About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Limpopo High Court, Polokwane
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Limpopo High Court, Polokwane
>>
2021
>>
[2021] ZALMPPHC 85
|
|
M.F.K v S.C.N (HCA26/2020) [2021] ZALMPPHC 85 (25 November 2021)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED
CASE
NO: HCA26/2020
In the matter
between:
M[....]
F[....] K[....]
APPELLANT
And
S....]
C[....] N[....]
RESPONDENT
JUDGEMENT
KGANYAGO
J
[1]
The appellant and respondent were married to each other by customary
union on 15
th
December 2012. This was the appellant’s
second marriage. At the time of the marriage of the two parties, the
respondent had
two children from her previous relationship. There are
no children born of the marriage between the appellant and
respondent.
[2]
On 4
th
October 2017 the respondent instituted a
divorce action against the appellant seeking (a) a decree of divorce;
(b) division of
the joint estate; (c) that 50% of the pension
interest due or assigned to the appellant up to the date of divorce
be paid to the
respondent within 30 days after the court grants a
decree of divorce; (d) that an endorsement be made on the records of
the relevant
pension fund by the appellant; (e) and that the
Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) be ordered to pay an amount
equal to 50%
of the value as on date of divorce to the appellant
within 30 days after the date on which the final decree of
divorce was
granted.
[3]
The appellant had defended the plaintiff’s action, and had also
filed a counterclaim to the respondent’s
particulars of claim.
In his counterclaim the appellant is seeking orders (a) that the
decree of divorce be granted; (b) that the
patrimonial benefits of
the marriage in community of property be forfeited by the respondent
in favour of the appellant to wit:
(i) the appellant’s interest
in GEPF; (ii) the immovable property known as erf [….],
Polokwane; and (iii) the immovable
property known as [….],
Polokwane.
[4]
The matter came before Ngobeni JT in the regional court Polokwane who
granted the following orders:
(a) dissolved the bonds of marriage
subsisting between the appellant and respondent; (b) equal division
of the movable and immovable
assets of the joint estate which
includes the immovable assets situated at [….], Polokwane and
[…..], Polokwane;
(c) that GEPF pay 50% of the pension
interest of the appellant calculated from date of marriage being the
15
th
December 2012 to 26
th
October 2020 within
sixty days of the date of divorce; (d) no order as to spousal
maintenance; (e) that if the parties are unable
to divide their joint
estate with the assistance of their legal representatives, an
application for appointment of a liquidator
be brought.
[5]
The appellant is appealing against the judgment and orders (b), (c)
and (e) granted by the regional
magistrate. Order (b) provides for
equal division of both immovable and movable assets; order (c)
provides for partial forfeiture
the pension interest by the
respondent; and order (e) provides for appointment of a liquidator in
case the parties are unable to
agree on the division of their joint
estate. The respondent had also lodged a cross appeal against the
judgment and order (c).
[6]
The appellant’s grounds of the appeal are that the respondent
will be unduly benefited if
a forfeiture order is not made in his
favour due to the significant larger contribution made by him,
compared to the respondent,
with respect to the assets brought into
marriage and accumulated during its short existence. According to the
appellant, the court
a quo
should have ordered a forfeiture of
the two immovable properties the appellant brought into the joint
estate as well as the respondent’s
50% share in the appellant’s
pension interest. The respondent’s ground for her cross appeal
is that the court
a quo
erred in making a partial forfeiture
of the appellant’s pension interest, but should instead have
made an order that she
share the appellant’s pension interest
from date of contribution to GEPF.
[7]
The facts to this case are briefly as follows. When the appellant and
respondent married each
other, the respondent was employed as a human
resource officer at Medi Clinic Tzaneen which employment was
terminated during December
2013 and the respondent was paid R168
074.00. The assets which the respondent brought into their marriage
were a Nissan Livinia
motor vehicle which she was still paying; her
pension benefit of R168 074.00; and furniture.
[8]
The appellant bought into their marriage the immovable property
situated at [….], Polokwane
valued at R400 000.00 as at date
of divorce; the vacant stand situated at [….], Polokwane which
he bought during 2007 for
R285 285.00; his pension interest at GEPF
with resignation value of R2 829 166.00 at the time of trial; two
vehicles to wit a Toyota
and Audi; furniture and his savings.
[9]
During March 2013, the appellant and the respondent started building
their house [….], Polokwane.
According to the appellant, he
was using his savings to build the house, and during December 2013 he
took a second bond over the
Shaluka Plains property of R344 000.00
which money he used to build the house in Serala View. Further that
he paid the said bond
throughout their marriage.
[10]
On 29
th
January 2014 the respondent registered her own
company which won a R201 000.00 tender at Correctional Services
Polokwane. From
1
st
November 2014 to 31
st
May
2017 the respondent was employed at [….] in Pretoria. During
2015 the parties moved to their house in [….]. On
31
st
March 2016 the parties concluded an ante-nuptial contract in terms of
which the accrual system was excluded which ante-nuptial
contract was
registered on 22
nd
April 2016. However, their marital
regime was never changed and it remained a marriage in community of
property. On 31
st
May 2017 the respondent was retrenched
from her employment and was paid a retrenchment package of R61
031.25. The respondent vacated
their matrimonial home on 3
rd
September 2017, and instituted divorce proceedings on 4
th
October 2017.
[11]
The appellant had submitted that the respondent’s contribution
to [….] property is next to nothing,
whilst she did not
contribute anything towards the [….] property. It is therefore
the appellant’s submission that
if the court compares the
assets that the appellant had brought into the marriage with the
assets brought by the respondent, it
is clear that the respondent
will unduly benefit from the marriage in community of property if
forfeiture order is not made.
[12]
The respondent’s version is that when she and appellant got
married, she was employed at Tzaneen
Medi Clinic. She was dismissed
by the Medi Clinic during October 2013 wherein she referred her
dismissal dispute to the CCMA. She
won her dismissal dispute at the
CCMA and was given an option to either return to work or to take the
package. The appellant advised
and encouraged the respondent to take
the package of which she did. On receipt of the payment of her
package, the respondent and
the appellant agreed that the respondent
will continue to pay the instalment of her car, buy groceries and
also assist in buying
building materials for the house that they have
started building at [….] during March 2013. According to the
respondent,
the people who were building their house in [….]
were paid by cash and on payment day the appellant will call her, and
she
would give the appellant money for the builders, and sometimes
she will deposit it into the appellant’s credit card.
[13]
According to the respondent her relationship with the appellant
started to deteriorate 5
th
February 2016 after the passing
of the first wife of the appellant’s father. The respondent saw
the appellant’s ex-wife
assisting with the funeral
arrangements, and when she reported that to the appellant, the
appellant told her that there was nothing
wrong with that. That the
appellant started to come home after midnight, and when he arrives,
he would wake up the respondent and
started insulting her. That led
to the respondent leaving their common home and going back to her
parental home.
[14]
The respondent had submitted that no other factors, other those
provided for in section 9(1) should be taken
into account in
determining whether forfeiture should be ordered or not. Further that
the court
a quo
had used wrong facts in finding that the
appellant had already shared his pension interest with his ex-wife,
and that if indeed
the appellant had already shared his pension
interest with his ex-wife, the court
a quo
should have made an
order for 50% of the pension interest minus the amount already paid
to the ex-wife.
[15]
The court
a quo
in ordering equal share of both movable and
immovable assets, found that a marriage in community of property is a
universal economic
partnership of the spouses, and that all their
assets and liabilities are merged in a joint estate, in which both
spouses, irrespective
of the value of their financial contributions,
hold equal shares. Even though the court
a quo
found that the
marriage of the parties was for short duration, held that there was
no evidence that the respondent entered into
the marriage with the
appellant to just benefit, or to just get a share from the property
of the appellant. Further that there
is no evidence that when the
respondent was away from the common home for work purposes, she
committed acts of substantial misconduct
which harmed their joint
estate.
[16]
The court
a quo
accepted that the appellant had contributed
more in building the house at [….], but that did not
necessarily mean that the
respondent must not benefit because of
that. With regard to [….] property, the court
a quo
found that after the parties have moved into the [….]
property, they rented that property and the rental paid contributed
towards the bond repayment of that property. The court
a quo
found that both parties were entitled to equal shares from the
proceeds from the two properties, as there was no benefit above
the
ordinary that was shown to exist.
[17]
With regard to the appellant’s pension interest, the court
a
quo
found that the appellant was a contributor to GEPF even
during the subsistence of his marriage with his ex-wife. That the
undisputed
evidence is that at the time of divorce to his ex-wife, in
the distribution of their joint estate, that pension interest was
also
considered and they reached a settlement concerning division of
their joint estate. The court
a quo
found that it will be
inappropriate for it to subject that portion of the pension interest
of the appellant to another distribution.
The court
a quo
concluded that it will be appropriate if the respondent must only
share in the pension interest of the appellant from the date
of their
marriage to date of divorce.
[18]
The appellant is seeking total forfeiture arising from the marriage
in community of property by the respondent,
whilst the respondent is
seeking equal division of the assets of the joint estate including
the appellant’s pension interest
held at GEPF. This court is
called upon to determine whether the court
a quo
was correct
in awarding equal division of the joint estate on the parties movable
and immovable assets instead of a forfeiture
by the respondent; the
appointment of a liquidator in case the parties were unable to divide
the assets of their joint estate,
and whether the court
a quo
had exercised its discretion correctly in making an order of partial
forfeiture of the respondent’s share in the appellant’s
pension interest.
[19]
It is trite that the granting of a forfeiture order is in the
discretion of the court and the test is whether
one party will be
unduly benefited if such an order is not made. In terms of section
9(1) of the
Divorce
Act
[1]
,
the factors which a court must consider in exercising its discretion
are (i) the duration of the marriage or civil union; (ii)
the
circumstances that gave rise to the break-down of the marriage or
civil union; and (iii) any substantial misconduct on the
part of
either of the parties.
[20]
In
Botha
v Botha
[2]
van Heerden JA said:
“
The
three factors governing the value judgment to be made by the trial
Court in terms of s 9(1) thus fall within a relatively narrow
ambit:
they are limited to (a) duration of the marriage; (b) the
circumstances which gave rise to the breakdown thereof; and (c)
any
substantial misconduct on the part of either of the parties.
Conspicuously absent from s 9 is a catch-all phrase, permitting
the
Court, in addition to the factors listed, to have regard to ‘any
other factor’. (Compare, in this regard, the wording
of s 7(2)
of the Divorce Act dealing with the maintenance orders upon divorce
which, apart from the fact that the list of relevant
factors is
significantly longer, also entitles the Court to have regard to ‘any
other factor which in the opinion of the
Court should be taken into
account’. So too, in terms of s 7(5), the list of the factors
which must be taken into account
by a Court in the determination of
which assets should be transferred by one spouse to the other upon
divorce, when the circumstances
set out in ss 7(3) and (4) justify
the making of which such a ‘redistribution order’, also
expressly includes ‘any
other factor which should in the
opinion of the Court be taken into account’.) The trial court
may therefore not have regard
to any other factors other than those
listed in s 9(1) in determining whether or not the spouse against
whom the forfeiture order
is claimed will, in relation to the other
spouse, be unduly benefited if such order is not made.”
[21]
It is trite that it is not a requirement that all the three listed
factors should be cumulatively present
before a forfeiture order is
granted. The appellant is relying on the duration of the marriage,
and has submitted that the respondent
will be unduly benefited if a
forfeiture order is not made in his favour due to the significant
larger contribution made by him,
with regard to the assets he brought
into marriage and those accumulated during its short existence,
compared to that of the respondent.
[22]
It is not in dispute that the marriage between the appellant and
respondent was for a short duration of time
and that the appellant
had contributed more towards their joint estate than the respondent.
In
Wijker
v Wijker
[3]
van Coller AJA said:
“
The
only remaining factor which persuaded the Court a quo to grant the
forfeiture order is that it was considered unfair that the
appellant
should share in the company and its assets while he had made hardly
any contribution towards its management, administration
and profit
making. The finding that the appellant would be unduly benefited if a
forfeiture order was not made, was therefore based
on a principle of
fairness. It seems to me that the learned trial Judge, in adopting
this approach, lost sight of what a marriage
in community of property
really entails. HR Hahlo in The
South African
Husband and Wife
5
th
ed at 157-8 describes community of property as follows:
‘
Community
of property is a universal economic partnership of the spouses. All
their assets and liabilities are merged in a joint
estate, in which
both spouses, irrespective of the value of their financial
contributions, held equal shares.’
The fact that the
appellant is entitled to share in the business established by the
respondent is a consequence of their marriage
in community of
property. In making a value judgment this equitable principle applied
by the Court
a quo
is
not justified. Not only is it contrary to the basic concept of
community of property, but there is no provision in the section
for
the application of such a principle. Even if it is assumed that the
appellant made no contribution to the success of the business
and
that the benefit which he will receive will be a substantial one, it
does not necessarily follow that he will be unduly benefited.
Compare
Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht
1989 (1) SA 597
(C) at 601F-G. The benefit that will be received
cannot be viewed in isolation, but in order to determine whether a
party will
be unduly benefited the Court must have regard to the
factors mentioned in the section. In my judgment the approach adopted
by
the Court
a quo
in
concluding that the appellant will be unduly benefited should a
forfeiture order not be granted was clearly wrong.”
[23]
It is highly unlikely that the parties in a marriage in community of
property will be able to contribute
equally towards their common
estate. Each party will contribute according to his/her financial
means. The one who is financially
well off will always contribute
more. The parties’ contribution towards their common estate
will therefore not on its own
be determining factor to grant a
forfeiture order. There must be other factors associated with that
that will make the other party
to unduly benefit. The determining
factor is whether a party will unduly benefit, and not that he/she
should not benefit.
[24]
The appellant was employed in a position that made him to earn more
that the respondent. When the appellant
and the respondent got
married to each other, the respondent was employed at Tzaneen Medi
Clinic which was a position not equivalent
to that of the appellant.
There is no evidence that when the parties married each other, they
were married for positions which
they held at their workplace or in
society. It therefore follows that since the appellant was the one
with a better financial muscle
and have also acquired more before
their marriage will contribute more. There is no evidence that the
respondent when she entered
into the marriage with the appellant, her
intention was to benefit from the appellant. The intention of both
parties was to see
their marriage work and growing old together.
[25]
After the respondent was dismissed from her employment at Tzaneen
Medi Clinic, she won her unfair dismissal
case at the CCMA and was
given the option for reinstatement or taking a package and leave her
employment. The appellant is the
one who encouraged the respondent to
take a package and leave her employment at Tzaneen Medi Clinic. When
the appellant encouraged
the respondent to that, he was quite aware
that the respondent had no other alternative employment and was to
stay at home and
he will be the one who will be taking care of her
and all the household necessities. By leaving her employment, the
respondent
was paid her pension benefit. The appellant was still
employed growing his pension interest whilst the respondent could no
longer
grow her pension interest as a result of the appellant’s
encouragement. By encouraging the respondent to take a package and
leave her employment, the appellant acknowledged that despite been
unemployed, the respondent will in kind also contribute towards
their
common estate.
[26]
The merge pension benefit which Medi Clinic had paid the respondent
was a contribution which the respondent
had brought into the common
estate which was commensurate with the respondent’s financial
muscle. That was merged with what
the appellant had brought into the
marriage to form a universal economic partnership of the parties.
Minimal as the respondent’s
pension interest was, part of it
was used to build the house in Serala View. Since the respondent was
by then out of employment,
it would not have been easy for her to
obtain a loan to contribute in building the Serala View house at a
reputable institution,
and what she had contributed from her pension
benefit was what she could afford. Her contribution had also enhanced
the parties’
common estate.
[27]
After the parties’ have moved into the Serala View property,
they let out the Shaluka Plains property
and the rental money was
used to service its bond. The parties were now jointly entitled to
the proceeds from renting out the property,
and by using that rental
money to pay the bond, they were jointly enhancing their common
estate. That is another form of contribution
by the respondent
towards their common estate.
[28]
It is not in dispute that before the appellant was married to the
respondent, had divorced. His pension interest
had also formed part
of the joint estate with his ex-wife. The court
a quo
took
into consideration that the appellant’s pension interest had
already being subjected to division with his ex-wife. Basically
what
this entails is that the respondent had taken over from where the
ex-wife had left. I don’t find any reason to fault
that
approach, since by paying his ex-wife, a debt against the appellant’s
pension interest was created, and will only be
seen at the time when
the appellant is paid his pension interest.
[29]
Even though the marriage of the parties was for short duration, the
court
a quo
had considered what both parties have brought into
their marriage and what they contributed during the subsistence of
their marriage
and decided to make an order for equal division of all
the movable and immovable assets of the parties’ joint estate.
With
to the appellant’s pension interest, the court
a quo
took into consideration that it had already been subjected to
division with the appellant’s ex-wife, and that it had left
a
hole in the appellant’s pension interest which the appellant
will feel when the pension interest was paid. In my view,
there is
nothing to fault the court
a quo’s
approach in making an
order of equal division of the parties’ movables and immovable
assets. The court
a quo
had also properly exercised its
discretion in making a partial forfeiture order in relation to the
respondent’s share of
the appellant’s pension interest.
[30]
Turning to the appointment of a liquidator, it is always in the
interest of the parties that if they are
unable to share the joint
estate on their own, or through the assistance of their legal
representative, a liquidator be appointed.
I don’t find
anything wrong with the court
a quo
making this order. It
follows that the appellant’s appeal and respondent’s
cross appeal stands to fail. Neither party
was successful in their
appeal and it will be appropriate if each party pays his/her own
costs
[31]
In the result I make the following order:
31.1
Both appeal and cross appeal are dismissed.
31.2
Each party to pay his/her own costs
KGANYAGO J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA,
LIMPOPO DIVISION
,
POLOKWANE
I
AGREE
KGOMO
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA,
LIMPOPO DIVISION, POLOKWANE
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the appellant
: MC DE Klerk
Instructed
by
: DDKK Attorneys Inc
Counsel
for the respondent
: NHK
Mabapa
Instructed
by
: Keneilwe Mabapa Inc
Date
heard
: 28
th
August 2021
Electronically
circulated on
: 25
th
November 2021
[1]
70 of
1979
[2]
[2006] ZASCA 6
;
2006
(4) SA 144
(SCA) at para 8
[3]
1993
(4) SA 720
(A) at 731C-H