About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Makhanda
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Makhanda
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAECMKHC 67
|
|
M.H v C.A.H (CA231/2021) [2022] ZAECMKHC 67 (4 October 2022)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA]
CASE
NO: CA231/2021
Heard
on: 05/09/2022
Delivered
on: 04/10/2022
In
the matter between:
M[....]
H[....]
Appellant
And
C[....]
A[....] H[....]
Respondent
FULL
COURT JUDGMENT
NHLANGULELA
DJP
[1]
This is an appeal against the order of civil contempt made by Lowe J
on 2 November
2020. The leave to appeal against the order by
the learned Judge was delivered on 27 July 2021.
[2]
I set out herein below the contents of the order. They read as
follows:
“
1.
Respondent be and is hereby directed to pay applicant the arrear
amount of R124 454,00 in respect of his
non-compliance with the
maintenance order granted in this Court on 30 April 2019 under case
number 342/2018 (“the order”),
at the rate of R4 000,00
per month, such payment to be made by Respondent commencing on 1
December 2020, and monthly thereafter
on the 1
st
day
of each month, until the full sum has been paid together with
interest as referred to below.
2.
The aforesaid sum of R124 454,00 is to bear interest a
tempore
morae
which
is to run from 5 November 2020 until date of final payment and is to
be calculated on the outstanding maintenance sum from
time to time.
3.
Respondent be and is hereby declared to be in contempt of the order.
4.
Respondent is committed to imprisonment for a period of 60 days.
5.
The period of imprisonment imposed on Respondent in paragraph 4 above
is suspended for a
period of 2 (two) years on condition that:
5.1
Respondent pays to Applicant the sum of R124 454,00 together
with interest thereon in accordance
with paragraphs 1 and 2 above;
5.2
Respondent complies with the order, including any amendment or
variation thereof by any competent court.
6.
Respondent be and is hereby directed to pay Applicant’s costs
of suit on the scale
as between attorney and client”.
[3]
Properly interpreted, the order granted on 12 November 2020, the
subject of this appeal,
consists of three sections
the first being the imprisonment for contemptuous conduct for
a period of 60 days,
albeit
, suspended for 2 years. The
second section pertains to the payment of arrear maintenance together
with legal interest thereon,
calculated as at 12 November 2020 in the
sum of R124 454,00, monthly in instalments of R4 000,00
retrospectively to 01
December 2020. Further, the order
provides in the third section, incorporated in para 5, that the
appellant shall continue
to pay maintenance for the lifetime of the
respondent and until the minor child becomes a major and is
independent from parental
control and care. It is anticipated
in paragraph 5.2 of the Order that the appellant cannot on his own
decision stop paying
maintenance unless authorised to do so by a
competent court.
[4]
It is common cause that in December 2019 the appellant stopped paying
the full amount
of R14 000. Stated differently, the
appellant ceased paying the R10 000,00 life-time maintenance due
to the respondent.
He sustained the monthly payments of
R4 000,00 due to the minor child. For that stoppage, which
was the conduct clearly
perpetrated in contravention of paragraph
8.1.1 of the court order dated 30 April 2019, the respondent brought
the contempt proceedings
in June 2020, whereafter, those proceedings
were concluded in terms of the order that is alluded to in paragraph
2 above.
Pursuant thereto, the appellant noted an appeal.
[5]
After a date for the hearing of this appeal had been allocated by the
Registrar, the
appellant deemed it necessary to bring a formal
application to the court advancing two causes of action. On the
first cause
of action, the appellant seeks relief that the order made
by the court on 30 April 2019 be rescinded. He bases his relief on
the
provisions of Rule 42 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court.
The thrust of the application in terms of Rule 42 is that
some
material information was erroneously withheld by the responded during
the proceedings which, if it was brought to the attention
of the
court
a quo
, would have persuaded the court not to grant the
order of civil contempt dated 12 November 2020. The
second cause of
action is premised on the provisions of s 19
(b)
of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013 and s 173 of the Constitution,
it being alleged that the appellant is entitled to introduce
new
evidence which, in the interest of justice, will show that the
respondent adduced inadmissible false evidence amounting to
perjury.
[6]
We expressed a view right at the outset of the appeal proceedings
that the application
for rescission of the judgment dated 30 April
2019 is irrelevant to the appeal against the order dated 12 November
2019.
To that extent we indicated our inclination towards
removing the application from the appeal roll. The evidence was
available
at all material times relevant to the hearings that led to
the granting of the orders dated 30 April 2019 and 12 November 2020.
We made it clear to the appellant that in the absence of an
explanation as to why that evidence had not been adduced, the
application
cannot pass muster. It may be pointed out that
confronted with the double-barrel application proceedings lumped into
a single
founding affidavit, we deemed it appropriate to dismiss both
applications. We will deal later on with the motive for
the bringing of these applications.
[7]
I now revert to the appeal itself.
[8]
The parties were married on 25 November 1989. Their divorce
proceedings were
commenced on 13 February 2018, and finalized on 30
April 2019 by means of a court order that was premised on a
settlement agreement
in terms of which the post-divorce spousal
maintenance would be paid in favour of the respondent at R10 000,00
per month.
In addition, a sum of R4 000,00 would be paid
in favour of Joshua, one of four sons of the marriage, for
maintenance and education.
Both the respondent and Joshua would
be kept under the medical aid scheme of the appellant. The
parties were legally represented
during the divorce proceedings that
culminated in the consent order. At the time of divorce, the
parties had a business trading
as Paint City in which the respondent
held shares valued at approximately R369 000,00. In terms
of the negotiations
that led to the consent order, those shares were
traded for the maintenance order that the respondent was granted with
the result
that the appellant became the sole owner of the business.
The appellant would also be the owner of a property situated at
Port
Alfred (the Green Fountain Farm Chalets). The appellant had a
job with FNB, Port Alfred earning a net income of R23 574,28
per
month. These assets together with other moveable assets, left
him with an asset base valued at R1,8 million approximately
in April
2019. Soon after divorce, in October 2019, the appellant raised
a complaint against legal bills, and a bitter complaint
that his own
legal representatives has caused him to sign a deed of settlement
under duress when he would not be able to afford
maintenance.
He also complained about the fact that the respondent would be paid
maintenance for the rest of her life without
contributing to the
growth of Paint City. Such complaint, together with others that
followed, persisted until the appellant
addressed a written notice to
the respondent that payment of R10 000,00 maintenance would be
stopped in November 2019.
Accordingly, he stopped paying.
But he was content with paying the R4 000,00 maintenance that is
due to the child.
According to the court
a quo
the
recurring theme raised by the appellant before and after he stopped
the payments was that he did not have financial means to
meet his
maintenance obligation.
[9]
Since the court
a quo
had to answer the question whether the
appellant’s non-payment of R10 000,00 maintenance was the
conduct that amount
to civil contempt, the court
a quo
applied
the principles set out in the leading case of
Fakie NO v CC11
Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA), where Camero
o
n
J had the following to say:
“
(a)
The civil contempt procedure is a valuable and important
mechanism for securing compliance with court orders, and
survives
constitutional scrutiny in the form of a motion court application
adapted to constitutional requirements.
(b)
The respondent in such proceedings is not an ‘accused person’,
but is entitled to analogous
protection as are appropriate to motion
proceedings.
(c)
In particular, the applicant must prove the requisites of contempt
(the order; service or notice; non-compliance;
and wilfulness and
mala fides
) beyond reasonable doubt.
(d)
But, once the applicant has proved the order, service or notice, and
non-compliance, the respondent
bears an evidential burden in relation
to wilfulness and
mala fides
. Should the respondent fail to
advance evidence that establishes a reasonable doubt as to whether
non-compliance was wilful and
mala fide,
contempt will have
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
(e)
A declaratory and other appropriate remedies remain available to a
civil applicant on proof on a balance of
probabilities.”
[10]
In relation to the present matter, it is discernible from the
statements of Camero
o
n J in
Fakie
that the respondent had the
onus
to prove the requisites of
contempt, namely that:
“
(i)
The order of payment of maintenance by the appellant existed.
(ii)
If it did exist, that it was duly served upon the appellant or that
notice of its existence was brought
to
the
notice of the appellant.
(iii)
If point (ii) above is satisfied, that, as a fact, the appellant did
not comply in terms thereof willingly and
with malice”.
[11]
It was common cause that the respondent did discharge its
onus
of proof that the order was granted by the court on 30 November 2019.
When that happened, the appellant was present in court; and
he did
acquire knowledge that the order was made. It also bears
mentioning that the appellant had consented to the granting
of a
decree of divorce incorporating a Deed of Settlement on which the
terms of payment for the maintenance of the respondent and
her minor
child are provided. However, since the reason for
non-compliance would invariably lie within the knowledge of the
defaulter, the appellant had to adduce evidence that establishes a
reasonable doubt that his default was not wilful and
mala fide.
If the appellant fails to adduce such evidence the contempt
will have been
proved on the criminal law
standard beyond
a reasonable doubt.
[12]
At the outset of the contempt proceedings the court
a quo
found, on the evidence on affidavit, that the order, notice thereof
and non-compliance was undisputed, and indeed common cause.
It
then said at para 27:
“
27.
The only issue is whether the Respondent has established wilfulness
and
mala
fide
s
beyond reasonable doubt in the failure to pay Applicant’s
maintenance of R10 000,00 per month (or any part thereof).
In this regard Respondent has an evidentiary burden.
28.
… This requires respondent to put up a cogent case that he was
not wilful, but particularly not
mala
fide
,
when he established this belief as each date for payment came and
went, commencing at the beginning of December 2019 to now.”
[13]
The court
a quo
investigated the issue concerning the meaning
of wilfulness and
mala fides
in the context of civil contempt
proceedings. In doing so, it relied on the case of
AK v JK
,
Case No. 19890/2018, Western Cape Division, Cape Town (3 November
2020), in which the following was said:
“
85
Has the respondent discharged the evidential burden he bears to show
that his failure to comply with the order
of Le Grange, J was not
wilful or
mala
fide?
In
Maulean
t/a Audio Agencies v Standard Bank Ltd
1994
(3) SA 801
(C) at 803H-I King J described the act of wilfulness thus:
‘
More
specifically in the context of a default judgment ‘wilful’
connotes deliberateness in the sense of knowledge of
the action and
of the consequences, its legal consequences and a conscious and
freely taken decision to refrain from giving notice
of intention to
defend, whatever the motivation for this conduct might be.’
I consider that the same
approach is warranted in considering the element of wilfulness in
this matter given that it accords with
the following
dictum
of
Cameron JA in
Fakie:
“
[9]
The test for when disobedience of a civil order
constitutes contempt has come to be stated as whether the breach
was
committed ‘deliberately
mala
fide
’
.
A deliberate disregard us not enough, since the non-complier may
genuinely,
albeit
mistakenly,
believe him or herself entitled to act in the way claimed to
constitute the contempt. In such a case good faith
avoids the
infraction. Even a refusal to comply that is objectively
unreasonable may be
bona
fide
(though
unreasonableness could evidence lack of good faith).”
[14]
In the final analysis, the court
a quo
found that the
appellant, having intimated to the respondent that he would pay a
reduced sum of R1 000,00 out of R10 000,00
per month, but
still failed to make the reduced payment, deliberately and with bad
faith breached the court order. On the
issue, the court
a
quo
placed reliance to the statement made by Kollapen J in
JD
v DD
2016 JDR 0933 (GP) which reads:
“…
if
father were truly not mala fide, one would have expected him at the
very least to have made payment of those amounts that he
alleged he
was able to pay in his application for reduced maintenance”,
the conclusion was reached that:
[33] …
as pointed out in
Fakie
objective unreasonableness in the
failure to comply may be
bona fide
but also can evidence bad
faith.”
[15]
In my opinion, the conclusion reached by the court
a quo
that
the appellant was in contempt of the order that monthly payments of
R10 000,00 had to be paid readily entitled the respondent
to the
relief contained in the first, second and third sections of the order
dated 12 November 2020. Such a conclusion accords
with the
principle that objective unreasonableness in the failure to comply
with a court order is indicative of bad faith in the
same way that it
would have been a sign of good faith had the behaviour and attitude
of the appellant towards compliance been different.
[16]
The court
a quo
rejected
the lack of
means defence based
not only on
the unacceptable conduct of self-help on the part of the appellant,
but also due to the financial records of Paint City
that the
appellant had placed before the magistrate in his application for the
variation of the maintenance order. The court
a quo
found that the documents and entries appearing in the bank statements
exhibited by the appellant were, though selective, indicative
of an
income stream of approximately R33 027,08 per month, the
scenario that remarkably demonstrated that the appellant had
deliberately not budgeted to pay R10 000,00 maintenance or, at
the very least, R1 000,00 reduced maintenance that he
had told
the respondent that he could afford to pay, but never did so.
It was found that on the information gleaned from
the financial
records of the appellant,
albeit
irregularly presented,
sufficient equity was available that afforded appellant to pay
maintenance, but he, that notwithstanding,
intentionally and with bad
faith chose to disobey the maintenance order. Having
found that the appellant’s version
that he could not afford to
pay the maintenance was not cogent, a conclusion of law was drawn
that contempt was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
[17]
The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment of the court
a quo
.
In challenging it, he raises the following grounds:
“
1)
The Appellant submits that the Court
a
quo erred
in
failing to take sufficient cognisance of the fact that the Appellant
was a lay litigant, who was not fully aware of all his evidentiary
requirements; was at the time suffering with depression and anxiety
for which he was booked off work; in all likelihood was not
in the
correct mental frame of mind to be present in court, let alone
attempt to defend himself against highly experienced senior
counsel
and as such was prejudiced.
2)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in finding at para
7 of the judgment that the Appellant has a “capacious”
home. We further refer to the Honourable
Justice Lowe’s
comment within the granting of appeal dated 12 July 20121, para 34.1
regarding 2 sons, this again in error
and should read 3 adult sons.
3)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in finding at para
57 of the judgment that there was a home valued at R875 000,00,
and there was therefore no equity available
that could have been
utilised to settled the Appellant’s obligations.
4)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in accepting at
para 35 of the judgment Respondent’s counsel’s claim that
the Appellant did not declare all income and
expenditure. The
evidence on the record revealed that the Appellant had disclosed and
proven the figures provided, with the
exception of groceries, which
will always be variable.
5)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in accepting at
para 35 that there was other income which the Appellant received. The
learned Judge incorrectly placed an
onus
on the Appellant to
prove a negative, ie that he did not receive other income.
6)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in accepting at
para 49 that whilst there were errors within the expenses cited in
the Appellant’s December 2019 trading
accounts, the month
reflected losses before overheads and expenses.
7)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in citing at para
49 and 69 “gross profit/loss” figures for November
(Profit) and December (Loss) 2019 as if these indicated
available
funds to pay the maintenance for which relief was sought, but
neglected to take into account that these figures were
prior to
overheads and expenses and any drawings by partners which would
reflect after the net profit/loss line of the bottom page.
The
directors’ drawings are not shown in the salaries and wages
line.
8)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in accepting the
respondent’s (Mrs Harnell) account that no warning of cessation
of payment was given, yet she was in receipt
of email dated 3
December 2019 reflecting the Appellant’s financial strain,
which together with her own admissions of the
Appellant’s
continuous advice that he could not afford the settlement is evidence
enough that the Appellant had certainly
tried to advise of the need
to cease/re-negotiate payments.
9)
The learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in failing to take
into consideration that a doctor’s referral placed on the
record, confirmed that the Appellant had been
consulting with him
since March 2018 regarding this matter and his financial strain, and
that at the time of trial he was booked
off from work for depression
and anxiety.
10) The
learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in finding at paras 54
and 55 in respect of income and expenditure that there is no
shortfall. If the Honourable Court’s
summation were to be
accepted, it would reduce a shortfall of R11 559 to R7 559,
and by demanding continued payment as
per the Deed of Settlement, and
the additional R4 000 pm on arrears, the shortfall is increased
back to unaffordable levels.
11) The
learned Judge in the Court
a quo erred
in para 54 in its
assessment of the Appellant’s purchase of a motor vehicle.
The record will show that the Appellant
was in dire need of funds to
pay legal fees. The learned Judge ought to have compared the
positions before and after the
divorce in that, during the divorce
there was already vehicle finance costing R2 750 pm and thus the
acquisition did not change
the ability to afford maintenance after
divorce.
12) The
Appellant respectfully submits that the Court
a quo
had
erred
in not finding, on a conspectus of the evidence on record as a whole
that the settlement was unaffordable from the beginning, and
the
signing of the Deed of Settlement was done under advice of senior
legal counsel, not as a reasonable offer, but to prevent
ever-mounting legal fees.
13) The
learned Court accordingly
erred
in finding that the Appellant
had the necessary intent to be found guilty of wilful disregard and
was
mala fide
in respect of the judgment dated 5 November
2020”.
[18]
Counsel for the respondent submitted that in essence the appeal is
premised on perceived unjust
settlement and financial inability to
pay maintenance. This is a correct summation of the grounds
upon which the appeal was
launched by the appellant. But the
ground stated in para 13 of the Notice of Appeal, that the appellant
did not harbour an
intention to disobey the maintenance order, adds
to the summation. It is on the basis of these three legs that
the appeal
must be decided. These legs involve an enquiry into
the facts on which the judgment dated 12 November 2020 was made.
Based
on this, it may very well be apposite to make
the point up-front that the court is not completely at liberty to
interfere with
the findings of fact made by the court
a quo,
which
is the court of first instance. Unless there is a misdirection of
fact by the trial judge, the presumption is that the conclusion
reached is correct, and the appellate court will only reverse it
where it is convinced that it is wrong. See:
R v Dhlumayo and
Another
1948 (2) SA 677
(A) at 706; and
Santam Bpk v Biddulph
2004 (5) SA 586
(SCA) at para 5.
[19]
In arguments before this court, as is also stated in the notice of
appeal, the appellant submitted
that the outcome of the contempt
application would have been different if the court
a quo
had
regard to the fact that the appellant appeared in person, and was not
possessed of legal skills to appreciate how to discharge
the
evidential burden to establish a reasonable doubt that he did not
disobey the maintenance order wilfully, and with
mala fides
.
The appeal cannot succeed on the ground of lack of intention because
the appellant presented the relevant facts on affidavit
which
demonstrated that he had engaged into the exercise of self-help by
stopping payments of maintenance without having been authorised
by
the maintenance court to do so. He thereupon displayed an
arrogant attitude that he did not owe even a cent to the respondent.
[20]
It was submitted in this court on behalf of the respondent that the
ground of appeal that the
appellant has had to appear in court
without being
legally represented due to the
alleged misrepresentation and / or undue influence by his legal team
when the settlement agreement
was signed on 30 April 2019 was merely
a perception rather than factual. Based on this the court was
urged to dismiss the
appeal as the Constitutional Court in
Eke
v Parsons
2016 (3) SA 37
(CC) states
at para 29 that once:
“…
a
settlement agreement has been made an order of court, it is an order
like any other”;
And
as stated in
PL v YL
2013 (6) SA 28
(ECG) at para 10 as
follows:
“
…
the
parties … [may] return directly in the court that made the
order, and to seek the enforcement thereof without the necessity
of
commencing a new action”.
[21]
Further, as stated in
Moraitis Investment (Pty) Ltd & Others v
Montic Dairy (Pty) Ltd
2017 (5) SA 508
(SCA) at para 10 the
courts are enjoined not to have regard to settlement agreements as a
point of departure. It will help
to quote the words of the
Supreme Court of Appeal at para 10. They read:
“
[10]
In my view that was not the correct starting point for the enquiry,
because it ignored the existence of the order
making the agreement an
order of court. Whilst terse the order was clear. It
read: ‘The Agreement of Settlement
signed and dated 05
September 2013 is made an order of court’.
For
so long as that order stood it could not be disregarded. The
fact that it was a consent order is neither here nor there.
Such an order has exactly the same standing and qualities as any
other court order. It is
res judicata
as between the
parties in regard to the matters covered thereby. The
Constitutional Court has repeatedly said that court
orders may not be
ignored. To do so is inconsistent with s 165 (5) of the
Constitution, which provides that an order issued
by a court binds
all people to whom it applies”.
[22]
I am in agreement with the submissions advanced on behalf of the
respondent that the court
a quo
could not have been wrong in
finding that the order dated 30 April 2019, incorporating the deed of
settlement, was enforceable
notwithstanding the stance now being
adopted by the appellant that he is not bound by the terms thereof.
[23]
Even if the appellant was suffering from depression and anxiety at
the time before and during
the hearing of his matter on 02 November
2020, the record of proceedings does not demonstrate that the court
a
quo
approached the matter in a way that was prejudicial to the
appellant. That said, this court is unable to find a
misdirection
with regard to the manner in which it evaluated the
evidence placed before it on affidavit. Consequently, the
grounds that
the settlement agreement was unjust is baseless.
Equally so, the alleged inability to explain non-compliance with the
order
of maintenance is not a sufficient ground for interfering with
the judgment of the court
a quo
.
[24]
The manner in which the court
a
quo evaluated the evidence and
applied the law relevant to the appellant’s non- compliance
with the maintenance order, cannot
be faulted. This
conclusion finds support
in the reasoning
of
the court
a quo
which
is
analysed
in paragraphs 11 to 13 of this judgment. Therefore, the grounds
listed in the Notice of Appeal that the court
a
quo did not
properly consider the income and expenditure accounts of the
appellant and Paint City cannot be sustained. More
is said on
this below.
[25]
The appeal does not merit success, notwithstanding that the court
a
quo erred
in relying on the incorrect valuation of the home of
the appellant at R875 000,00 with an outstanding bond of
R521 643,00
for the conclusion it made that based on such
valuation the appellant had sufficient equity to comply with the
court order.
Even if the court
a quo
had found in favour
of the appellant that the correct valuation was R530 000,00
which admittedly would reduce the equity considerably,
such an error
would not detract from the overall finding that on a balance of
probabilities, the appellant’s financial profile
did not
demonstrate a total inability to pay R10 000,00 or, at the very
least, the reduced sum of R1 000,00 that he had
offered to pay.
Similarly, the grounds that the outcome of the proceedings in the
court
a quo
would have been different had it been considered
that the home of the appellant is not “capacious” and its
value is
negligible, the trading income and expenditure accounts for
Paint City and the appellant do not show a profit and that the
acquisition
of a new vehicle after divorce was not a reflection of
solvency, do not in themselves evidence financial inability to pay
maintenance.
On the face of valid findings that the appellant
had placed reliance on selective documents and bank statements which
were unaudited
and irreconcilable, the attempt to discover,
albeit
in an irregular fashion, the appellant’s, new financial records
through the applications purportedly brought in terms of
Rule 42 and
s 29 of Act 10 of 2013, the appeal premised on the broad ground that
the appellant is not able to pay maintenance is
disingenuous.
At best for the appellant the maintenance court would be the forum
best placed to make a determination, with
the benefit of full
information that was not provided to the court
a quo
, that the
appellant is not able to pay maintenance at R10 000,00 per
month.
[26]
On the consideration of all the valid reasons given by the court
a
quo
in support of the order it made on 30 November 2020, the
appeal must fail. To the extent that a case has not been made
out
warranting deviation from the rule of practice that the costs
should follow the result, the appellant must pay the costs of the
appeal process that commenced with this application for leave to
appeal.
[27]
In the result the following order shall issue:
The appeal is
dismissed with costs; including the costs incurred in the prosecution
of the application for leave to appeal and the
condonation thereof.
Z.
M. NHLANGULELA
DEPUTY
JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT.
I
agree:
T.
MALUSI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
agree:
A.
GOVINDJEE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
For
the appellant
: Mr. M. H[....]
[In person]
No. 1 Greenfountain
Farm Chalets
PORT ALFRED.
Counsel
for the respondent
: Adv. A. Beyleveld SC
Instructed
by
: Wheeldon Rushmere & Cole Inc.
MAKHANDA