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2022
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[2022] ZANCHC 9
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Magaguli and Others v Setlhomogi and Others (2620/21; 24/22) [2022] ZANCHC 9 (25 February 2022)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN
CAPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
Date
Heard: 17 February 2022
Date
Delivered: 25 February 2022
Case
No: 2620/21 and 24/22
In
the matter between:
BUSISWE
PATIENCE MAGAGULI
1
st
Applicant
PORTIA
RAMAKETSE SELOGILWE
2
nd
Applicant
TEBOGO
AFRICA
3
rd
Applicant
and
MICHAEL
SETLHOMOGI
1st Respondent
GOITSEMODIMO
HALTER
2nd Respondent
OLEBOGENG
SAMUEL TEMODI
3rd Respondent
TSHOLOFETSO
MOCUMIE
4th Respondent
THABONYANE
VANWYK
5th Respondent
NEO
PITSO
6th Respondent
LESEGO
JANKI
7th Respondent
ANETTE
VAN
WYK
8th Respondent
ESTELLE
DAVIES
9th Respondent
LEAN
LE
ROUX
10th Respondent
THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, PHOKWANE
LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
11th Respondent
MPHO
MOJAKI
12th Respondent
Coram:
Lever J
JUDGMENT
Lever
J
1.
In this matter the two cases
identified by the case numbers set out
above were heard together at the request of the parties involved.
Both matters involved
the same parties. An expedited date was
arranged because the matter involves office bearers of the Phokwane
Municipality. It was
considered to be in the interests of all parties
concerned and their respective constituencies to try and bring
finality to this
matter. Hopefully this approach would also bring the
stability required for the said local municipality to render services
to its
inhabitants and stakeholders. This judgment was prepared in a
shortened time frame in the hope that it would achieve that end.
2.
Case number 2620/21 is an
application that has two parts a part A and
a part B. Part A was brought on an urgent basis seeking certain
interim relief pending
the finalisation of Part B together with
certain other relief. Part A came before my sister Judge Mamosebo on
the 20 December 2021.
Judge Mamosebo handed down a written judgement
on the 23 December 2021 in which she struck the matter off the roll
and reserved
the question of costs.
3.
Before part B of case number
2620/21 could be enrolled the
respondents in that matter together with Phokwane Local Municipality,
with only the council having
been cited in case number 2620/21,
launched an urgent application by way of a rule
nisi
under
case number 24/22. The relief sought in case number 24/22 was against
the applicants in case number 2620/21 as well as the
provincial
management of the ANC and 50 unidentified members of the ANC. That
application came before my brother Nxumalo J on the
7 January 2022.
Nxumalo J granted a rule
nisi.
The respondents in case number
2620/21 anticipated the return day of the rule
nisi.
The
anticipated rule nisi in case number 24/22 came before me on the 13
January 2022. After reading the papers and hearing oral
argument, in
an
ex tempore
judgment on that day, I discharged certain of
the orders contained in the rule
nisi
and extended the
remaining prayers of the rule
nisi
to the 18 February
2022.
4.
By agreement between the
parties both case 2620/21 and 24/22 were
postponed for argument to the 17 and 18 February 2022. It was
postponed to be dealt with
over 2 days because it was anticipated
that oral evidence might be required to deal with certain factual
disputes that emerged
in the papers.
5.
On the morning of the 17
February 2022, the parties agreed that the
decision in matter number 2620/21 would determine the fate of matter
number 24/22. I
agreed to deal with the matter on that basis.
6.
The next debate was whether
or not matter 2620/21 was a review or
not. Mr Ngandwe, who appeared for the respondents (hereinafter "the
respondents")
in matter number 2620/21 maintained that it was.
The importance of that question is that in this Division a review
must be heard
by 2 judges and this would have necessitated a further
postponement of both matters.
7.
Mr Motlogelwa who appeared
for the applicants (hereinafter "the
applicants") in matter number 2620/21 submitted that this matter
involved certain
declaratory orders, pure and simple. After debating
the matter with him, he moved an amendment which he submitted would
remove
any possible doubt in the matter.
8.
The respondents opposed
the amendment. After hearing the parties on
this question, I granted the amendment and ruled that it was not in
fact a review but
could proceed on the basis that applicants merely
sought certain declaratory orders. My reasons for such ruling were
given in my
ex tempore
ruling and need not be repeated herein.
9.
The next debate between
the parties related to the question of
whether or not there was a dispute of fact that needed to be referred
to oral evidence.
10.
Mr Motlogelwa, for the applicants, submitted that
whilst there were
disputes of fact, these were not material to the relief the
applicants' sought.
11.
Mr Ngandwe, for the respondents argued that the
disputes of fact were
both relevant and material to the matter at hand.
12.
In my
ex
tempore
ruling
on this question, I ruled in favour of the applicants'. In short, my
reason for doing so was, as submitted by Mr Motlogelwa,
the matter
could be decided on the basis of the facts admitted by the
respondents in their answering affidavit, as contemplated
in the test
set out in PLASCON-EVANS PAINTS LTD v VAN RIEBEECK
PAINTS
(PTY)
LTD
[1]
.
13.
The matter then proceeded to oral arguments on
the merits of matter
2620/21 on the 18 February 2022. It was agreed between the parties
that the only live issue for this court
to determine was the relief
sought by the applicants in part B of matter 2620/21 and that the
decision in this matter would determine
the fate of matter 24/22.
14.
In brief, the factual background to the matter
is that the first
applicant was appointed as the acting municipal manager by way of a
resolution of the eleventh respondent (the
council of the Phokwane
Local Municipality) taken on the 8 October 2021. The said appointment
in terms of the resolution was to
take effect from the 11 October
2021. This was confirmed in her letter of appointment signed by the
then mayor. The appointment
of the first applicant as the acting
municipal manager was for a period of 3 months commencing on the 11
October 2021 and ending
on the 14 January 2022.
15.
It is common cause that the local government elections
took place on
the 1 November 2021. It is also not disputed that the eleventh
respondent has 19 seats, being 10 ward seats and 9
proportional
representation seats (PR seats). It is also not in dispute that the
African National Congress (ANC) won all 10 ward
seats. It is also not
disputed that the 9 PR seats were distributed between various
opposition parties. As they acted in concert
as a unit, in the
activities relevant to this matter, their identities are not material
at present.
16.
After the election and on the 22 November 2021
the inaugural council
meeting of the eleventh respondent was convened. The second applicant
was elected as the Speaker of the eleventh
respondent. The third
applicant was elected as the Mayor of the eleventh respondent.
17.
On the 6 December 2021 the second applicant gave
notice of an
ordinary Council meeting which was to be held on the 13 December
2021. One of the items on the agenda for such meeting
was the
extension of the first applicant's acting appointment as the
municipal manager beyond the 14 January 2022 when such appointment
was due to end.
18.
The meeting was chaired by the second applicant
as Speaker. The
meeting was quorate when it commenced. The meeting conducted its
business, but when it got to the item on the agenda
relating to the
extension of the acting appointment as municipal manager of the first
applicant the meeting was adjourned by the
speaker in circumstances
described as "prevailing chaos" by the first applicant in
the founding affidavit. Applicants
contend that the chaos disrupted
the meeting before the item dealing with the extension of the first
applicant's appointment could
be dealt with.
19.
The respondents, in the answering affidavit filed
on their behalf,
admit that the meeting had been adjourned and that there was chaos in
the meeting. The respondents however contend
that initially 3
alternative counter-proposals were placed before the meeting that
this was whittled down to 2 counter-proposals
that on the respondents
version were voted on before the meeting was disrupted and the
meeting adjourned.
20.
The respondents also contend that the proposal
to terminate the
employment of the first applicant was carried with a vote of 10
Councillors to 9 Councillors against.
21.
The respondents aver that once the second applicant
had adjourned the
meeting and instructed the members to vacate the Council chamber, the
majority of councillors remained in chambers
and formed a quorum. The
councillors who remained behind requested the Speaker (second
applicant) to reconvene the meeting at another
venue due to safety
concerns. The second applicant refused. They then decamped to another
venue some distance away and on
their
version continued the
meeting. The minute of that 'continuation' meeting is not perfect,
but it seems that this continuation meeting
resolved to terminate the
employment of the first applicant and that the twelfth respondent be
appointed in her stead.
22.
Then on the 14 December 2021 a letter dated 13
December 2021
purporting to give effect to the said resolution was delivered to the
first applicant, terminating her appointment
as the acting municipal
manager with immediate effect.
23.
It emerges from case number 24/22 that subsequent
meetings were
called and held and the original incumbents of the office of Speaker
and Mayor were replaced from amongst the first
to tenth respondents.
24.
As already set out above, the parties agreed that
the fate of matter
24/22 rested on the outcome of matter 2620/21. It was also agreed
that the only live issue to be determined
was the relief sought in
Part B of matter number 2620/21.
25.
The relief sought in Part B of the Notice of Motion
as amended reads
as follows:
"1. Declare that the
purported termination of the First Applicant's employment as an
acting Municipal Manager entailed (sic)
in a letter dated 13 December
2021 is unlawful and invalid.
2.
Declare that the purported Council meeting organised and
convened by the first respondent to the tenth respondent on 13
December
2021, and its resultant resolutions are invalid and
unlawful.
3.
Declared (sic) that the first to tenth respondent lacks any
authority to terminate my employment or convene any Council meeting,
and that such conducts are unlawful and invalid.
4.
That any party which elects to oppose the relief sought be
ordered to pay the costs of this application.
5.
Granting the applicants further and or alternative relief."
26.
On the facts of the case as presented to this court,
the first
prayer, quoted above, resolves itself into an enquiry as to whether
on such facts, the first to tenth respondents could
in law terminate
the first applicant's employment as the acting municipal manager as
they purported to do at the meeting of the
13 December 2021.
27.
The second prayer, quoted above, resolves itself
into the question as
to whether on the facts admitted by the respondents in the
applicants' case, taken together with the facts
put up by the
respondents, were they entitled to convene the continuation meeting
on the 13 December 2021. The second aspect of
this prayer relates to
the resolutions purportedly adopted at the continuation meeting on
the 13 December 2021. The first such
resolution would already have
been dealt with when dealing with the questions raised under prayer 1
above. The second resolution
purportedly taken at the said meeting
relates to the appointment of the twelfth respondent as the acting
municipal manager ostensibly
on the 13 December 2021.
28.
Prayer 3, as quoted above is problematic, I can
only deal with it in
the context of the present application and not in the open-ended
fashion as it is currently framed. I can
in my view only deal with
the authority or otherwise of the respondents and in particular the
second (the new speaker), the third
(the new mayor) and the twelfth
(the new acting municipal manager) respondents to call and conduct
meetings that pre-date any order
that I make in this matter.
29.
Turning now
to the issues to be considered in respect of prayer 1 of Part B in
case 2620/21. In my view the issue is governed by
the provisions of
s30(5) of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act
[2]
(the
Act),
the said
sub-section
reads
as follows:
"(5)
Before a municipal council takes a decision on any of the following
matters it must first require its
executive committee or executive
mayor, if it has such a committee or mayor, to submit to it a report
and recommendation on the
matter -
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c)
the appointment and conditions of service of the municipal manager
and a head of a department
of the municipality."
30.
In my view this section applies to the appointment
of Acting
Municipal Managers as well. In any event Mr Ngandwe who appeared for
the respondents has not challenged the applicability
of this sub
section, even though it featured significantly in the debate that
preceded my ruling on whether or not there were
material disputes of
fact. The said sub-section also featured prominently when the merits
of this matter were debated.
31.
In my view reference to "conditions of service
of the municipal
manager" also encompasses termination of such services.
32.
It is the respondents' position that such resolution
summarily
terminating the first applicant's appointment as the acting municipal
manager was lawfully adopted at the meeting of
the 13 December 2021.
In these circumstances it was incumbent upon the respondents not only
to allege compliance with s30(5) of
the Act, but also establish such
compliance. The respondents have not done so. In these circumstances
the purported termination
of the first applicant's appointment as the
acting municipal manager cannot be lawful or valid. This conclusion
entitles the applicants
to the relief set out in prayer 1 of Part B
in case 2620/21.
33.
Turning now to the relief sought by the applicants
in the second
prayer. In order to resolve whether the continuation meeting of the
13 December 2021 was lawfully and validly convened
and conducted. If
it was lawfully and validly convened and conducted, then subject to
any other applicable law the resolutions
adopted at such meeting
might be lawful and valid. However, if the said continuation meeting
was not validly and lawfully convened
then any resolutions
purportedly adopted at such meeting would not be lawful or valid.
34.
To
determine in these motion proceedings if the applicants are entitled
to the relief sought in prayer 2, I must look to the facts
admitted
by the respondents taken together with the facts put up
by
the
respondents.
If on
those
facts,
the
applicants
are
entitled
to such
relief
then
it may be
granted.
This
is
an
application
of
the
Plascon-Evans
test
[3]
.
35.
In the respondents' answering affidavit in several
places, they admit
that there was chaos at the ordinary meeting that took place in the
Council Chambers on the 13 December 2021.
In several places in their
answering affidavit the respondents admit that the second respondent
adjourned the meeting. However,
the respondents are not consistent in
their version on these issues. In one place in their answering
affidavit the respondents
aver that the second applicant agitated for
an unlawful adjournment of the meeting. This section appears after
they have set out
their own version of events when they deal with
their response to the individual paragraphs of the applicants'
founding affidavit.
36.
This is a critical issue to be determined in this
case. In this
context I need to quote verbatim three paragraphs of the respondents
answering affidavit in order to assess the credibility
of this
contention. The relevant paragraphs are in response to the
applicants' contentions set out in paragraphs 4.11 to 4.13.
The
relevant paragraphs in the answering affidavit read as follows:
"60. I deny the
contents of these sub-paragraphs and specifically that the Second
Applicant did not do her best to quell the
disruption. In fact to the
contrary, she agitated for an unlawful adjournment of the meeting and
shouted instructions for members
to evacuate the Council Chamber.
61.
She also issued instructions for the chambers to be locked. I
further deny that the meeting ended at this point because the
continuation
of the meeting proceeded to De Venue where it was safer
to continue with the meeting. The Second and Third Applicants refused
to
attend the continuation of the meeting despite being invited to do
so by the respondents.
62.
It is for this reason that at the continuation meeting, the
Respondents invoked
Section 41
of the
Local Government: Municipal
Structures Act 117 of 1998
and appointed the First Respondent as an
Acting Speaker."
37.
It is noteworthy that the passages of the answering
affidavit quoted
above are not consistent with other important passages in the
answering affidavit. Specifically, at the beginning
of the answering
affidavit where the respondent's set out their own version of the
events in the manner in which they choose to
present it. In this
section of the answering affidavit the respondents on several
occasions admit that there was chaos and disturbance
of the meeting.
They also freely volunteered when giving their own version before
responding to the applicants' case that the second
applicant
adjourned the meeting. In the passages quoted above the respondents
seek to characterise the situation differently. As
simply a
continuation of the ordinary meeting. This would not be possible if
there was a lawful adjournment.
38.
The theme of the threat to the safety of the councillors
and having
to decamp to a new venue is consistent in the respondents' answering
affidavit.
39.
In the paragraphs quoted above and specifically
in paragraph 60, the
respondents set out a conclusion in law, being that second applicant
agitated for an unlawful adjournment.
Respondents rely on this
conclusion without setting out the factual basis anywhere in their
affidavit that would justify reaching
such conclusion. In these
circumstances, I have no basis to even consider the proposition that
in adjourning the meeting the second
applicant acted unlawfully.
40.
The functions and duties of a Speaker are set out
in
s37
of the Act
and in particular sub-sections 37(d) and (f) are applicable in the
circumstances of this case. The said sub-section
reads as follows:
"37
The speaker of a municipal council-
(a) ...
(b) ...
(c) ...
(d)
must maintain order during meetings;
(e) ...
(f)
must ensure that council meetings are conducted in accordance with
the rules and orders of the
council."
41.
From the respondent's own version they accept as a fact the meeting
was adjourned
in circumstances where there was at the very least
disturbances which led to the adjournment. There is no basis for
finding that
the speaker acted unlawfully in adjourning the relevant
meeting in the circumstances.
42.
In
addressing argument on this issue Mr Ngandwe urged me to rely
on the SCA
judgment in the case of NORTHERN FREE STATE DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY v
MATSHAI
[4]
and handed up a copy
of the report. I have carefully read the said judgment. In my view
the facts in Matshai are totally distinguishable
from the facts of
the present case. In Matshai: there was no disturbance; there was a
prior resolution of the council to deal with
the issue involving the
speaker; the speaker purported to adjourn the meeting which could
only have
been in her
own interest; and everyone including the mayor remained behind and
gave
effect
to the
prior council resolution to deal with the matter.
43.
In the present matter: the respondents on their own version describe
a disturbance;
both resolutions purportedly adopted by the
respondents would in any event be unlawful for want of compliance
with
s30(5)
of the Act regardless of where they were purportedly
taken; the speaker was not seeking to protect her personal interests;
and
the respondents on their own version asked the speaker to
reconvene, showing that they must have accepted that there had been
an
adjournment. In my view, the Matshai judgment is not applicable in
the present circumstances.
44.
This is
sufficient to find that the continuation meeting was neither valid
nor lawful. However, there are other grounds for reaching
or
substantiating this conclusion. The meeting having been adjourned
there was no compliance with the eleventh respondent's standing
orders 6 and 7 which require notice of the adjourned meeting to be
given to all councillors. This was not done. All that the respondents
say is that they invited the second and third applicants to attend
the continuation meeting. Even if this constitutes notice the
decision in THE
DEMOCRATIC
ALLIANCE
V
MATIKA
and
OTHERS
[5]
requires
that
effective notice be given to all councillors. The respondents have
not alleged that this was done. On this ground as well,
the
continuation meeting
was not
lawful
or
valid.
45.
The second part of the relief sought in prayer 2 relates to the
resolutions purportedly
adopted or recorded on the 13 December 2021
at the continuation meeting. The first, relating to the termination
of the appointment
of the first applicant, has already been dealt
with and the conclusion of this court is that such resolution was not
lawful or
valid for the reasons already set out. The second
resolution relates to the appointment of the twelfth respondent as
the acting
municipal manager to take the place of the first
applicant. As already set out above this resolution also did not
comply with
s30(5)
of the Act. In these circumstances it is also not
lawful or valid.
46.
In relation to prayer 3 the only order I am prepared to make is that
the meetings
called between the 13 December 2021 and the date of this
judgment cannot be valid or lawful because the appointment of the 12
Respondent
was neither lawful or valid. Accordingly, the twelfth
respondent did not have the power to call any meetings under the
provisions
of
s29(1A)
of the Act.
47.
Mr Ngandwe also raise the following issues in his oral submissions:
that the appointment
of the first applicant was void
ab initio
as
she purported to rely on s54A of the Local Government: Municipal
Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the Systems Act) which had already been
repealed at the time of her appointment; that the question of the
first applicants appointment as acting municipal manager was
moot as
at the time that this matter was heard her appointment would in any
event have come to an end; and that the applicants
would have to
establish the requirements for both a final interdict and a
declaratory order, which he contended was not done.
48.
Section 54A
of the Systems Act is not relevant in the present circumstances.
I
hold
this
view
because the
first
applicant's
appointment letter makes no reference to that section of the Systems
Act. The resolution purportedly adopted by the
ten respondents makes
no mention of the said section in the Systems Act. Certainly, the
termination letter delivered to the first
applicant on the 14
December 2021 places no reliance on the said section or indeed any
voidness
ab
initio.
This
was a development subsequent to the said purported termination and
appears to have been opportunistically latched onto after
the first
applicant used the section to describe her appointment in the
founding affidavit. In any
event,
first applicant's appointment must per force have been an
administrative action
which
stands until it is set aside.
[6]
49.
In debating
the question of mootness with Mr Ngadwe I put to him that in so far
as mootness is concerned the question would be,
was the matter moot
at the time that the Notice of Motion in this matter was issued.
Despite conceding this point on more than
one occasion he
nevertheless persisted with his contention that the matter was moot.
The Constitutional Court held in the matter
of MEC EDUCATION KZN &
OTHERS v PILLAY
[7]
, that despite
the matter being moot Pillay was still entitled to a declarator
setting out her rights. In
my opinion,
the same position holds true in the present case.
50.
Finally, Mr
Ngandwe conflates the issues of a final interdict and a declaratory
order. A declaratory order is by no means an interdict
even if it can
be regarded as final relief. The position relating to a declaratory
order is now governed by s21(1)(c) of the Superior
Courts Act
[8]
.
In this regard see the case of KAYA KATSA CC v HUY LE CAO &
ANOTHER
[9]
.
51.
In these circumstances, the
rule nisi
in case number 24/22
stands to be discharged.
52.
The only outstanding issue is the question of costs. Mr Motlogelwa on
behalf of the
applicants submitted that if I find for the applicants
then the respondents were not acting on behalf of the council,
because they
would have no standing to do so. On this basis he
submitted that the first to the tenth respondents plus the twelfth
respondent
be ordered to pay the costs of both matters personally on
a punitive scale of attorney and own client.
53.
In regard to costs, Mr Ngandwe tried to bring the respondents'
conduct within the
realm of them trying to enforce their rights or
acting in the public interest.
54.
In my view neither position reflects the true situation and what
would be just and
equitable in the circumstances. The respondents
excluding the eleventh respondent in matter number 2620/21 were
reckless in the
manner in which they proceeded to the continuation
meeting. In my view they were acting opportunistically but I do not
think they
were deliberately dishonest or malicious. This is not a
case where the said respondents were enforcing their own rights or
acting
in the public interest. It would in these circumstances not be
equitable for the Council and indirectly the public to foot the bill
in these circumstances. However, it would equally not be equitable
for the said respondents to have to pay a punitive costs order
on an
attorney and client scale or even an attorney and own client scale.
55.
Further, each side employed multiple Counsel. At one stage in matter
24/22 one party
had employed three counsel. In my view the facts of
these cases do not warrant the employment of multiple counsel. The
costs order
I intend to make will reflect this.
56.
In my view the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh,
eighth, ninth,
tenth and twelfth respondents in case number 2620/21
will pay the costs of that case, restricted to the costs of one
counsel and
on a party and party scale. The said respondents will be
jointly and severally liable for such costs, the one paying the
others
to be absolved.
57.
Similarly, in case number 24/22 the third, fourth, fifth, sixth,
seventh, eighth,
ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth
applicants will pay the costs of that case, restricted to one counsel
and on a party
and party scale. The said applicants will be jointly
and severally liable for such costs, the one paying the others to be
absolved.
In
the circumstances, the following order is made:
1)
It is declared that the purported termination of the First
Applicant's
employment as an acting Municipal Manager as set out in a
letter dated 13 December 2021 is unlawful and invalid.
2)
It is declared that the purported Council meeting organised by the
first to the tenth respondents on the 13 December 2021, and its
resultant resolutions are invalid and unlawful.
3)
It is declared that any meetings convened by the first to the tenth
respondents between the 13 December 2021 and the date of this
judgment are unlawful and invalid.
4)
The rule
nisi
issued under case number 24/2022 be and is
hereby discharged.
5)
The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, tenth and twelfth respondents in case number 2620/21 will pay
the costs of that case, restricted to the costs of one counsel
and on
a party and party scale. The said respondents will be jointly and
severally liable for such costs, the one paying the others
to be
absolved.
6)
In case number 24/22 the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh,
eighth,
ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth applicants
will pay the costs of that case, restricted to one counsel and on a
party
and party scale. The said applicants will be jointly and
severally liable for such costs, the one paying the others to be
absolved.
Lawrence
Lever
Judge
Northern Cape
Kimberley
Obo
the Applicants
:
Adv. M Motlogelwa and Adv. P Mthombeni
Obo
the Respondents
:
PJ Ngandwe and Adv. K. Lefalandi
[1]
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at 634-635.
[2]
Act 117 of 1998
[3]
Plascon-Evans., above., at p634E to p635C.
[4]
Case Number 90/2004. Judgment delivered 30 March 2005. Although the
case is marked reportable I do not have the citation if it
has been
reported.
[5]
2019 (1) SA 214 (NCK).
[6]
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & Others 2004
(6) SA 222 (SCA).
[7]
[2007] ZACC 21
;
2008 (2) BCLR 99
(CC) at
[8]
Act 10 of 2013.
[9]
2019 JDR 0084 (FB)