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[2022] ZAMPMBHC 42
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Pine Glow Investments (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Energy and Others (3525/2020) [2022] ZAMPMBHC 42 (10 June 2022)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(MPUMALANGA DIVISION,
MBOMBELA)
CASE
NO: 3525/2020
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: YES
REVISED: YES
10/06/2022
In
the matter between:
PINE
GLOW INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF
ENERGY
First Respondent
THE
CONTROLLER OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
Second Respondent
ERF
6 HIGHVELDT TECHNOPARK INVESTMENTS
(PTY)
LTD
Third Respondent
NAD
PROPERTY INCOME FUND (PTY) LTD
Fourth Respondent
ROYALE
ENERGY
Fifth Respondent
ROYALE
ENERGY GROUP (PTY) LTD
Sixth Respondent
ROYALE
ENERGY MANAGEMENT SERVICES
Seventh Respondent
ROYALE
ENERGY OLIFANTSFONTEIN (PTY) LTD
Eighth Respondent
VIVA
OIL (PTY)
LTD
Ninth Respondent
TOKIVECT
(PTY)
LTD
Tenth Respondent
J
U D G M E N T
MASHILE
J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This review application first served before this Court on 19 January
2021 as an urgent
matter comprising Part A and B. On that day, the
parties reached a transitory settlement in terms of which the Third
and Fourth
Respondents (“Highveld Technopark”) and (“NAD
Property”) respectively agreed to halt construction of the
filling station until early February 2021. In Part A of the
application, the Applicant (“Pine Glow”) sought an order
prohibiting Highveld Technopark and NAD Property, which will
henceforth be referred to as the Respondents, from proceeding and/or
commencing with the construction of a filling station alternatively,
from continuing with operation of the filling station situated
on a
site described as
Erf 930, Greenvalley, Extension
1 Township, Registration Division K.U, Province of Mpumalanga (“the
site”).
[2]
In Part B of the application, Pine Glow sought to urgently review and
set aside:
2.1
The decision of the Minister on the Respondents’ appeals in
terms of section 12A of
the Petroleum Products Act, 120 of 1977 (“the
PPA”), to refer the applications back to the Second Respondent
(“the
Controller”) for re- evaluation; and
2.2
The decision of the Controller to approve the site and retail license
applications of the
Respondents in terms of the PPA; and
2.3
Lastly, it also sought an order that, under the exceptional
circumstances of this matter,
an appeal against the granting of the
foregoing prayers will, as provided for in
section 18
of the
Superior
Courts Act, 10 of 2013
, not suspend the operation of the order of
this Court setting aside the decisions of the First Respondent (“the
Minister”)
and the Controller.
[3]
When the urgent application returned to Court on 2 February 2021, it
was struck off
the roll for lack of urgency. The parties arranged
that Part b be heard during the ordinary course on 3 May 2021. When
they came
back to Court in May 2021 to argue Part B, Highveld
Technopark and NAD Property took a legal point that Pine Glow lacked
locus standi.
On that day the parties argued the point and
judgment was reserved. The
locus standi
point was ultimately
dismissed and the parties argued Part B on 25 October 2021.
[4]
In its initial founding affidavit, Pine Glow sought to review and set
aside the decisions
of both the Minister and that of the Controller.
I note that this is no longer the position in its supplemented
founding affidavit.
The review grounds now pertain to the decision of
the Controller to re-evaluate his decision approving the license. The
upshot
of the reconsideration of the applications is that the
Controller has now granted the licenses as applied for by the
Respondents.
[5]
Where I refer to Respondents in this judgment, it will mean Highveld
Technopark and
NAD Property otherwise and depending on the context, I
will refer to them in their individual names. The Fifth to Ninth
Respondents
have been joined to this application insofar as they
might have interest in case the proposed filling station elects to
use one
of their petroleum brands. Pine Glow seeks no relief or costs
against the Tenth Respondent (“Tokivect”) but it is cited
as it operates a filling station on a site owned by Pine Glow.
Besides, Pine Glow is also the wholesaler from which Tokivect
purchases
its petroleum products.
FACTUAL
MATRIX
[6]
The factual background of this application is substantially
uncontested by either
side. In April 2016, the Respondents applied to
the Controller for site and retail licences in terms of the PPA for
the establishment
of a new filling station on the site. Following the
application, the Controller granted the licenses on 3 November 2020
and on
12 November 2020, allocated G/2018/04/26/0001 and
G/2018/04/26/0002 to the site and retail licenses respectively.
[7]
Pine Glow, as it was entitled in terms of PPA
regulations 4(2)(e)
and
16
(2)(e), objected to the license applications. On 9 November 2018,
the Controller found that there was no need for the proposed filling
station and that it would be incongruent with the objectives of the
licencing system prescribed by PPA, the Controller refused
the site
and retail licences. In consequence of the Controller’s
decision, the Respondents noted an appeal to the Minister
in terms of
section 12A
of the PPA against the Controller’s decision to
refuse the licenses.
[8]
Pine Glow opposed the appeal. On 12 December 2019, Pine Glow received
a notification
from the Minister dated 10 December 2019 advising the
parties that he has upheld the appeal and set aside the decision of
the controller
and referred the license applications of the
Respondents back to the Controller for re-evaluation based on
information submitted and other documentation
obtained during the appeal process.
[9]
On 5 February 2020, Pine Glow reacted to the decision of the Minister
stating that:
9.1
The Minister is required to decide the appeals and not empowered to
refer the applications
back to the Controller; and
9.2
The Controller is
functus officio
.
[10]
Standing the Minister’s ground, his office reverted to Pine
Glow in an e-mail message of
27 February 2020 recording the
intransigent stance of the Minister on the matter. On 26 November
2020, Pine Glow alleges that it
learnt for the first time that
construction of what appeared to be a filling station had taken root
on the site. On 30 November
2020, Pine Glow wrote to the Controller
and to the attorneys of the Respondents demanding that the Controller
gives direction ending
construction or proof that licences had been
issued to Highveld Technopark and NAD Property in terms of the PPA.
[11]
On 7 December 2020, the attorneys of the Respondents furnished Pine
Glow with letters confirming
the issuing of site and retail licences
to the Respondents. The attorney further verified that the
construction on the site was
indeed a filling station. Pine Glow
claims that other than the response from the attorneys of the
Respondents, it has not heard
from the Controller
[12]
This Court has been provided with e-mail message communications that
preceded the dispute between
Pine Glow and the Respondents suggesting
that they had a
long established business
relationship concerning the site and these petroleum license
applications.
These exchange of e-mail messages are common
cause consequently I do not intend to quote them extensively. While
they may not be
directly relevant to the outcome of this judgment,
they nonetheless establish the motive behind this review application.
[13]
The Respondents allege that the e-mails indubitably reveal that Pine
Glow
was actively involved in the planning of the
proposed new site and assisted the Respondents with advice and
planning. It began on
24 November 2017 when Mr Arnold Le Roux, an
employee of Pine Glow, sent an e-mail message to Japie, a director of
both Respondents,
annexing a draft layout plan of the proposed
filling station. On 13 February 2018, one Rina Groves a property
manager in the employ
of the Applicant addressed an email
correspondence to Riaan Kock of a Kock & Associates Inc., which
represents the Respondents
in this matter and is also the firm
responsible for the license applications.
[14]
Groves requests Kock to send her copies of the license applications
and to inform her of the
progress of the said license applications.
On 14 February 2018, Wimpie de Beer, the Senior Manager: Property and
Brand Development
of Pine Glow, wrote to Kock requesting and
emphasizing that Pine Glow needed to peruse and signoff on the final
versions of the
license application prior to Kock’s submission
to the Minister. On 14 February 2018, startled by the request, Kock
replied
and said that he did not appreciate why De Beer wanted to
sign off on any documents and copies of the applications when Caltex
Mpumalanga North Marketer was not the client in this matter.
[15]
Responding to the above on 15 February 2018, De Beer stated that Kock
was correct and confirmed
that they were not the client but said that
their interests thought were closely aligned. De beer added that
incidentally, they
had recommended the Respondents’ services to
the client for this application. He concluded by saying that the
reason for
the perusal of the application was to ensure that there
was no room for an objection nor for the Minister to cause undue
delays,
due to technical or other reasons.
[16]
On 19 February 2018, Mr Moeen Omar (“Omar”), the Property
and Brand Director of Pine
Glow who is also the deponent to the
founding affidavit in this matter, sent an email to Japie stating
that as the project manager
for the license process, their duty was
to protect both parties’ mutual interest, by ensuring that the
application complied
with requirements to prevent delays or
non-approval. He then concluded his message by stating that they
understood that time was
of the essence to all parties.
[17]
The Respondents now allege that the assessment of Pine Glow of the
trade area was that there
was a definite need for the introduction of
a new player at the premises as the current Caltex Plaza filling
station would not
be able to cope with the increase in demand. Pine
Glow has always been aware of the contents of the respective license
applications
and had no difficulty with the validity of any document
and/or required rights that could prevent the license applications
being
granted to the Respondents. The parties only became estranged
when NAD Properties refused to accept an unfair clause that Pine Glow
wished to introduce in the proposed supply agreement.
GROUNDS
FOR REVIEW
[18]
As stated earlier, the review has, to the extent that it does not
challenge the Minister’s
decision to uphold the appeal and to
remit it to the Controller for re-evaluation, shifted focus to the
Controller’s pronouncement
to grant the licenses to the
Respondents following re-evaluation. Pine Glow has put forward five
grounds as the basis on which
the decision of the Controller should
be reviewed and set aside by this Court and these are:
18.1
The Controller was not authorised by
section 12A
of the PPA or any
other provision in the said Act to re-evaluate applications
previously finally decided by him;
18.2
The Controller’s decision to re-evaluate the applications and
reverse his final refusal was materially
influenced by an error of
law;
18.3
The Controller’s decision to re-evaluate and approve the
applications was procedurally unfair;
18.4
The Controller was biased or can reasonably be suspected to have been
biased; and
18.5
The Controller’s decision to re-evaluate the applications and
reverse his final refusal was unlawful
as he was
functus officio
.
ISSUES
[19]
It is apparent from the facts described above that some of the issues
to be considered by this
Court are:
19.1
To establish what the repercussions of Pine Glow not to challenge the
decision of the Minister to uphold
the appeal, set it aside and remit
it to the Controller for re-evaluation are, if any;
19.2
In terms of the PPA, does the Minister’s referral of the matter
back to the Controller constitute a
fresh decision by the Controller
or is the decision of the Controller following his re-evaluation
essentially his own or that of
the Minister?
19.3
Whether or not Pine Glow has exhausted its
internal remedies in terms of PPA, which provides for an internal
appeal;
19.4
The validity or irregularity of the decision taken by the Controller
on re-evaluation;
19.5
Does the court have a remedial discretion regardless of a declaration
of irregularity that it may find.
LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
[20]
Section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000
(“PAJA”) defines
‘administrative action’ as:
“
administrative
action” means any decision taken, or any failure to take a
decision, by –
1.
(a)
an organ of state, when –
(I)
exercising a power in terms of
the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or
(ii)
exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of
any legislation; or
(b)
a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state,
when exercising
a public power or performing a public function in
terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights
of any person
and which has a direct, external legal effect …”
[20]
To the extent that the seems to be a dispute on whether or not the
Minister made a decision when
he referred the matter back to the
Controller, the definition of the word, decision, in PAJA may be
beneficial. Section 1 of PAJA
also defines ‘decision’ as
meaning any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be
made, or required
to be made, as the case may be, under an empowering
provision, including a decision relating to…”
[21]
Section 3(2) of PPA provides that:
“
(2)
Subject
to
the
provisions
of
this
Act,
the
Controller
of
Petroleum
Products,
a
regional
controller
of petroleum products and an
inspector—
(a)
may assist the Minister in the exercise of his powers and the
performance of his functions under this
Act;
(b)
may gather such information in connection with the operation or
administration of this Act as the Minister
may desire, and
investigate any offence relating to this Act.
(3)
The Minister shall, subject to the
provisions of this Act, determine the powers, duties and functions of
the Controller
of
Petroleum
Products,
a
regional
controller
of
petroleum
products
and
an
inspector,
and
different powers,
duties and
functions
may
thus
be
determined
in
respect
of
different
persons
or categories
of
persons appointed or authorized
under subsection (1).”
[22]
Dealing with appeals, Section 12A of PPA provides as follows:
“
(1)
Any person directly affected by a
decision of the Controller of Petroleum Products may, notwithstanding
any other rights that such
a person may have, appeal to the Minister
against such decision.
(2)
…
(a)
…
(b)
…
(3)
The Minister shall consider the
appeal, and shall give his or her decision thereon, together with
written reasons therefor, within
the period specified in the
regulations.”
[23]
To the extent that Pine Glow is vigorously contending that Section
12A of PPA gives the Minister
no discretion when considering the
appeal but to make his decision and furnish reasons therefor, the
case of
CompCare
Wellness
Medical
Scheme
v
Registrar
of
Medical
Schemes
and
others
[1]
)
may be of great value. Tersely, Compcare
had
in terms of the
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998
applied to the
Registrar for approval of a name change. The Registrar refused
approval on the ground that the new name was likely
to mislead the
public as, if approved, it would bear part of the name of the
scheme’s administrator.
[24]
On appeal, the Registrar’s decision was upheld by an appeal
committee of the Council. The Appeal Board
reversed the decision of
the Appeal Committee of the Council. Upholding the appeal of
Compcare, the Appeal Board ordered the Registrar
to give effect to
the name-change but attached conditions with which Compcare had to
comply. In a review and setting aside application
by the Registrar
and the Council that ensued, the Gauteng North Division, agreed with
the Registrar but granted leave to the SCA.
The latter subsequently
held that the empowering legislation did not give the Appeal Board
authority to approve the name-change
and then to attach conditions.
The appeal before the SCA therefore succeeded.
[25]
Insofar as the
functus
officio
status of the Controller is concerned, Pine Glow has referred this
Court to the matter
of
Manok
Family Trust v Blue Horison Investment 10 (Pty) Limited and Others
[2]
where
at Paragraph 17
and in circumstances substantially akin to the present the Court
states:
“
I
have mentioned above that a regional commissioner has no power,
sourced from the Act, to reverse a decision made in terms of s
11(4)
and that his decision to preclude Kgoshi Manok’s land claim was
final. He was therefore functus officio and could not
reverse or
ignore the decision he had already made. Until set aside by a court
in proceedings for judicial review, which could
have been instituted
by the regional commissioner himself (see Municipal Manager: Qaukeni
Local Municipality & another v FV
General Trading CC
2010 (1) SA
356
(SCA) para 23 and the cases there cited) the decision exists in
fact and has legal consequences. It could not simply be overlooked
or
reversed (Oudekraal, supra, para 26)
.”
[25]
In holding as it did, the Court in Manok
supra
was following in the footsteps of a long established case law one of
which is
Thompson,
trading as Maharaj & Sons v Chief Constable, Durban
[3]
where the court held at D
et
sec
ond
page 668 that:
“
The
general rule is that, in the absence of special statutory provision,
once a judicial or quasijudicial decision has been
given, the
Court or officer giving it is functus officio in respect of the
matter to which it relates. There are rare exceptions
to this rule,
but the tendency today is to restrict rather than to extend the
scope of the exceptions. Minister of Agricultural
Economics and
Marketing v Virginia Cheese and Food Co. (1941) (Pty.) Ltd.,
1961 (4)
SA 415
(T). See also Vellyammal E v. Winser,
1928 NPD 36
, and
Childerley Estate Stores v Standard Bank of SA Ltd.,
1924 OPD 163
…”
[26]
In the matter of
Bronkhorstspruit
Liquor Licensing Board v Rayton Bottle Store (Pty) Ltd and Another
[4]
it was held that where an
unfavourable decision affects the rights and interests of only the
applicant(s) … such a decision
may be revoked by the public
authority concerned. However, where the rights or interests of other
parties are also at stake, the
public authority is regarded as being
functus
officio
.
So, it would appear that the rule is intransigent in those
circumstances where an administrative authority’s decision to
revisit his or her decision will negatively affect the rights of
others.
[27]
The Respondents have argued that an administrative action remains
valid until legal measures
to set it aside are taken. To this
argument I need to point out that the rule is not inflexible and that
it all depends on the
circumstances of each case. Paragraphs 43 and
44 of
Merafong
City
Local
Municipality
v
Anglogold
Ashanti
Limited
[5]
below
are illustrative of the point:
“
[43]
But it is important to note what
Kirland did not do. It did not fossilise possibly unlawful - and
constitutionally invalid - administrative
action as indefinitely
effective. It expressly recognised that the Oudekraal principle puts
a provisional
brake
on
determining
invalidity.
The
brake
is
imposed
for
rule
of
law
reasons
and
for
good administration. It does not
bring the process to an irreversible halt. What it requires is that
the allegedly unlawful action
be challenged by the right actor in the
right proceedings. Until that happens, for rule of law reasons, the
decision stands.
[44]
Oudekraal and Kirland did not impose
an absolute obligation on private citizens to take the initiative to
strike down invalid administrative
decisions affecting them. Both
decisions recognised that there may be occasions where an
administrative decision or ruling should
be treated as invalid even
though no action has been taken to strike it down.66
Neither decision expressly
circumscribed the circumstances in which an administrative decision
could be attacked reactively as invalid.67
As important, they did not imply or
entail that, unless they bring court proceedings to challenge an
administrative decision, public
authorities are obliged to accept it
as valid.68
A
n
d
neither imposed an absolute duty of proactivity on public
authorities. It all depends on the circumstances.”
ANALYSIS
CONSEQUENCES OF
PINE GLOW’S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE MINISTER TO SEND THE
MATTER BACK TO THE CONTROLLER FOR RE-EVALUATION
[28]
The starting point here is that this Court accepts that the decision
of the Minister to refer
the matter back to the Controller was an
administrative action and so was the decision to re-evaluate and
approve the licenses.
Pine Glow argues that to the extent that the
Minister remitted the applications back to the Controller instead of
considering them,
making a decision and furnishing his written
reasons therefor, the action is unlawful. Section 12A of the PPA,
continues the argument,
requires him to evaluate and to make a
decision and does not give him any power to remit.
[29]
Now that the Minister has remitted the matter to
the Controller, what is the legitimacy of his decision?
In the
absence of any challenge, his decision to refer the matter back to
the Controller stands either because the PPA allows him
to do so or
circumstances in this matter are such that his decision should be
legitimised. Merafong
supra
is clear that an unlawful
administrative action in certain circumstances may, unless
challenged, be permitted to stand. However,
before I explore whether
or not circumstances are favourable for that to happen, it is proper
to first determine whether or not
there are provisions in the PPA
that support the Minister’s action.
[30]
Sections 3(2)(a) and 12A(3) read together make it clear that the
Controller may
assist the Minister in the exercise
of his powers and the performance of his functions under this Act.
Some of the powers exercised
by the Minister under the PPA are those
relating to consideration of appeals described in Section 12A(3). If
the Controller is
in terms of Section 3(2)(a) expected to assist the
Minister in the exercise of his powers and performance of his duties
under the
PPA, it must follow that the Minister is equally entitled
to call upon the Controller to assist him in the exercise of his
powers
and performance of his functions as prescribed in the PPA.
[31]
The Minister was therefore entitled to refer the matter to the
Controller and the latter was
expected to assist as requested. In
doing so, the Controller was discharging his responsibilities set out
in Section 3(2)(a) of
the PPA. Contrary to what Pine Glow would have
this court believe, the Controller was not revisiting his own
decision but was merely
executing instructions of the Minister. It is
manifest from the facts of this matter that the instruction to
re-evaluate emanated
from the Minister and not the Controller.
[32]
In the circumstances, the finding of this Court must be that in terms
of the PPA the Minister
was and has always been at liberty to refer
the applications back to the Controller for reconsideration. This
case must be distinguished
from cases such as CompCare
supra
where the Minister was not authorised, not even by implication, to
remit. The mere fact that Section 3(2)(a) of the PPA envisages
the
Controller assisting the Minister on any matter prescribed under the
PPA means that the Minister could not have been precluded
from
referring the matter to the Controller.
[33]
Turning to the issue whether or not the circumstances are such that
the unchallenged decision
of the Minister to refer the applications
back to the Controller should stand. This question is somewhat
rhetorical because firstly,
it should be the end of the matter
because the finding in
casu
is that the Minister was not
legislatively prohibited. Secondly, Pine Glow wants to do this in
circumstances where it has consciously
withdrawn its attack on the
Minister’s action to remit the matter to the Controller.
Indeed, it might be that the Controller
was
functus officio
but
that is not the issue. The Controller was simply discharging his duty
of assisting the Minister. Ordinarily, it should be accepted
that
without instructions from the Minister, the Controller would not have
re-evaluated his decision.
WAS THE CONTROLLER
FUNCTUS OFFICIO WHEN HE RE-EVALUATED THE APPLICATIONS
[34]
The answer to this question would have been in the affirmative if the
decision to re-evaluate
was his own. However, when the Controller
re-assessed the applications, it was on instructions from the
Minister. The Controller
was therefore fulfilling his duties
contemplated in Section 3(2)(a) of the PPA. Accordingly, he cannot be
said to have been
functus officio.
While the cases on
functus
officio
echo and represent the current position of our law on
when a party becomes
functus officio
, they are not germane to
the facts of this matter. As such, no reliance should be made on
them.
HAS PINE GLOW
EXHAUSTED ALL THE INTERNAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT
[35]
The Respondents contend that Pine Glow has not exhausted the
available internal remedies that
are provided by the PPA. Pine Glow,
so argues the Respondents, should have taken the decision of the
Controller on appeal to the
Minister presumably for the second time.
This argument is fallacious because the decision that the Controller
made was not his
own. The Controller arrived at it following the
Minister discovering, during his consideration of the appeal, that
the Controller
had not considered some information that should have
been part of his deliberations. He then directed the Controller to
take into
account the information that the Controller should have
weighed-up before making a decision.
[36]
If I am right that ordinarily, the Controller would not have reversed
his decision because he
was
functus officio,
his decision to
re-assess was part of the Minister’s consideration of the
appeal. In this sense Pine Glow only had one opportunity
to appeal
the matter to the Minister, which it has utilized. Pine Glow could
not have been expected to appeal the decision of the
Minister because
that was the extent to which its right to appeal could take it. There
is therefore no merit in the assertion that
Pine Glow should have
endeavoured to exhaust all available remedies. The reality is that
there were none.
WAS THE MINISTER
FUNCTUS OFFICIO
[37]
The Minister could not have been
functus officio
at any
juncture on these facts. He upheld the appeal following his discovery
that the Controller had failed to consider some weighty
information.
Based thereon, he ordered the Controller to re-evaluate the
applications with in mind the new information. Again,
it is worth
reiterating that the decision to re-assess the applications was not
one made by the Controller but by the Minister.
There is nothing
irregular about the Controller’s re-evaluation of the
applications. The decision of Pine Glow to withdraw
the attack on the
Minister’s decision was, in the opinion of this Court,
inappropriate as it is targeted at the wrong party.
CONCLUSION
[38]
In view of the approach adopted by this Court, it will be
unproductive to explore any of the
remaining matters raised by the
parties. The findings of this Court are as follows:
38.1
The failure of Pine Glow to challenge the decision of the Minister
means, on the facts of this matter, that
his decision stands, not so
much because of the peculiar facts in this matter but because
legislatively the Minister was, during
the exercise of his powers and
performance of his duties under the PPA, entitled to refer the
applications to the Controller for
assistance when deciding the
appeal;
38.2
The Controller could not have been
functus officio
because he
made a decision only once and that is when he refused the licenses.
The decision to re-evaluate the applications was
one taken by the
Minister and not the Controller;
38.3 In
the absence of any challenge to the Minister’s decision, there
is no attack on the decision to grant
the licenses;
38.4
Pine Glow was entitled to approach this Court for relief as, contrary
to what the Respondents would have
this Court believe, exhausted all
internal remedies that were available to it;
38.5
The Minister could not have been
functus officio
as his
decision to uphold the appeal and to re-evaluate albeit through the
Controller, was made once; and
38.6
There was nothing irregular or unlawful about the re-evaluation
performed by the Controller.
COSTS
[39]
I am not persuaded that the general rule that costs follow results
should be altered.
ORDER
[40]
The application to review and set aside the decision of the
Controller fails and I make the following
order:
The
application is dismissed with costs including those of two Counsel,
where so employed.
B
A MASHILE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA
DIVISION, MBOMBELA
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties
and/or parties’ representatives by email. The date
and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 10 June 2022 at 10:00.
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv
MC Erasmus SC
Adv J van Heerden
Instructed
by:
WDT Attorneys
Counsel
for the Respondents:
Adv JA Venter
Instructed
by:
Riaan Kock & Associates Inc
Date
of Judgment:
10 June 2022
[1]
[2020]
JOL
48124
(SCA
[2]
2014 (5) SA 503
(SCA
)
[3]
1965 (4) SA 662 (D)
[4]
1950 (3) SA 598 (T), 601 F-H
[5]
[2016]
JOL
36772
(CC)