About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2021
>>
[2021] ZAGPPHC 106
|
|
R.T.R v D.J.R (37229/2015) [2021] ZAGPPHC 106 (10 February 2021)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO.
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO.
(3)
REVISED.
DATE
10
FEBRUARY 2021
CASE
NO: 37229/2015
In
the matter between:
R[....]
T[....] R[....]
Applicant
and
D[....]
J[....] R[....]
Respondent
J
U D G M E N T
(Contempt
of Court, Leave to Appeal and ancillary matters)
This
matter has been heard in terms of the Directives of the Judge
President of this Division dated
25
March 2020, 24 April 2020 and 11 May
2020.
The judgment and order are accordingly published and distributed
electronically.
DAVIS,
J
[1]
Introduction
1.1
On 23 February 2018,
after the conclusion of a trial where evidence had been led in the
parties’ hotly contested divorce action,
which had been raging
since its inception three years earlier, this court granted a divorce
order. The salient features of
that order relevant to these
proceedings were the following (for ease of reference and sake of
convenience due to the fact that
the parties had been plaintiff and
defendant, applicant and respondent respectively in various
proceedings, they shall be referred
to as Mrs and Mr R[....]
respectively):
-
A decree of divorce was
granted;
-
In terms of Section
7(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of Zimbabwe, Act No 33 of 1985,
both parties remained joint owners of a certain
immovable property in
Maputo, Mozambique (the [….] property) and equally entitled to
whatever net rental income the property
generates;
-
Mr R[....] was ordered
to transfer 40% of the shareholding in the [….] Group of
companies, including [….] as well
as the South African company
[….] to Mrs R[....]. This transfer had to take place
within 60 days from date of the
order, i.e by 24 April 2018;
-
Various other
distribution orders and declarations about retention of other movable
and immovable properties were also made, including
an interim
maintenance order of R 10 000.00 per month in favour of Mrs
R[....].
1.2
There are now, almost
three years later, three applications before court:
-
Mrs R[....]’s
application for contempt of court. She has, to date, not
received any rental income from the [….]
property, no shares
had been transferred to her and Mr R[....] has stopped paying
maintenance (the latter only occurred during
the course of the
present litigation).
-
Mr R[....]’s
application for leave to appeal, launched on 5 March 2020.
-
An application for
condonation for the late lodging of the application for leave to
appeal.
-
Mr R[....]’s
counter-application to the contempt application wherein he seeks a
variation of the initial order (the variation
application).
1.3
The application for
leave to appeal and the application for condonation go together and
the contempt application and its consequences
are related to the
variation application. I shall deal with these various
applications consecutively in this fashion.
[2]
Leave to appeal
2.1
It is trite that the
right to appeal is waived if a litigant, by unequivocal conduct
inconsistent with the intention to appeal,
acquiesces in the
judgment. This waiver is also called peremption of the appeal.
It does not relate to the grounds
of appeal, but to conduct after the
appeal. See for example:
Blou
v Lampert & Chipkin
1970 (2) SA 185
(T) at 199A-E.
2.2
From a reading of Mr
R[....]’s answering affidavit to the contempt application,
there was initially no intention to appeal
the order made in the
judgment in respect of the [….] property (which he now
seeks to claim as his sole property in
the variation application).
For more than two years after the judgment, he continued to claim
that Mrs R[....] was entitled
to her half share of the rental
income. The reason he could not pay it over to her, according
to him, was that she did not
have an operative bank account in
Mozambique and that he could not expatriate the funds to South
Africa. Prior to him citing
exchange control restriction as
reasons for non-compliance he, on the second working day after the
order, forwarded to Mrs R[....]
an email wherein he in his own words
“
restated the
whole of the order and I inserted in bold after certain paragraphs
thereof my comments and/or what I required from
the
applicant
to be able to comply with the order
and/or what steps would be necessary in future
to
comply with same
”
(my underlining).
2.3
In similar fashion, Mr
R[....]’s initial intention was to comply with the court order
regarding the transfer of the shareholding.
In fact, he says as
much in his aforementioned answering affidavit: “
I
admit that, in terms of the order, I have to transfer 40% of my
shareholding in my businesses in Mozambique to the applicant 60
days
from date of the order, including, but not limited to the
shareholding in [the Mozambican companies] as well as the South
African company …
”
and, with reference of a letter of 27 February 2018 “
Israel
Casimoro Franca (Israel), who is a majority shareholder in the
Mozambique companies, and I spoke about the order, we have
no
objection thereto and
we
would like to comply with the order
with effect from its date
”
(my underlining).
2.4
Despite Mr R[....]
alleging in his answering affidavit that he initially thought he had
no choice but to comply and his allegation
that he was, during June
2018 advised by his second set of attorneys that he could appeal the
order, nothing was done in pursuit
of this alleged advice until he
got wind of the contempt application and the rule nisi calling upon
him to respond thereto.
This was on 4 September 2019.
That was when Mr R[....] resorted to his present set of attorneys
(his third in this litigation).
The application for leave to
appeal was thereafter only filed simultaneously with Mr R[....]’s
answering affidavit to the
contempt application on 5 March 2020.
2.5
There appears to be
substance in Mr R[....]’s complaints about his various
attorneys: the first set cost him R1,9 million
and juggled counsel
right up to three days prior to the actual trial, the second
allegedly failed to inform him about the contempt
application having
been served at their offices and consented to taxation of the trial
costs without telling him. Despite
this, and after having been
advised of his rights of appeal in June 2018, nothing is done in
respect thereof. In fact, insofar
as he complains about
financial difficulties, he pays in excess of R160 000,00 as his
40% share of Mrs R[....]’s legal
costs of the trial, without
lodging an application or for leave to appeal against the order
compelling him to do so.
2.6
All outward
manifestations of Mr R[....]’s conduct for more than two years
after the order, therefore amounted to acquiescence
as opposed to
initiating appellate proceedings. This peremption precludes Mr
R[....] from subsequently applying for leave
to appeal.
2.7
Even if I am wrong in
this regard and even if Mr R[....] is afforded the benefit of doubt
as to his ostensible waiver of his right
of appeal, there is, in view
of the undue delay and passage of time, insufficient explanations why
the application had not been
launched earlier. One is left with
the distinct impression that, had the shoe of the contempt
application not pinched, the
application for leave to appeal would
not have been launched. The condonation application for the late
lodging of the application
for leave should therefore fail.
2.8
Even if the application
for leave to appeal is to be considered on its merits, the attack on
the correctness of the judgment is
primarily based on the alleged
impracticality of the distribution order. I have already
referred to the difficulties raised
by Mr R[....] in paying Mrs
R[....]’s half share of the net rental income in the [….]
property to her (with which
I shall again deal in respect of the
contempt application). The prime alleged impracticality
pertains to the transfer of
shares. Mr R[....] complains that
the shares in the South African company is not held by himself, and
lists a number of other
objections against having Mrs R[....] as a
co-shareholder. None of these aspects were raised at the trial
and the shares
were all referred to by Mr R[....] in his evidence as
his own. The reason why a percentage was ordered, rather than a
monetary
amount was because Mr R[....] was extremely vague in his
evidence in attaching values to his shareholding. The risk was
that,
if an amount was ordered, Mrs R[....] might end up with less
than the determined percentage of the estate/s to which it has been
found that she was entitled to. When I put these issues to Mr
R[....]’s counsel, he argued that a great many issues,
including valuations and share price determinations could indicate
what a fair order or, at least, a fair division of the value
of Mr
R[....]’s ownership in the companies should be. The
difficulty with this answer is that nothing of this proposed
further
evidence on appeal had been placed before court. There is not
even, in the application for leave to appeal, a reference
to the
intention to lead further evidence on appeal and neither an
indication why such evidence had not been led at the trial.
No
detail at all has been furnished about the values of the shares or
the asset and liability position of the companies and the
court is
still left with what has been put before it at the trial. An
appeal court would be in the same position. This
militates
against the granting of leave to appeal.
2.9
I find that, even if
the appeal had not become perempted and, should condonation for the
late launching of the application for leave
to appeal be granted, Mr
R[....] has not cleared the hurdle of section 17(1) of the Superior
Courts Act requiring him to indicate
a reasonable prospect of success
on appeal.
2.10
Both the applications
for condonation and for leave to appeal should therefore be
dismissed.
[3]
The contempt
application
3.1
Mr R[....] has, in his
answering affidavit, identified four “themes” in Mrs
R[....]’s application, in respect
of which she suggested that
Mr R[....] has acted in contempt of the order of this court.
This thematic approach appears convenient
and I shall follow it in
this judgment. The four themes are 1) the [….] property,
2) the transfer of shares issue,
3) the Dream Vacation Club points
and 4) the maintenance issue.
3.2
The [….]
property
3.2.1
This is a lucrative
property (estimated at the trial at a forced sale value of US $
243 000.00). The current value of
Mrs R[....]’s
share of the rental income, at the time of hearing these
applications, was R 489 136.59.
3.2.2
It is common cause that
Mr R[....] has not been paid a cent of this rental income to Mrs
R[....].
3.2.3
The reason why the
rental has not been paid, so the papers say, is because Mrs R[....]
could not furnish Mr R[....] with particulars
of an operative bank
account in Mozambique. Various other objections to the
expatriation of the funds to South Africa and
foreign exchange
regulations operative in Mozambique were cited. Mr R[....] also
stated that, should Mrs R[....] simply receive
the funds in South
Africa, that would enable her to avoid her tax liabilities in
Mozambique. No detail of this was furnished
and when Mrs
R[....] replied that she was quite prepared to meet all her tax
liabilities, this was merely “noted” by
Mr R[....].
As Mr R[....] still has assets in South Africa and access to bank
accounts here, Mrs R[....] questions why payment
was not simply made
to her in South Africa and that the necessary adjustments for set-off
and taxation be made. Although
Mr R[....] was not expressly
ordered to made such payment, at all relevant times it was common
cause that he administered and received
the rent. He has also
tendered to pay Mrs R[....], his only gripe is that she made it
“impossible” to pay her
(in Mozambique). Mr
R[....]’s failure to even consider the option of payment in
South Africa, indicates a willful intention
to frustrate the court
order. Mr R[....], as an aside, states that, prior to the
order, the rent derived from this property
was “utilized”
by him towards the parties’ daughter’s tertiary expenses
in the UK (he is silent about exchange
control or taxation issues
relating to both his and Mrs R[....]’s portions of this income
and its expatriation). Mr
R[....] failed to inform the court
what happened to the daughter’s expenses since February 2018
and refused to state where
the funds had been held by him for the
past three years.
3.3
The transfer of
shares
3.3.1
In respect of the
transfer of shares in the South African Company, Mr R[....] for the
first time, when faced with the contempt application,
indicated to
the court that the shares were held by the Mozambican company, [….].
He therefore claims impossibility
of performance.
3.3.2
This aspect was neither
disclosed nor raised as a defence at the trial. The principle
debate was the value of the shares of
the Mozambican Companies.
3.3.3
In his current
answering affidavit, Mr R[....] referred to a “structure”
of companies. This indicates that he
holds 45% in Engco
Limitada, which in turn holds 80% in Engco Investments Limitada,
99,5% in Engco Electrica Limitada and 80% in
Fleetco Limitada.
He also holds 10% in Peirlite Mozambique Limitada which owns 100% in
Engco Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd.
None of this was
disclosed to the court by him in his evidence. In fact, the
reference to 45% shareholding in Mozambique,
was portrayed,
particularly during cross-examination, as if it referred to either
all of the companies jointly, or 45% in respect
of each of them.
3.3.4
Be that as it may for
the time being in respect of the transfer of shares of the various
companies. Mr R[....] initially initiated
the transfer of
shares process through his erstwhile attorneys. He soon
reminded Mrs R[....] about shareholders’ obligations
in terms
of Mozambican law as well as to the companies. When her
attorneys started querying the value of the shares and requested
perusal of the company financial statements, Mr R[....] again hid
behind shareholders’ rights to company statements which
he was
keen to underline, Mrs R[....] was not. Apart from the
statutory rights, there was absolutely nothing preventing Mr
R[....]
from disclosing the financials of the companies to Mrs R[....].
In similar fashion as during the trial more than
three years ago, Mr
R[....] refused to place Mrs R[....] and, more importantly, the court
in possession of the relevant information.
Mrs R[....]’s
attorneys’ request for this information also prompted Mr
R[....] to express fears about possible sale
of the shares by Mrs
R[....] which may not carry the approval of the other shareholders.
3.3.5
A more pressing
motivation not to transfer the shares appears from the following
statement by Mr R[....]: “
Furthermore,
had I acted in the manner demanded by the applicant’s [Mrs
R[....]’s] attorneys and/or if the applicant
insisted on
exercising her rights as a prospective shareholder without compliance
of the articles of association …, I would
have been confronted
with the real risk of being excluded as a shareholder from the
Mozambique companies … . Furthermore,
transferring 40%
of my shareholding to the applicant would have the immediate result
that I am a minority shareholder who then
became subject to the whims
and/or dictates of the other shareholders …
”.
3.3.6
Mr R[....] further
decided that the companies would be worse off if Mrs R[....] becomes
a shareholder whilst she is not in a position
to contribute thereto.
As proof of her unwillingness, he referred to her refusal to borrow
money on the [….] property.
He put it as follows in his
answering affidavit: “
However,
after the applicant was not willing to grant her consent that
I
take out a loan on the [….] property as aforesaid, which was
ultimately intended for the benefit of the Mozambique companies,
both
Israel and I realized that it will not be in the best interest of the
companies and we are no longer prepared to take her in
as such
”
(my underlining).
3.3.7
While one can
appreciate Mr R[....]’s concerns for the continued well-being
of the Mozambican companies in which he holds
shares, either directly
or indirectly, it is not open to a party to unilaterally “decide”
not to comply with a court
order. Such conduct undermines the
authority of courts and is, in effect, contemptuous of a court’s
pronouncements.
This contempt may have been ameliorated, had Mr
R[....] applied for amendment or variation of the order or explored
alternative
ways (such as payment) to comply with the findings that a
percentage of his estate must be distributed to Mrs R[....]. By
simply refusing to comply with the redistribution order for reasons
of his own, amounts to willful contempt of court.
3.4
The Dream Vacation
Club Levies
It is trite that, for a finding of contempt of court to
be made, which carries a sanction of possible incarceration, a court
must
be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. See:
Fakie No v
CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA) and
Matjhabeng
Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd
2018 (1) SA 1
(CC).
In her application Mrs R[....] alleged that a previous amount on the
account relating levies has not been paid by Mr
R[....] and that a
subsequent credit was not as a result of a payment by him, but
generated by her. She also alleged that
“nothing”
had been paid by Mr R[....] in 2020. The statement produced by
Mr R[....] does not address all these
issues, but seems to suggest
that the account is up to date, albeit that some payments were late.
There is sufficient of
a factual dispute on this issue that no
adverse finding can be made against Mr R[....] regarding a finding of
contempt of court.
3.5
The maintenance
issue
3.5.1
It is clear from the
judgment that the question as to whether the transfer of assets would
be such in value that it might result
in a “clean break”
being attained between the parties to the extent that Mrs R[....]
might not be in need of maintenance
from Mr R[....].
3.5.2
It was therefore
contemplated that the maintenance issue would be enrolled by Mr
R[....]. This had not happened, despite him
saying in his
answering affidavit that he had given instruction for this to be
done. But, by the same token, neither has
the transfer of
assets taken place, which would have been determinative of that
issue. I need not determine this issue as
it has been indicated
during argument that Mrs R[....] is no longer relying on this
“theme”.
3.6
Based on what I have
stated in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 above, I find Mr R[....] in contempt
of the order of this court of 23 February
2018. I shall deal
with the issue of sanction later.
[4]
The
counter-application
4.1
In his
counter-application, Mr R[....] claims the following as alternative
to the granting of leave to appeal: that paragraphs 2.2,
2.3 and 2.6
of the initial order substituted with the following:
“
2.2 The
property known as … the [….] property … be sold
and the net proceeds thereof shall be paid
to the Defendant;
2.3 The Defendant shall
retain as his sole property the immovable property known as [….],
Maputo,
Mozambique and the Plaintiff shall sign all and /or any
documents necessary to effect the amendment of the title deed to
remove
the Plaintiff as a co-owner of this property
2.6 The
Defendant shall retain as his sole property all the points in the
Dream Vacation Club subscription
…
”
4.2
The result of the
variation to the order suggested by Mr R[....] would be that he
retains both shares of the [….] property
as well as both
shares of the Dream Vacation Club. He further seeks a deletion
of paragraph 2.4 of the order with the result
that he does not have
to transfer any percentage of his shareholding in nay company to Mrs
R[....]. The last patrimonial
effect of his suggested
variation, is that the home where Mrs R[....] is currently residing
be sold and the proceeds be retained
by him.
4.3
The variation suggested
by Mr R[....] flies in the face of the whole judgment, the
redistribution order contained therein and all
the various grounds
relating to section 7 of the aforementioned Matrimonial Causes Act
considered therein.
4.4
The justification put
forward by Mr R[....] for the radical reversal of the previous order
is Mr R[....]’s contention that
Mrs R[....] had already
received more than she was entitled to and that a redistribution had
already taken place prior to the divorce
order. Mr R[....]
includes in this “redistribution” the interim maintenance
which he had paid in terms of a previous
order of this court in terms
of Rule 43 (and in respect of which he was substantially in arrears
at the time of the divorce) as
well as the proceeds of assets which
Mrs R[....] had sold in lieu of maintenance payments to defray her
expences.
4.5
As part of the
justification for the redistribution which Mr R[....] now seeks, he
extensively referred to aspects which pre-dated
the trial and which
cannot now be revisited. Insofar as these facts had been
testified about, they had been considered by
this court, which is now
functus officio
and
precluded from reconsidering them.
4.6
What can and must be
considered, however, is that a court’s orders must be capable
of implementation. If a redistribution
order, couched in the
terms in which it has been done, cannot be implemented and the
parties seek a variation thereof, this must
be considered in order to
render the court’s initial order effective.
4.7
Considering the
counter-application then:
4.7.1
The proposed variation
regarding the sale of the [….] property is not necessary to
render the initial court order effective
and cannot be acceded to.
4.7.2
The retention of the
[….] property by Mr R[....] as his sole property implies the
acquisition by him of Mrs R[....]’s
half share. This is
also not necessary to render the initial order effective. There
is nothing stopping Mr R[....]
from purchasing Mrs R[....]’s
half share at market value. There is insufficient evidence
before court to determine
what that half share is valued at.
Until that happens, she remains a co-owner and she remains entitled
to half of the net
rental income.
4.7.3
The retention of the
Dream Vacation Club points by Mr R[....] as his sole property is not
necessary to render the initial order
effective, but it appears that
it would avoid future factual disputes regarding the payment of
levies. Mr R[....] also contends
that to remain in joint
ownership of the subscription points forces him into “a
relationship” with Mrs R[....] despite
the fact that they are
divorced. Based on this, he claims transfer of Mrs R[....]s 50%
to him. This transfer and further
cutting of the cord between
the parties appears eminently sensible and justifiable. It must
happen with the necessary quid
pro quo, however. Mrs R[....]’s
50% was valued at R44 000.00 at the time of the initial order
and no party has suggested
that this value has changed since.
This portion of the counter-application can therefore be granted
against the necessary
payment.
4.7.4
Regarding the
shareholding: as already indicated, at the time of the divorce, the
fear was whether a monetary amount determined
then, would
actually amount to 40% of the estate to be transferred. If not,
Mrs R[....] might be short-changed in the
redistribution
contemplated. The result however, of ordering a percentage of
shareholding to be transferred, has had the
unintended iniquitous
result that she has for three years seen nothing of a transfer while
Mr R[....] had retained full ownership
of his shares. The only
manner in which the deletion of paragraph 2.4 of the initial order
can be justified, is if Mr R[....]
makes payment in lieu of the
transfer of shares. While it is still correct that Mr R[....]
has to date not favoured the court
with any proper valuations or
financial statements of the companies, what one has, is his initial
evidence. During argument,
Mrs R[....]’s counsel has
indicated acquiescence with the court relying on those figures.
The evidence regarding the
value of the Mozambican companies was the
following: There were assets worth US $3.3 million and outstanding
amounts due to the
companies by the Mozambican Government of US $ 17
million. The company debt amounted to US $ 9 million.
This leaves
a net value of US $ 11.3 million. When confronted
with this in cross-examination, Mr R[....] disputed the simplicity of
the
calculations but offered nothing in the alternative save to state
that the Government debt might be uncertain. In the initial
judgment I then gave Mr R[....] a 50/50 benefit regarding the
“impairment” or provision for possible bad debt in
respect
of the R 17 million, and calculated his asset in this regard
as 45% of a net asset value of US $ 2, 5 million, i.e. US $ 1, 125
million. Mr R[....] was at the time more conservative and
estimated the company value at between US $ 750 000 and US
$1
million. One must assume through, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, that none of the feared bad debt or
impairment happened, otherwise one would have expected that to
feature in the current affidavits. There is also the concession
in Mr R[....]’s papers, that since April 2019, his financial
situation has improved. I am therefore disinclined to
accept
his lower estimates and to revert to the initial “broad”
figures of 45% of US $ 2.5 million. 40% thereof
translates to
US $ 450 000.00.
4.7.5
Payment of the above in
lieu of transfer of shares might still not achieve the “clean
break” referred to in the initial
judgment and the issue of
liability for maintenance shall, until determined as initially
envisaged, remain a live issue.
The order in respect of
maintenance therefore remains intact.
[5]
Conclusion
In addition to the findings made in paragraphs 2 and 3
above, I therefore find that the counter-application succeeds
partially in
order to render the initial order effective, but with
the necessary
quid pro quo’s
attached thereto so as not
to undermine the initial order. This means that:
5.1
Mr R[....] can become
the sole owner of the Dream Vacation Club points once he pays Mrs
R[....] R44 000 for her half share.
5.2
Mr R[....] can retain
the shareholding of the companies mentioned in the order but has to
pay Mrs R[....] US $ 450 000.00.
Having regard to the
lapse of time, this should happen within the same time-frame
contemplated in the initial order, but calculated
from date hereof.
5.3
The liability to pay
maintenance and to pay to Mrs R[....] her half of the net rental
proceeds on the [….] property, remain.
In order not to
again drift into contempt of court, Mr R[....] is expected to ensure
payment of the rental to Mrs R[....] in South
Africa.
[6]
Costs
In view of the substantial success achieved by Mrs
R[....] in the set of litigation as well as the nature of the cause
of action
in the contempt application, I determine that Mr R[....]
should pay Mrs R[....]’s costs of the applications.
[7]
Order:
1.
The application for
condonation for the late lodging of the application for leave to
appeal is dismissed.
2.
The application for
leave to appeal is dismissed.
3.
The rule nisi dated 10
July 2019 is confirmed as follows: the respondent is declared to be
in contempt of the order of this court
dated 23 February 2018 and is
hereby sentenced to imprisonment of 60 (sixty days), which sentence
is wholly suspended on condition
that he makes payment, in South
Africa, to Mrs R[....], into her bank account designated by her
attorneys on 12 March 2018 of the
amount of R 489 136,59, within
30 days of this order.
4.
Should Mr R[....] fail
in future to ensure that Mrs R[....] is quarterly paid her half share
of the net rental income from the property
known as [….],
Maputo, Mozambique (after adjustment for any taxation payable on such
rental by Mrs R[....]), she shall be
entitled to approach this court
afresh on the same papers as supplemented.
5.
The order of this court
dated 23 February 2018 is amended by the substitution of paragraphs
2.4 and 2.6 thereof with the following:
“
2.4 The Defendant
shall pay to the Plaintiff US $ 450 000,000 within 60 days from
date of this order, or within such
extension of time as this court
may on good cause grant …
2.6 The
parties shall each retain the movable property in their possession at
the time of the order as their
own save that, upon payment to the
Plaintiff of R44 000,00 the Defendant shall become the sole
owner of the Dream Vacation
Club points
”
.
6.
The date of 60 days
referred to in the amended paragraph 2.4 of the initial order shall,
for purposes of the payment mentioned therein,
be calculated form
date of this order.
7.
Mr R[....] shall pay
Mrs R[....]’s costs of these applications.
N
DAVIS
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Date of
Hearing: 1 February 2021
Judgment
delivered: 10 February 2021
APPEARANCES:
For
the Applicants:
Adv.
A M
Raymond
Attorney for
Applicants:
Macintosh Cross & Farquharson, Pretoria
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
H F Geyer
Attorney
for Respondent: Grohovaz
Attorneys Incorporated, Pretoria