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[2021] ZALMPPHC 1
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S v Mangena (A81/2019) [2021] ZALMPPHC 1; 2022 (1) SACR 102 (LP) (20 January 2021)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE)
CASE NO: A81/2019
HIGH
COURT REV NO: 60/2020
In
the matter between:
THE
STATE
VS
MOGOWE
VICTOR MANGENA
REVIEW JUDGMENT
KGANYAGO
J.
[1]
This matter was brought on special review by the Head of Court
Lenyenye Magistrate court.
[2]
On 3
rd
September
2019 the accused appeared before magistrate Ms R Govender on a charge
of alleged contravention of a protection order.
He pleaded guilty to
the charge. After pleading guilty and as the trial court was about to
explain to him the provisions of section
112 (1) (b) of the
Criminal
Procedure Act
[1]
(CPA)
,
the accused informed the trial court that he was seeking a legal
representative from Legal Aid South Africa to represent him in
that
matter. On hearing that, the presiding magistrate informed the
prosecution that the accused has decided to change his guilty
plea
and therefore she was recording a plea of not guilty in terms of
section 113 of the CPA. The prosecution tried to bring it
to the
attention of the presiding magistrate that the accused was seeking
legal representation and not changing his plea. However,
the
presiding magistrate responded by telling the prosecution that since
the accused was seeking legal representation, she still
had to change
his plea, as the accused has to consult with his attorney, and they
will decide. The guilty plea was accordingly
recorded as that of not
guilty. The matter was postponed to the 9
th
September
2019 for the accused to go and apply for a Legal Aid attorney.
[3]
On 9
th
September 2019 the accused appeared in court
represented by a Legal Aid attorney. The matter was postponed to the
23
rd
September 2019 for confirmation of the accused Legal
Aid representation. On 23
rd
September 2019 the records
were not yet transcribed, and the matter was postponed to the 14
th
October 2019 for transcription of the record. On 14
th
October 2019 Ms Govender was not in court and the matter was
postponed the 22
nd
October 2019 for the presiding
magistrate and also for the case docket. The transcribed record does
not show what transpired on
the 22
nd
October 2019, but
shows that on the 11
th
November 2019 the matter was
postponed to the 2
nd
December 2019 for the presiding
magistrate. Again on the 2
nd
December 2019 the matter was
postponed to the 10
th
February 2020 for the presiding
magistrate. On the 10
th
February 2020 the matter was
postponed to the 24
th
February 2020 for trial.
[4]
On 24
th
February 2020 the accused did not attend court and
a warrant for his arrest was authorized. The accused bail money was
provisionally
forfeited to the State and the return date was the 9
th
March 2020. On 9
th
March 2020 the accused appeared in
court in person, and the warrant for his arrest was cancelled and his
bail was reinstated. The
matter was postponed to the 16
th
March 2020 for the accused Legal Aid attorney. On 16
th
March 2020 the matter was postponed to the 4
th
May 2020
for State witnesses and trial. On 4
th
May 2020 the matter
was postponed to the 8
th
June 2020 for the presiding
magistrate who was not in court that on that day.
[5] On
the 26
th
May 2020 the matter was in court before the
presiding magistrate Ms Govender. From the transcribed record it
seems that the presiding
magistrate had requested the prosecution to
secure the attendance of the accused for the 26
th
May
2020, but the prosecution could not succeed in doing that. After that
the presiding magistrate proceeded to deliver her judgment
in the
absentia of the accused, and the accused was found not guilty and
discharged.
[6]
When the Head of Court picked up this acquittal during his routine
office inspection, he requested some
comments from the presiding
magistrate and the prosecution. In her reply the presiding magistrate
informed the Head of Court that
from the charge sheet that was handed
to her, her judicial inscriptions of the 9
th
September
2019 appears to have been taken out of the charge sheet, and that she
reserves her comments until she had listened to
the full record of
the 9
th
September 2019 on the recording machine.
[7]
The prosecution in its comments has stated that the matter was
postponed to the 8
th
June 2020. However, on the
26
th
May 2020 the presiding
magistrate called the matter without the accused or complainant being
present. The court proceeded to dispose
the matter by acquitting the
accused, and that the State was not afforded an opportunity to
address the court on a postponement
of the matter.
[8]
When this matter was laid before me on special review, I requested
some comments from the presiding
magistrate and she commented as
follows:
“
[1]
The Honourable Judge Kganyago’s directives dated the 27
th
August 2020 received on 28
th
August 2020, the contents
thereof being noted.
[2]
The handwritten record of 09/09/2019 seems to be mislaid, for reasons
unknown but part of the transcribed record of the same
date has been
transcribed.
[3]
This case was indeed mechanically recorded however that part of the
record after the tea break cannot be retrieved from the
recording
system.
[4]
This matter stands out as a sore thumb in the Judicial Officer’s
mind as the Legal Aid attorney that handled this case
attended court
after a long bereavement of her nascituris fiction.
[4.1]
Subject to further directives by the Honourable Judge I wish to place
on record that the Judicial Officer applied careful
introspection of
the matter at hand and notes the following procedure was used to take
the matter to finality.
[4.2]
On 3
rd
September 2019, the Accused
initially pleaded guilty, and section 112 (1) (b) procedure was used
as he was in person, but alluded
to a defense, thereafter a section
113 change of a plea was inscribed on the J15. Rights to Legal
Representation was reiterated
and the Accused favoured legal aid.
[4.3]
The matter was postponed for legal aid to take instructions and
continue with the trial.
[4.4]
The Judicial Officer was at all times extremely vigilent of the norms
and standard set in Limpopo.
[4.5]
The matter proceeded on 9
th
September 2020 before and
after tea break with the state calling the complainant (victim) to
adduce evidence under the watchful
eye of the Judicial Officer
overseeing that Justice is done.
[4.6]
The defense attorney (legal aid) took the court by surprise with
excellent cross examination of the complainant who failed
dismally in
her version of events that led to the accused appearing before the
court.
[4.7]
The state did nothing extraordinary to rebut the cross examination
and closed its case.
[4.8]
The defense attorney closed her case without calling the accused.
[4.9]
Arguments by both parties were adduced and due to the lateness of the
hour approximately 16h05 on 9
th
September 2020, the matter was
postponed for judgment.
[4.10]
The court gave judgment after due consideration of the evidence
adduced and acquitted the accused.
It is
the humble submission by the Judicial Officer of record that the
decision regarding the Acquittal (accused found not guilty)
of the
accused to be confirmed as proper procedure has been followed with
due diligence, after consideration of the Norms and Standard
set in
Limpopo Province”
[9]
The presiding magistrate received the review query from the reviewing
Judge on the 28
th
August 2020 and she signed her comments
on the 7
th
September 2020. Therefore, the 9
th
September 2020 referred in her comments is incorrect. Even in her
reply dated 6
th
July 2020 to the Head of Court she refers
to the inscriptions made on the charge sheet for the proceedings of
the 9
th
September 2019. Therefore, the correct date is the
9
th
September 2019 as captured on the transcribed record,
her reply to the Head of Court, and that the 9
th
September
2020 is just a typing error.
[10] I have
also requested the opinion of the Deputy Director of Public
Prosecutions (DDPP). The DDPP have furnished
me with a helpful
opinion and I am indebted to them. The DDPP is of the opinion that
the proceedings were not in accordance with
justice and should be set
aside.
[11] The
first issue to be dealt with is the manner in which the presiding
magistrate has recorded the accused’s
plea of not guilty. When
the trial started, the accused pleaded guilty to the charge as laid
against him. As the presiding magistrate
was about to explain the
provisions of section 112 (1) (b) of the CPA, the accused informed
the trial court that he was seeking
to be represented by a Legal Aid
attorney. Without entertaining the accused’s request, the trial
court took that as a change
of the guilty plea by the accused, and it
recorded a plea of not guilty in terms of section 113 of the CPA.
[12] Section
113 of the CPA read as follows:
“
(1)
If the court at any stage of the proceedings under section 112 (1)
(a) or (b) or 112 (2) and before sentence is passed is in
doubt
whether the accused is in law guilty of an offence to which he or she
has pleaded guilty or if it is alleged or appears to
the court that
the accused does not admit an allegation in the charge or that the
accused has incorrectly admitted any such allegation
or that the
accused has a valid defence to the charge or if the court is of the
opinion for any reason that the accused’s
plea of guilty should
not stand, the court shall record a plea of not guilty and require
the prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution:
Provided that any
allegation, other than an allegation referred to above, admitted by
the accused up to the stage at which the
court records a plea of not
guilty, shall stand as proof in any court of such allegation.
(2) If
the court records a plea of guilty under subsection (1) before any
evidence has been led, the prosecution shall proceed on
the original
charge laid against the accused, unless the prosecution explicitly
indicates otherwise.”
[13] The
prerequisite for a presiding officer to record a plea of not guilty
in terms of section 113 are that (i) there
must be doubt whether the
accused is in law guilty of the offence which he or she had pleaded
guilty; (ii) or it must appears to
the court that the accused does
not admit an allegation in the charge; (iii) or that the accused has
incorrectly admitted any such
allegation; (iv) or that the accused
has a valid defence to the charge; (v) or if the court is of the
opinion for any other reason
that the accused’s plea of guilty
should not stand. It does not mean that all the five prerequisites
should be present at
the same time for the presiding officer to
record a plea of not guilty in terms of section 113 of the CPA.
Usually whether either
of the five prerequisite is present, will be
determined during the questioning of the accused after pleading
guilty in establishing
whether the accused is admitting all the
elements of the offence, or when the accused is testifying in
mitigation of sentence.
That is the reason the section state that at
any stage of the proceedings but before sentence is passed.
[14]
In
Shiburi
v S
[2]
Makgoka
AJA as he was then said:
“
When
questioning the accused in terms of s 112 (1) (b) the court’s
duty is to determine whether an accused factual statements
and
answers in his or her plea of guilty adequately support the
conviction on the charge. It is not the courts’ function
to
evaluate the plausibility of the answers, or to determine their
truthfulness at this stage of the proceedings. Instead, for
the
purposes of the section, the accused explanation must be accepted as
true. On that premise, the court should consider whether
the
explanation discloses a possible defence in law to the charge he or
she pleaded guilty to. As is plain from the text of the
section, the
presence of doubt is a jurisdictional factor to trigger the
application of the procedure laid down is s 113. Thus,
once a basis
exists, objectively considered, the court has no residual discretion
but to apply the procedure set out in s 113”
[15]
There must be the basis for the presiding officer to record a plea of
not guilty in terms of section 113. The presiding
officer will be
guided by what the accused tells the court during questioning by the
court or when the accused testify during mitigation
of sentence, and
not what the presiding officer thinks will transpire. Judicial
officers should guard against preconceived views.
(See
Bula
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
[3]
)
[16] In the
case at hand, the presiding magistrate was about to explain the
provisions of section 112 (1) (b) to the
accused, when the accused,
informed the court that he was seeking to be represented by a Legal
Aid attorney. On that basis the
presiding magistrate invoked the
provisions of section 113 of the CPA. Her reasoning for that was that
when the accused seeks legal
representation, she had to change the
plea as the accused had to consult with his attorney, and thereafter
they will decide. This
in my view, is a wrong test that was followed
by the presiding magistrate. She was pre-empting what might transpire
after the accused
had consulted with his legal practitioner, and that
was based on pure speculation. She invoked the provisions of section
113 based
on her own speculation and not on what the accused had
placed before court. In my view, the presiding magistrate had
misdirected
herself in the manner in which she had invoked the
provisions of section 113. The application before her was that of
legal representation,
and that is what she should have dealt with.
Whether the accused at a future date would have changed his plea or
not, that was
not an issue that should have concerned her at that
stage.
[17] The second issue to
be dealt with pertains to the record of the proceedings. According to
the presiding magistrate, her hand
written notes of the 9
th
September 2019 seems to have been misplaced for reasons unknown to
her. The presiding magistrate has further stated that despite
her
hand written notes being misplaced, part of the proceedings for that
date have been transcribed. She had also stated that part
of the
record cannot be retrieved from the recording system. On her foot
note in reply to the reviewing Judge, she has stated that
a
possibility exist that the case was recorded on DCRS which was no
longer in use as they have migrated to CRT, and that is the
reason
why the record cannot be transcribed as it no longer appears on the
ICMS. What the presiding magistrate is highlighting
is that the
record that is placed before the reviewing Judge is incomplete and
that the incomplete record cannot be reconstructed
since her hand
written notes were missing and also that since they have migrated
from DCRS to CRT, the records could no longer
be retrieved.
[18] The
presiding magistrate went on to state that the matter proceeded on
9
th
September 2019 before and after tea break with the
State calling the complainant to adduce evidence under oath under the
watchful
eye of the judicial officer overseeing that justice was
done. She had further stated that the defence attorney took her by
surprise
with her excellent cross examination of the complainant who
had failed dismally in her version of the events. According to her,
the defence attorney thereafter closed the accused case without
calling the accused to testify. Thereafter both parties submitted
their closing address and the matter was postponed for judgment.
[19] The
proceedings of the 9
th
September 2019 wherein the
complainant allegedly testified and the parties submitted their
closing address does not form part of
the transcribed record. The
alleged missing part constitute the whole trial which is vital to
this court to determine whether the
proceedings appears to be in
accordance with justice. In the absence of that missing part of the
record it will be difficult for
this court to determine whether the
proceedings were in accordance with justice or not.
[20]
In
S
v Phakane
[4]
Zondo
J said:
“
[39]
As to when it can be said that an incomplete record will result in
the infringement of an accused’s right to a fair appeal,
in S v
Chabedi the Supreme Court of Appeal said:
‘
(T)he
requirement is that the record must be adequate for proper
consideration of the appeal; not that it must be a perfect recordal
of everything that was said at the trial…The question whether
defects in a record are so serious that a proper consideration
of the
appeal is not possible, cannot be answered in abstract. It depends
inter alia, on the nature of the defects in the particular
record and
on the nature of the issues to be decided on appeal’.
This
passage was quoted with approval by this court in Schoombee.
[40]
In the present case the full court did not have before it a record on
the basis of which it could fairly assess whether the
trial court’s
conviction of the applicant was correct. The trial record available
to the full court was simply not adequate
for a proper consideration
of the applicant’s appeal. Therefore, the applicant’s
right of appeal was frustrated by
the fact that material evidence was
missing from the record.”
[21] In the
case at hand, the transcribed record is not adequate and the defects
are so serious as the entire evidence
upon which the conviction has
been based is missing. The transcribed record is not adequate for a
proper consideration of the review.
The proper remedy will be to set
aside the proceedings in its entirety.
[22]
The third area of concern in this matter and probably the most
disturbing, is the
response of the
presiding magistrate after being requested by the reviewing Judge to
give her comments in this matter. The impression
created in her
response is that on the 9
th
September 2019 there was a full blown trial, but
that the proceedings for that date have not being transcribed in
full. Further
that for reasons unknown to her, her hand written notes
for the 9
th
September
2019 has been removed from the charge sheet. This is a serious
accusation which had some elements of gross misconduct
by whoever
might have removed her hand written notes from the charge sheet.
[23] It will be
helpful to quote directly from the record in relation to the
proceedings of the 9
th
September 2019 to illustrate the
serious discrepancy in the presiding magistrate’s response and
the transcribed record:
“
PROCEEDINGS
ON 9
TH
SEPTEMBER 2019
PROSECUTOR:
The state calls case number B81/2019 the state v Victor Mangena. The
matter is on the roll today for accused to apply
for Legal Aid your
worship.
COURT:
Is it B court? Is it a B court matter?
PROSECUTOR:
It is A, your worship. I mixed it. The matter is on the roll for
accused to apply for Legal Aid. I see it is already
[indistinct]
COURT:
Legal Aid, are you on record?
PROSECUTOR:
Thank you, your worship.
COURT:
The date again?
PROSECUTOR:
May be postponed for further hearing, your worship. For state
witnesses and further hearing. Counsel’s [indistinct]
diary.
Counsel, 7 October your worship, will be suitable for further
hearing.
COURT:
Ms Legal Aid you are still to confirm your instructions, confirmation
of Legal Aid.
DEFENCE
ATTORNEY: Your worship, may I place on record for the accused. I also
confirm the date of the 7
th
October your worship for
further hearing.
COURT:
For consideration of Legal Aid only
DEFENCE
ATTORNEY: Correct, your worship. I was not there when [indistinct]
COURT:
So how can we place it for hearing.
DEFENCE
ATTORNEY: Your worship, we have to postpone maybe for transcribed
record but the best thing was for to receive the record,
that will be
the fastest way. But I will follow the transcribed record, I do not
know how long does it take, maybe two weeks for
transcribed record.
DEFENCE
ATTORNEY: Transcribed record, your worship, for two weeks.
PROSECUTOR:
Can we place it on the 23 September, your worship.
COURT:
23
rd
day of?
PROSECUTOR:
Your worship, is it, the clerk of court is saying something, I cannot
hear him.
COURT:
Could we have order please. Mr Mangena, Ms Prosecution?
PROSECUTOR:
Your worship, the accused person pleaded but I was not there but I do
not have a problem, your worship to listen to
the record in the
morning of that day when the trial will be proceeding to hear what
did he say. But however for Legal Aid, your
worship, I think maybe
she might need a transcribed record. But however I am not sure if she
does need the transcribed record because
the accused person has
already pleaded guilty, said something that might incriminate him if
she advise him otherwise. So she needs
to prepare herself for that. I
do not know whether she needs a transcribed record or rather she will
also do the same that I am
going to do on the date of the trial, your
worship. It is up to her. If she says she wants transcribed record it
is the accused
person right. If she says she will listen to the
record like I do, I am not sure whether she will choose the listening
or transcribed
record your worship.
COURT:
Legal Aid, are you confirming your appearance today that you have
also accepted that this particular person, Mr Mangoma,
Mangena, you
will continue with the matter because I know that Legal Aid normally
has to do the means test before [indistinct]
is accepted on Legal
Aid.
DEFENCE
ATTORNEY: Your worship, I am confirming the instruction for today,
your worship. Further that his application will be processed
and then
if he qualifies to be represented by Legal Aid, your worship, that is
when I will be able to continue and confirm his
plea, your worship,
that has been changed. And also the transcribed records, your
worship.
COURT:
What is your full names? Full names?
ACCUSED:
[Indistinct]
COURT:
The matter is postponed to the 23 October 2019 for confirmation of
Legal Aid and transcript, the transcribed record, your
bail is
extended, you are warned for 8:30.
INTERPRETER:
23?
COURT:
October
DEFENCE
ATTORNEY: September your worship, two weeks, I am not sure because I
was waiting for her to confirm if it is two weeks.
I do not know how
long does it take, your worship. It is only her that can assist
us…[intervenes]
COURT:
With what things
PROSECUTOR:
The transcribed record, how long does it take, I do not know, your
worship. But we may postpone it for two weeks, the
23
rd
then for her confirmation with
Legal Aid and we will see what are the results on that day, your
worship. 23 September, not October,
two weeks. 14 days your worship.
COURT:
Sir this matter is postponed to the 23
rd
September 2019 for
confirmation of Legal Aid only. Your bail is extended, you are warned
for 8:30.
MATTER
POSTPONED TO 23
RD
SEPTEMBER 2019 [09:40]
COURT
ADJOURNS
[24] From
this quote, it is clear that on the 9
th
September 2019,
the matter was not trial ready and State witnesses were not even
before the court. The 9
th
September 2019 was for the
accused to apply for Legal Aid attorney. Even though the Legal Aid
attorney has attended court on that
date, she was still to confirm
instructions to represent the accused. On the 9
th
September 2019 there was also the issue of the transcribed record of
date on which the accused had pleaded. On the 9
th
September 2019 the trial court had postponed the matter to the 23
rd
September 2019
“for confirmation of Legal Aid only”
and the court adjourned at 9:40. It is clear that on 9
th
September 2019 this matter did not proceed beyond tea time.
[25]
It is mind boggling as to which proceedings is the presiding
magistrate referring wherein a full blown trial took place.
The presiding magistrate’s reply to the
query letter of the reviewing Judge is not in line with the
transcribed record, specifically
the proceeding of the 9
th
September 2019. In my view, this is a deliberate
attempt by the presiding magistrate to mislead this court in trying
to cover herself
for the irregularity committed by her in the manner
in which she had acquitted the accused. She had created imaginary
proceedings
of the 9
th
September 2019 despite the transcribed record
speaking for itself. Even if her hand written notes might have been
misplaced as she
claims, the record of the 9
th
September 2019 gives a full picture of what
transpired on that date, and that record does not appear to be
incomplete.
[26] With
regard to the proceedings of the 3
rd
September 2019, the
presiding magistrate has stated that the accused had initially
pleaded guilty, and section 112 (1) (b) procedure
was followed but
the accused alluded a defense, thereafter a section 113 change of
plea was inscribed on the J15. The record of
the 3
rd
September 2019 shows that as the trial court was about to explain the
section 112 (1) (b) procedure, the accused requested Legal
Aid
representation, and that is what triggered the presiding magistrate
to act in terms of section 113 of the CPA. The record does
not show
which defence had the accused alluded which prompted the presiding
magistrate to act in terms of section 113 of the CPA.
What the record
shows is that the accused was at no stage questioned in terms of
section 112 (1) (b) of the CPA. It seems that
the presiding
magistrate is trying to manufacture evidence which does not exists.
[27] The
reviewing query letter was specific as to what the presiding
magistrate should comment on. It read as follows:
“
[1]…On
reading the memo requesting automatic review, there are serious
allegations made against you in the manner in which
you have
acquitted the accused on 24
th
May 2020.
[2] As
per your letter dated 6
th
July 2020 addressed to S
Phakula Head of Court, you have also made serious allegations that
your hand written notes have been taken
out from the charge sheet. In
conclusion you have stated that you reserve your comments after you
have listened to the full record
of 09/09/2019 on the recording
machine. Unfortunately, we don’t have your comments after
listening on the recording machine.
[3] In
order to enable us to have a full picture of this matter, kindly let
us have your comments within seven (7) days of receipt
of this
letter.”
[28] The
presiding magistrate has failed to address the circumstances that led
her to bringing the trial forward to
the 26
th
May 2020
despite the matter having been properly postponed to the 8
th
June 2020 in an open court. The presiding magistrate has failed to
address the allegations raised by the prosecution that on the
26
th
May 2020 when she delivered her judgment, she did not give them an
opportunity of addressing the court regarding the postponement
of the
matter. In her reply, the presiding magistrate has given a picture
that shows that on the 9
th
September 2019 there was a full
blown trial for the whole day, and thereafter the matter was
postponed for judgment, but did not
specify to which date was the
matter postponed. If indeed the matter on merits was finalized on the
9
th
September 2019 and what was outstanding was for the
presiding magistrate to deliver her judgment, logic dictates that for
such
a short trial it would not have been postponed to the 8
th
June 2020 for judgment. Something does not add up here. There are
more questions than answers.
[29] The
presiding magistrate in replying the Head of Court has stated that
she will make her comments after listening
on the recording machine.
In replying to the review query letter, she did not state whether she
had listened to the recordings
or not. However, what she had stated
in her reply is that part of the record after tea break cannot be
retrieved from the recording
system. The transcribed record of the
9
th
September 2019 shows that the accused’s matter
was adjourned at 9h40 after it was postponed to the 23
rd
September 2019, and there were no further proceedings in relation to
that matter on that date after tea break. Again this shows
that the
presiding magistrate is trying to mislead this court by creating
imaginary proceedings which did not exists. This court
views that in
a serious light since it comes from a judicial officer who had taken
an oath to uphold the Constitution and dispense
justice without fear,
favour or prejudice. A judicial officer is obliged to display the
uttermost honesty, intergrity and honourable
conduct at all material
times when executing his/her duties. The reply by the presiding
magistrate in relation to the proceedings
of the 9
th
September 2019 leaves much to be desired. It will therefore be proper
if copy of this judgment is brought to the attention of the
Magistrates Commission.
[30] In conclusion,
the manner in which the presiding magistrate has recorded the accused
plea of not guilty in terms of section
113 of the CPA, the manner in
which the accused was acquitted in his absentia, and also misleading
this court that the complainant
was called to testify whilst no
evidence was ever led, amounts to serious gross irregularities which
taint the whole proceedings.
The proceedings were therefore not in
accordance with justice and stand to be reviewed and set aside.
[31] In the
results I make the following order:
31.1
The acquittal of the accused stand be reviewed is set aside.
31.2
The matter is remitted to the trial court for a trial
de
novo
before
a different magistrate should the State still wish to pursue this
matter.
31.3
Copy of this judgment be sent to the Magistrates Commission for their
attention.
M.F
KGANYAGO J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
I agree
M.V
SEMENYA J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
DATE DELIVERED: 20
TH
JANUARY 2021
[1]
51 of 1977
[2]
[2018] ZASCA 101
;
2018 (2) SACR 485
(SCA) (29 August 2018) at para
19
[3]
2012 (4) SA 560
(SCA) at para 56
[4]
2018 (1) SACR 300
(CC) at paras 39 and 40