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[2022] ZAECMKHC 84
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Tekoa Engineers (Pty) Ltd v Alfred Nzo Municipality and Others (1284/20) [2022] ZAECMKHC 84 (25 October 2022)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE DIVISION,
MAKHANDA
CASE NO: 1284/20
In the matter between:
TEKOA ENGINEERS (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
ALFRED NZO
MUNICIPALITY
First Respondent
THE MUNICIPAL MANAGER:
ALFRED NZO DISTRICT
MUNICIPALITY
Second Respondent
ZINZAME CONSULTING
ENGINEERS/CYCLE
PROJECTS/ UBUNTU BAM
JV
Third Respondent
EMLANJENI
JV
Fourth Respondent
OLON CONSULTING
ENGINEERS JV
IMP PLANT
HIRE
Fifth Respondent
BM INFRASTRUCTURE JV
MAGNACORP
Sixth Respondent
JUDGMENT: URGENT
APPLICATION
LOWE J:
INTRODUCTION
1.
By way of a notice of motion filed of
record and issued on 7 October 2022, applicant in this application
seeks an order condoning
its non-compliance, forms, time limits and
service period in terms of Uniform Rules 6(12) and an order,
effectively arising from
section 18
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013
, that the order of Laing J of 14 June 2022 relevant to the
matter between the same parties not be suspended pending the decision
of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the application for leave to appeal
against that order, or in any subsequent appeal.
2.
In essence then applicant seeks that
respondents are prohibited from continuing with the works on a
contract between first respondent
and the third to sixth respondents,
in respect of the tender referred to and dealt with in the judgment
of Laing J.
3.
The matter was brought as one of extreme
urgency supported by a certificate of urgency drafted by applicant’s
attorney and,
being a matter set down by way of the notice of motion
for hearing on a Tuesday, did not require a directive of this court.
4.
The time table constructed was that the
matter having been issued on 7 October 2022 (a Friday) respondents
must notify applicant’s
attorney by Tuesday 11 October 2022 of
their intention to oppose and file their answering affidavits, if
any, by no later than
16h00 on Thursday 13 October 2022, no reply
being referred to, the matter was to be heard on 18 October 2022, a
Tuesday.
5.
In point of fact, the founding papers were
not served in terms of
Rule 6
of the Rules of this court, but were
delivered by email to all the respondents’ various attorneys
only on 10 October 2022
(a Monday) some three days after the issue of
the papers in fact.
6.
Whilst the matter was a new self-standing
application, it should have been served on the respondents
themselves, and not their attorneys,
this is not an issue of which
respondents made much, seeming to accept the service on their
attorneys as adequate, although complaining
about the time limits.
7.
In due course, and on 11 October 2022,
first and second respondents gave notice of opposition and filed
their answering affidavits
on 13 October 2022 complying with the
stringent time limits imposed upon them. Third to sixth respondents
gave notice of their
intention to oppose the application on
18 October 2022, the day of the hearing, and their answering
affidavit was filed similarly
on the 18 October 2022.
8.
In due course, and during the course of
motion court on 18 October 2022, and received by me at approximately
midday, applicant filed
its replying affidavit to third, fourth,
fifth and sixth respondents’ answering affidavit, having
already filed its replying
affidavit to first and second respondents
on 14 October 2022.
9.
Counsel for applicant handed to me his
heads of argument at approximately 13h45, in motion court on the day
of the hearing, and
as I stood the matter down to the next day,
counsel for all the respondents handed in their heads of argument at
9h30 the next
morning, 19 October 2022.
10.
All the above demonstrates that the time
line chosen by applicant can only be described as one of extreme
urgency, and having regard
to late service afforded respondents on
the time table chosen, one day to give notice of intention to oppose
(served on 10 October
2022 intention to oppose to be given by close
of business 11 October 2022); and from receipt of the papers on the
morning of the
10 October 2022 to close of business on Thursday
13 October 2022 to file their answering affidavits, a period of
no more than
three and a half days.
11.
That first and second respondents managed
to meet the time table is remarkable, but this was completely missed
by the remaining
respondents who only managed to comply therewith on
the day of the hearing.
12.
It is also plain from the summary above,
that I received the papers in dribs and drabs, and that papers were
still being handed
in by the remaining respondents and in reply by
applicant during the course of the day intended for the hearing, and
that applicant
had only been able to file its heads, being handed to
me at 13h45 on the day of the hearing, respondents’ only the
next day.
13.
The above course of conduct brings these
urgent proceedings into the category of those launched with and
proceeding along the lines
of extreme urgency.
14.
It should be said that the main application
was complex and that the founding papers were some 91 pages in
length. By the time the
matter was finally before me and the papers
complete these were some 199 pages in length.
15.
It will thus be seen that not only was the
matter proceeded with as one of extreme urgency, but involved a
complex set of facts
raising various issues of law, going to some 199
pages.
16.
The matter was literally forced onto the
roll on Tuesday, 18 October 2022, and applicant persisted in its view
that the matter must
not only be heard but dealt with similarly as
one of extreme urgency.
17.
Having stood the matter down on the 18
October 2022 to the 19 October 2022 in order that I might read the
heads of argument and
papers which were filed during the Tuesday
motion court day as I have set out above, argument then proceeded for
some three hours.
18.
I reserved judgment having regard to the
complexity of the matter requiring to consider all the arguments
advanced which were many.
19.
Three questions arose in the argument:
19.1
whether the matter was properly enrolled at
all;
19.2
whether the matter was of such urgency as
to warrant being heard on the time table and date chosen unilaterally
by applicant; and
19.3
the issues surrounding the merits of the
application being the issues raised by applicant in terms of
section
18
of the
Superior Courts Act.
>
THE BACKGROUND TO
THE APPLICATION
20.
On 14 June 2022 Laing J gave judgment in an
application to have reviewed and set aside first respondent’s
decision to refuse
to award applicant a tender under a particular bid
number (“the tender”) as well as the awarding of the
tender to the
third to sixth respondents herein.
21.
Having heard argument Laing J found that
the process followed by first respondent with regards to the tender
was unlawful and that
its decision to disqualify applicant’s
bid in response to the tender be reviewed and declared unlawful and
set aside. Laing
J found further that second respondent’s
decision to award the tender to the third to sixth respondents was
such as to be
reviewed, declared unlawful and set aside and similarly
such contracts concluded between first respondent and third to sixth
respondents
being declared unlawful and void
ab
initio
. Finally, to enable certain of
the projects that were near to completion to be completed, Laing J
suspended certain parts of his
order for a period of thirty days,
that period ending on 15 July 2022.
22.
Not agreeing with the correctness of the
judgment and order of Laing J respondents filed a notice of
application of leave to appeal
which was argued on 31 August 2022,
judgment reserved and then handed down on 6 September 2022
dismissing the application
for leave to appeal.
23.
Out of time, but seeking condonation, third
to sixth respondents served their petition to the Supreme Court of
Appeal, upon applicant’s
attorneys on 4 October 2022
serving at the Supreme Court of Appeal on 5 October 2022.
THE
SECTION 18
APPLICATION
24.
Applicant’s case is that in terms of
section 18(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act, and
subject to subsections
2 and 3 thereof, and unless the court under exceptional circumstances
orders otherwise, the operation and
execution of a decision that is
the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is
suspended pending the decision
of the application or appeal.
25.
Applicant seeks an order allowing
enforcement of the main judgment of Laing J which is the subject
of the application for leave
to appeal to the SCA contending that
material exceptional circumstances exist which justify the grant of
leave to execute the judgment
with potential irreparable harm or
prejudice to be sustained by applicant if the leave to execute the
judgment is refused and was
so, it is alleged, the absence of
irreparable harm or prejudice to respondents if leave to execute the
order pending appeal is
granted.
26.
It is this application which was brought
before me as a matter of extreme urgency.
URGENCY
27.
Urgency
must be judged against the background of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform
Rules of Court and Rule 12(d) of the Eastern Cape Practice
Directions
[1]
.
28.
Urgent applications require an Applicant to
persuade the Court that non-compliance with the Rules, and the extent
thereof, is justified
on the grounds of urgency. Applicant must
demonstrate
inter alia
that it will suffer real loss or damage were it to rely on normal
procedure.
29.
The Rules adopted by an Applicant in such
an application must, as far as practicable, be in accordance with the
existing Rules both
as to procedure and time periods applicable.
30.
A
Respondent faced with an urgent application, and to avoid the risk of
judgment being given against it by default, is obliged provisionally
to accept the Rules set by Applicant and then, when the matter is
heard, make its objections thereto if any
[2]
.
31.
In
Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality & Others v Greyvenouw CC and
Others
[3]
Plasket AJ (as he then was) said as follows:
“
[37]
It is trite that applicants in urgent applications must give proper
consideration to the degree of urgency and tailor
the notice of
motion to that degree of urgency. It is also true that when Courts
are enjoined by Rule 6(12) to deal with urgent
applications in
accordance with procedures that follow the Rules as far as possible,
this involves the exercise of a judicial discretion
by a Court
'concerning which deviations it will tolerate in a specific case'.
[38]
… it is not in every case in which the applicant may have
departed from the Rules to an unwarranted extent
that the appropriate
remedy is the dismissal of the application. Each case depends on its
special facts and circumstances. This
is implicitly recognised by
Kroon J in the
Caledon Street Restaurants CC
case
when he held - looking at the issue from the other perspective, as it
were - that the 'approach should rather be that
there are times
where, by way of non-suiting an applicant, the point must clearly be
made that the Rules should be obeyed and that
the interest of the
other party and his lawyers should be accorded proper respect, and
the matter must be looked at to consider
whether the case is such a
time or not'.
…
[40]
… Indeed, the erstwhile Appellate Division has on a number of
occasions turned its back on such formalism
in the application of the
Rules. For instance, in
Trans-African
Insurance Co Ltd v Maluleka
Schreiner
JA held that 'technical objections to less than perfect
procedural steps should not be permitted, in the absence
of
prejudice, to interfere with the expeditious and, if possible,
inexpensive decision of cases on their real merits'. …
in
D
F Scott (EP) (Pty) Ltd v Golden Valley Supermarket,
Harms JA held that the Rules 'are designed to ensure a fair
hearing and should be interpreted in such a way as to advance,
and
not reduce, the scope of the entrenched fair trial right' contained
in s 34 of the Constitution.”
[4]
32.
There are degrees of urgency of course. An
Applicant must set out explicitly the circumstances which render the
matter urgent such
as to justify the curtailment of the Rules,
procedures and time periods adopted. That there will be a loss of
substantial redress,
if not heard on the basis chosen, must be shown.
33.
An
Applicant cannot create its own urgency by simply waiting till the
normal rules can no longer be applied
[5]
34.
If the above is satisfied other issues come
to be considered, some of which are:
34.1 Whether
Respondent can adequately present its case in the time given;
32.2 Other
prejudice to Respondent and the administration of justice;
32.3 The strength
of Applicant’s case and any delay in asserting its rights
(self-created urgency).
35.
In this matter Respondents contends that:
35.1 The urgency is
self-created by the substantial delay in Applicants’ launch of
the application;
35.2 That in any
event the procedures and time limits adopted were completely
unjustified and unsupported by the relevant
facts as to urgency.
36.
I have set out
the relevant time line exhaustively above and the remaining issues
relevant.
APPLICANTS
SUBMISSIONS AS TO URGENCY
37.
Applicant contends that the urgency with
which the matter has been brought is justified by the prejudice that
applicant might suffer
by having to wait for a hearing in the
ordinary course; the prejudice that other litigants might suffer if
the applicant is given
preference; and the prejudice that respondents
might suffer by the abridgment of the prescribed times and early
hearing.
38.
It is argued for applicant that it has
shown sufficient and satisfactory grounds to permit the hearing
sought, not only seeking
to exercise its right to approach a court
for relief not solely for financial reasons, but also in protection
of unlawful spending
of tax payers’ money which it is alleged
cannot be reversed in the event that the appeal proceedings are not
in respondents’
favour. It is alleged that there has been no
undue delay in bringing the application and that on the facts
applicant may not obtain
substantial redress in the event that it is
successful but forced to wait in the queue to argue the application.
39.
In essence applicant contends that the
apparent delay from the original date of the judgment of Laing J and
its suspension having
lapsed on 15 July 2022, is adequately explained
by the exchange of correspondence between the parties, and that it
was only upon
the filing to the Supreme Court of Appeal of the
petition in early October (5 October 2022) which precipitated the
need to bring
the application. As I understand the argument is that
although it is conceded the application could have been brought at an
earlier
stage, there was really no need to do so having regard to the
correspondence between the parties, and the delay between the
judgment
of Laing J dismissing the application for leave to appeal,
on 6 September 2022 and the filing of the petition in early
October 2022.
40.
As to the extreme time line adopted in the
application, applicant sought to justify this particularly with
reference to the fact
that it was attempting to protect the loss of
public funds in the matter that would have been occasioned had the
matter been delayed,
effectively arguing that this all on it is own
justified the extreme time line, as well as the fact that it was
argued that the
money would never be able to be recovered, and would
be lost to the public purse on the one hand, and to applicant’s
prejudice
on the other.
41.
As to urgency respondents join issue with
every allegation and argument put forward by applicant.
42.
Relying
on the judgment in
Bobotyana
supra
[6]
, and various other
authorities on urgency, it was argued that firstly the section 18
application could have been brought on or
after 15 July 2022, some 84
days prior to the actual launch of the urgent application and thus
any urgency in the matter was self-created,
alternatively, even were
that not the case, that in the circumstances the time line adopted
was entirely inappropriate, prejudicial
and one which should not be
countenanced by this court.
43.
Respondents argued in addition that the
applicant failed to show that it would not be afforded substantial
redress in due course.
44.
Respondents in argument perceived that
applicant relied upon the submission that it was not essentially
obliged to comply with the
usual principles relevant to the bringing
of urgent applications as section 18(3) proceedings were inherently
urgent on the one
hand, and on the other this was an application
brought in protection of public funds, were simply fundamentally
incorrect.
45.
It was strongly argued that the urgency was
in fact self-created, it having stood back and done nothing and then
sought the court’s
assistance as a matter of the utmost urgency
with no reasonable explanation as to the three months delay in
launching the application
at all.
46.
Quite apart from the merits, it was argued
that on either of the above main grounds the application should be
struck from the roll.
47.
I proposed to deal only with the question
of urgency and not the merits of the application, having regard to
the conclusion which
I have reached.
THE RELEVANT FACTS,
CONSIDERATION AND CONCLUSION IN RESPECT OF URGENCY
48.
In the founding affidavits, it is certainly
so that applicant appears to rely on the fact that this is a section
18(3) application
as rendering it sufficiently urgent to justify the
method in which this application was brought.
49.
Conceding as did applicant’s counsel
that the applicant could certainly have been brought at an earlier
date, it was nevertheless
contended that having regard to the factors
already elucidated above, this was by no means fatal. Heavy reliance
was placed upon
the exchange of correspondence between the parties
justifying the delay in launching the proceedings.
50.
As conceded by applicant’s counsel,
and correctly so, of course it is plain that this application could
have been brought
at any time after the initial application for leave
to appeal was filed in respect of the judgment of Laing J dated
13 June 2022.
Certainly, having regard to applicant’s
fears, it could appropriately have been brought both before and
certainly at the
time of or soon after the 30 day lapsed period
expiring on 15 July 2022. The applicant would not have been faulted
for bringing
that application at any time up to 6 September 2022
when the application for leave was dismissed.
51.
Whilst the applicant delayed considerably
in launching its application to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and
whilst the order of Laing
J was certainly operative during the
intervening period, this of itself is not such as to have been any
bar to the earlier bringing
of an application which would, on the
authorities have determined the matter between the parties whatever
the result of the application
for leave to the SCA may have been or
may be.
52.
There is, however, a further and perhaps
even more difficult issue for applicant in this matter.
53.
Having delayed, and there can be no doubt
that applicant did delay its actual launch of the application on 7
October 2022, this
may have been such as to be condoned,
notwithstanding the delay, had it adopted a sensible and less
stringent time line.
54.
I say this on the basis that certainly
section 18 proceedings are, by their nature, usually of some urgency,
and warrant being dealt
with generally accordingly. However, the
degree of that urgency must be justified taking into account also the
backgrounds, history
and facts.
55.
When considering the launch of an urgent
application, not only the convenience of the parties but the court
and all issues relevant
to the reasonableness of the time limits
imposed against the size of the papers and complexity of the matter
must be weighed, carefully
considered and applied.
56.
I have already set out carefully above and
in some detail the principles applicable to urgent applications.
57.
I emphasise that there are degrees of
urgency, each of which must be justified on the papers after careful
consideration by an applicant
when launching its urgent application.
58.
I am not suggesting that there was the
complete absence of some urgency but the application could and most
certainly should in the
circumstances, at least have been brought on
a less stringent time line to have any prospect of passing the
urgency test. Indeed,
I have considerable difficulty in understanding
how the stringent time line with which applicant itself was unable
itself to comply
could have been thought to be appropriate. It placed
an entirely unreasonable and pretty much unachievable time line upon
respondents
and at the end of the day not only were there no heads of
argument ready for the hearing from applicant, in a complex and
difficult
matter, but applicant’s own replying affidavit had to
be handed in in respect of the third to sixth respondents halfway
through
the day of the intended hearing. Whilst respondents were
obliged provisionally to accept the rules set out by applicant and
then
when the matter is heard make objections thereto, this does not
in any way indicate that an application brought other than in a
justifiable manner should nevertheless be determined and this does
not relate or apply to formalism in the application of the Rules.
59.
In this matter the applicant it seems
failed to consider whether respondents could adequately present their
case in the time given,
this constituting prejudice to respondents
and the administration of justice, let alone the delay in applicant
asserting its rights
(self-created urgency).
60.
In my view applicant erred in failing, when
finally proceeding, to carefully consider what had passed, the full
ambit of its application,
the elements of delay which could be
attributed to it (as set out above) and then the setting of an absurd
time table in the context
of the complicated issues to be decided and
answered. Applicant in so doing acted to the clear detriment of the
matter itself as
to it being properly and sensibly adjudicated. It
did so, in my view, against the background that to have afforded a
greater period
for respondents to answer and itself to reply with
heads of argument to be filed and the duty judge having adequate time
to consider
and read the matter would have made a very considerable
difference and would of itself not by any means have much aggravated
the
urgency contended for having regard to the time that had already
been allowed to lapse. This in my view simply cannot be endorsed.
61.
In my view, the allegations made in the
founding affidavit and in reply, do not serve to address or cure the
defects pointed out
above. It seems to have been applicant’s
attitude that having regard to the fact that public moneys were
involved, it was
the court’s duty to deal with the matter
however inappropriate the time line may have been. This is obviously
an unsustainable
argument.
62.
In my view accordingly and having regard to
all of the above, this is a matter which simply cannot proceed on the
urgency time line
adopted by applicant as a result of both the
self-created urgency adverted to above and quite separately from that
the unreasonable
and unnecessary stringent and unsustainable time
line adopted.
63.
It must be accepted that matters factual
and legal required thought and careful consideration by respondents,
its deponents, the
legal team and not to mention the court. This was
denied for no good reason, applicant having afforded itself a
considerable period
to consider the issues and draft answers and
having had the luxury thereof itself forced an unreasonable and
stringent time line
upon the parties and the court. The issues of the
merits of applicant’s claim in terms of section 18, whilst
certainly arguable
is not such to …...us to change or alter
the issue as to urgency above in the circumstances of this matter.
64.
The
usual order in these circumstances is to strike the matter from the
roll.
[7]
Of course in
appropriate circumstances the papers may be such and the circumstance
such as to justify the dismissal of the matter
as set out in
Vena
v Vena and two others
[8]
.
Such a dismissal is on technical grounds being lack of urgency and
not on the merits.
65.
In this matter applicant’s papers and
the circumstances are not, however, such as to justify such a
dismissal order nor is
this contended for by respondents. It seems to
me that the usual striking off order is appropriate.
CASE FLOW
MANAGEMENT
66.
It is worth saying that this entire issue
surrounding the urgency difficulty and set down dates could have been
avoided had the
parties sought that their matter be dealt with by way
of case flow management by the Judge President or his nominee as to
procedure
and dates for hearing. In this regard, and whilst not
completely on all fours, the matter of B
obotynana
(
supra
) is
relevant.
67.
If applicant is to proceed with the matter,
and having regard to the order I intend to give, it must do so in the
manner and procedure
required by law and in addition thereto engage
the case flow management process by way of the Judge President or his
nominee.
COSTS
68.
In
Biowatch
Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources and Others
[9]
it was pointed out that generally in Constitutional litigation
against the State the successful litigant should not be ordered
to
pay the costs. This is a judicial discretion having regard to all
relevant considerations, and only if not frivolous, vexatious
or
manifestly inappropriate.
69.
In
matters raising Constitutional issues against Universities
[10]
the Constitutional Court found the
Biowatch
principle applicable.
70.
The
usual Rule that a successful party should be awarded costs in any
event is always subject to judicial exercise of the Court’s
discretion. Where Constitutional issues are raised
bona
fide
this must necessarily be taken into account in respect of an
appropriate just and equitable costs order. The judicial discretion
has been described as “
very
wide”
or “
overriding”
[11]
.
Judicially in this context means “
not
arbitrarily”
one
must consider the circumstances, weigh the various issues that have a
bearing on costs and make an order that is fair and just
between the
parties
[12]
.
71.
In
my view, the principles relating to costs impact upon access to
justice – this includes the chilling effect adverse costs
orders have on Constitutional litigation
[13]
.
It is also important to consider the position of the litigants. In
this matter there has however been an egregious failure in
respect of
urgency, unsatisfied and deserving of censure.
72.
It seems to me that in all the
circumstances and having regard to the above considerations, and
Biowatch
and
in my general costs discretion, and further on the basis of justice
and equity it is justified to order that Applicant pay Respondent’s
wasted costs occasioned by the striking of the matter from the roll.
ORDER
73.
The following order issues in the result:
1.
The application is struck from the roll.
2.
Applicant is to pay respondents’
wasted costs relevant to the argument as to urgency and those
consequent upon the matter
being struck from the roll.
3.
Should applicant proceed further with the
matter in due course and in whatever manner it chooses to do so,
applicant must refer
the matter to the Judge President for case flow
management directives.
M.J. LOWE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Appearing on behalf of
the Applicant:
Adv. Ndamase with Ms. Masiza, instructed by Moletsnae PN Attorneys
Inc., East London, Mgangatho Attorneys, Makhanda.
Appearing on behalf of
the Respondent:
Adv. Maliwa,
instructed by V. Funani Incorporated and Gilindoda
Attorneys, Makhanda
Date
heard:
19 October 2022.
Date
delivered:
25 October 2022.
[1]
Bobotyana
supra
[2]
Caledon
Street Restaurants CC v D’Aviera
[1998]
JOL 1832
(SE).
In
re: Several Matters on the Urgent Roll
[2012]
4 All SA 570
(GSJ) [15]
[3]
2004 (2) SA 81
(SE) [37], [38] and [40].
[4]
But see:
Murray
& Others NNO v African Global Holdings (Pty) Ltd & Others
2020
(2) SA 93
(SCA) [35], [38], [39] and [40]
[5]
Lindeque
and Others v Hirsch and Others, In Re: Prepaid24 (Pty) Limited
(2019/8846) [2019] ZAGPJHC 122 (3 May 2019) [10];
Masipa
& Another v Masipa 2020
JDR
1054 (GP);
Edrei
Investments 9 Ltd (In Liquidation) v Dis-Chem Pharmacies (Pty) Ltd
2012
(2) SA 553 (ECP);
Bandle
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds and Others
2001
(2) SA 203 (SE) 213;
East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty)
Ltd and Others
(11/33767)
[2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) [6] and [9] – The fact
that Applicant now wants the matter resolved urgently
does not
render the matter urgent;
Ntozini
and Others v African National Congress and Others
(18798/2018) [2018] ZAGPJHC 415 (25 June 2018) 415.
[6]
Bobotyana
and two others v Dyantyi and five others
case
no 1198/2020, Eastern Cape Division, Makhanda, judgment by Mbenenge
JP.
[7]
SARS
v Hawker Services
2006
(4) SA 292 (SCA)
[8]
2010
(2) SA 248
(ECP) [6], [7] and [8].
[9]
2009 (6) SA 232
[10]
Harrielall
v University of KwaZulu-Natal
(CCT100/17)
[2017] ZACC 38
; 2018 (1) BCLR (CC) (31 October 2017);
Rhodes
University v Student Representative Council of Rhodes University and
Others
(1937/2016) [2016] ZAECGHC 141;
[2017] 1 All SA 617
(ECG) (1
December 2016).
In
the Constitutional Court Ferguson v Rhodes University
2017 JDR 1768 (CC) [23]-[28].
[11]
K
& S Dry Cleaning Equipment (Pty) Ltd and Another v South African
Eagle Insurance Co Ltd
and
Another
2001
(3) SA 652
(W) at 668;
Griffiths
v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd
[1993] ZASCA 121
;
1994 (1) SA 535
(A);
Ferreira
v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others
[1996] ZACC 27
;
1996 (2) SA 621
(CC) para [3].
[12]
Cilliers on Costs 2.01 to 2.04
[13]
Minority Judgment of Poswa J in
Biowatch
[45] –
[46].