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[2022] ZAGPPHC 732
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Wingate-Pearse v Commissioner for The South African Revenue Service (54038/20) [2022] ZAGPPHC 732 (30 September 2022)

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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 54038/20
DATE:
30 September 2022
REPORTABLE:
YES / NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:  YES / NO
REVISED
In
the matter between:-
MARTIN
FRASER
WINGATE-PEARSE
Applicant
V
THE
COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
KOOVERJIE
J
THE
APPLICATION
[1]
In this matter this court is required to firstly determine an
interpretation to the
settlement agreement entered between the
parties on 20 March 2009.  The issue in dispute is whether the
payment in an amount
of R336,374.98 constituted payment towards the
tax debt or payment as security (in
securitatim debiti
).
[2]
Secondly, whether the applicant, Mr Wingate-Pearse, has made out a
case for the return
and delivery of the material and goods seized
during the search and seizure operation conducted in April 2005 in
terms of Section
66 of the Tax Administration Act (“TAA”).
[3]
Thirdly, the applicant further sought the striking out of certain
portions of SARS’s
affidavit.  Its contention is that SARS
presented extrinsic evidence which in law is prohibited.
[4]
For the purposes of this application, the applicant will also be
referred to as “Mr
Wingate-Pearse” and the respondent as
“SARS”.
[5]
The parties have been litigating against each other for almost two
decades.
SARS raised assessments from the 1998 to 2005 income
tax years.  There had been numerous court proceedings between
the parties,
which included:
(i)
an application for search and seizure by SARS in April 2005;
(ii)
an urgent application in 2009 to interdict SARS from enforcing the
pay-now-argue-later principle;
(iii)
the taxpayer’s tax appeal in the Tax Court.  The appeal
did not proceed, since the matter was
eventually settled as per court
order of 1 June 2020.
[6]
Both parties agreed that the two salient agreements which has
relevance to the matter
are both the 2009 and 2020 settlement
agreements.  The said agreements emanated from the settlement of
the respective court
applications of 2009 and 2020.  The
interpretation dispute in issue pertains to clause 1.1.1 of the 2009
agreement.
2009
AGREEMENT
[7]
On 20 March 2009 the parties settled the urgent application and the
review application
in terms of a written settlement agreement which
was made an order of court (“2009 agreement”).
[8]
The preamble of the 2009 agreement reads:
“
Whereas
the Commissioner has sought to collect the capital portion of the tax
obligation in the sum of R4,394,811.28 and has on
12 March 2009,
taken judgment against Wingate Pearse in the Gauteng High Court.
Wingate Pearse in the Gauteng High Court
under case number 13684/2009
and has appointed KWP Attorneys as an agent in terms of the
provisions of Section 99 of the Act to
pay the proceeds of the sale
of Section [....] V[....], M[....], Cape Town held on behalf of
Wingate Pearse to the Commissioner.
Whereas
Wingate Pearse instituted an urgent application against the
Commissioner in the Gauteng South High Court under case no:

2009/10991 for an interim interdict, preventing the Commissioner from
collecting the tax obligation pending finalisation of the
review of
the Commissioner’s refusal to exercise his discretion in terms
of Section 88(1) of the Act.”
[9]
Clause 1.1.1 of the settlement agreement reads
[1]
:
“
Pending
determination of the tax appeal against the assessments raised by the
Commissioner for the 1998 to 2005 years of assessment;
1.1
Wingate-Pearse and
1.1.1
shall
forthwith pay over to the Commissioner the balance of the proceeds
of
the sale of its immovable property, section 8-51 V[....], M[....],
Cape Town, currently held by KWP Attorneys in the sum of
R336,374.98.
1.1.2
cedes to the Commissioner in
securitatim debiti
his right,
title and interest in and to the shareholdings and members’
interest as well as any or all loan accounts held
by him in 12
identified entities.
1.1.3
tenders
as security for
the tax obligation three identified
properties …
1.1.4
undertakes not to dispose of or encumber or in any other way diminish

the value of any of his personal assets otherwise than in the
ordinary course of business and without giving the commissioner 10

(ten) days’ notice of his intention to do so.
[2]
6.
The deed of cession in securitatim debiti by Wingate Pearse referred
to in paragraph 1.1.2
hereof is marked as Annexure 1C.”
[10]
It is not in dispute that the payment of R336,374.98 was, in fact,
made to SARS on 27 March 2009.
2020
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
[11]
Thereafter a further settlement agreement was entered into in 2020,
disposing of the disputes
between the parties.  Clause 2.9 of
the 2020 settlement agreement set out the terms upon which the
parties were amenable to
settle upon:
“
2.9
The parties acknowledge that the contents of this agreement
represents the final agreed position between them in
respect of the
relevant (income tax) years of assessment (1998 – 2005) and in
particular in respect of the remaining disputes
between the parties
in the aforementioned Income Tax Appeal and will be in full and final
settlement of all such issues in dispute.”
[12]
Clause 4.1 and 4.2 of the said settlement agreement made provision
for the payment of R3 million
to SARS within 7 business days from the
effected date of the agreement in full and final settlement of all
the applicant’s
alleged payment obligations.
Clause
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 read as follows:
“
4.1
The taxpayer shall make payment in the amount of R3,000,000.00 (three
million rand) to the Commissioner within seven
business days from the
effective date of this agreement.”
4.2
The amount in clause 4.1 above constitutes a full and final payment
by the taxpayer to the Commissioner in
settlement of all the
taxpayer’s alleged outstanding payment obligations (as was in
dispute between the parties before the
conclusion of the settlement
agreement) in respect of the aforementioned relevant income tax years
of assessment (1998-2005) and
in terms of the pending Tax Court
Appeal under case number 12547/2008.  For the avoidance of any
doubt is recorded herein
that pursuant to payment of the amount
stated in clause 4.1 above, the taxpayer has no further indebtedness
towards the Commissioner
and/or SARS in respect of any outstanding
capital, and/or understatement penalty(ies), and/or interest in
respect of both income
tax years of assessment.
4.3
The parties agree that no payment by the taxpayer to the Commissioner
in terms of the settlement will have
the effect that all that remain
in dispute in the pending Tax Court Appeal under case number
12547/2008 will be resolved.”
[13]
Clause 4.7 particularly read:
“
4.7
The Commissioner agrees to release any and all security held by the
Commissioner forthwith after receipt
of payment by the Commissioner
of the amount referred to in clause 4.1 above.”
[14]
Clause 6.5 of the agreement read:
“
6.5
The Commissioner agrees and undertakes that –
6.5.1
this agreement is irrevocable and unconditional;
6.5.2
this settlement as set out herein, is in full and final settlement
of
any and all fiscal claims which the Commissioner may have against the
taxpayer in regard to the relevant issues for the relevant
years of
assessment as stated herein.”
APPLICANT’S
INTERPRETATION
[15]
The applicant’s salient points of argument regarding the
interpretation of clause 1.1.1
are the following:
(i)
In having regard to the ordinary language of clause 1.1.1 and
considered against the background
to the settlement agreement as set
out in the preamble read with the remaining clauses, the only
interpretation that can be afforded
is that the payment served as
security pending the determination of the Tax Court Appeal.
(ii)
The wording of clause 1.1.1 specifically does not state that the
payment would be made in part satisfaction
of the disputed tax debt.
In other words, that payment was made pending the determination of
the Tax Appeal.
(iii)
The 2009 settlement agreement was concluded by the parties pursuant
to the applicant’s proceedings
to interdict collection of the
disputed tax debt (the subject of a pending Tax Court appeal).
The application was necessitated
as SARS sought to enforce the
“pay-now-argue-later” principle.
(iv)
It was only the 2020 settlement agreement that made provision for
payment of the debt.  In fact, it
was expressed in such
agreement that the amount was fully paid and the agreement
constituted the full and final settlement with
the taxpayer having no
further indebtedness.  It was further pointed out that the only
time that the issue regarding the settlement
of the debt was raised,
was in the 2020 agreement.  In this context, the 2009 payment
therefore served as
security.
(v)
By SARS having independently allocated the amount and set it off
against the income tax debt, could
be of no consequence as SARS did
so on its own volition.
(vi)
Furthermore, the “pay-now-argue-later” rule which the
respondent relied on has no merit.
(vii)
It is not disputed that the 2009 agreement came to light when the
respondent sought to enforce the “pay-now-argue-later”

principle.  This is set out in the preamble of the 2009
agreement.  The preamble set the basis for entering into the

agreement.
(viii)
The applicant opposed the extrinsic evidence relied upon in
interpreting clause 1.1.1.  It sought the striking
off of those
portions in the affidavit.  It was further argued that the
applicant remains prejudiced if such extrinsic evidence
is taken into
consideration.  Extrinsic evidence in law is inadmissible.
SARS’
CASE
[16]
SARS, on the other hand, argued that the applicant’s
interpretation regarding clause 1.1.1
is untenable.  In essence,
SARS’ contentions were that:
(i)
The interpretation must be considered in the context of both the 2009
and 2020 agreements. The
extrinsic evidence, namely the surrounding
circumstances and documents which preceded both the 2009 and the 2020
settlements, has
relevance to the interpretation and are permissible
in law.
(ii)
The amount was paid on the basis of the “pay-now-argue-later”
rule.  Hence it was
treated as a tax debt and it was on this
basis that it was taken into account when calculating the remaining
debt referred to in
the 2020 agreement, namely the R3 million.
(iii)
Considering the ordinary language in clause 1.1.1, it should be noted
that no mention of the word “security”
is made.
Clause 1.1.1 of the settlement agreement must be considered in the
context of the agreement as a whole, more specifically,
the other
terms thereof.
(iv)
Furthermore, clause 1.1.1 must be read in the context of clauses
1.1.2 and 1.1.5 and 6, where mention is
made of the assets offered as
security:
(a)
Clause 1.1.2 reads:
“
Cedes
to the Commissioner
in
securitatim debiti
his right,
title and interest in and to the shareholding’s and member’s
interest as well as any or all accounts held
by him in the following
entities:
Bedfin,
Costa Verde, Denim, Blitz, Factoprops, Mag, Ming’s
Distributors, Ming’s Trading, Replay, Tradepost and Thorwyn

(the entities) as well his right, title and interest in and to the
member’s interest as well as any or loan accounts held
by him
in Bridgewater Investment CC, and Erf 30 as at 28 February 2009.”
(b)
Clause 1.1.3 reads:
“
Tenders
as security
for the tax obligation the immovable properties described”
.
(c)
Clause [6] reads:
“
The
deed of
cession insecuritatim
debiti
by Wingate-Pearse
referred to in paragraphs 1.1.2 hereof is annexed mark C.”
On
the reading of the said clauses, it is only clauses 1.1.2 and 1.1.3
of the 2009 settlement that made reference to assets put
up as
security.  There is no mention of “security” in
paragraph 1.1.1.
EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE
[17]
As this matter is based on an interpretation of clause 1.1.1 of the
2009 settlement agreement,
I am firstly required to make a
determination if extrinsic evidence can be relied upon.  The
applicant’s contention
is that extrinsic evidence is
impermissible and contrary to the
parol evidence
rule.
[18]
In this regard the applicant relied on the
parol
evidence
rule and relied on the
De
Klerk
matter,
where the court stated that “
where
a contract has been reduced to writing, the written document is
regarded as the sole memorial of the transaction and deprives
all
previous inconsistent statements of their legal effect.  The
document becomes conclusive as to the terms of the transaction
which
it was intended to recall.  The result is that the previous
statements by the parties on the subject can have no legal

consequences and are accordingly irrelevant and evidence to prove
them is inadmissible”
.
[3]
[19]
I find this submission of the applicant to be untenable, particularly
if we have regard to the
emerging trend to interpreting contracts and
agreements.  The leading authority is the matter of
Endumeni
,
[4]
which introduced the triad approach – emphasizing that the
text,
context and purpose
must be considered holistically.
[20]
The
Endumeni
principle on interpretation is well known
and has been often quoted in matters concerning interpretation.
[21]
I, however, find it appropriate to set out the principles therein.
The unitary tenets to
interpretation are text, context and
purpose.  At paragraph 18 of
Endumeni
the court
explained that:
(i)
Interpretation is the process of attributing
meaning to the words
used in a document
, be it legislation, some other statutory
instrument, or contract having regard to the
context
provided
by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the
document as a whole and the
circumstances attendant upon its
coming into existence
.
(ii)
Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to
the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar
and syntax
; the context in which the provision appears; the
apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to
those responsible
for its production.
(iii)
The process is objective
.  A sensible meaning is to be
preferred.
(iv)
In summary, the point of departure is the language of the provision
itself read in context and having regard
to the purpose of the
provision and the background to the preparation and production of the
document.
[22]
Endumeni
particularly expressed that this principle is
consistent with the “emerging trend” in statutory
construction and the
prior approaches to interpretation are therefore
outdated.
[23]
The
Endumeni
principle was more recently adopted in both the
UJ
[5]
and
Capitec
[6]
matters.  In essence, it was emphasized that the text, context
and purpose must be considered holistically.  In the
UJ
matter at paragraph [67], the court found it acceptable for the
parties to adduce evidence to establish the context and purpose
of
the relevant contract provision.  It found that the evidence
could include pre-contractual exchanges between the parties
leading
to the conclusion of the contract and evidence in the context in
which the contract was concluded.
At
paragraph 69 the court stated:
“…
context
must be considered when interpreting any contractual provision and it
must be considered from the outset as part of the
unitary exercise of
interpretation …”.
[24]
Notably, and of significance, the SCA in
UJ
warned
against a carte blanche approach.  It appreciated that extrinsic
evidence is not always admissible.  It held that
a court’s
recourse to extrinsic evidence is not limitless because
interpretation is a matter of law and not of fact and it
is for the
court to interpret.  It is also true that “
to the
extent that evidence may be admissible to contextualize the document
(since context is everything) to establish its factual
matrix or for
purposes of identification, one must use it as conservatively as
possible …”
.
[25]
The text has to be considered together with the context and
circumstances that led to the existence
of the agreement.
Context particularly becomes relevant where the ordinary grammatical
wording is not conclusive or helpful.
More importantly,
contextual interpretation requires that regard be had to the setting
of the word or provision to be interpreted
with particular reference
to all the words, phrases around the word
[7]
.
[26]
In these circumstances when more than one interpretation is possible,
I am required to objectively
weigh the interpretation proffered in
light of all the facts, more particularly, “text, context and
purpose”.
[27]
By merely considering the plain wording in the 2009 agreement, it is
noted that no reference
is made to the word “security”.
When read with the other clauses, it is clear that the latter clauses
make reference
to the assets being put up as “security”.
[28]
I am directed by
Endumeni
to have regard to the
extrinsic evidence to the extent that such evidence would
contextualize clause 1.1.1.  In its papers,
the respondent made
reference to extrinsic evidence in an attempt to set the context and
purpose that caused the wording of clause
1.1.1.
[29]
The extrinsic evidence the court was requested to have regard to:
(i)
I was referred to correspondence between the parties pursuant to the
launching of the urgent application,
as part of the settlement
negotiations pertaining to the 2009 proceedings.  The applicant
stated therein:
“
We
were instructed to offer that pending finalisation of the Tax Appeal
(the applicant) will:
4.1
Pay to [SARS] the balance of the proceeds of the sale of his
immovable property, Section [....] V[....], M[....], Cape
Town which
proceeds are currently held in the KWB trust account in the amount of
R336,374.98.  These monies are currently
held in Section 78(2)
account (in terms of the provisions of Section 78(2) of the
Attorneys’ Act 1979”
[8]
;
Further
on in the same letter, the applicant listed the assets tendered as
security at paragraph 4.2.  It was pointed out that
the amount
tendered was not identified to be “security”.
[30]
The applicant particularly objected to the reliance on the said
letter.  It was pointed
out that this was part of the without
prejudice negotiations between the parties.  I have taken their
objection into consideration.
[31]
I was further referred to paragraph 53.2 of the replying affidavit in
the urgent application
[9]
where
it illustrated that the applicant made proposals in settling the debt
and offering security.  The applicant alleged
[10]
:
“
I
have made proposals to [SARS] in respect of payment of the Tax
obligation, as well as offering security to the respondent.”
This
illustrates that two aspects were considered as part of the
settlement process, namely payment and security.
[32]
Reference was also made to the judgment of
Prinsloo
at
paragraph [25] where the judge referred to the 2009 settlement and
stated:
“
The
urgent application was settled pending determination of the tax
appeal … against the assessments raised by SARS for the

relevant years.  In terms of the settlement, [SARS] would hold
back recovery steps pending the outcome of the tax appeal and
the
applicant would make a certain interim payment.  The applicant
would also seek, in securitatim debiti his right, title
and interest
and to his shareholding and member’s interest in some eleven
closed corporations who were parties in the settlement
agreement
which is part of the record.”
[11]
It
was pointed out that the said undertaking recorded by the Judge, is
in accordance with the 2009 settlement agreement.
[33]
In paragraph 59 of the applicant’s founding affidavit, in the
second review application
launched on 17 August 2015, the applicant
made no reference to the fact that the amount was paid as part of
security:
[12]
“
On
20 March 2009, SARS agreed not to apply the “pay-now-argue-later”
rule on condition that I, inter alia, ceded as
security my interests
in various memberships, shareholdings and immovable properties which
agreement was concluded in settlement
of the urgent application.”
[34]
It was also pointed out that the amount was set off against the
outstanding tax debt on the statement
of account.  The amount
was therefore not held in
securitatim
debiti.
[13]
From the statement of account, appearing as ‘SARS 10’, it
has not been disputed that the R336,374.98 was taken
into account
when the final figure of R3 million was computated.  It was
argued that if the R336,374.98 was only held as security,
the amount
would then not have been deducted from the outstanding debt.
[35]
On the further reading of the correspondence between the parties, it
was submitted that no mention
is made that the amount of R366,374.98
was to serve as security.
[14]
[36]
In regard to the events that led up to the 2020 settlement, SARS
further pointed out that no
mention was made that the R336,374.98 had
to be repaid to the applicant.  Even the KWP letter of 10 June
2020, does not mention
the repayment of R336,374.98.  In fact,
in such letter it was stated that the applicant relied on the terms
of the settlement
that is, SARS on receipt of the R3 million payment
would furnish the settlement journals on the taxpayer’s income
tax account
to reflect the result of the settlement.  SARS was
required to undertake to release the securities held and provide
evidence
to that effect.
[15]
[37]
This was followed by two correspondences from SARS’ instructing
attorneys of record where
it was confirmed that SARS complied with
its obligations in terms of the settlement.  KWP was furnished
with the applicant’s
statement of account reflecting a NIL
balance.
[38]
SARS further informed the applicant, through its attorneys, that the
caveats registered over
the immovable properties would be lifted.
It further advised that the security ceded to SARS in terms of the
2009 settlement
agreement be cancelled.
[39]
The issue of the repayment of the amount and its states as status as
security was for the first
time raised in KWP’s response of 26
June 2020.
[16]
[40]
In addition, I have noted from one of the previous matters namely:
Wingate Pearse v Commissioner of SARS
2019 (6) SA 196
GJ
the presiding judge at paragraph 8 of his judgment
recorded:
“
On
13 March 2001, Mr Wingate-Pearse launched an urgent application
against SARS in this court under case number 10991/09, inter
alia,
seeking an order interdicting SARS from taking collection steps based
on the tax judgment.  The matter was settled and
the written
settlement agreement made an order of court on 20 March 2009.
In terms of the settlement, SARS would hold back
recovery steps
pending the outcome of the tax appeal and Mr Wingate Pearse
would
make an interim payment and cede, in securitatim debiti
,
his right title and interest in and to his shareholding and members
interest in some eleven closed corporations, which were also
parties
to the settlement agreement.” (my emphasis)
Once
again the inference one draws from the aforesaid is that the amount
could not have been intended as security.
[41]
In reasonably applying an objective approach in interpreting clause
1.1.1, I am required to consider
the factual matrix, the context
namely the circumstances that led to the conclusion of the said
agent.  On the evidence before
me, considered holistically, I
find that the amount referred to in clause 1.1.1 was not tendered as
security.  Even if I exclude
the without prejudice settlement
negotiations, the rest of the evidence, in my view, does not
illustrate that the amount was not
tendered as security.
Consequently, the applicant’s request for the striking out of
those portions of the record of
SARS’ answering affidavit has
no merit, as such evidence may be considered by this court.
RETURN
OF THE SEIZED GOODS AND DOCUMENTS
[42]
I have considered the contentions of both parties pertaining to the
seized material.  The
applicant seeks an order in terms of
Section 66 of the TAA for the return of the seized material.  I
have noted that there
are material disputes of fact which includes
not only whether the applicant has
locus standi
to seek the
relief sought but various material factual disputes which included
issues as to:  whether the seized items were
in fact returned to
the applicant; whether SARS lawfully disposed of the goods; whether
the goods were seized in terms of the customs
and excise legislation.
[43]
From the affidavit I have further noted that there are allegations
that proper inventories/indexes
of the seized material were not
kept.  In my view, these are material disputes of fact which
cannot be resolved on the papers.
[44]
This is clearly not an instance where there is a bare denial on the
part of the respondent.
I have a version that is not farfetched
nor is it untenable so as to warrant a rejection on the papers.
[45]
In fact, there are two conflicting versions which I am unable to
determine without the benefit
of oral evidence and without the issues
in dispute properly identified.  The parties are required to
define the salient points
in dispute and identify the relevant
material documents which has a bearing on the issues.
[46]
By referring this matter for oral evidence, I am aware that I have a
wide discretion and which
discretion should be exercised judicially.
Since the material disputes of fact are evident and which cannot be
satisfactorily
determined on the papers, I am of the view that the
matter should be properly referred to oral evidence.
[47]
Motion court proceedings could never have been the appropriate forum
to ventilate these issues.
In light thereof, the relief sought
by the applicant, more specifically in prayers 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 in
terms of Section 66 of the
TAA for the return of the items seized and
removed by the respondent during April 2005 is referred to oral
evidence.  The
issue for determination whether an order in terms
of Section 66 of the TAA for the return of the seized material is
justified or
not, is referred to oral evidence.
COSTS
[48]
On the issue of costs, since SARS is successful on the first issue,
namely that the payment in
an amount of R336,374.98 constituted
payment towards the tax debt, there is no reason why SARS should not
be entitled to costs
in its favour.  However, since the second
issue regarding the return of the seized material has not been
finalized, SARS is
not entitled to its full costs.
[49]
In exercising my judicial discretion, I am of the view that awarding
SARS 30% of the costs in
its favour is appropriate and justified.
Furthermore, such costs should only be taxed and executed upon
finalisation of the
second issue.
[50]
I have further, in awarding the costs order, taken into consideration
the extent of the arguments
in respect of the various issues, the
pleadings as well as the record in this matter.  A substantive
portion of the court
record constituted documents pertaining to the
second issue.
[51]
Since the second issue, namely the return and delivery of the
material goods seized in terms
of Section 66 of the TAA has been
referred to oral evidence, the appropriate order would be that costs
be costs in the cause.
[52]
In the premises I make the following order:
1.
The payment of R336,374.98 constituted payment towards the tax debt.
2.
The applicant is ordered to pay 30% of the costs of this application.
3.
The relief sought in terms of
Section 66
of the
Tax Administration
Act 28 of 2011
for the return of the items seized and removed by SARS
during April 2005 is referred to oral evidence.
4.
The costs pertaining to prayer 3 are costs in the cause.
H
KOOVERJIE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
:
Counsel
for the
Applicant
:                           Adv

PA Swanepoel SC
Adv
CA Boonzaaier
Instructed
by:

KWP

Attorneys
Counsel
for the
Respondent
:
Adv
HGA Snyman SC
Instructed
by:                                              MacRobert

Inc
Date
heard:

27 July
2022
Date
of Judgment:
30

September 2022
[1]
Annexure
‘WP2’ (my emphasis on underlining)
[2]
002-2822
to 2824 of the record
[3]
De
Klerk v Old Mutual Insurance Co Ltd
1990 (3) SA 34
E 39 D-E
[4]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012 (4) SA 593
SCA at 603
[5]
University
of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary and Another
2021 (6) SA 1
CC
[6]
Capitec
Bank Holdings Ltd & Another v Coral Lagoon Investment 194 (Pty)
Ltd 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA)
[7]
Afriforum
and Another v University of the Free State
2018 (2) SA 185
CC at
page 200H-201A at par 43
[8]
SARS
14 Caselines 005-199, particularly 005-202
[9]
Par
70 of the answering affidavit, Caselines 005-28
[10]
Par
72 of the answering affidavit, Caselines 005-29
[11]
005-29
of the record
[12]
005-30
of the record
[13]
‘
SARS
10’ p 005-171
[14]
‘
SARS
14’ 005-199 read with 005-27 to 005-30
[15]
‘
WP6’
of the founding affidavit -002-2867-2871 of the record
[16]
‘
WP9’-002-2911-2913
of the record