Firstrand Bank Limited v Meyer (2129/2020) [2022] ZAECMKHC 3 (19 April 2022)

80 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Execution — Sale in execution — Default judgment — Applicant sought default judgment against respondent for arrears on a home loan secured by residential property; respondent admitted arrears but disputed their extent, citing COVID-19 impact on income. Legal issue concerned whether the applicant established grounds for judgment and property executability. Court held that the applicant demonstrated entitlement to judgment and that execution against the residential property was justified, as the respondent failed to provide evidence of alternative assets to satisfy the debt; a reserve price for the sale in execution was deemed appropriate to protect the respondent's interests.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an application by a mortgagee creditor for default judgment and an order declaring the respondent’s residential immovable property specially executable, together with ancillary execution relief including authorisation for a warrant of attachment and a sale in execution, and a determination of whether the sale should occur without a reserve price or subject to a reserve price. The application engaged the court’s supervisory role over execution against a primary residence under Uniform Rule 46A, read with Uniform Rule 46.


The applicant was Firstrand Bank Limited (the credit provider and mortgagee). The respondent was Roderick Julius Meyer (the mortgagor and judgment debtor), who opposed the application and appeared in person.


Procedurally, the dispute arose from a written home loan agreement concluded in December 2016. After the respondent fell into arrears, the applicant delivered statutory notices and then issued summons which was served at the respondent’s chosen domicilium in April 2019. The respondent did not defend the action. The applicant thereafter launched the present application (instituted in early 2020), which ultimately came before the court for determination as an opposed application.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned enforcement of a home loan debt secured by a mortgage bond, and whether execution against the respondent’s home was justified and, if so, on what terms (including whether a reserve price should be set for the sale in execution).


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that on 9 December 2016 the parties concluded a written home loan agreement in terms of which the applicant lent and advanced R365,000.00 to the respondent. The loan was secured by the registration of a mortgage bond over four separate but contiguous erven situated at 32 Brownlee Street, Molteno, comprising a residential property with a dwelling.


It was also common cause that the respondent fell into arrears. The judgment recorded that by 9 January 2019 he was in arrears in the amount of R17,165.56, that he then owed a total of R375,966.43, and that the monthly instalment at the time was R4,197.81. The applicant took steps to demand performance, including issuing notices in terms of section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, and later issued summons which was served on 15 April 2019. The respondent did not enter a defence.


In the execution proceedings under Rule 46A, the applicant placed information before the court regarding value and indebtedness. The market value (as at 19 September 2019) was stated as R330,000.00, the municipal valuation (as at 19 November 2019) as R450,000.00, the amount owing under the bond (as at 30 November 2019) as R407,651.06, and rates and taxes (as at 18 November 2019) as R13,830.00. The applicant proposed an approach in which its attorneys would be mandated to purchase the property at a sale in execution at a stated “buy-in figure” if bidding did not reach that figure, followed by resale on the open market.


Certain facts were raised by the respondent and treated as relevant to the Rule 46A enquiry. The respondent stated that the property was his primary residence. He stated that his two minor daughters stayed with him at certain times in terms of a divorce settlement arrangement. He also indicated that there were long-term leases in place for two rooms in the dwelling and that part of the property was enclosed and used as a sanctuary for abandoned cats and dogs.


As to matters in dispute, the respondent admitted arrears but disputed the extent of the arrears. The court noted, however, that the applicant had attached a certificate of balance and payment history, and that the respondent did not produce evidence to substantiate his denial of the amount claimed. The respondent attributed his payment difficulties to the impact of COVID‑19 disaster management regulations, alleging that these impeded his ability to generate income by letting rooms to travellers, and he expressed an intention to catch up when conditions normalised.


In relation to value, the respondent asserted during argument that the market value was at least R500,000.00, but the court recorded that he did not substantiate this allegation and did not provide the further valuation information the court had requested. The applicant, by contrast, provided a valuation report dated 15 February 2022 describing the property as run down, estimating repair costs of R50,000.00, estimating a market value of about R400,000.00 if repairs were done, estimating an open-market selling period of about 24 months, and stating a forced sale value of R210,000.00.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the applicant had established a case for, first, the granting of a money judgment by default, and second, an order declaring the respondent’s residential property executable with related execution authorisations.


A further, distinct issue concerned the terms of execution under Rule 46A, namely whether the court should permit a sale in execution without a reserve price, or whether it should set a reserve price, and if so at what level, having regard to the information placed before the court.


The dispute required the court to apply established legal principles to largely common-cause foundational facts (existence of the credit agreement, default, security, and absence of a defended action), while also making a value-laden, discretionary assessment under Rule 46A concerning proportionality and fairness in authorising execution against a primary residence. It additionally required evaluative determinations about the adequacy and reliability of valuation information and the fairness of the “buy-in figure” approach proposed by the applicant.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that execution against a home is subject to judicial oversight. It relied on the Constitutional Court’s statement in Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC) that while a judgment creditor is generally entitled to execute against a debtor’s assets to satisfy a money judgment, due regard must be paid to the risk and consequences of people losing their homes, and that if the debt can reasonably be satisfied without those drastic consequences, that alternative should be considered before granting execution orders.


The court further referred to Firstrand Bank v Folscher 2011 (4) SA 314 (GNP) for the proposition that a range of factors may be relevant when deciding whether to issue execution process in the context of residential property, but that the enquiry is fact-bound and not every factor is necessarily applicable in every case. This framing informed the court’s assessment under Rule 46A.


In applying Rule 46A, the court considered the history of the applicant’s attempts to procure payment or a resolution. It accepted that the applicant had attempted to address the arrears through telephone contact and statutory demand letters, and that summons was issued and served but not defended. The court placed weight on the length of time the matter had been pending (over two years) during which the respondent had not brought the arrears up to date and had not made an acceptable arrangement to remedy the breach.


On the respondent’s challenge to the quantum, the court noted that the home loan agreement provided for a certificate of balance to constitute evidence of the amount outstanding, and that such a certificate, together with payment history, was attached at the time of summons. In the court’s view, the respondent’s continued dispute about the extent of arrears was unsupported by evidence.


A central aspect of the Rule 46A enquiry concerned whether the debt could be satisfied without execution against the mortgaged home. In this regard the court relied on Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Frasenburg [2020] 4 All SA 87 (WCC), which emphasised that the prospect of satisfying the debt without recourse to the mortgaged property must be investigated, but that where a debtor is substantially in arrears and fails to place information before court showing other assets from which the debt can be satisfied, a court will generally be justified in proceeding on the basis that execution against the mortgaged property is the only means of satisfying the mortgagee’s claim. Applying that approach, the court held that the respondent had not placed evidence of other assets before it. The respondent’s references to income from leases, proposed future business plans, and a possible inheritance were characterised as vague and unsupported, and in any event were viewed as insufficient relative to the size of the indebtedness.


The court acknowledged the personal circumstances advanced by the respondent, including that the property was his primary residence and was used to accommodate his minor children at times. It nevertheless considered that execution was justified on the facts presented, particularly in the absence of viable alternatives to satisfy the debt. The court also observed, on the limited information before it, that the minor children did not permanently reside with the respondent, that tenants might be protected by long-term leases, and that the animal sanctuary might be capable of relocation with assistance from its funder as referenced by the respondent.


The remaining substantive question concerned whether a reserve price should be set. The court sought additional information about current value and accepted the applicant’s valuation report because the respondent did not provide substantiating information for his own higher valuation assertion. In considering the applicant’s proposed “buy-in figure” approach, the court was not persuaded that it would be fair to the respondent, especially because the buy-in figure mentioned (R128,468.80) was significantly below the forced sale value appearing in the valuation report. The court considered that setting a reserve price would more sensibly balance the parties’ interests and test whether there was a market for the property. It further noted that if the reserve price were not met, the applicant could resort to the procedures contemplated in Rule 46A(9)(c)–(e) for further directions.


The applicant proposed a reserve price of R259,000.00, calculated by reference to a forced sale methodology described in argument. The court accepted that setting a reserve price is not an exact science and that the purpose is to strike a balance between the creditor’s interest in recovering a substantial debt and the debtor’s interest in protecting the value of a residential property subject to execution. On that basis, the court held that the proposed reserve price was not inappropriate and adopted it.


On costs, the court applied the general principle that costs follow the result. It considered there was no reason to depart from that approach and ordered the respondent to pay costs, including specified reserved costs for postponements on particular dates. It recorded that the matter could not be heard on a further date and made no costs order in respect of that occasion.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted the application, being satisfied that the applicant had made out a case for default judgment, a declaration of executability, and associated execution relief. The grant of execution relief was subject to the proviso that the sale in execution would be subject to a reserve price.


The immovable property was ordered to be sold by the sheriff subject to achieving a reserve price of R259,000.00.


The respondent was ordered to pay costs, including costs on an attorney and client scale in relation to the postponements on 31 March 2021 and 27 July 2021. No costs order was made in relation to 11 November 2021.


Cases Cited


Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC)


Firstrand Bank v Folscher 2011 (4) SA 314 (GNP)


Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Frasenburg [2020] 4 All SA 87 (WCC)


Legislation Cited


National Credit Act 34 of 2005


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 46


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 46A


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 46A(8)(d)


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 46A(9)(c)–(e)


Held


The court held that the applicant was entitled to default judgment for the mortgage debt and to an order declaring the respondent’s primary residence specially executable under Rule 46A, because the respondent remained in arrears, did not substantiate his dispute of the claimed balance, and failed to place evidence before the court of other assets or realistic means by which the judgment debt could be satisfied without execution against the mortgaged property.


The court further held that a reserve price should be set for the sale in execution. It rejected the applicant’s proposed “buy-in figure” approach as unfair on the information before it and ordered that the property be sold in execution subject to a reserve price of R259,000.00, with provision for further Rule 46A procedures if the reserve price were not achieved.


The respondent was held liable for costs in accordance with the result, including attorney-and-client costs for specified postponements.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Execution to satisfy a money judgment is a recognised incident of a judgment creditor’s rights, but where execution is sought against a person’s home, courts must exercise oversight and give due regard to the potential drastic impact of loss of a residence, considering reasonable alternatives where the debt can be satisfied without that consequence, as reflected in the approach endorsed in Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC).


The Rule 46A enquiry is fact-bound. While a wide range of factors may potentially be relevant, not all factors must be addressed in every case; rather, the court must identify and weigh the considerations relevant to the particular matter, consistent with the approach in Firstrand Bank v Folscher 2011 (4) SA 314 (GNP).


In conducting the Rule 46A assessment, the court must investigate whether the judgment debt can be satisfied without recourse to the mortgaged residential property. Where a debtor is substantially in arrears and fails to place evidence before the court of other assets or other realistic means of satisfaction, a court will generally be justified in concluding that execution against the mortgaged property is the only viable method to satisfy the creditor’s claim, in line with Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Frasenburg [2020] 4 All SA 87 (WCC).


The setting of a reserve price for a sale in execution under Rule 46A entails an evaluative balancing exercise. It is not an exact science, and its purpose is to balance the judgment creditor’s interest in recovering the debt with the judgment debtor’s interest in protecting the value realised upon the forced sale of a residential property. Where proposed mechanisms for sale (such as a “buy-in figure”) appear on the facts to operate unfairly against the debtor, a reserve price may be preferred, with further directions available under Rule 46A procedures if the reserve price is not achieved.

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[2022] ZAECMKHC 3
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Firstrand Bank Limited v Meyer (2129/2020) [2022] ZAECMKHC 3 (19 April 2022)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA
CASE
NO. 2129/2020
In
the matter between:
FIRSTRAND
BANK
LIMITED

Applicant
and
RODERICK
JULIUS
MEYER

Respondent
JUDGMENT
LAING
J
[1]
This
is an application for default judgment and for the respondent’s
residential property to be declared executable. The applicant
also
seeks,
inter
alia
,
authorisation for the issue of a warrant of attachment, the execution
thereof by the sheriff, and that the property may be sold
in
execution without a reserve price, alternatively subject to a reserve
price, as stipulated. The provisions of rules 46 and 46A
are
pertinent.
Background
[2]
On
9 December 2016, the parties entered into a written home loan
agreement in terms of which the applicant loaned and advanced the
sum
of R365,000.00 to the respondent, which was secured by the
registration of a mortgage bond over four separate but contiguous

erven located at 32 Brownlee Street, Molteno. The erven comprise a
residential property with a dwelling situated thereon.
[3]
In
time, the respondent fell into arrears. By 9 January 2019, he was in
arrears in the amount of R17,165.56 and owed the applicant
the total
sum of R375,966.43. The monthly repayment amount at the time was
R4,197.81.
[4]
Consequently,
the applicant instructed its attorneys to issue letters of demand in
terms of section 129 of the National Credit Act
34 of 2005 (‘the
NCA’), calling upon the respondent to rectify his breach of the
underlying home loan agreement. The
letters produced no result,
prompting the applicant to institute action proceedings against the
respondent, who received the applicant’s
summons at his chosen
domicilium
citandi et executandi
on 15 April 2019. The respondent never defended the action.
[5]
On
10 February 2020, the applicant brought the present application. The
respondent has opposed the application; he is unrepresented.
[6]
The
respondent admits that he has fallen into arrears, but disputes the
extent thereof. The main reason advanced for his having
failed to
maintain payments is the impact of the COVID-19 disaster management
regulations, which prevented him from using the property
as an
accommodation establishment and letting out rooms to travellers. He
has indicated that he intends to catch up on his arrears
as soon as
the market returns to normality.
[7]
The
respondent appears to accept the inevitability of the attachment and
sale in execution of the property but points out that it
would be in
the best interests of both parties for the property to be sold at
market value. He states that the property is currently
for sale and
that an estate agent is involved for such purposes.
Issues
to be determined and discussion
[8]
The
issues to be determined are whether the applicant has made out a case
for: (a) the granting of judgment; and (b) the declaration
of the
property as executable and associated relief.
[9]
By
reason of the residential nature of the property, the provisions of
rule 46A are applicable. The applicant has supplied the following

details: the market value of the property, as at 19 September 2019,
was R330,000.00; the local authority valuation, as at 19 November

2019, was R450,000.00; the amount owing on the mortgage bond, as at
30 November 2019, was R407,651.06; and the amount owing to
the local
authority for rates and taxes, as at 18 November 2019, was
R13,830.00. In addition, the applicant has proposed that the
sale in
execution be approached on the basis of its attorneys being provided
with a mandate to purchase the property at a sale
in execution for a
‘buy-in figure’ in the event that the property is not
sold for at least that amount, after which
the property would be
advertised and put up for re-sale on the open market. This approach,
argues the applicant, is preferable
to setting a reserve price, which
could discourage potential bidders from participating in the sale.
[10]
The
respondent has, in turn, indicated that the property is his primary
residence. Moreover, it accommodates his two minor daughters
when
they do not reside with their mother at alternate times, as
contemplated by the terms of a divorce settlement. There are
long-term leases in place for two of the rooms in the dwelling and a
portion of the property has been enclosed and established as
a
sanctuary for abandoned cats and dogs.
[11]
In
Gundwana
v Steko Development
2011 (3) SA 608
(CC), the Constitutional Court observed, at [53],
that it is a well-established principle that a judgment creditor is
entitled
to execute upon the assets of a judgment debtor in
satisfaction of a judgment debt sounding in money. However,

due
regard should be taken of the impact that this may have on judgment
debtors who are poor and at risk of losing their homes.
If the
judgment debt can be satisfied in a reasonable manner, without
involving those drastic consequences, that alternative course
should
be judicially considered before granting execution orders.’
[12]
The
court in
Firstrand
Bank v Folscher
2011 (4) SA 314
(GNP) listed an extensive range of factors that could
be considered when deciding whether a writ should be issued.
Nevertheless,
the court was careful to note, at [41], that not each
and every factor had to be taken into account for every matter;
rather, the
enquiry had to be fact-bound to identify the criteria
that were relevant to the case in question.
[13]
In
the present matter, the applicant has alleged that several attempts
were made to resolve the outstanding arrears by telephone;
these were
unsuccessful. Subsequently, the applicant instructed its attorneys to
issue letters of demand on 25 January and 13 February
2019; these,
too, failed to yield any result. The applicant caused summons to be
issued and served on the respondent; this was
never defended. The
present application was brought on 16 January 2020 and the matter has
been before court ever since.
[14]
During
the time that has since elapsed, a period of more than two years, the
respondent has simply failed to bring his arrears up
to date or to
make any other acceptable arrangement with the applicant to address
his breach of the underlying home loan agreement.
He continues to
dispute the extent of his arrears, notwithstanding the fact that the
home loan agreement makes provision for a
certificate of balance to
be issued by the applicant, which would serve as evidence of the
outstanding balance owed. The applicant
attached same to its summons
at the time of the institution of action proceedings, as well as
details of the respondent’s
payment history. The respondent has
not presented any evidence in support of his refutation of the amount
claimed by the applicant.
Moreover, he has not identified any assets,
whether movable or immovable, that could be attached and sold in
execution as an alternative
to the attachment and sale of his
residential property.
[15]
In
Changing
Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Frasenburg
[2020] 4 All SA 87
(WCC), Rogers J held as follows:

[51]
In making the rule 46A assessment, the prospect of the judgment debt
being satisfied without recourse to the mortgaged property
has to be
investigated. If a debtor is substantially in arrears and fails to
place information before court pointing to the existence
of other
assets from which the indebtedness might be satisfied, a court would
generally be justified in proceeding on the basis
that execution
against the mortgaged property is the only means of satisfying the
mortgagee’s claim.
[52]
If, however, it emerges from the rule 46A assessment that there are
other assets from which the mortgagee’s claim can
be satisfied,
the court would be justified in granting the money judgment but
postponing or refusing an order of special executability.
This is not
only in accordance with the default mode of execution which has since
time immemorial been embedded in our law; rule
46A itself points in
that direction by requiring the court to consider whether the
judgment debtor has other means from which the
judgment debt ca be
satisfied and to withhold an order of executability against the
residential property if such other means exist
(rule 46A(8)(d)). In
such circumstances the court is not compelling the mortgagee to seize
the debtor’s proverbial pots and
pans or (as alluded to in
Hendricks
)
the debtor’s sewing machine. The court is instead insisting
that the mortgagee execute against other assets of substance
which
are known to exist.’
[16]
Here,
the respondent has failed to place any evidence before the court of
other assets that may be used to satisfy the claim of
the applicant.
During argument, the respondent referred to the long-term leases and
his plans to set up a fish-and-chips takeaway;
he also mentioned the
possibility of inheriting an amount of R100,000.00 from his late
father’s estate. However, these were
vague, unsupported
allegations. On the face of it, any income derived therefrom or any
amount inherited would be patently insufficient
to cover the amount
owed in relation to the mortgage bond, which would now be well in
excess of the amount of R407,651.06 that
was outstanding on 30
November 2019. The attachment and sale of the residential property is
the only viable option available to
the parties.
[17]
Admittedly
the respondent would be compelled to secure alternative housing.
Nevertheless, his minor daughters do not reside with
him permanently
and the existing tenants would presumably be protected by the
long-term leases to which the respondent has referred.
The sanctuary
for abandoned cats and dogs could possibly be relocated with the
assistance of its funder, Ouma Rusks, as mentioned
by the respondent
in his opposing affidavit.
Reserve
price
[18]
The
only remaining aspect is whether a reserve price is to be set. The
court requested further information from the parties about
the
current market value of the property. To that effect, the applicant
submitted a valuation report (dated 15 February 2022),
stating that
the property is run down and that the estimated cost of repairs to be
made before the property can be placed on the
open market is
R50,000.00. If such repairs were made then the estimated market value
of the property would be approximately R400,000.00.
The report goes
on to state that the property would take about 24 months to sell on
the open market. The forced sale value for
the property is stipulated
as R210,000.00.
[19]
Despite
having made the allegation, during argument, that the market value of
the property was at least R500,000.00, the respondent
has failed to
substantiate same and has failed to furnish the court with the
information requested previously. The court is constrained
to rely
upon the information provided by the applicant.
[20]
Mindful
of the details contained in the application made by the applicant,
including the fact that the realisable value of the property
is
likely to be considerably lower than the amount owed on the mortgage
bond once the cost of repairs and amounts owed for rates
and taxes
are taken into account, the court is not persuaded that an approach
based on the applicant’s stipulation of a ‘buy-in
figure’
would be fair to the respondent. The amount suggested, R128,468.80,
is significantly less than the forced sale value
described in terms
of the valuation report. It would seem to be more sensible (and
fairer to both parties) to set a reserve price
and to ascertain
whether there is indeed a market for the property in the first place.
If the reserve price is not met then the
applicant may simply rely on
the procedures available to it under rule 46A(9)(c) - (e) and request
the court to order how execution
should proceed further.
[21]
In
argument, the applicant submitted that an appropriate reserve price
would be R259,000.00. This is based on a forced sale value,

calculated as 70% of the average market price of R390,000.00, less
outstanding rates and taxes. The suggested reserve price does
not, of
course, take into account the applicant’s recent valuation
report, which estimates the market value to be R400,000.00
(assuming
that repairs can first be carried out); it also does not take into
account any possible increase in the outstanding rates
and taxes.
Nevertheless, the determination of a reserve price is not an exact
science and the purpose of such determination is
to strike a balance
between protecting the interests of the judgment creditor, in the
recovery of a substantial amount owed to
it, and the interests of the
judgement debtor, in the attachment and sale of his residential
property. The reserve price suggested
by the applicant is not
inappropriate.
Relief
to be granted and order
[22]
Consequently,
the court is satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for the
granting of judgment, the declaration of the
property as executable,
and associated relief. The proviso thereto is that a reserve price be
set for purposes of the sale in execution.
[23]
The
only remaining issue is that of costs. There is no reason why costs
should not follow the result and that the respondent be
liable
therefor, including the costs reserved in relation to the
postponements on 31 March and 27 July 2021. It is apparent from
the
court file that the matter could not be heard on 11 November 2021; no
costs order is made in that regard.
[24]
The
following order is made:
(a)
the
application is granted in terms of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8
of the notice;
(b)
the
immovable property of the respondent shall be sold by the sheriff,
subject to achieving a reserve price of R259,000.00; and
(c)
the
respondent is liable for the costs of the postponements on 31 March
and 27 July 2021, on an attorney and client scale.
_________________________
JGA
LAING
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCE
Counsel
for the applicant:       Adv
Sephton, instructed by Huxtable Attorneys, Makhanda.
For
the respondent:
Mr Meyer (In
person).
Date of
hearing:

03 February 2022
Date of delivery of
judgment:  19 April 2022