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[2022] ZAECMKHC 119
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S v Rweqane (CC31/2022) [2022] ZAECMKHC 119 (28 October 2022)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
CASE
NO.: CC31/2022
Heard:
24, 25, 26 & 27 October 2022
Delivered:
28 October 2022
In
the matter between:
THE
STATE
and
AYANDA
RWEQANE
JUDGMENT
MOLONY
AJ:
1.
The accused in this matter faces six
charges emanating from events occurring on 18 August 2021 at C[...]
G[...] Farm, that being
the home of J[...] J[...] R[...] F[...]
(hereafter referred to as the complainant), an 80-year old man.
2.
The charges, in summary, are the following:
2.1
One count of attempted murder of the
complainant, by shooting at him with a firearm.
2.2
One count of housebreaking with intent to
commit robbery with aggravating circumstances, in that the accused
broke into and entered
the home of the complainant, with the intent
to commit robbery with aggravating circumstances. The
aggravating circumstances
relate to the use of the abovementioned
firearm. A discretionary minimum sentence of 5 years
imprisonment is applicable to
this charge.
2.3
Attempted robbery with aggravating
circumstances, in that the accused assaulted the complainant in an
attempt to take by force from
his possession items inside the house,
those being the property of, or in the lawful possession of, the
complainant. Aggravating
circumstances were present in that a
firearm was wielded during the commission of the attempted robbery.
2.4
Murder, in that the accused acting in
furtherance of a common purpose to commit the offences in question,
killed L[…] X[…],
a 38-year-old male (hereafter
referred to as ‘the deceased’). A discretionary
minimum sentence of life imprisonment
is applicable to this charge,
as the death of the victim was caused during an attempt to commit the
offence of robbery with aggravating
circumstances, and was committed
by a group of persons acting in the furtherance of a common purpose
or conspiracy.
2.5
Unlawful possession of a firearm, in that
the accused had in his possession a 9mm Lew/Vektor semi-automatic
pistol with the serial
number erased, without holding the requisite
license, permit or authorization. A discretionary minimum
sentence of 15 years
imprisonment is applicable to this charge, as
the accused was in possession of a semi-automatic firearm.
2.6
Unlawful possession of ammunition, in that
the accused had in his possession ammunition (those being 3 x 9 mm
parabellum calibre
cartridges) without being the holder of the
requisite license, permit or authorization for a firearm capable of
discharging such
ammunition.
3.
Whilst
the above-mentioned charges only mention common purpose in terms of
the charge of murder (which is count 4), the summary
of substantial
facts states in paragraph 10 thereof that the accused acted in
concert throughout, in the furtherance of a common
purpose to commit
the crimes in question. It is not in dispute that this
adequately served to inform the accused of the nature
of the charges
against him, and there was accordingly no prejudice emanating from
this aspect.
[1]
4.
The accused pleaded not guilty to all the
charges. No plea explanation was advanced, however several
formal admissions were
made in terms of section 220 of the Criminal
Procedure Act (see exhibit ‘A’ in this regard).
5.
The contents of the following documents
were admitted as correct:
5.1
The post-mortem report in regard to the
deceased (exhibit ‘B’).
5.2
The contents of the photo album and the key
thereto (exhibits ‘C’ and ‘D’).
5.3
The contents of the comparison report
compiled in regard to shoe imprints found at the scene (exhibit ‘E’).
5.4
The ballistic report (exhibit ‘F’)
confirming,
inter alia
,
that the pistol used in the commission of the offences was a
semi-automatic firearm.
6.
The accused does not dispute that he did
not, at the relevant times, have a valid firearm
license/permit/authorization to have the
pistol or the relevant
ammunition in his possession.
7.
For record purposes it must be noted that I
was informed that, in regard to exhibit ‘C’, only 104 of
the 169 photographs
taken were considered relevant and utilized in
evidence by the State. In regard to exhibit ‘E’, it
appeared the
affidavit portion of the report was commissioned on 16
August 2021. This was clearly an error. Mr Solani (who
appeared
for the accused) was aware of both of the aforementioned
aspects and did not raise any concerns or objections.
8.
The State led the evidence of four
witnesses, those being Mr E[...] P[...]; Mr D[...] P[...] (both of
whom reside on farms neighbouring
C[...] G[...] Farm), Warrant
Officer Plaatjies, who is the investigating officer in this matter,
and Mr A[...] B[...] (an employee
of the complainant).
9.
The complainant himself did not testify due
to his advanced age, ill health, and the difficulty in transporting
him to Makhanda
from the Bedford area, particularly given the state
of the roads.
10.
The accused was the only witness to testify
in his defence.
11.
The following was common cause:
11.1
At approximately lunch time on Wednesday 18
August 2021, the accused and the deceased, who had travelled together
to C[...] G[...]
Farm, arrived at the glass paneled veranda door of
the complainant’s farmhouse. One of them apparently
knocked on the
door.
11.2
When the complainant approached the door
from inside the house, one or more shots were fired at the
complainant through the door,
utilizing the 9mm pistol referred to in
count 5.
11.3
The accused and the deceased both entered
the farmhouse.
11.4
The complainant, at some point, managed to
obtain his own firearms (apparently from his gun safe in the spare
bedroom), and a gun
battle ensued, during which time one or both of
the perpetrators (that being the accused and the deceased) were
trapped in the
bathroom of the farmhouse.
11.5
Ultimately the deceased was shot in the
head and killed by the complainant. The identity of the
deceased and the cause of
his death was not in dispute.
11.6
The accused, thereafter, took the pistol,
left the farmhouse, and fled the scene, leaving his beanie behind in
the bathroom.
11.7
Later the same day, Mr E[...] P[...] and Mr
D[...] P[...] , having discovered what had occurred and the police
having been alerted,
went in a bakkie looking for the perpetrator who
had fled the scene.
11.8
At some point on the road to Bedford (it
appears not far from the farmhouse) they encountered the accused, and
instructed him to
climb on the back of the bakkie.
11.9
Both had firearms with them at the time,
which would have been visible to someone looking into the bakkie.
The intention (as
testified by Mr E[...] P[...]) was to return with
the accused to the farmhouse, so that the complainant could confirm
whether or
not the accused was the perpetrator who had fled the
scene.
11.10
After turning the bakkie and beginning to
accelerate, the accused jumped off the back of the bakkie, and
ultimately jumped over
a fence and fled. Mr E[...] P[...] and
Mr D[...] P[...] both fired what they referred to as warning shots
(the accused testified
that he thought they were shooting at him),
but the accused nonetheless continued to run away. Despite a
further search,
the accused was not found that day.
11.11
On Friday 20 August 2022, Mr. D[...] P[...]
was notified that the accused had been spotted on one of his farms.
Mr D[...]
P[...] drove to the farm and saw the accused walking in the
road. When he was about 200 meters away from the accused, the
accused began running away. Mr D[...] P[...] pursued the
accused, shouting at him to stop. The accused during his evidence
in
chief confirmed hearing Mr P[...] shout at him to stop, but during
cross-examination disputed hearing this. Mr P[...] thereafter
fired
several warning shots (the accused’s view was that Mr D[...]
P[...] was shooting at him at the time). After pursuing
the
accused across two other properties, and the accused having thrown
the pistol into a goat shed along the way, the accused ultimately
surrendered, and was arrested thereafter. The pistol was
recovered from the goat shed the same day.
12.
Warrant Officer Plaatjies, who had been
present when the relevant footprints were examined at the scene,
confirmed that the import
of the report (exhibit ‘E’)
was,
inter alia
,
that the footprints of the deceased and the accused had been found
going from one window to another along the front of the farmhouse.
The accused’s footprints had also been found going away from
the farmhouse, the pattern of the prints indicating that he
had been
running.
13.
Mr B[...], who has been working on the
complainant’s farm for 5 years, testified that on Monday 16
August 2021, he had seen
the deceased and another man sitting
together on the public road which runs through the complainant’s
farm.
14.
He knew the deceased because the deceased
had a girlfriend from another farm in the area.
15.
On 16 August 2021, at about noon, the
deceased and the other man were about 100 meters from the farmhouse.
Mr B[...] was travelling
with the complainant in the complainant’s
vehicle. The complainant asked Mr B[...] to find out what they
wanted there.
16.
Mr B[...] did so. Both the deceased
and the man with him were eating apples, and Mr B[...] was informed
that they were eating
breakfast. When they were finished they
would leave.
17.
He had seen the face of the man (whom he
did not know) who was with the deceased. He identified him in
court as the accused.
18.
Mr B[...] described both the deceased and
the man he was with as having hair that looked like dreadlocks.
It must be noted
that Mr E[...] P[...] also described the accused
(when he was stopped by Mr E[...] P[...] and Mr D[...] P[...] on 18
August 2021)
as having long dreadlocks.
19.
Mr B[...] observed that both men were
wearing beanies.
20.
On Wednesday 18 August 2021, Mr B[...] saw
both the deceased and the accused again, at approximately 08h00,
walking past the complainant’s
farmhouse. Mr B[...] was
outside the shed next to the farmhouse at the time. The accused
and deceased appeared to be
wearing the same clothes they had been
wearing on Monday 16 August 2021, and looked at him as they passed.
21.
He then saw them again, just before 1 pm,
this time walking in the opposite direction past the farmhouse.
He did not speak
to either the deceased or the accused that day.
22.
Mr B[...] then locked up the dog (which he
was required to do) and went to lunch at about 13h00.
23.
He lives in a house beyond the shed.
He did not hear any shots being fired or any noise from the direction
of the complainant’s
farmhouse during lunch. He was
informed of what had occurred when he returned from lunch.
24.
He was shown the body of the deceased in
the farmhouse by the complainant.
25.
The accused’s version of events is
the following:
25.1
He resides in M[…] in Port
Elizabeth.
25.2
On Monday 16 August 2021, he met the
deceased for the first time, whilst he was visiting someone who lives
in the same street as
him (the accused).
25.3
He heard the deceased discussing employment
with someone else. Apparently the deceased was saying that he
must return to the
place where he used to work, and ask for
employment. The accused asked to accompany the deceased as he
too was looking for
employment.
25.4
The deceased did not disclose where they
would go, how far they would need to travel, who his previous
employer was, or what specific
type of work they might be doing.
All that the accused was aware of was that they would be looking for
work on a farm.
25.5
Despite this the deceased paid for himself
and the deceased to hitchhike to Bedford on Tuesday 17 August 2021.
The accused
took a purse with him, containing a wallet and a phone.
This was the bag into which he later placed the pistol after fleeing
the scene on 18 August 2021.
25.6
Aside from that, he had no luggage.
Once he found work on a farm, he would travel back to Port Elizabeth,
notify his family,
pack his belongings and return to the relevant
farm.
25.7
The accused and the deceased spent the
night at the deceased’s parental home in Bedford.
25.8
Based on the aforementioned sequence of
events, the accused denied under cross-examination that either he, or
the deceased, could
have been on the complainant’s farm on
Monday 16 August 2021. It must be noted that it was not put, on
the accused’s
behalf, to Mr B[...] during cross-examination
that the deceased had not been at the farm on 16 August 2021.
25.9
The next day they made their way to the
complainant’s farm. The accused apparently did not
enquire as to whose farm
they were going to, or whether any work was
available there which he (the accused) would be able to do.
25.10
They arrived at the complainant’s
farm between 12h00 and 13h00. Once there he saw the deceased
talking to Mr B[...].
The accused at this point still did not
know if they were going to ask for employment at this farm, and had
not asked the deceased
whose farmhouse this was. Despite it
having been put on his behalf to Mr E[...] P[...] that the deceased
used to be employed
by the complainant, the accused testified that
the deceased did not volunteer any information about whether or not
he (the deceased)
had previously been employed on this farm.
25.11
The deceased and Mr B[...] conversed
briefly in Afrikaans. In his evidence in chief the accused
testified that he could understand
their conversation, and said that
the deceased had been asking Mr B[...] if the complainant was in the
house. This was also
put to Mr B[...] when he was cross
examined. Under cross-examination the accused was adamant that
he had no idea what was
being discussed between the deceased and Mr
B[...].
25.12
Mr B[...] had then placed the dog in its
kennel, and left for lunch.
25.13
The deceased went to the verandah door and
knocked. The accused was behind him. The complainant
appeared from inside.
Upon seeing the complainant, the deceased
took out a firearm (which he had apparently, the accused surmised,
been carrying in the
front of his lumbar jacket). The deceased
tried to open the door, but it would not open.
25.14
The deceased then fired a shot at the door
through the glass panes. The door did not open and the deceased
kicked it.
He then told the accused to go through one of the
gaps created in the door. The accused, under cross-
examination, was clearly
uncertain as to which gap in the door he had
been forced to climb through, and changed his mind more than once
about which gap
was the gap in question. In contrast, it was
put on his behalf to Mr E[...] P[...], during cross-examination, that
the deceased
had opened the door after firing a shot through the
glass of the door, at the complainant. The section 220
admissions state
that the deceased shot at the complainant through a
glass pane of the verandah door, and then kicked the door open.
25.15
When asked why he complied by entering the
house, the accused initially testified that the deceased had been in
possession of a
firearm, and the accused was shocked and afraid.
Later, under cross-examination, the version developed to include that
the
firearm had been pointed at him. He also said that it had
come across his mind that the deceased wanted him to go in first
because maybe the deceased wanted the farmer to shoot him (the
accused) but the farmer ended up shooting the deceased. The
accused later tried to distance himself from this comment, but did
concede during cross-examination that he thought the farmer
could
have posed a threat in his house.
25.16
Once inside the house, the deceased
directed the accused, and made the accused walk in front of him until
they reached the bathroom.
Apparently then the gun battle
began, with the complainant shooting at them from the entrance to the
living room. The accused’s
version vacillated between him
and the deceased having been in the process of turning in to the
bathroom when the first shot was
fired, to him being the only one in
the bathroom, with the deceased being in the passage, when the first
shot was fired.
The version again appeared to evolve during
cross-examination in accordance with where bullet cartridges and
bullet holes appeared
in the house, (as set out in exhibit ‘C’).
25.17
The accused, upon the deceased being shot,
pulled the deceased into the bathroom, ostensibly in order to gain
access to the pistol.
He wanted the pistol in order to be able
to fight back and shoot at the farmer. He did not know how to
use a firearm, but
in re-examination stated that he had seen the
deceased operate the firearm in his presence, which apparently caused
him to have
the confidence to operate the firearm.
25.18
He took the pistol and left the house,
running in the opposite direction to the side of the house where he
saw the complainant when
he looked outside. Under
cross-examination, when referred to the admitted contents of exhibit
‘E’, and the import
thereof, he changed the direction in
which he had been running when he left the house. Later he said
that after speaking
to Mr B[...], he and the deceased had walked past
the windows to get to the verandah door.
25.19
He said he had been wearing a hat that day,
but did not know if he left it there (at the farmhouse) or if he lost
it. This
is despite the fact that in the formal admissions in
terms of section 220 the accused confirmed having left his ‘beanie
hat’
behind in the bathroom of the complainant’s house.
25.20
The accused apparently later jumped off the
bakkie, having climbed on at the behest of Mr E[...] P[...], as he
had heard Mr E[...]
P[...] and Mr D[...] P[...] stating that they
were going to shoot him. This did not accord with what was put
on his behalf
to those witnesses under cross-examination, which was
that he had heard them saying that someone had been shot and died,
which
had made the accused think that he would be shot. When the
accused ran away from the bakkie, he was shot at by the two farmers.
25.21
The accused left the main road to Bedford,
apparently being concerned that he may encounter more farmers who
would want to shoot
him. He kept the pistol because if the
police arrested him he wanted to be able to give them the pistol.
He intended
to return to Bedford and inform the deceased’s
family of what had occurred, and would then wait for them to contact
the police.
He did not ask the employees he encountered on one of Mr
D[...] P[...] ’s farms on Friday 20 August 2021 to call the
police
because they told him he must leave as Mr P[...] did not
want visitors there.
25.22
He ran from Mr D[...] P[...] on Friday 20
August 2021 because he thought he was also going to shoot him.
He threw the pistol
into the goat shed because he did not want to
appear threatening when he eventually surrendered, which he did after
Mr D[...] P[...]
had pursued him for between 45 minutes and an hour.
He surrendered because he was tired.
25.23
He did not know that it was an offence to
possess a firearm without a license, and had not been aware as to
whether or not the pistol
had ammunition in it when he took it.
26.
It is trite that in criminal matters the State bears the onus to
prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused’s
version is reasonably possibly true, he is entitled to his acquittal.
27.
As
stated in the oft-cited matter of
S
v
Van
der
Meyden
1999
(1) SACR 447
(W) at pages 80 to 81:
‘
The onus of
proof in a criminal case is discharged by the State if the evidence
establishes the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The
corollary is that he is entitled to be acquitted if it is reasonably
possible that he might be innocent (see,
for example, R v
Difford
1937
AD 370
at
373 and 383). These are not separate and independent tests, but the
expression of the same test when viewed from opposite
perspectives. In order to convict, the evidence must establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, which will be
so only
if there is at the same time no reasonable possibility that an
innocent explanation which has been put forward might be
true. The
two are inseparable, each being the logical corollary of the other.
In
whichever form the test is expressed, it must be satisfied upon a
consideration of all the evidence. A court does not look at
the
evidence implicating the accused in isolation in order to determine
whether there is proof beyond reasonable doubt, and so
too does it
not look at the exculpatory evidence in isolation in order to
determine whether it is reasonably possible that it might
be true.’
[2]
28.
The state witnesses all testified in a
forthright manner and without any apparent guile. There is no
obvious reason to doubt
the truth of their evidence.
29.
I was invited by Mr Solani to speculate on
the fact that Mr B[...] had not appeared on the original witness
list, yet was a crucial
witness, and appeared to be called as an
afterthought. The suggestion, although not specifically stated,
was that an adverse
inference may be drawn.
30.
In my view the aforementioned does not
warrant any such inference. There was no objection to Mr B[...]
being called, and the
State undertook to provide a statement from Mr
B[...] to the defence before he testified.
31.
The accused himself was a poor witness.
There were several contradictions in his evidence, as well as between
his evidence
and the version put on his behalf, which have already
been canvassed. His description of how he met the deceased and
came
to be at the complainant’s farm, and in particular his
lack of knowledge about any of the details surrounding his intended
trip to find employment, render his version inherently improbable.
32.
His version in this regard is furthermore
incompatible with the evidence which is common cause.
33.
In particular, he was unable to provide a
cogent explanation in relation to where his and the deceased’s
footprints had been
found outside the house, and furthermore quite
clearly tailored his version when improbabilities between his version
and what was
contained in annexure ‘C’ were pointed out
to him.
34.
He also, between 18 and 20 August 2021,
avoided every possible opportunity to proclaim his innocence and
offer his surrender, and
instead, after leaving the farmhouse,
behaved in a manner far more akin to one who was evading detection
than one who feared for
his life from the local farmers.
35.
In my view the version of the accused, to
the extent that it does not accord with the probabilities, falls to
be rejected as false,
and not reasonably possibly true.
36.
The evidence of the State, which was in my
view reliable, demonstrates that the accused and the deceased (having
agreed on a prior
date to commit the offences in question) spent two
days prior to the incident observing activities on the farm.
The deceased
had knowledge of the area, having lived there
previously.
37.
They arrived on 18 August 2021 just before
Mr B[...] was due to lock up the only dog on the property, and leave
the premises to
go on lunch, thus leaving the elderly complainant
alone on the premises to face the accused and the deceased.
38.
Either the deceased or the accused shot at
the complainant through the verandah door, and broke into the house,
where after a gun
battle ensued. Unfortunately for the accused
and deceased, their plans went severely awry, as the complainant
(despite his
age) launched a formidable attack of his own in order to
defend himself and his property.
39.
The accused admitted that he was aware of
the potential that the complainant may harm them once they were
inside his home.
40.
The conduct of the deceased and the accused
demonstrates a common purpose to commit the relevant offences from
the outset, with
the aid of a firearm. Whilst nothing was taken
from the complainant’s home, given the circumstances and
probabilities,
in my view the only reasonable inference which can be
drawn in regard to their reasons for observing the complainant’s
home
over two days, as well as the timing and manner of their
approach, is that they intended to break into the complainant’s
home and rob the complainant.
41.
The fact that one of them shot at the
complainant through his own verandah door, demonstrates a clear
intention to kill the complainant.
It is not necessary to
determine whether this was by prior agreement or not, as the accused
actively associated himself with what
occurred from the outset.
42.
In regard to count 4, the accused has been
charged with the murder of his co-perpetrator. There is
precedent in this regard,
and I can do no better than refer to the
matter of
S v Nkosi
2016 (1) SACR 301
(SCA), which involved an armed robbery of business
premises, in the course of which one of the perpetrators was killed
by the owner
of the premises. The issue of the liability of a
co-perpetrator was dealt with. The court, having considered
various
case authorities on the issue, and recognizing that such an
enquiry was fact-specific, stated the following at para 13:
‘
[13]
In conclusion and to summarise: on the facts of this case
the appellant was well aware that the fact of him and his fellow
robbers being armed with loaded firearms may result in a shoot-out
or, as it was referred to in Bergstedt and in Dube,
that they may encounter 'dangerous resistance'. He reasonably foresaw
subjectively that, in the course of encountering such 'dangerous
resistance', the firearms may be used with possible fatal
consequences. He was thus correctly convicted of murder and the
appeal must fail.’
43.
I also bear in mind the following caution
from the
Nkosi
matter, found in paragraph 7 in which is it stated that:
‘
[7]
I am mindful of the fact that intent is a subjective state of mind
and that 'the several thought processes attributed to an
accused must
be established beyond any reasonable doubt, having due regard to the
particular circumstances of the case' (per Olivier
JA in
S
v Lungile and Another
1999
(2) SACR 597 (SCA)
([1999]
ZASCA 96) para 16). Equally important is to be cognisant that
'the question whether an accused in fact foresaw a particular
consequence of his acts can only be answered by way of deductive
reasoning. . . . (b)ecause such reasoning can be misleading, one
must
be cautious'.’
44.
I
am satisfied that, on the facts of this matter, the accused
subjectively foresaw that in the course of an armed attack upon the
complainant, dangerous resistance may result, and continued
nonetheless. The intention involved would be that of
dolus
eventualis
.
[3]
45.
In regard to counts 5 and 6, the accused’s
claim of not knowing that it was unlawful to possess a firearm for
which he did
not have a license (which would in turn affect the
possession of ammunition for such firearm), does not ring true, and
is clearly
not a bona fide belief.
46.
The accused took the firearm with him when
he left the complainant’s property, hid it from the sight of
both Mr E[...] P[...]
and Mr D[...] P[...] , and attempted to rid
himself of it prior to surrendering. The serial number on the
firearm had been
erased. The accused made off with the firearm,
after the deceased had been shot and killed, knowing that it had been
used
in the commission of serious offences.
47.
In the matter of
S
v Tilayi
2021 (2) SACR 350
(ECM), the
issue of joint possession of firearms and ammunition was addressed at
paragraphs 43 and 44, with the following being
stated:
‘
[43]
On the facts of the present matter, I am of the view that the
inescapable inference that must be drawn from the evidence as
a whole
is that the group and the individual participants in the common
purpose had the necessary intention (animus) and control
required for
a conviction on the basis of joint possession as postulated in Nkosi.
The group agreed to acquire firearms that
were to be used in the
execution of the primary offence of robbery, the elements of which
offence required the theft of the money
by means of an act of force.
The firearms were necessary instruments in the execution of the
robbery in the manner it was planned.
[44]
Conceptually the question must be asked whether joint possession and
the requirements formulated in Nkosi must at
all find
application in the context of an application of the principles
underlying the common- purpose doctrine. In the context
of the
present matter the right question to ask may accordingly be whether
the possession of the firearms and the ammunition by
one member of
the group is a criminal act (actus reus) that falls within the scope
of the group's common design, and must as a
result be imputed to all
the other members of the group. The doctrine, after all, rests upon
the legal fiction that by association
one member of the group is held
liable for the criminal act (actus reus) of another. Liability for
the act of another arises by
operation of law and is not based on the
individual acts of the participants in the criminal design.’
48.
I cannot conclude from the available
evidence whether it was the deceased, the accused, or indeed both,
who wielded the firearm
in question on the relevant day, however it
is not, in my view, necessary to do so, as the use of the firearm
also clearly formed
part of the common design between the accused and
the deceased to commit the offences in question, and both the accused
and the
deceased actively participated in the implementation of the
common design.
49.
The possession of the firearm and
ammunition can accordingly be imputed to both the accused (and indeed
the deceased).
50.
Given all of the above, I am satisfied that
the State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
accused is accordingly
found guilty as charged.
N MOLONY
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT (ACTING)
For the
State :
Mr Coetzee
For
the Defence : Mr Solani
[1]
See
Section 144(3)(a)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
and the
commentary thereto in Du Toit
et
al: Commentary on the
Criminal Procedure Act at
R5 68 2022 ch21-22.
[2]
See
further
S
v Chabalala
2003(1) SACR 134 (SCA) at paragraph 15.
[3]
See
further
S
v Tilayi
2021
(2) SACR 350
(ECM) at paragraphs 18 to 33
.