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[2022] ZAMPMBHC 7
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Yuma v S (A09 / 2022) [2022] ZAMPMBHC 7 (3 February 2022)
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA
DIVISION, MBOMBELA MAIN SEAT
CASE
NO: A09 / 2022
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
03
FEBRUARY 2022
In
the matter between:
MULUMBA
TRESOR
YUMA
APPELLANT
and
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives by email. The date and time
for hand-down is
deemed to be 10H00 on 03 FEBRUARY 2022.
J
U D G M E N T
RATSHIBVUMO
J:
[1]
Introduction:
This
is an appeal against the refusal of bail by the Eerstehoek Magistrate
Court. The Appellant was arrested on 14 November 2021
while
attempting to cross the South African border to Swaziland at Oshoek
Port of Entry. The provisional charges preferred against
him were
fraud for having presented a passport to Home Affairs officials with
a forged visa, and contravening
section 49(1)(a)
of the
Immigration
Act, no. 13 of 2002
, for being illegal in the Republic of South
Africa. These offences are listed in Schedule 1 of Act no. 51 of 1977
(the Criminal
Procedure Act) and have not been repeated in Schedule 5
or 6. He would as such be entitled to be released on bail at any
stage
preceding his or her conviction in respect of such offences, if
the court is satisfied that the interests of justice so permit.
[2]
The evidence presented during bail application can be summarised as
follows.
When the appellant arrived at the border post as described
above, the Home Affairs official had him arrested on suspicion that
the visa (critical skills visa) in the passport presented by him was
forged. The said visa was alleged to have been issued by the
South
African consulate in Lubumbashi in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(the DRC). Following his arrest, an email correspondence
from the
Consulate-General was secured confirming that the said visa was not
issued by the consulate. This email and was also handed
in as
exhibit. The State submitted that in essence, that rendered the
appellant illegal in the Republic of South Africa (South
Africa).
[3]
In his evidence given under oath, the Appellant confirmed the events
leading
to his arrest as testified by the Investigating Officer. The
visa was issued to him by the South African consulate in the DRC on
11 February 2019. He did not personally visit the consulate as he
acquired it through an agent. He found it difficult to accept
that
the visa was forged because from the date it was issued, he had
entered the country without anyone from the Department of
Home
Affairs questioning it.
[4]
He also testified that he has been in South Africa for the past 16
years
and that he used a passport and always renewed his permit. It
is not clear what permit he was referring to. His current passport
was the fourth one. He resided with his wife named Monga Winny Nku
who is also a citizen of the DRC. The two have been married
since
2018 and have two small kids. He does not own any immovable property.
He however has a motor vehicle the details of which
he did not
furnish. It was not mentioned what the make and value of the car was
or if it bought through a loan or cash.
[5]
On 22
December 2021, which was the last day of the bail hearing, counsel
for the appellant handed in a bundle of documents from
the Gauteng
Division if High Court, Pretoria. Amongst these was a court order
dated 21 December 2021 directing that the criminal
proceedings at
Eerstehoek Magistrate Court (under case no. A848/2021) against the
appellant be stayed pending the finalisation
of a Review Application
under case no. 59473/2021 in the same court. In that application, the
Appellant seeks an order declaring
that the decision by the Minister
and the Director General in the Department of Home Affairs declaring
him an illegal immigrant,
be reviewed and set aside. Further relief
sought mirrors the relief sought and granted by the Constitutional
Court in
Abore
v Minister of Home Affairs & Another
.
[1]
The difference is that in
Abore
,
the applicant/appellant was challenging his detention and the looming
deportation for being illegal in South Africa whereas the
Appellant
in casu
is facing criminal charges that have nothing to do with his
nationality. The less said about this review application, the better
since it is pending.
[6]
A number of
exhibits were also handed in as part of the urgent application before
the High Court in Pretoria forming the bundle
that was handed in
during the bail application on 22 December 2021. Although the purpose
of handing in this bundle was to persuade
the court to release the
appellant on account of the proceedings being stayed, one could glean
into some of the supporting documents
handed in by the appellant
before the High Court in Pretoria. Amongst these was a one-year lease
agreement that shows that he was
renting (or was due to rent) some
premises for R6 500.00 per month, and that the lease was to
start on 01 May 2019.
[2]
[7]
Another document attached was an “offer of employment” by
a company named Vetasi. This document was dated 29 August 2018 and in
it, the appellant is offered an employment as a technician
from 01
September 2018. He had to sign the document and return the original
thereof to the company. What is conspicuous in the
document is that
it makes no mention of the salary and that the letter contains only a
postal but no physical address.
[8]
In her judgment refusing bail, the Magistrate also referred to the
entries
and/or stamps on the passport which reflected that the
passport ceased to be valid on 23 February 2019. This was according
to an
entry dated 20 February 2019 which extended its validity by
just three days. Her other concern was the fraudulent visa presented
by the appellant at the border post. It was on that note that she
reasoned that once the appellant was released on bail; he would
be
breaking the immigration laws as he would be illegal in South Africa.
[9]
On appeal, the Appellant submitted that the Magistrate erred by
failing
to consider the nature and the gravity of the charge on which
he is to be tried. In this regard it was submitted that the
Magistrate
should have found that the nature and the gravity of the
charges against him were not indicative of any likelihood that he
would
attempt to evade the trial. It was argued in this regard that
the Magistrate failed to consider the gravity of the punishment which
is likely to be imposed should he be convicted of the charges against
him in view of the absence of any evidence of any previous
convictions.
[10]
The Respondent countered this by submitting the penal provisions of
sections 49(1)(a) and
49(14) of Act 13 of 2002 which state,
“
1 (a) Anyone who
enters or remains in, or departs from the Republic in contravention
of this Act, shall be guilty of an offence
and liable on conviction
to a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding two years.
…
14 “Any person who
for the purpose of entering or remaining in, or of facilitating or
assisting the entrance into, residence
in or departure from, the
Republic, whether in contravention of this Act or not, commits any
fraudulent act or makes any false
representation by conduct,
statement or otherwise, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on
conviction to a fine or imprisonment
not exceeding eight years”
[11]
The Respondent argued therefore that the charges faced by the
appellant are serious and
carry serious sentences upon conviction. It
submitted therefore that the question on whether the appellant was
likely to evade
trial given the kind of sentence to be imposed upon
conviction was rightly decided by the court.
[12]
Section 65(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides,
The court or judge
hearing the appeal shall not set aside the decision against which the
appeal is brought, unless such court or
judge is satisfied that the
decision was wrong, in which event the court or judge shall give the
decision which in its or his opinion
the lower court should have
given.
[13]
The
provisions above were considered and interpreted by Hefer J in
S
v Barber
[3]
where he held,
“
It is well known
that the powers of this Court are largely limited where the matter
comes before it on appeal and not as a substantive
application for
bail. This Court has to be persuaded that the magistrate
exercised the discretion which he has wrongly. Accordingly,
although
this Court may have a different view, it should not substitute its
own view for that of the magistrate because that would
be an unfair
interference with the magistrate's exercise of his discretion. I
think it should be stressed that, no matter what
this Court's own
views are, the real question is whether it can be said that the
magistrate who had the discretion to grant bail
exercised that
discretion wrongly.”
[14]
In
S
v Porthen and Others
,
[4]
Bins-Ward AJ (as he then was) focuses on the appeal court’s
right to interfere with the discretion of the court of first
instance
in refusing bail when he held,
“
When a discretion…
is exercised by the court
a quo
, an appellate Court will give
due deference and appropriate weight to the fact that the court or
tribunal of first instance is
vested with a discretion and will
eschew any inclination to substitute its own decision unless it
is persuaded that the determination
of the court or tribunal of first
instance was wrong.”
[15]
The submissions by the Respondent above should be seen in light of
the provisions of section
60 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which
states,
“
4. The interests
of justice do not permit the release from detention of an accused
where one or more of the following grounds are
established:
(a)
Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were
released on bail, will
endanger the safety of the public or any
particular person or
will commit a Schedule 1 offence
.
(b)
Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she is
released on bail,
will attempt to evade his or her trial
.
(c)
Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she is
released on bail, will attempt
to influence witnesses or to conceal
evidence.
(d)
Where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she is
released on bail,
will undermine or jeopardise the objectives or
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system, including bail
system
. [My emphasis].
[16]
In
S
v Hudson
[5]
,
Thirion J was confronted with the meaning of the likelihood to evade
trial when he dealt with the bail appeal where the appellant’s
personal circumstances largely mirrored those of the appellant
in
casu;
and he held,
“
It is true that
the appellant has built up a business in this country, that he is
married to a South African woman and that he has
fixed property in
this country and that he has lived in this country for some 11 years.
But the fact remains that he has no deep
roots in this country.
Furthermore he has connections overseas. He referred in evidence to
the fact that he received from his mother
in Canada certain trunks,
in one of which a missing passport was found. It would therefore
appear that his mother is living in
Canada. He also admitted that
whilst in Canada he had been arrested by the police for
possession of marijuana, which I assume
is another name for dagga. It
also appeared from his passport that he has travelled widely abroad.
This is therefore a case in
which the appellant, if he wants to leave
the county, would not find it difficult to do so.”
[17]
In considering bail, the courts are not expected to foresee how an
applicant would behave
in the future. They are however expected to
tell from the facts of the case and personal circumstances presented
to them, if there
is a likelihood of the applicant evading the trial.
The likelihood to evade trial is not gathered from the applicant’s
undertakings,
but an evaluation of the circumstances of the case as a
whole. Like Thirion J indicated in
Hudson
above, the court
should not only look at whether the applicant is attached to South
Africa, but also consider the kind of sentence
likely to be imposed
in case of conviction. The applicant’s court attendance should
not just be left at his mercy. Unless
this is done with care, the
resources may soon be channelled or focused on extraditing back to
South Africa, people who were released
because courts had faith in
them and placed themselves at their mercy.
[18]
The court
a quo
held a view that if the appellant was unable
to produce a document that makes him legal in the country, he would
be committing
a crime the moment he stepped out of a courtroom if so
released. I do not find any misdirection in this view. I therefore
agree
with the finding that it would not be in the interests of
justice for the appellant to be released on bail as there is a
likelihood
that he could evade trial.
[19]
Before I conclude, I wish to express my distaste on certain
utterances by the counsel for
the appellant during the bail
application proceedings which I found to be unfortunate and not
upholding the court’s decorum.
The manner in which Advocate
Loubser from the Pretoria bar was so vigorous in opposing the State’s
request for a postponement
before the application could commence, the
Public Prosecutor who was involved ended up asking to be “recused”
from
the bail application by the court. Although the presiding
Magistrate did not excuse him, the Public Prosecutor gave the case to
his colleague to handle for the purposes of bail application. On the
date of the application, it was not long before the Public
Prosecutor
on record felt the heat. He informed the court that he could no
longer handle the attacks from his opponent and all
he needed was for
the proceedings to be adjourned, as he was too emotional and feared
saying what he was not supposed to.
[20]
When bail application finally got underway, record is replete with
objections from the
defence right from the beginning to the end. The
actual evidence is very brief, but the transcribed record is huge
because of these
objections, arguments, counter-objections and the
rulings. There was even an objection to the first statement by the
Public Prosecutor
made to the Investigating Officer as a witness when
he told him, ‘it was common cause that he was a police officer
stationed
at Hartebees Police Station.’ Few paragraphs
thereunder, it became clear that the defence actually did not mean
what he said
in the objection as he knew not only the investigating
officer, but also knew when the docket was handed to him for
investigations.
Most of the rulings by the court were ignored as Asdv
Loubser argued against them after they were made as the court’s
authority
was put to test. Not even the Court Interpreter was spared
the wrath of the counsel to the extent that all she wanted was to be
excused from working in that court. I quote some of the exchanges as
they appear from the record
in verbatim
:
PART
A
After
a lengthy argument for and against a postponement, the Magistrate
gave reasons for her ruling which made about four pages
and concluded
as follows:
[6]
COURT:
….
However,
the Court
will now make a ruling that this matter will be remanded
.
Defence, give me the
date when you will be able to come here for these purposes of this
case to proceed? Whether it is tomorrow,
whether it is this –
whenever, because looking into time now it is 14:55. Even if you can
say we proceed now, chances are
that we may not be able to finalise
the day, today.
MR LOUBSER: May it
please Your Worship. Your Worship my – we prepared a bail
affidavit. If I can simply read that into the
record, I believe it
can be done in half an hour’s time Your Worship.
COURT:
You may proceed then.
MR LOUBSER:
As it pleases. I accept then that the application for postponement is
refused Your Worship?
COURT:
It is not refused…
PART
B:
After
another argument emanating from an objection on whether the
Investigating Officer could testify on the statement made by the
complainant, the court again made a ruling as follows:
[7]
RULING
COURT:
The hearsay in bail application it is allowed in court. The only time
when a hearsay evidence
is not allowed in court is during the trial.
It is allowed on condition if the state will call that particular
witness for supplementary
of such hearsay evidence that has been led
but under general law the hearsay it is allowed in court if such
witness will be called
to supplement such. And
in bail application
hearsay evidence it is allowed
. Thank you, you may proceed state.
ADV LOUBSER:
Your Worship may I advance the argument if the court is so inclined.
Your Worship hearsay evidence is
only admissible in a bail
application if it complies with Section 3 of the Law of Evidence
Amendment Act. My colleague has not
made out any case as to why this
evidence would comply with Section 3 of
Law of Evidence Amendment Act
of 1988
. And as a result the evidence is then not admissible…
Argument
on this aspect proceeded further as recorded on two pages of the
transcription until the Public Prosecutor undertook to
get all the
authorities from his office to prove his argument, provided he was
granted a postponement; to which the following interaction
is
recorded:
[8]
COURT:
No way. I have already made a ruling that you are allowed to proceed
with the leading of the
question of your witness.
PROSECUTOR: As it
pleases the court Your Worship.
COURT:
But now Mr Loubser came back and to say you did not lay basis for
such. And you have responded
to say if that what he want then the
matter can be remanded for you to also can get the case to prove that
such evidence it is
allowed in bail applications
PROSECUTOR: I can Your
Worship.
COURT:
So now the only where we stand now is the question of that do we
proceed with the matter as per
my ruling or we postpone the matter to
allow the state to come and respond to the objection?
ADV LOUBSER: Your
Worship but I fail to understand why the state is given another
opportunity. Why can I be prepared. This was the
exact same issue on
Monday. I came prepared, the state was not prepared. Again today a
very basic principle that the state has
neglected to prepare upon. We
are sitting with
Section 3
this is the law and now the court wants to
postpone the bail application once again to give them another
opportunity despite the
fact that the are dragging feet.
COURT:
But it is an objection that you are laying so he want to prove to you
why he lead hearsay evidence
to this witness…
An
argument proceeded until Adv Loubser took instructions (it is not
clear whether these were taken from his instructing attorney
of the
Appellant) and he came back on record to inform the court that he
will now accept the court’s ruling. In my view,
it was
unnecessary for a member of the court to be given instruction to
accept the court ruling as he was in any event obliged
to do so. I
guess he had to be instructed because the person giving instructions
understood the court’s procedures better.
PART
C:
While
the Public Prosecutor was leading the witness (the Investing
Officer), the following appears on record:
[9]
PROSECUTOR:
I want to show you this document with regards to the facts of this
matter. And you can confirm if
you know this document or not. With
leave of the court Your Worship.
OBJECTION BY ADV
LOUBSER: Your
Worship I have not seen this document.
COURT:
Can your colleague have this particular document perhaps.
PROSECUTOR:
I can make a copy for him Your Worship.
COURT:
Oh okay.
ADV LOUBSER:
But Your Worship do you see this is now again the problem. Now there
has to be a copy made. This
is… you cannot question a witness
on a document if the opponent does not know what the document is. The
validity of that
document. Your Worship a hundred percent in
contradiction of the law of evidence.
PROSECUTOR:
I am not sure why my colleague is standing up while I am busy
addressing the court or is it because
he undermines me or what but
when I still addressing the court I have to be respected as such up
until when I sit down if he wants
to raise an objection he will raise
an objection Your Worship.
COURT:
Mr Loubser… (intervenes)
PROSECUTOR:
This is not how the law… (intervenes)
COURT:
I will also appreciate that if you can raise up on a question of
objection and then your colleague
will sit down and then you will
address your objection. Do not just attack the document which we do
not have any knowledge of and
without following proper procedure.
Because now you are arguing about the document that you did not
receive but you do not object
so that your colleague can have
opportunity to sit down.
ADV LOUBSER:
I will object slower next time that he has the opportunity to sit
down Your Worship.
COURT:
Okay. So you did not receive this particular document that the state
lead evidence based on?
ADV LOUBSER:
I have no idea what document this is. This is a hundred percent has
to be disclosed to your opponent.
This is trial by ambush. It is
against our laws Your Worship and it is extremely disconcerting that
I have to object to it.
COURT:
Thank you.
PROSECUTOR:
My colleague must go and read
State v Dlamini
and Others what
does
State v Dlamini
and Others… If you want any
document which have to be used whether at the bail application or at…
you must make a
request. There was no request made to the State. How
will the state know that my colleague will want… He must just
read
State v Dlamini
it is a principled case of any bail
application in this country. He cannot just interject without reading
the law. Read between
the lines, then when you object object within
the lines. He must note a proper request if that is what he want. But
state was willing
to make a copy for him, but based on the fact that
he is having an objection he must make a proper request as per then
law.
COURT:
Okay.
PROSECUTOR:
As the court pleases.
COURT:
Any submission Mr. Loubser?
ADV LOUBSER:
Your Worship if I recall,
State v Dlamini
correctly that
refers to the trial after discovery has happened. The simple fact of
the matter is that on Monday we indicated that
we are still applying
for bail. The matter was postponed to Monday for bail application.
The matter was postponed to today for
bail application. No indication
of any documentation was made and the mere well logic simply does not
follow that we would request
it.
It is also not the
obligation of the state of the defence to request it, it is the
obligation of the person using the document.
The party using the
document to support in evidence needs to disclose that to the
opposing party.
Absolute at worst
before he hands it up to the witness so that I am aware of what
exactly is being handed up to the witness Your
Worship. There is no
way that we could have requested it and that if I recall
Dlamini
correctly which I have not recently read it, it refers to discovery
before trial not before bail application.
PROSECUTOR:
If I may raise the point he have not read it, I can confirm he have
not read it.
State v Dlamini
speaks about the bail application
and contents of the docket in a bail application. He must read the
case and come back and make
the submission. I know it by heart.
ADV LOUBSER:
Your Worship perhaps my colleague can indicate the …it seems
he is getting very emotional.
Perhaps he can indicate the full
citation that I can go and read again. As it pleases.
PROSECUTOR:
I can have it in my office Your Worship I can quickly even have it on
my phone. ‘
COURT:
Do you want to go through?
PROSECUTOR:
But now must I make research for him? He said when I come here I must
be prepared and now he is the one
who is not prepared because he does
not know the law in terms of
State v Dlamini
that if you want
to have problems with documents you can request them. I am not the
one who must provide him with the documents.
Unless a proper request
is made. And this is a bail application in any event.
COURT:
Yo.
PART
D:
The
arguments between what was supposed to be the two learned friends
went on until the stage where the Public Prosecutor indicated
that
his emotions would not let him proceed with the matter that day. He
asked the court to adjourn the proceedings to the next
day saying he
feared he would say what he was not supposed to say. Unfortunately,
even that request was debated for a long time
culminating in another
ruling by the court. Before a ruling could be made, the following
appears on record while the Public Prosecutor
was addressing the
court:
[10]
PROSECUTOR:
… I have been always asking if my colleague he cannot just
interject me. How will I proceed
and assist him if he just interject
me. That is not how the law works your worship that you interject and
you say the matter will
be struck from the roll. That is not so your
worship.
ADV LOUBSER:
Does the court want me to elaborate?
COURT:
No, your colleague learned colleague is busy addressing me and you
are busy talking to your
instructing attorney next you and you are
not paying attention and now I am wondering as to…
(intervenes)
ADV LOUBSER:
Your Worship that is my prerogative.
COURT:
Did you hear his objection?
ADV LOUBSER:
It is my prerogative. Your worship he is just repeating himself. I do
not need to give attention
to pay attention…
PART
E:
During
cross examination of the Investigating Officer as a witness by Adv
Laubser, the following appears:
[11]
ADV LOUBSER:
Yes Sir we are all very well aware of what the court looks for can
just simply answer my question.
INTERPRETER:
Can I also be given a chance to finish?
Are you swearing at
me?
ADV LOUBSER:
(inaudible)
INTERPRETER:
He just said fuck so I do not …
COURT:
Really?
INTERPRETER:
Yes
COURT:
Mr Loubser?
ADV LOUBSER:
Yes Your Worship I was not swearing at her I am frustrated with the
process because everybody seems to
have some sort of entitlement that
infringes on either my colleague’s examination or mine. The
arrogance displayed by the
interpreter when she requested that I give
her an opportunity to finish indicates that I am being malicious
towards her. I am not
being malicious I am simply trying to do my job
and the remark was unnecessary.
COURT:
So must you then swear
INTERPRETER:
So was I supposed to keep quiet
ADV LOUBSER:
Your Worship why is the court allowing that the court interpreter is
speaking directly to counsel in open
court why is that being allowed
COURT:
And now are you raising your voice to me?
ADV LOUBSER:
One hundred percent I am. Why is the court allowing a court
interpreter to address counsel directly?
Unsurprisingly,
the interpreter was no longer willing to continue interpreting in
this bail hearing. She asked and insisted that
she should be excused
and was eventually released by the court. Another interpreter came
and took over.
[21]
It will be
difficult to expect members of the public to respect and uphold the
decorum of the court if this is not adhered to by
members of the
court. Of late, it has become fashionable to just address the
presiding officers in a contemptuous manner
[12]
,
as if parties are immune from the conviction of contempt of court.
The fact that no such inquiry was held should not mean that
there are
no consequences for contemptuous behaviour as it can be best dealt
with through a referral to the bodies or institutions
governing the
parties’ conduct. This is one of such cases warranting an
investigation so that corrective measures may be
taken if deserved.
[22]
In the result the following order is made:
[22.1] Appeal against the
refusal of bail is dismissed.
[22.2] The Registrar
should bring this judgment and the appeal record to the attention of
the Legal Practice Council.
TV
RATSHIBVUMO
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
FOR
THE APPELLANT
: ADV JW KOK
INSTRUCTED
BY
: BANDA AND ASSOCIATES
SANDTON
C/O NTULI ATTORNEYS
NELSPRUIT
FOR
THE RESPONDENT : ADV CV MKHULISE
INTRUSCTED
BY
: DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
MPUMALANGA
MBOMBELA
DATE
HEARD
: 27 JANUARY 2022
JUDGMENT
DATE
: 03 FEBRUARY
2022
[1]
(CCT115/21)
[2021] ZACC 50
(30 December 2021). In this matter, the
Constitutional Court granted an order in the following terms:
1.
Leave for direct appeal is granted.
2.
The appeal is upheld.
3.
The order of the High Court is set aside
and is substituted with the following:
“
a)
It is declared that Mr Abore is, in terms of
section 2
of the
Refugees Act 130 of 1998
read with the Refugees Amendment
Act 11 of 2017, entitled to remain lawfully in the Republic of
South Africa and the respondents
are ordered to refrain from
deporting him until his status has been determined and finalised.
b)
The respondents are directed to take all reasonable steps, within
14 days
from the date of this order, to give effect to
Mr Abore’s intention to apply for asylum in terms of
section 21(1B)
of the Refugees Amendment Act.
c)
It is declared that the continued detention of Mr Abore during
the period
from 26 August 2020 to 7 February 2021, and
during the period from 30 May 2021 to 25 June 2021,
was unlawful.”
4.
The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs in both
the
High Court and in this Court, including the costs of two counsel.
[2]
See p. 26 of the appeal record.
[3]
1979 (4) SA 218
(D) at 220E - H
[4]
2004 (2) SACR 242
(C) para 4.
[5]
1980 (4) SA 145 (D)146H-147B
[6]
See p. 110 of the appeal bundle:
[7]
See p.134 of the appeal bundle.
[8]
See p. 137 of the appeal bundle
[9]
See p. 146 of the appeal bundle.
[10]
See p. 167 of the appeal bundle.
[11]
See p. 209 of appeal bundle.
[12]
See
S v
Lavhengwa
1996 (2) SACR 453
(W) where the High Court confirmed a conviction
and a sentence on a legal practitioner for ignoring and arguing
after the rulings
were made by the Magistrate.