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[2021] ZALMPPHC 27
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Notley v Great North Transport (Pty) Ltd (HCAA10/2020) [2021] ZALMPPHC 27 (1 June 2021)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
REPORTABLE:
NO/
YES
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO/
YES
REVISED.
1/06/2021
CASE
NO: HCAA10/2020
In
the matter between
LIONEL
MARWOOD NOTLEY
APPELLANT
AND
GREAT
NORTH TRANSPORT (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
KGANYAGO
J.
[1]
The appellant was employed by the respondent as a depot manager. The
appellant was dismissed by
the respondent on 30
th
November
2012 following a disciplinary hearing. The appellant referred his
dispute to the CCMA. The CCMA found in favour of the
appellant and
ordered the respondent to reinstate the appellant in the position he
occupied before his dismissal without any loss
of benefits; that the
respondent pay the appellant the sum of R204 840-40 as back-pay;
and that the appellant to resume his
duties on 15
th
May
2013 and the respondent to allow him to do so.
[2]
The respondent was dissatisfied with the outcome of the arbitration
award and it decided to take that
award on review to the Labour
Court. The appellant seeing that the respondent was not complying
with the arbitration award also
referred the matter to the Labour
Court in order to declare the award an order of court. On 4
th
February 2016 under the appellant’s matter at the Labour Court,
the parties settled their dispute wherein it was agreed that
the
respondent will withdraw its review application; that the respondent
will reinstate the appellant in his former position of
depot manager
on terms that shall not be less favourable than those he enjoyed at
the time of his dismissal in November 2012; that
the appellant to
report for duty at the respondent’s head office in Polokwane on
Monday 8
th
February 2016 at 8h00; that the respondent to
pay the appellant the sum of R204 840.40 being back-pay as
ordered by the CCMA,
and R49 160-00 being interest on back-pay
calculated at 9% per annum from 15 May 2013 to 31
st
January 2016; and that the respondent pay contribution towards costs
in the amount of R25 000-00. The said settlement agreement
was
by consent made an order of court. The respondent reinstated the
appellant and also paid the appellant as per the court order.
[3]
The appellant is of the view that the respondent is also liable to
pay him salary and benefits for the
period from the date of the CCMA
award up to and including the date of the implementation of the
award, which according to the
appellant amounted to R1 777 887.57.
The parties could not reach any agreement in relation to the
appellant’s alleged
claim. That led to the appellant
instituting action against the respondent claiming that the
respondent is liable to him for that
amount.
[4]
The respondent has defended the appellant’s action. In its plea
the respondent has raised two
special pleas. The first being that of
non-compliance with section 3(1) of the Institution of Legal
Proceedings Against Organs
of State Act 40 of 2002, and the second
being that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain labour
disputes. However, the
respondent abandoned both special pleas at the
commencement of the trial in the court a quo.
[5]
The respondent in its plea on the merits has denied the appellant’s
claim. The respondent has
further pleaded that the order of the
Labour Court was in full and final settlement of the dispute, and
therefore the appellant
was not entitled to any other amount from the
respondent as the reinstatement award or order cannot extend to a
date beyond the
date of the order, nor can it serve to form a basis
of a common law contractual entitlement.
[6]
At the commencement of the trial, merits and quantum were separated.
The court a quo made a ruling that
the onus rested on the respondent
to prove that the settlement agreement that was made an order of
court was in full and final
settlement of the dispute.
[7]
The respondent called its first witness Mack Ntuli. He testified that
he is employed by the respondent
as human resources manager. That the
records of the respondent are kept at the human resources department.
They are having the
records of the appellant. According to their
records, the appellant was dismissed on 30
th
November
2012. After his dismissal he referred his dispute to the CCMA. The
CCMA ordered that the appellant be reinstated. The
respondent took
that award on review. That as per the CCMA award, the appellant was
supposed to report for duty on 15
th
May 2013, but he did
not report as he never saw the appellant. However, the witness went
further and stated that it was possible
that the appellant might have
reported for duty on 15
th
May 2013 by going to the CEO’s
office without his knowledge. The witness stated that the appellant
has never reported to
him that he was coming back to work.
[8]
According to the witness, the appellant reported for duty on 8
th
February 2016 after the parties have reached a settlement agreement.
The witness stated that after the appellant was dismissed
by the
respondent, the appellant was employed at Lowveld Bus Services from
1
st
October 2013 to 30
th
September 2015, and
could therefore not being able to render his services with the
respondent. The witness stated that he was not
sure whether the
previous employment terms before the dismissal of the appellant were
still the same with that after his reinstatement,
however, he thought
that they were still the same. The witness further stated that the
settlement agreement that was made an order
of court was in full and
final settlement of the dispute.
[9]
The witness was cross examined and he conceded that one Jabulani was
also a human resources manager
employed by the respondent. When it
was put to the witness that on 15
th
May 2013 the appellant
reported for duty to Jabulani who informed the appellant that he will
not report for duty as they have commenced
with the review
application, the witness stated that he was not aware of that. The
witness further stated that the appellant could
have been informed
that the matter has been taken on review as there were company
secretary and IR manager who were dealing with
that matter, and that
these two will only update them. The witness conceded that he was not
present at the Labour Court when the
matter was settled, and he can
therefore not tell what the parties have discussed and negotiated
that the led to the matter being
settled.
[10]
Mr David Mokoena testified as the respondent’s second witness.
He testified that the respondent had
employed him as human resources
manager. The respondent dismissed him on 21
st
December
2012. He appealed his dismissal and was not successful, and he then
referred his matter to the CCMA. He was successful
at the CCMA
wherein the respondent was ordered to reinstate him. When he reported
for duty based on the CCMA award, he was given
a letter by the
respondent informing him that the CCMA award has been taken on review
to the Labour Court. At the Labour Court
the matter was referred back
to the CCMA to be heard afresh.
[11]
At the CCMA when the matter was supposed to be heard afresh, the
parties settled the dispute on the basis
that he was reinstated, and
should report for duty on 1
st
June 2017. The offer of
settlement that was made at the CCMA was in full and final settlement
of his dispute. On 1
st
June 2017 he reported for duty to
Jabulani Shingange the human resources manager. The witness stated
that if an employee was supposed
to report for duty but was prevented
do so by the respondent, the respondent will instruct the human
resources department to notify
that employee in writing and also to
give reasons why he/she was prevented from reporting for duty.
[12]
Under cross examination the witness conceded that he did not have any
knowledge of the internal happenings
at the respondent workplace
between December 2012 and June 2017. The witness further conceded
that in relation to the appellant’s
case, he had no knowledge
whether a letter was written to the appellant, or whether the
appellant had pitched up for work. That
concluded the evidence for
the respondent and it closed its case.
[13]
The appellant testified under oath. He testified that he was seeking
payment of back-pay for the period between
his CCMA award and when he
was finally reinstated. That according to the CCMA award, he was
supposed to report for duty on 15
th
May 2013. On that
particular day, he reported for duty at the respondent’s head
office to Mr Jabu Shingange. When he reported
for duty, Jabu told him
to go back home as they have taken the award on review, and that they
will let him know should they wish
him to come back to work. He did
not hear anything from the respondent and about two to three months
later he went back to the
respondent’s workplace. On arrival he
was told the same thing that they have taken the award on review and
that they will
let him know should they wish him to come to work.
[14]
He got employed at Lowveld Bus Services. Whilst employed at Lowveld
Bus Services, he got a telephone call
from the CEO of the respondent.
The CEO made an offer to him, which he turned down. The CEO told him
that she will contact him,
but she never did that.
[15]
At the Labour Court he reached an agreement with the respondent
wherein the respondent agreed to reinstate
him, but they could not
agree on the issue of back-pay. The Judge at the Labour Court told
them that the Labour Court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate a
dispute relating to back-pay. That the Judge further told them that
with regard to back-pay, they
must go back to the company and
negotiate it on a win-win situation, and if they are unable to agree,
he may institute a civil
claim against the respondent. The award of
the CCMA and wasted costs on attorney and client was made an order of
court. However,
that order of court was not in full and final
settlement of the dispute between the parties as the Judge advised
them to go back
to the company to negotiate the issue of back-pay on
a win-win situation.
[16]
The appellant was cross examined, and he stated that for the first
time when he reported for duty after the
CCMA award, he reported to
Jabu Shingange, and for the second time to the acting CEO Mr
Hlongwane. The appellant stated that when
he reported for duty, he
was prepared to immediately start working. The appellant conceded
that part of the order of the Labour
Court was that the respondent
was withdrawing its review application. The appellant further
conceded that after he was reinstated
as per the order of the Labour
Court, he wrote a letter to the respondent seeking advanced payment
of R60 000.00, and in that
letter he further wrote “
I
accepted the reinstatement offer that was made by the court on 4
th
February 2016”
. The appellant further stated that at
that stage he accepted reinstatement to get back to work, and from
there he would have started
negotiations as advised by the Judge as
the correct procedure to follow. That concluded the evidence of the
appellant and he closed
his case.
[17]
Muller ADJP dismissed the appellant’s claim on the basis that
the settlement confirms that the parties
were in agreement that the
appellant’s contract should be reinstated from 8
th
February and not from the date of the award made by the CCMA. The
court a quo further held that the Labour Court order superseded
the
CCMA award by agreement between the parties, and that the parties
were in agreement that the contract that came to an end on
the date
of the appellant dismissal had not been reinstated. The appellant has
appealed against the judgment and order of Muller
ADJP. The appeal is
with the leave of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
[18]
This appeal concerns the proper interpretation of the court order
granted by the Labour Court on 4
th
February 2016. The
question is whether that court order has substituted the award of the
CCMA that was issued on 22
nd
April 2013, and also whether
it was in full and final settlement of the dispute between the
parties.
[19]
The proper approach in the interpretation of a court order has been
set out in
Eke
v Parsons
[1]
in which it was held:
“
Once a settlement
agreement has been made an order of court, it is an order like any
other. It will be interpreted like all court
orders. Here is
well-established test on the interpretation of court orders:
‘
The starting point
is to determine the manifest purpose of the order. In interpreting a
judgment or order, the court’s intention
is to be ascertained
primarily from the language of the judgment or order in accordance
with the usual well-known rules relating
to the interpretation of
documents. As in the case of a document, the judgment or order and
the court’s reasons for giving
it must be read as a whole in
order to ascertain its intention.’
[20]
In
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2]
Wallis
JA said:
“
Interpretation is
the process of attributing meaning of words used in a document, be it
legislation, some other statutory instrument,
or contract, having
regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or
provisions in the light of the document
as a whole and the
circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the
nature of the document, consideration must
be given to the language
used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the
context in which the provision appears;
the apparent purpose to which
it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its
production. Where more than one
meaning is possible each possibility
must be weighed in the light of all factors. The process is
objective, not subjective. A sensible
meaning is preferred to one
that leads to insensible or unbusiness-like results or undermines the
apparent purpose of the document.
Judges must be alert to, and guard
against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable
and sensible or businesslike
for the words actually used. To do so in
regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide
between interpretation
and legislation; in a contractual context it
is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in fact
made. The ‘inevitable
point of departure is the language of the
provision itself’, read in context and having regard to the
purpose of the provision
and the background to the preparation and
production of the document.”
[21]
It is common cause that after the appellant was dismissed by the
respondent on 30
th
November 2012, he referred his dispute
to CCMA wherein it was arbitrated by the CCMA Commissioner. The award
was in favour of the
appellant, and the respondent was ordered to
reinstate the appellant in the same position he was before his
dismissal without any
loss of benefits. The respondent was further
ordered to pay the appellant the sum of R204 840-40 as back-pay.
The appellant
was supposed to resume his duties on 15
th
May 2013 and the respondent was to allow the appellant to do so.
[22]
The respondent took that award on review, and that resulted in the
appellant not resuming his duties as per the
award. In terms of
section 145(7) of the
Labour
Relations Act
[3]
(LRA)
,
the institution of the review proceedings does not suspend the
operation of an arbitration award. Seeing that the respondent was
not
complying with the award, the appellant instituted an application in
the Labour Court in order to enforce that award. The appellant’s
application was set down for the 4
th
February 2016. On that date the parties reached an agreement which by
consent was made an order of court.
[23]
The court a quo found that this order of the Labour Court has
superseded the CCMA award and that the contract that
came to an end
when the appellant was dismissed had not been reinstated. The
respondent has pleaded that the order of the Labour
Court was in full
and final settlement of the dispute. However, the two witnesses which
the respondent has called to testify, the
court a quo found that they
were not really of assistant to the court. That makes the version of
the appellant to remain unchallenged.
The version of the appellant
was that the Judge at the Labour Court, told them that with regard to
the issue of back-pay for the
period May 2013 and February 2016 the
parties must go back and negotiate at the company, and if they are
unable to settle, the
appellant reserves his right to institute a
civil claim against the respondent.
[24]
It was the appellant contention that after he succeeded at the CCMA,
he twice went to the respondent to tender
his services as per the
CCMA award but was prevented from doing so by the respondent, as the
respondent had told him that they
have taken his award on review.
This version was not challenged. The court quo found that if the
appellant has tendered his services
and the respondent had refused
him an opportunity to work, that amounted to a wrongful repudiation
of the contract which amounts
to a dismissal. When arriving at that
conclusion, the court a quo has overlooked that by taking the
arbitration award on review,
the respondent was exercising its
statutory right provided for in the LRA. The respondent’s
refusal to permit the appellant
to resume duties as per the CCMA
award whilst the review application was pending did not amount to a
repudiation of the contract
as a live dispute was still pending.
[25]
The court a quo also found that when the appellant was finally
reinstated on 8
th
February 2016, his employment contract prior to his dismissal was no
longer in existence. The remedies provided for in the LRA
for unfair
dismissal are reinstatement, re-employment or compensation. For
reinstatement you are placed in the same position you
were prior to
your dismissal. Re-employment you are employed afresh which might be
on new terms and conditions. Compensation the
term is
self-explanatory. With regard to the meaning of reinstatement, the
court a quo correctly referred to the case of
Equity
Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
[4]
in which it was held:
“
The ordinary
meaning of the word ‘reinstate’ is to put the employee
back into the same job or position he or she occupied
before the
dismissal, on the same terms and conditions. Reinstatement is the
primary statutory remedy in unfair dismissal disputes.
It is aimed at
placing an employee in the position he or she would have been but for
the unfair dismissal. It safeguards workers’
employment by
restoring the employment. Differently put, if employees are
reinstated they resume employment on the same terms and
conditions
that prevailed at the time of their dismissal. As the language of s
193(1)(a) indicates, the extent of restrospectivity
is dependent upon
the exercise of a discretion by the court or arbitrator. The only
limitation in this regard is that the reinstatement
cannot be fixed
at a date earlier than the actual date of the dismissal. The court or
arbitrator may thus decide the date from
which the reinstatement will
run, but may not order reinstatement from a date earlier than the
date of dismissal. The ordinary
meaning of the word ‘reinstate’
means that the reinstatement will not run from a date after the
arbitration award.
Ordinarily then, if a Commissioner of the CCMA
order reinstatement of an employee that reinstatement will operate
from the date
of the award of the CCMA, unless the Commissioner
decides to render the reinstatement retrospective. The fact that the
employee
has been without income during the period since his or her
dismissal must, among other things, be taken into account in the
exercise
of the discretion, given that the employee’s having
been without income for that period was a direct result of the
employer’s
conduct in dismissing him or her unfairly.”
[26]
In terms of the consent order obtained at the Labour Court, the first
order is that the respondent will withdraw
its review application.
The respondent’s review application was never heard, and the
award rendered by the Commissioner of
the CCMA on 22
nd
April 2013 was at no stage set aside. When the respondent withdrew
its review application on 4
th
February 2016, the award
remained extant. The Labour Court order did not set aside the award
or substitute it. The award remained
valid and enforceable.
[27]
As per the award of 22
nd
April 2013, the appellant was
supposed to report for duty on 15
th
May 2013. That date
had passed and was therefore impossible for the appellant to report
for duty as per the date of the CCMA award.
According to the Labour
Court order, the appellant was supposed to report for duty on 8
th
February 2016. The Labour Court order also dealt with interest
accrued to the back-pay awarded by the CCMA, that the appellant’s
reinstatement was on the same terms prior to dismissal, contribution
towards costs, when and where payment for back-pay should
be made.
[28]
In implementing the order of 4
th
February 2016, the
respondent issued the appellant with an appointment letter dated 8
th
February 2016. In that letter the appellant was notified that he was
reinstated with effect from 8
th
February 2016. The
appellant and respondent have also signed a new employment agreement
on 8
th
February 2016 which also state that the appellant
was reinstated with effect from 8
th
February 2016.
[29]
The reasoning of the court a quo in dismissing the appellant’s
claim was that the parties have agreed at
the Labour Court that the
appellant’s contract be reinstated with effect from 8
th
February 2016, and that the reinstatement was not retrospective. The
court a quo also held that the appellant has failed to establish
a
properly completed contractual claim. The court a quo further held
that reinstatement cannot serve as a common law contractual
entitlement. What the court a quo overlooked was that the award of
the CCMA was never set aside, the parties did not abandon it,
and it
remained valid and enforceable. The court a quo also overlooked that
the Labour Court order state that the appellant was
reinstated to his
former position on terms that shall not be less favourable than those
he enjoyed at the time of his dismissal
on November 2012. As per the
Labour Court order, the 8
th
February 2016 was the date on
which the appellant was supposed to report for duty, and not the
reinstatement date.
[30]
The appellant was not even supposed to have signed a new employment
contract, and it was also unnecessary for the
respondent to issue the
appellant with a new appointment letter. The date of the 8
th
February 2016 on both the new employment contract and new appointment
letter as the date of reinstatement of the appellant is misleading
as
it was not what the Labour Court order has stated. In Equity Aviation
Services case supra, the court held that the ordinary
meaning of the
word “reinstate” means that the reinstatement will not
run from a date after the arbitration award.
The court Equity
Aviation Services case further held that ordinarily then, if a
Commissioner of the CCMA order reinstatement of
an employee that
reinstatement will operate from the date of the award of the CCMA,
unless the Commissioner decides to render reinstatement
retrospectively.
[31]
In the case at hand the CCMA Commissioner has already awarded the
appellant full back-pay, which literally mean
that the reinstatement
of the appellant was retrospective. It can therefore not be correct
that the appellant was reinstated from
the 8
th
February
2016 as that is a date after the award. That would be contrary to the
principle set out in the Equity Aviation Services
case which held
that reinstatement will not run from a date after the award. In my
view the court a quo erred in holding that the
appellant’s
reinstatement was not retrospective and that the order of the Labour
Court stated that the appellant will be
reinstated at a future date
which is the 8
th
February 2016.
[32]
The award state that the appellant is reinstated in the position he
was before his dismissal without any loss of
benefits. The Labour
Court order state that the appellant be reinstated on terms that
shall not be less favourable than those he
enjoyed at the time of his
dismissal in November 2012. In my view, the award and the Labour
Court order refer to one and the same
thing. What it entails is that
the appellant must not be placed in less favourable terms than the
one he enjoyed prior to his dismissal.
That will entail that if
during the period which the appellant was out of work, conditions of
service were improved, or there were
salary increment for other
employees, the appellant will also be entitled to benefit from that
despite his dismissal. It was not
through his fault that he was not
at work. In my view, the order of the Labour Court was amplifying the
CCMA award, and not substituting
it.
[32]
As held in Equity Aviation Services case supra, reinstatement is
aimed at placing an employee in the position he
or she would have
been but for the unfair dismissal. The appellant because of the
unfair dismissal did not earn salary, or the
equivalent he would have
earned from the respondent as at some stage he was employed at
Lowveld Bus Services. The court order,
appointment letter and
employment contract does not state that the appellant reinstatement
was without back-pay. In Natal Joint
Pension Fund case supra, it was
held that where more than one meaning is possible, each possibility
must be weighed in the light
of all factors. In that case Judges were
warned to be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to
substitute what they regard
as reasonable and sensible or
businesslike for the words actually used. In the appellant’s
case, if it were the parties’
intention that the appellant’s
reinstatement was without back-pay for the period after the award
whilst the respondent was
still exercising its right of review, they
would have stated so in the draft order of 4
th
February
2016. The court a quo was reading into the Labour Court order what
was never agreed by the parties at the Labour Court
when it held that
the appellant’s reinstatement was not retrospective and that
the parties agreed that the appellant will
be reinstated from 8
th
February 2016. The Labour Court order did not state that the
appellant was reinstated with effect from 8
th
February
2016, but has stated that the reinstatement of the appellant must not
be on less favourable terms than the one the appellant
enjoyed prior
to his dismissal, and that the 8
th
February 2016 was the
date on which the appellant was supposed to report for duty. The
proper and favourable interpretation of
the order of the Labour Court
is that the reinstatement of the appellant was with effect from the
date of the award since back-pay
prior the award being issued has
already been dealt with by CCMA Commissioner and was no longer an
issue.
[33]
The appellant’s claim is based on back-pay for the period from
the date of the award up to, and including
the date of the
implementation of the award. In
Coca
Cola Sabco (Pty) Limited v Van Wyk
[5]
Musi JA said:
“
Therefore if an
employee, after the reinstatement order and during the time that
employer exercises its review and appeal remedies
to exhaustion
tenders his/her labour he/she does so in terms of the employment
contract. She/he is therefore entitled to payment
in terms of the
contract of employment. The claim is therefore a contractual one,
wherein the employee would have to set out sufficient
facts to
justify the right of entitlement to judicial redress. The employee
would inter alia have to prove that the contract of
employment is
extant; that she/he tendered his/her labour in terms of thereof and
that the employer refuses or is unwilling to
pay him/her in terms of
that contract. The employer on the other hand would have all the
contractual defences at her/his disposal.”
[34]
The appellant’s employment contract that prevailed before his
dismissal on 30
th
November 2012 was revived by the CCMA
award rendered on 22
nd
April 2013 which ordered the
respondent to reinstate the appellant in the position he was before
his dismissal without any loss
of benefits. There is uncontested
evidence that after the award was rendered, the appellant twice went
to the respondent in order
to report for duty and was prevented from
doing so by the respondent who told the appellant that they were
still exhausting their
right to review the award at the Labour Court.
When the appellant went to the respondent to tender his services, he
did so on the
basis of his employment contract that was revived by
the CCMA award.
[35]
At the commencement of the trial, the court a quo made a ruling that
the respondent bore the onus to prove
that the Labour Court order was
in full and final settlement of the dispute between the parties. The
court a quo found that the
respondent’s only two witnesses were
not of assistance to the court. If the two witnesses for the
respondent were not of
assistance to the court, it follows that the
respondent has failed to proof that the Labour Court order of the 4
th
February 2016 was in full and final settlement of the dispute between
the parties. The respondent has failed to raise any contractual
defences to the appellant’s claim. That left the version of the
appellant to be unchallenged, and the court a quo did not
find the
appellant’s version to be untruthful and uncreditworthy. In my
view, the appellant has established a contractual
claim against the
respondent for back-pay for the period from the date of the award up
to, and including the date of implementation
of the award. The court
a quo therefore erred in dismissing the appellant’s claim, and
it follows that the appeal stands
to succeed.
[36]
In the result I make the following order:
36.1 The appeal is
upheld with costs.
36.2 The
order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the
following:
“
The plaintiff’s
claim succeeds 100% on merits on proven, or agreed damages”
36.3 The
matter is remitted to the court a quo to proceed on quantum.
MF
KGANYAGO J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
I
agree
MG
PHATUDI J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
OF
SOUTH AFRICA, LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
I
AGREE
MAKWELA
AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
SOUTH
AFRICA, LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
APPEARENCES
FOR
THE APPELLANT
: ADV Z SCHOEMAN
INSTRUCTED
BY
: ESPAG MAGWAI ATTORNEYS
FOR
THE RESPONDENT
: ADV ZF KRIEL
INSTRUCTED
BY
: VENTER DE VILLIERS ATTORNEYS
DATE
HEARD
: 21
ST
MAY 2021
DATE
OF JUDGMENT
: 1
ST
JUNE 2021
[1]
2016 (3) SA 37
(CC) at para 29
[2]
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) at para 18
[3]
66 of 1995
[4]
[2008] ZACC 16
;
2009 (1) SA 390
(CC) at para 36
[5]
[2015] ZALAC 15
;
[2015] 8 BLLR 774
(LAC); (2015) 36 ILJ 2013 (LAC)
(5 May 2015) at para 24