of the
Defendants. No one appeared for the
Defendants to explain this anomaly. They Court remarked that,
as the Rule required
a party to indicate the person in whose
possession the documents are, to keep quiet about the whereabouts of
the documents, is
not sufficient. It is tantamount to failure
to respond.
21.5
The Court correctly concluded that in the face of failure to comply,
a party that had requested to be furnished
with the documents was
entitled to approach the Court for an order compelling the party that
had failed to furnish the documents
to do so, has nevertheless
confirmed that the Respondent obtained such an order, showed the
Court the order and informed the Court
that it was served on the
Defendant. The Court was informed, furthermore, that after the
order had been served, the Defendants
had to respond within the
period stated therein. In this case, there was no response from
the Defendants.
21.6
The Court was satisfied that the outstanding documents were in the
possession of the Applicant because the Second
and Third Defendants
stated so. The Second and Third Defendants tried unsuccessfully
to obtain those documents from some
of the employees of the First
Applicant.
21.7
Furthermore, the Court was satisfied that in their notice to oppose
the State Attorney had indicated that it was
acting for all the three
Defendants.
21.8
The Court also found grounds to reject the affidavit of Tladi.
It contained material inconsistencies and
furthermore the document
was not properly before the Court. Lastly, it had not been
filed with the Registrar of the Court,
that is why it was not even in
the court file.
21.9
The Court was satisfied that the Applicant’s attorneys failed
to respond to the emails, one dated and sent
on 4 March 2019 and the
other one dated and sent on 5 March 2019 in which the Respondent
sought clarity.
21.10
The Court saw no reason to deny the Respondents the order it sought.
It was satisfied that the Respondent had made out
a good case for the
relief that he sought, and that the Applicant had put up no valid
defence against the application. It
granted the order
accordingly. This Court bemoans the lackadaisical manner in
which the State Attorney handled the Applicant’s
case.
The matter was handled slovenly and unprofessionally.
[22]
Then on the basis of the order of 7 March 2019, on 7 August 2019 Bam
AJ granted judgment on the merits against
the Applicant in favour of
the Respondent. The quantum of the Plaintiff’s claim was
postponed
sine die
and the First Applicant was ordered to pay
the wasted costs of the merits of the Defendant’s claim on a
party-and-party scale.
[23]
The legal officer contends, erroneously so, that the Respondent’s
legal representatives concealed at
the hearing of the Rule 35(7)
application on 7 March 2019 that a further discovery affidavit was
furnished, although late.
According to the legal officer, this
fact alone would have prevented the Court from granting the order of
7 March 2019.
[24]
This contention by the legal officer is, as already pointed out,
wrong. If anything, it shows that
it was made by someone who
had not read a copy of the transcript of the proceedings of 7 March
2019. It is clear from the
said record that Ms Bouwer had
mentioned this supplementary discovery affidavit to the Court and
that the Court considered it.
Therefore, the allegation by the
Applicant’s legal officer that the legal representatives of the
Respondent failed to disclose
to the Court that a supplementary
discovery affidavit had been furnished, lacks merit. The legal
officer of the Applicant
avoided informing the Court how, and to whom
the supplementary affidavit was “furnished”. This
was done deliberately.
Secondly, the Applicant’s legal
officer failed to explain to the Court why there was no appearance
for the Applicant at Court
on 7 March 2019 and also on 7 August 2019.
[25]
The Applicant’s legal officer stated that the default judgment
granted by Bam AJ stands to be rescinded
and set aside for having
been sought erroneously and granted erroneously. At the stage
the Respondent applied for the default
judgment, the Applicant had no
defence against the Respondent’s case. I agree with the
Respondent that the Applicant
had the opportunity to raise his
argument in respect of both the order and the judgment but failed to
attend Court.
[26]
It is known that a failure to file the necessary documents, like in
the instant matter, the supplementary
discovery affidavit, should not
be used by the parties to grab on the slip of the opposite party.
A discretion whether or
not to grant default judgment is always for
the Court to exercise judicially. A judicial officer must be
sure that the party
that is in default is definitely not pursuing his
litigation. In deciding or arriving at a decision it is
important that
the judicial officer have regard to all the documents
in the court file; see in this regard
Geyser v Nedbank Ltd
;
in Re Nedbank Ltd v Keyser
2006 (5) SA 355
(E) at paragraph 40
the conduct of the defendant upon being served with documents by the
plaintiff; i.e. whether he reacts with the immediacy that
such
documents require and where he fails to do so, whether he furnishes a
reasonable explanation for his delay or whether he approaches
the
other side or the court for an indulgence.
[27]
The order of Collis J granted on 7 March 2019 and the judgment of Bam
AJ granted on 7 August 2019 were both
granted in the absence of the
Applicant. They are therefore default judgments. There was no
appearance on both occasions
for the Applicant. The State Attorney
did not deem it necessary to explain why there was no appearance for
the Applicant on both
occasions.
[28]
The basis on which the Applicant seeks to rescind the order of Collis
J on 7 March 2019 and the judgment
of Bam AJ on 7 August 2019 is that
both the order of Collis J and the judgment of Bam AJ were
erroneously sought and erroneously
granted. The judgment of
Rossiter and Others v Nedbank Ltd (96/2014)
[2015] ZASCA 196
(1
December 2015) paragraph [16]
sets out the law governing an
application for rescission under Rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules
of Court. In paragraph
16, the Court had the following to say:
“
The
law governing an application for rescission under uniform rule
42(1)(a) is trite. The Applicant must show that the default
judgment or order had been erroneously sought or erroneously
granted. If the default judgment was erroneously sought or
granted, a Court should without more, grant the order for
rescission. It is not necessary for a party to show good cause
under the sub-rule. Generally, a judgment is erroneously
granted if there existed at the time of its issue, a fact, which
the
Court was unaware of, which would have precluded the granting of the
judgment and which would have induced the Court, if aware
of it, not
to grant the judgment.”
The
test to be applied, therefore, is whether there existed at the time
of its issue a fact which the Court was unaware of, which
would have
precluded the granting of the judgment and which would have induced
the Court, if aware of that, not to grant the judgment.
See
also
Promedia
Drukkers Uitgewers (Edms) Bpk v Kaimowitz and Others
1996 (4) SA 411
CPD
as regards the effect and meaning of Rule 42(1) had the following to
say at page 417 G-H:
“
Relief
will be granted under this rule if there was an irregularity in the
proceedings (see De Wet and Others v Western Bank Ltd
(supra) at 1031
AD; Tshabalala and Another v Peer
1979 (4) SA 27
T at 30 H to 31 A;
Bakhoven Ltd GJ Howes (Pty) Ltd (supra at 471 H); Dawson and Fraser
(Pty) Ltd v Havenga Construction (Pty) Ltd
1993 (3) SA 397
(at 399
B-C); if the Court lacked legal competence to have made the order see
Afmaram v Singh and if the Court at the time the
order was made was
unaware of facts which, if known to it, would have precluded the
granting of the order.”
In
my view, there was no irregularity in the proceedings. It is
not necessary for an Applicant to show good cause.
[29]
At common law a Court has a discretion to grant the rescission of
judgment where sufficient cause or good
cause has been shown.
But it is clear that in principle and in the long-standing practice
of our Courts, two essential elements
of “sufficient costs”
for rescission of a judgment by default must be satisfied namely:
1.
that the party seeking relief must present a reasonable and
acceptable explanation for his
default and;
2.
that on the merits such party has a
bona fide
defence which
prima facie carries some prospects of success. Such defence
must appear
ex facto
the papers.
See
in this regard
Chetty v Law Society, Transvaal
1985 (2) SA 756
A
at 765 B-C
. It is not sufficient if only one of these
elements is established.
[30]
Now in the instant application the Applicant has failed to explain
his default of both 7 March 2019 and 7
August 2019. There
exists no valid reason whatsoever why the State Attorney failed to
attend Court on those dates on which
Collis J struck the Applicant’s
defence out. The State Attorney had been notified about the
date and the nature of
the application that would be made on 7 March
2019. There is no explanation by the State Attorney why there
was no representation
for the Applicant on the said date. Similarly,
there was no representation for the Applicant on 7 August 2019.
No explanation
has been proffered for such a failure.
[31]
The Applicant has not made out a good case for the relief that it
seeks. This Court is disinclined to come
to his assistance. The
following order is accordingly made:
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
With regards to costs, the officers of the State Attorney who dealt
with this matter are
hereby ordered to furnish this Court with
reasons why they should not be ordered to pay the costs of the
application for rescission
in their personal capacity.
3.
The reasons must be furnished by uploading them within 20 days of
this order.
PM
MABUSE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv K Toma
Instructed
by:
The State Attorney
Counsel
for the Defendant:
Adv M Bouwer
Instructed
by:
Mostert Attorneys
Date
on the opposed roll before Mabuse J:
17 November 2020
Date
of Judgment:
12 February 2021