Mutale v P and Others (028197/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 748 (7 October 2022)

78 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Eviction — Urgent application for stay of eviction — Applicant sought to stay eviction pending review of prior court order — Court found self-created urgency and lack of locus standi — Eviction application based on expiry of lease and unlawful occupation — Review application not affecting eviction proceedings — Urgency not established, application dismissed.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This was an urgent application in the Gauteng Division, Pretoria, in which the applicant, Ms Constance Mutale, sought a stay of eviction proceedings pending in the Magistrates’ Court for the district of Pretoria. The eviction application had been launched by the first respondent (P[....], referred to in the judgment as the “PCC”) and was set down for hearing on 10 October 2022 under case number 17906/2022.


The applicant’s urgent application was brought together with, and expressly linked to, a review application instituted simultaneously in the High Court. The review was directed at an earlier magistrates’ court order granted under case number 17028/2021, referred to as the “Dangalazana order”, which embodied a settlement agreement between the PCC and the second respondent, Mr Michael Botha Potgieter.


Beyond the stay, the applicant also sought further relief aimed at an investigation into the condition of the premises where she resided and an interim determination by the court of a fixed monthly rental until the premises were repaired. The third respondent was the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), cited in connection with the requested investigation-related relief.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the relationship between (a) a prior settlement order relating to a lease and rental arrears, and (b) subsequent eviction proceedings brought under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), together with the applicant’s attempt to prevent the eviction from proceeding before the review was determined.


Material Facts


The court treated it as common cause that there were multiple legal proceedings involving the PCC, Mr Potgieter, and/or the applicant, arising from the occupation of a cottage on the PCC’s property. The initial litigation arose from rental arrears attributable to Mr Potgieter under a lease concluded between him and the PCC.


It was also not in dispute that the Dangalazana order (granted on 14 February 2022) was made by agreement between the PCC and Mr Potgieter. The order recorded, among other things, that the respondent (Mr Potgieter) and other occupiers would vacate the premises by 31 March 2022, that an amount of R154,477.43 (being outstanding amounts calculated up to 31 January 2022) would be paid in instalments, that further amounts for February and March 2022 would be provided and paid, that interest would run from 21 June 2021, and that costs would be paid.


It was further accepted that the eviction application (case number 17906/2022) was issued on 19 May 2022 and was to be heard on 10 October 2022. The judgment recorded that eviction proceedings had followed in April 2022 and, after postponements, were ultimately set down for hearing on the October date.


The applicant’s position was that she had been residing on the property since 2017, and that the review of the Dangalazana order affected her right of occupation and implicated her constitutional right to housing. The applicant alleged, as part of the issues she sought to advance in the review, that the arrears position reflected in the settlement was incorrect, contending that only R8,271.46 was owed in February 2022 and that the outstanding amount was settled thereafter. The applicant also contended that Mr Potgieter had entered into the settlement under duress and that she had not been consulted in the settlement negotiations.


The court noted, as part of the chronology, that Mr Potgieter later negotiated again with the PCC shortly before an earlier eviction hearing date and undertook to vacate on 9 September 2022. The court proceeded on the basis that Mr Potgieter had eventually vacated, leaving the applicant in occupation. Only around 21 September 2022 did the applicant directly approach the PCC asserting her residence since 2017, offering to pay a reduced rental of R500.00 (on the basis that repairs were needed), and requesting that the settlement agreement be abandoned because she had not been consulted and Mr Potgieter allegedly lacked mandate to settle on her behalf. The PCC rejected the proposal and informed her that she was illegally occupying the premises and should vacate.


In relation to the requested investigation, the court recorded that the SAHRC had directed the applicant to ventilate the matter before the Gauteng Rental Housing Tribunal, and the judgment also noted that a complaint (instituted by Mr Potgieter in August 2022) concerning the conditions of the cottage had been dismissed by the Tribunal.


Legal Issues


The urgent application raised two primary legal questions.


The first was whether the matter met the requirements for urgency under Uniform Rule 6(12), given the PCC’s contention that urgency was self-created because the applicant had known about the Dangalazana order and the eviction proceedings for months but only instituted the review and stay application shortly before the eviction hearing.


The second, and central, issue on the merits was whether the review proceedings concerning the Dangalazana order had to be determined first because their outcome would have a bearing on the pending eviction application, thereby justifying a stay of the eviction proceedings. This was primarily a question involving the application of legal principles (concerning stays, the relationship between separate proceedings, and the nature of PIE eviction enquiries) to the procedural and factual setting before the court.


Additional issues arose concerning the applicant’s further relief, namely whether the court should direct an investigation by the SAHRC (or an ombudsman) into the premises and whether the court could impose a fixed interim rental, but these were ancillary to the stay and were disposed of on the basis explained in the judgment.


Court’s Reasoning


On urgency, the PCC argued that the applicant had been aware since at least April 2022 of the Dangalazana order and had long known of the eviction proceedings, and that bringing the application at the last hour prejudiced the PCC by leaving it less than 48 hours to file opposing papers. The PCC relied on authority emphasising that urgent-court procedures are frequently abused and that self-created urgency should not ordinarily ground urgent enrolment.


The court nevertheless held that, despite the delay, the matter warranted urgent attention because the eviction hearing was imminent. In reaching this conclusion, the court took account of the applicant’s explanation and the broader sequence of litigation steps that had occurred since mid-2022. The court relied on authority indicating that delay is not, by itself, decisive against urgency; rather, a court must consider the full circumstances and the explanation given.


On the merits, the court identified the narrow question it was required to decide as whether the outcome of the review application would have a bearing on the eviction proceedings such that a stay was justified. The PCC contended that the eviction application was brought under section 4(1) and section 6(1) of PIE and was not premised on the Dangalazana order, and that the eviction application rested on the expiry of the lease and the alleged unlawful occupation of the premises. The PCC further raised that the applicant had not been a party to the Dangalazana proceedings and that the settlement order was not enforced against her, which it said impacted her standing.


The court examined the Dangalazana order and emphasised that the underlying action and settlement concerned the lease relationship between the PCC and Mr Potgieter and the failure to pay outstanding rentals, with Mr Potgieter being the party responsible for rental payments. Against that background, the court concluded that the issues the applicant wished to raise on review—such as whether the settlement was bona fide, questions of maintenance, consultation, and whether rentals were paid—could be ventilated in the review, but did not determine the question whether eviction proceedings under PIE should proceed.


The court reasoned that the eviction application, initiated after the settlement order, could be dealt with independently in terms of PIE. It stated that the court hearing the eviction would, on the facts before it, be required to determine whether the applicant was a lawful occupier and whether she had made out a case to remain in occupation. It further noted that to the extent the applicant sought to rely on her constitutional right to housing or to challenge the termination of occupation, those were issues she remained free to raise in the eviction proceedings themselves.


In evaluating the applicant’s position in context, the court placed weight on the fact that the negotiations with the PCC were conducted by Mr Potgieter, who was the contracting party under the lease and who negotiated occupation on their behalf while both resided there. The court observed that only once Mr Potgieter vacated in September 2022 did the applicant approach the PCC directly concerning her independent continued occupation. Against this factual and procedural background, the court held that the review of the Dangalazana order had no bearing on whether the eviction proceedings should be stayed.


As to the additional relief involving the SAHRC, the court held that the issue was already resolved because the SAHRC had directed the applicant to pursue the matter before the Rental Housing Tribunal. Regarding the request that the High Court impose a fixed monthly rental, the court held that it was not the appropriate forum to determine the rental amount in the manner sought.


On costs, the court applied the general principle that costs follow the result and held that, because the applicant was unsuccessful, she was liable for the costs of the application.


Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the urgent application in its entirety. The requested stay of the eviction proceedings pending the determination of the review was refused, and the court did not grant the investigation-related relief or the request to impose an interim fixed rental.


The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application, with such costs to be taxed.


Cases Cited


In several matters on the urgent roll, [2012] ZAGPJHC 165; 2013 (1) SA 549 (GSJ).


Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another (t/a Makin’s Furniture Manufacturers) 1977 (4) SA 135 (W).


East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others 11/33767 [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011).


Legislation Cited


Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (sections 4(1) and 6(1)).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 6(12).


Held


The High Court held that, although the applicant delayed in instituting the review and urgent proceedings, the imminent hearing of the eviction application justified urgent enrolment on the facts and explanation presented.


On the merits, the court held that the applicant failed to establish that the review of the Dangalazana order would have a bearing on, or justify staying, the eviction proceedings brought under PIE. The eviction application was capable of being determined independently under PIE, including the question whether the applicant was a lawful occupier and whether she could remain in occupation.


The court further held that the SAHRC-related relief had effectively been overtaken because the SAHRC had directed the applicant to the Rental Housing Tribunal, and that the High Court was not the appropriate forum to fix an interim rental amount in the manner sought.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Urgency under Uniform Rule 6(12) is assessed contextually; delay in instituting proceedings is not in itself decisive against urgency, and a court must consider the circumstances and the explanation advanced, particularly where imminent proceedings may materially affect a party.


A party seeking a stay of proceedings must demonstrate that the pending proceedings sought to be stayed are sufficiently connected to, and materially affected by, the outcome of the other proceedings relied upon. Where eviction proceedings are brought under PIE, they may be adjudicated on their own footing, including determinations concerning lawful occupation and whether continued occupation should be permitted on the facts placed before the eviction court.


Where a statutory or institutional process has been identified as the appropriate forum for a complaint (as where the SAHRC directs a complainant to the Rental Housing Tribunal), a court may treat the request for direct court-ordered intervention as not warranting the relief sought in the urgent application.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAGPPHC 748
|

|

Mutale v P and Others (028197/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 748 (7 October 2022)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 028197/2022
DATE:
7 October 2022
REPORTABLE:
YES / NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
REVISED
In
the matter between:-
CONSTANCE
MUTALE
Applicant
V
P[....]
First
Respondent
MICHAEL
BOTHA POTGIETER
Second
Respondent
SOUTH
AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISISON
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
KOOVERJIE
J
THE
URGENT APPLICATION
[1]
The applicant, Ms Mutale, instituted this application to stay an
eviction application
launched by the first respondent, P[....],
against the second respondent, Mr Potgieter, the applicant and three
other parties under
case number 17906/2022 in the magistrate’s
court of Pretoria.   The said application has been set down
for hearing
on 10 October 2022.
[2]
In particular, the applicant seeks relief that such eviction
application be stayed
pending the determination of the review of the
order granted in the magistrate’s court under case number
17028/2021 (the
Dangalazana order).  The review application has
been instituted simultaneously with this urgent application.
[3]
The further relief she sought was that the conditions of the premises
where she is
currently residing, namely Cottage [....], P[....],
situated at [....] S[....] Avenue, W[....], be investigated by the
Ombudsman
alternatively the South African Human Rights Commission and
that this court imposes a fixed monthly rental in the interim until

the said premises are fixed or repaired.
[4]
The nub of the applicant’s case is that the issues in the
review application
have to be ventilated first.  The issues
raised therein have a bearing on the eviction application.  It
is this issue
that I am required to determine.  For the purposes
of this judgment the first respondent will also be referred to as the
“PCC”.
URGENCY
[5]
On urgency, the PCC argued that the matter is not urgent.  In
fact, it was self-created
urgency.  The applicant was already
aware of the “Dangalazana order” since 11 April 2022 and
in that time she
had ample opportunity to institute the review
application.  Furthermore she was aware of the eviction
proceedings which were
instituted around June 2022.  She had
ample time to challenge the “Dangalazana order”.  By
her instituting
the review and this application at the last hour, is
demonstrative of the abuse of this court’s process.
[6]
The first respondent also contended that the first respondent had
less than 48 hours
in which to file opposing papers.
[7]
It was argued that self-created urgency does not constitute urgency
for the purposes
of Rule 6(12) and relied on various authorities.
Reference was made to various authorities.  In the judgment of
Wepener
[1]
at paragraph 17:

An
abuse of the process regarding urgent applications has developed (in
all likelihood with the hope that the respondents would
not be able
to file opposing affidavits in time).  This practice must be
addressed in order to stop matters being unnecessarily
enrolled and
to clog a busy urgent court roll.  In these matters, sufficient
time should be granted to the respondent to file
affidavits and they
can rarely do so when papers were served less than a week before the
matter is to be heard ….”
The
judge continued at paragraph 18:

Urgency
is a matter of degree.  See Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk
v Makin and Another (t/a Makin’s Furniture Manufacturers)
1977
(4) SA 135
W.  Some applicants who abuse a court should be
penalized and the matter should simply be struck off the roll with
costs for
lack of urgency.  Those matters that justify a
postponement to allow the respondents to file affidavits should, in
my view,
similarly be removed from the roll so that the parties can
set them down on the ordinary opposed roll when they are ripe for
hearing,
with costs reserved.”
[8]
The applicant’s mere motivation for urgency as set out in
paragraph 39 of her
affidavit was,
inter alia
, that the matter
had become urgent due to the eviction application being heard on 10
October 2022.
[9]
The applicant submitted that although this said order was granted on
14 February 2022,
she only became aware thereof in April 2022.
I have noted further that the eviction application in terms of the
Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act 19 of 1998 (PIE Act) under case number 17906/22 was issued on 19
May
2022.  The applicant, in argument, stated that she has in
that period attended to the tribunal proceedings and further in
August 2022 applied for legal aid assistance.
[10]
I had considered both parties’ argument and am of the view that
although the applicant
delayed the institution of the review
application she should be afforded a hearing as the eviction
application is imminent.
Furthermore from the events that
played out since July 2022, I have noted that the applicant was
involved in various litigation
pertaining to her occupation.
The court in
East
Rock Trading
[2]
held:
“…
the
delay in instituting proceedings is not on its own a ground for
referring to regard the matter as urgent.  A court is obliged
to
consider the circumstances of the case and the explanation given.”
[11]
On the facts before me, I am therefore of the view that the urgent
attention of this court is
warranted.
MERITS
[12]
It was the PCC’s view that the “Dangalazana order”
has no bearing on the eviction
application.  The applicant is
therefore under the misapprehension that the eviction proceedings
pending against her was premised
on the “Dangalazana order”.
It was further argued that the applicant failed to make out a
case for the stay of
the eviction proceedings.  She has failed
to demonstrate that she will suffer irreparable harm.
[13]
The PCC argued that the eviction application is sought in terms of
Section 4(1) and Section 6(1)
of the PIE Act and not on the
“Dangalazana order”.
[14]
It was also argued that even if the applicant is entitled to have the
court order reviewed, the
issues for determination in the review
application has no bearing on the eviction proceedings.
[15]
It was pointed out that the eviction application is premised on the
expiry of the lease agreement,
the applicant and second respondent’s
unlawful occupation of the premises.
[16]
The PCC also contended that the applicant was not a party to the
litigation in respect of the
“Dangalazana” proceedings
and neither was such order enforced against her.  Consequently
she has no
locus standi
in these proceedings.
[17]
It is common cause that various legal proceedings were initiated
between the PCC, Mr Potgieter
and/or the applicant.  Initially
summons was instituted due to Mr Potgieter falling into arrears with
his rental obligations.
Thereafter eviction proceedings
followed in April 2022.  After two postponements the matter has
eventually been set down for
hearing on 10 October 2022.
[18]
It is also noted that the applicant filed an interpleader summons on
6 May 2022 which was not
followed through.  She also instituted
summons in respect of alleged damages due to the removal of her
belongings and furniture
from the premises.
[19]
Mr Potgieter in August 2022 further filed a complaint with the
Gauteng Rental Housing Tribunal
(the Tribunal) concerning the
conditions of the cottage.  The Tribunal dismissed the
complaint.
[20]
The applicant insists that her review of the “Dangalazana
order” has merit and affects
her constitutional right to
housing.   She has been residing on the property since
2017.  The outcome of the review
will influence her right of
occupation on the premises.
[21]
Part of the issues on review is whether or not the second respondent
was in arrears.  The
applicant claims that only R8,271.46 was
owed in February 2022 as the bulk of the settlement was already made
on 9 October 2021.
Furthermore, she alleged that the full
amount was settled on 16 March 2022.
[22]
For the purposes of this judgment I find it necessary to quote the
“Dangalazana order”
which states the following:

By
agreement between the parties the following order is made:
1.
The respondent consents thereto, together with all other people
occupying Unit [....], P[....],
[....] S[....] Street, W[....],
Pretoria, vacate the said premises on or before 31 March 2022.
2.
The respondent will pay the outstanding amount with regard to the
lease of the premises,
calculated up to 31 January 2022, in the
amount of R154,477.43 in six equal installments of at least
R25,000.00 a month.
The first payment will be made on or before
the 7
th
day of March 2022 and thereafter on the 7
th
day of each and every of the five months thereafter.
3.
After 31 March 2022 the applicant will provide the respondent with
the outstanding rent and
electricity accounts of February 2022 and
March 2022 which amounts will be paid by the respondent within the
six month period.
4.
Interest on the outstanding amount will be payable at the rate of
7.25% from
21 June 2021,
being the date that the summons was served until the full amount has
been paid.
5.
The respondent will pay the taxed party and party costs of the
applicant including the postponement
of [....] January 2022 which
amounts will include the costs of counsel.”
[23]
The order was issued based on an agreement entered into between the
PCC and Mr Potgieter.
Due to non-compliance with the said
order, an eviction application was instituted.  As the date for
the hearing of the eviction
application was nearing and set down for
7 September 2022, Mr Potgieter again negotiated with the lessor, the
PCC, that he will
be vacating the cottage on 9 September 2022 and
that judgment against him should not be taken on 7 September 2022 in
respect of
the eviction.
[24]
It appears that Mr Potgieter had eventually vacated from the
premises.  This left the applicant
to fend for herself.  It
was only around 21 September 2022 that the applicant, on her own
accord, approached the PCC informing
them that she has been residing
with Mr Potgieter since 2017
[3]
.
She made an offer to continue residing at the premises and offered to
pay a certain rental amount of R500.00 on the basis
that the premises
need to be repaired.  Therein she also requested the parties to
abandon the settlement agreement on the
basis that she was not
consulted with.  Furthermore, Mr Potgieter had no mandate to act
on her behalf when settling with the
PCC.  On this basis she
claimed that her rights are affected in terms of the PIE Act.
[25]
I have noted that this was the first time that mention was made of
the settlement order (Dangalazana
order).  Prior thereto, she
had raised no issue therewith.
[26]
In response, the PCC on 21 September 2022, advised her that her
rental offer is not accepted
and she should vacate the premises since
she is illegally occupying the premises.  She was further
advised that there will
be damages claim against her, specifically,
for illegally residing on the premises on her own accord.
[27]
The applicant further argued that the second respondent, Mr
Potgieter, entered into the settlement
under duress.  No doubt
this point will have to be ventilated at the hearing of the review
application.  This appears
to be a farfetched argument if one
takes into consideration that Mr Potgieter, as a senior legal
practitioner understood the consequences
of a settlement agreement
and moreso an order confirming the settlement between the parties.
[28]
As alluded to above, the only issue for determination before me is
whether the outcome of the
review application would have a bearing on
the eviction application.
[29]
The applicant submitted that her contentions primarily in the review
application are,
inter alia
, whether the settlement was
bona
fide
, the issue of the lack of maintenance on the premises, the
fact that she as a tenant was not consulted with when the settlement

negotiations took place and that the rentals were in fact all paid.
The applicant is entitled to have ventilate these issues
at the
hearing of the review application.
[30]
However, in the Dangalazana proceedings, the summons instituted was
premised on the lease agreement
between PCC and the second
respondent.  It is not disputed that the second respondent was
responsible for the rental payments.
[31]
The applicant further argued that the termination of the lease did
not take into consideration
her constitutional right to basic
housing.
[32]
Once again, the applicant is at liberty to raise this in the eviction
application.  From
the submissions and the reading of the
“Dangalazana order”, it is evident that the issues in
those action proceedings
dealt with the lease agreement and the
failure to pay the outstanding rentals.
[33]
I am of the view that the issues on review in the Dangalazana matter
has no bearing on the eviction
issue.  The eviction proceedings
initiated after the said settlement order, on 19 May 2022, can be
independently dealt with
in terms of the PIE Act.  The court
therein, based on the facts before it, is required to determine if
the applicant is a
lawful occupier and further whether she has made
out a case to remain on the property.  I reiterate that the
negotiations
were with Mr Potgieter who not only was a party to the
lease agreement but also the person responsible for the rental
payments.
The applicant was residing on the premises at the
behest of Mr Potgieter who throughout negotiated the occupation of
the premises
on their behalf.  It was only in September 2022,
when Mr Potgieter vacated the premises, that the applicant was then
fored
to approach the PCC directly regarding her occupation on the
premises.
[34]
Insofar as the relief sought to direct the SAHRC to intervene, this
issue has already been resolved.
The SAHRC had in fact directed
the applicant to ventilate the matter before the Tribunal.
[35]
On the third relief sought, this court is not the appropriate form to
make a determination on
the rental amount.
COSTS
[36]
The determination of costs is always in this court’s
discretion.  The general rule
is that costs should follow the
result.  Since the applicant has not been successful, she is
liable for the costs of this
application.
ORDER
[37]
In the premises I make the following order:
This
application is dismissed with costs, which costs are to be taxed.
H
KOOVERJIE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
:
Counsel
for the applicant:                                  The

applicant appeared in person
Instructed
by:
Counsel
for the first respondent:
Adv
J Mouton
Instructed
by:

E.D. Ras, Burger & Partners
Attorneys
c/o
Hartzenberg Inc
Date
heard:

4
October 2022
Date
of Judgment:
7 October 2022
[1]
In
several matters on the urgent roll, [2012] ZAGPJHC 165;
2013 (1) SA
549
(GSJ) dated September 2012
[2]
East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty)
Ltd and Others 11/33767 [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September
2011)
[3]
Annexure
‘CM23’