N.T obo S.T v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (24618/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 726 (26 September 2022)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Delict — Negligence — Liability of rail operator — Plaintiff, a minor, injured after falling from a moving train with open doors while boarding — Dispute over whether plaintiff was pushed by other passengers or jumped — Court finds that regardless of the circumstances, the operation of the train with open doors constituted negligence on the part of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) — PRASA failed to plead apportionment of damages or establish any fault on the part of the plaintiff, thus liable for the full extent of damages claimed.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were a delictual action for damages arising from personal injuries sustained in a railway incident. The plaintiff, N T[…] acting on behalf of her minor son, ST, sued the defendant, the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), for compensation arising from injuries allegedly caused by PRASA’s negligent operation of a passenger train.


The matter came before the Gauteng Division, Pretoria, as a trial on the merits. By agreement between the parties, and pursuant to a separation order, the issues of liability (merits) and quantum were separated. The court adjudicated liability only, with quantum postponed sine die for later determination.


The dispute concerned an incident in which ST, then aged 13, fell from a moving train and sustained serious injuries to his right foot. The central subject-matter was whether PRASA incurred 100% liability for the damages given the undisputed fact that the train moved with doors open, and whether any version advanced by PRASA could reduce liability through apportionment (contributory fault).


2. Material Facts


On 26 November 2019, ST, aged 13, was at Mlamlankunzi train station in Soweto at approximately 18h00 after soccer practice. He attempted to board a train to go home. During this process, he fell from the train while it was moving and suffered significant injuries, described in the pleadings as including a degloving injury of the right foot and traumatic amputation of several toes on the right foot. After the incident, ST reported it to security personnel and was transported to hospital by ambulance.


A key fact treated by the court as common cause was that, on either party’s version, ST fell (or exited) from a train that was already moving with its doors open. The parties were therefore aligned on the presence of an operational safety failure: the train departed or travelled while the coach doors were open.


The disputed facts concerned the immediate mechanism of how ST came to fall from the moving train. ST’s version was that, while he was boarding, he was pushed by disembarking passengers and fell as the train started moving with its doors open. PRASA’s version was that ST had boarded the wrong train, realised the mistake, and then attempted to disembark from the moving train (characterised in PRASA’s submissions as having “jumped off” or tried to get off while the train was moving), resulting in his foot becoming trapped and causing injury.


The evidentiary dispute was materially linked to the potential for an apportionment of damages. PRASA relied substantially on statements attributed to ST by PRASA protection officers taken shortly after the incident, while ST was injured and awaiting medical assistance. ST denied that he told the officers he was disembarking; he maintained he said he was injured while trying to board. The plaintiff later reopened her case (with PRASA’s consent, subject to PRASA’s right to call further witnesses) to call ST’s mother, who testified that she was present during the taking of the statement and that ST stated he was injured while trying to get onto the train.


PRASA did not call evidence from any train guard or official to establish that the train doors were closed before the train moved.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether PRASA was negligent and therefore liable in delict for ST’s injuries, given the accepted fact that ST was injured in circumstances involving a moving train with open doors, and whether PRASA could avoid full liability by relying on ST’s alleged conduct (jumping off/attempting to disembark) to support an apportionment of damages.


The dispute involved a combination of application of law to fact and fact-finding. The application-of-law component concerned whether operating a moving train with open doors constituted negligence under settled authority and whether that negligence was sufficient to ground liability irrespective of whether ST fell while boarding or attempting to disembark. The fact-finding component concerned which version (pushed while boarding versus jumping/trying to disembark) was more probable, but the court treated that factual dispute as relevant primarily to the question of apportionment rather than the existence of negligence.


A further legal issue was procedural and doctrinal: whether PRASA was legally entitled to rely on apportionment where it had not pleaded contributory fault and sought to introduce apportionment only at the stage of written submissions.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached PRASA’s liability through the lens of what it regarded as settled jurisprudence on open train doors. It reasoned that the common-cause fact—that ST fell (or exited) from a train in motion with open doors—was alone sufficient to establish negligence on PRASA’s part. The court emphasised that prior decisions have repeatedly concluded that a rail operator acts negligently where it permits a passenger train to travel with open doors, because the harm of falling from a train is reasonably foreseeable, even if the exact chain of events is not, and because the preventative steps required (keeping doors closed while in motion) are straightforward.


In applying those principles to the facts, the court held that PRASA’s negligence did not depend on accepting ST’s version in full. Even on PRASA’s own version—that ST tried to disembark after realising he was on the wrong train—the operative danger remained that the train was moving with open doors, creating a foreseeable risk of a commuter falling or being injured. The court regarded the risk as particularly apparent where persons are boarding or alighting and the train begins to move while the doors remain open.


The court then addressed the bearing of the factual dispute (fell versus jumped) on apportionment of damages. It held that PRASA had not pleaded apportionment and had not pleaded fault on the part of the plaintiff. Relying on authority from the Supreme Court of Appeal, it concluded that a defendant seeking apportionment must plead plaintiff fault; PRASA’s attempt to introduce apportionment for the first time in written submissions, without an amendment application and without a properly developed basis, could not succeed. On that basis alone, the court rejected any reduction of liability through apportionment.


The court nonetheless proceeded to consider the apportionment issue on the assumption that it were open, and held that PRASA would in any event have failed to discharge the onus of proving contributory fault. It evaluated the reliability of the evidence on which PRASA relied, including the circumstances in which ST’s statement was taken. The court expressed concern about the context: ST was a severely injured 13-year-old, in pain and awaiting an ambulance on a busy platform; there were language differences (ST spoke Xhosa, while the officers spoke Sotho); and the setting was not conducive to precision. The court also noted that the protection officer’s contemporaneous notes were missing, and the statement relied on had been transcribed later from those missing notes, increasing the possibility of error.


In addition, the court found that the two protection officers contradicted one another on various aspects of their evidence, which undermined reliability. It further expressed doubts about the memory and trustworthiness of one of the officers, referring to shifting accounts about whether a written statement was taken, when it was transcribed, and whether ST was sitting or lying down. The court considered it significant that the officer asserted facts about security presence at the station that he could not directly know, and that his evidence conflicted with that of the other officer on the question of whether there was security on the platform.


By contrast, the court described ST’s evidence as adamant, credible, and consistent on the core issue that he fell while trying to board. The court further treated the mother’s evidence as rebutting PRASA’s version that ST said he was disembarking, noting that she testified that ST told the officers he was trying to get onto the train. While the court acknowledged that the timing of that evidence required caution, it considered that, in the context of the totality of the evidence, it constituted an additional difficulty for PRASA in meeting its onus.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted judgment on the merits in favour of the plaintiff and held PRASA liable for 100% of the plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages. The determination of quantum remained postponed in accordance with the earlier separation of issues.


The order as recorded in the judgment addressed liability only and did not set out a separate costs order in the portion reproduced.


Cases Cited


Mthombeni v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (13304/17) [2021] ZAGPPHC 614 (27 September 2021).


Baloyi v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) 2018 JDR 2044 (GJ).


Transnet Ltd t/a Metro Rail and Another v Witter (517/2007) 2008 ZASCA 95 (16 September 2008); 2008 (6) SA 549 (SCA).


Rodgers v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2018 JDR 0347 (GP).


Maruka v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2016 JDR 0720 (GP).


Maduna v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2017 JDR 1039 (GJ).


Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa v Mashongwa 2016 (3) SA 528 (CC).


Ngubane v South African Transport Services [1990] ZASCA 147; 1991 (1) SA 576 (A).


AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Nomeka 1976 (3) SA 45 (A).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment as reproduced.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule of Court 33(4) (separation of issues between merits and quantum).


Held


The court found that it was common cause that ST was injured in circumstances where he fell (or exited) from a moving train with open doors, and that this fact, on its own, established negligence on PRASA’s part in light of settled authority.


The court further held that PRASA could not obtain a reduction of liability through apportionment of damages because contributory fault had not been pleaded, and the attempt to raise apportionment in written submissions was procedurally impermissible in light of the applicable authority. In any event, the court found that PRASA failed to discharge the onus of proving contributory fault on the evidence.


Accordingly, PRASA was held liable for 100% of the plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages, with quantum standing over for later determination.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A rail operator’s failure to ensure that train doors are closed while a train is in motion constitutes negligent conduct, because the risk of commuters falling and suffering serious injury is reasonably foreseeable, and reasonable preventative steps are available and straightforward.


Where a defendant seeks to rely on apportionment of damages based on alleged fault of the plaintiff, the defendant must plead such contributory fault and the basis for apportionment. A defendant cannot ordinarily introduce apportionment for the first time in written submissions without pleading and, where necessary, without seeking an amendment.


Even if apportionment is procedurally available, the defendant bears the onus of proving contributory negligence or facts justifying apportionment. In discharging that onus, the reliability of contemporaneous statements may be undermined by factors such as the injured person’s condition, language barriers, missing contemporaneous notes, internal contradictions in witnesses’ accounts, and demonstrated unreliability in memory and trustworthiness.

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[2022] ZAGPPHC 726
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N.T obo S.T v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (24618/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 726 (26 September 2022)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO:
24618/2021
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED:
NO
26
September 2022
In
the matter between:
N
T[....] obo ST
Plaintiff
and
PASSENGER
RAIL AGENCY OF SOUTH AFRICA
Defendant
JUDGMENT
DE
VOS AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an action for damages.
The plaintiff sues PRASA on behalf of
her son,
who
will be referred to as "ST".
[2]
ST fell from a moving train when he was
13 years old. He had finished soccer practice and was getting on the
train to go home.
As
he was boarding the train, disembarking passengers pushed him and the
train started moving with its doors open. He fell and slipped
under
the train.
He
pleads that he suffered a degloving injury of his right foot and a
traumatic amputation of several of his toes on his right foot.
He claims, through his mother, delictual
damages for these injuries.
[3]
PRASA
opposes this relief.
PRASA
contends that ST got injured because he “jumped off the moving
train”.
[1]
[4]
The parties have a factual dispute
whether ST was pushed by other commuters trying to get onto the train
or whether he jumped off
the train.
The
parties, however, are in agreement that whether ST was trying to get
onto or off the train, pushed or jumped, the train was
moving
with its doors open
.
[5]
It
is within this context that PRASA’s liability is to be
considered.
[2]
The
facts
[6]
ST testified that on 26 November 2019 he
went to Mlamlankunzi train station in Soweto at about 18h00 after
finishing soccer practice.
His
friends were ahead of him. Whilst he was boarding the train, he was
pushed by disembarking passengers when the train started
moving with
its doors open. This created the perfect storm that permitted him to
fall out of the moving train and fall under it.
ST was badly injured. ST reported the
incident to private security at Mlamlankunzi and also at Orlando
station to PRASA security.
From
there he was taken to hospital by ambulance.
[7]
The core aspects of his evidence is that
he was pushed out of a moving train whilst he was trying to get onto
the train.
[8]
ST was cross-examined by PRASA on two
main grounds. The first was that he got onto the wrong train,
realised his mistake and then
jumped whilst the train was in motion.
ST admitted that he had boarded the
wrong train, but denied that he tried to jump off the train. He held
steadfast that he was pushed
and fell out whilst trying to get onto
the train.
[9]
The second line of cross-examination
related to a version ST had given two protection officers after the
incident.
The
protection officers took down the version in a statement.The
statement recorded that ST told the protection officers that he
fell
whilst disembarking from the train.
ST
explained that he did give a statement to protection officers whilst
sitting on the platform, injured and waiting for an ambulance.
He said during this interview he
informed the protection officer that he fell whilst being pushed out
when he was trying to get
onto the train.
ST admits the interview but denies that
the told the protection officers that he jumped out of the train.
[10]
At the end of ST’s evidence the
core of this evidence, that the doors were open whilst the train was
moving, was left substantially
unchallenged.
[11]
PRASA called two protection officers, Mr
Tsoagang and Mr Hassim. The protection officers testified about the
statement ST made to
them after the accident.
They testified that ST told them that
having gotten onto the wrong train, he tried to disembark when his
foot got caught and that
is when he was injured.
[12]
The protection officer’s version
were tested against each other and the probabilities during
cross-examination.
They
were consistent in their view that ST’s mother was present
during the time the statement was taken from ST.
[13]
The plaintiff sought leave to re-open
its case to lead the evidence of ST’s mother. PRASA agreed to
the reopening on condition
that they may call further witnesses. ST’s
mother testified that she was with ST when his statement was taken by
the protection
officers and he said he was injured trying to get onto
the train and not off the train.
[14]
PRASA did not call any officer or guard
to testify that the doors of the train were closed before it started
to move.
Consideration
of the matter
[15]
PRASA
submits that ST “jumped off the
moving
train”.
[3]
This
is repeated several times by PRASA in its submissions: ST got injured
from a moving train as he realised the “train was
moving
towards Johannesburg he then tried to disembark form the moving
train”.
[4]
PRASA’s
summary of its witness statement is that “after [he] realised
that he boarded the wrong train he tried to disembark
from a
moving
train”.
[5]
PRASA
submits that “the plaintiff told them he tried to disembark
from the
moving
train after realising he had boarded a wrong train”.
[6]
[16]
It is common cause – on both
side’s versions – whether ST fell or jumped – he
did so,
out of a moving train with
open doors
.
The facts that are common to both sides
– a train in motion with open doors – is sufficient to
ground negligence on
the part of PRASA.
[17]
Our
Courts have concluded, repeatedly
[7]
that PRASA's failure to ensure the doors of a train in motion were
closed, is a negligent act.
The
reasoning underpinning this is that
the
harm
of
falling
from
a
train
is
reasonably
foreseeable,
even
if
the
precise
sequence
leading to it was not; and the steps reasonably required to prevent
it were easy to take.
[8]
[18]
The
principle is quite categorically stated in
Maduna
v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa
[9]
:

Open
train doors and injuries resulting from them have often received
judicial attention.
Unsurprisingly the cases all say that a rail
operator who leaves train doors open while the train is in motion,
acts negligently
.” (emphasis added
[19]
The
Chief Justice put it succinctly in
Mashongwa
[10]
-

The
vulnerability of rail commuters and the precarious situation in which
they often find themselves ought, by now, to be self-evident.
It is
10 years since Metrorail in effect highlighted the need to keep coach
doors closed to secure rail commuters and the significance
of failing
to provide safety and security measures for them when a train is in
motion. Even then it was not a new problem as there
were reported
decisions in other courts that dealt with it. This underpins the
utmost importance of PRASA's duty "to ensure
that reasonable
measures are in place to provide for the safety of rail commuters"
[20]
PRASA,
operating a moving train with open doors is, in terms of our settled
jurisprudence, a negligent act.
The
risk of serious injury to an intending commuter resulting from
starting a train while persons are in the act of boarding the
train
are self-evident.
[11]
PRASA
was negligent in allowing the train to start moving with its doors
open whilst a child was busy embarking.
[12]
The
two versions: did he fall or jump?
[21]
The parties present different versions
about how ST was injured.
He
says he fell and PRASA says he jumped.
The factual dispute has bearing on the
apportionment of damages.
[22]
PRASA did not plead an apportionment of
damages.
Nowhere
in its pleadings does it rely on an apportionment.
[23]
The
Supreme Court of Appeal in
AA
Mutual Insurance v Nomeka
held
that the defendant, to obtain such condonation, must have pleaded
fault on the part of the plaintiff.
[13]
[24]
In this case, PRASA did not plead any
fault on the part of the plaintiff.
Nowhere in its pleadings does PRASA
contend that there ought to be an apportionment of damages or that
the plaintiff was at fault.
PRASA,
plainly, did not plead this case.
[25]
PRASA, for the first time, in its
written submissions refers to apportionment of damages.
PRASA, quite muted, submits that damages
“should” be apportioned and PRASA ought to be liable for
only 10% of the damages.
No
case law for this proposition is set out.
No development of this contention is
presented by PRASA.
No
basis to deviate from the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment in
Nomeka has been presented.
No
application for leave to amend was sought.
[26]
Apportionment has not been pleaded and
no basis has been provided to the Court to permit PRASA to rely on it
at this stage or to
deviate from the Supreme Court of Appeal
authority of
Nomeka
.
[27]
On this basis alone there can be no
apportionment of damages.
[28]
However, even if PRASA had pleaded an
apportionment of damages, it attracts the onus to prove an
apportionment of damages.
It
has failed to meet this onus for the following reasons.
[29]
First, the reliability of PRASA's
version is questionable.
PRASA
relies on a version presented by an injured 13 year old sitting on a
platform at a train station.
The
context within which this statement was made, causes concern.
[30]
Mr Tsoagang testified that he took ST’s
statement on the day ST was injuredST was severely injured, in pain
and must have
been bleeding from his wounds for more than two hours.
He had a traumatic amputation to his
right foot, suffered a degloving injury of his leg and was only 13
years old at the time.
ST
speaks Xhosa.
The
protection officers Sotho.
ST’s
attention must have been on his injuries and the hope for help. All
of this occurred on a busy platform surrounded by
people coming and
going.
The
circumstances were hardly conducive to the detailing of an accurate
statement and the exclusion of any possibility of a mistake
being
made.
The
circumstances in which this statement was taken leaves the Court with
a sense of unease whether it was conducive to accuracy.
The possibilities of miscommunication
were great.
[31]
To compound the Court’s
discomfort, Mr Tsoagang's contemporaneous notes have gone missing.
The statement was taken orally and then
later transcribed from these missing contemporaneous notes.
The actual recording of what was said by
ST cannot be presented to the Court as the contemporaneous notes went
missing.
This
adds another layer to the possibilities of errors.
[32]
Second,
the two protection officers contradicted each other.
This
leaves doubt in the court's mind as to the clarity of their memory of
the events. They contradicted each other regarding where
they were
when the call from the JOC (Joint Operations Centre) came through;
when and where the manuscript statement by Mr Tsoagong
[14]
was written out; and at what stage it was determined that ST had a
fracture.
[15]
[33]
Third, the Court has doubts concerning
the reliability of the memory of the protection officer Tsoagang.
Mr Tsoagang wavered regarding material
aspects of the statement. Mr Tsoagang testified that he took a
written statement from ST.
He
backtracked on this and indicated that he did not take a written
statement from ST.
Mr
Tsoagang testified that he wrote out the statement at the day of the
incident whilst ST was waiting for the ambulance.
After further questions, this was also
altered and Mr Tsoagang conceded that he had transcribed it later
from some contemporaneous
notes that he had made at the time, but
which since went missing.
[34]
PRASA’s fourth difficulty is Mr
Tsoagang’s trustworthiness as a witness.
Mr Tsoagang claims never to make
mistakes, yet when confronted with a mistake in his handwritten
statement was quick to counter
‘it was a human error’. He
claimed to be able to remember this incident very well, but he could
not recall whether
the injured minor child was sitting or lying down
when he was being interviewed by himself. He claimed that there was
security
at the Mlamlankunzi train station “24/7” and
sought to discredit the version of ST that there was no PRASA
security
there to whom the injured child could report the incident,
even though he never went there to the Mlamlankunzi train station at

any time that day. Not only was he willing to testify to events he
could not know about, but he was willing to testify to them
in a
manner that is prejudicial to ST’s case.
Worse, his version is contradicted by Mr
Hassim who testified that there was no security on the platform at
Mlamlankunzi train station.
[35]
To compound this, Mr Tsoagang would not
concede, at all, that ST must have been in pain.
Mr Tsoagang’s version that ST was
not in pain is not only improbably but also at odds with the
testimony of the other protection
officer Mr Hassim who,
unsurprisingly, testified that ST was in fact in pain and bleeding.
[36]
Mr Tsoagang claimed to have an
independent recollection of this very incident despite it having
happened years ago.
Notwithstanding
numerous similar incidents in the intervening period without recourse
to his written statement is improbable, particularly
as he was only
reminded of the incident by the attorney a few days before he
testified. However, Mr Tsoagang’s claim of an
independent
recollection faltered as he changed his memory of the events after
being shown the statement. In particular, after
being vague in his
memory whether ST was lying down or sitting when the statement was
taken, when shown his statement, he appeared
to have gained a clear
recollection and was convinced that ST had been lying down.
[37]
Fifth, is ST’s adamant, credible
and consistent evidence that he fell.
[38]
Lastly, the version of the protection
officers, that ST told them he fell trying to get off the train, is
rebutted and defeated
by the testimony of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, ST's mother, testified
clearly and convincingly that ST had told the Protection Officer that
he had been getting
onto the train at the time.
Had this been the only evidence against
PRASA the Court would have approached it with caution due to the
timing of when this evidence
was presented.
However, when seen together with the
remainder of the evidence, it is another hurdle PRASA has failed to
overcome in discharging its
onus.
Order
[39]
In the result, the following order is
granted:
a)
Defendant is liable for 100% of Plaintiff’s proven or agreed
damages.
I
de Vos
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Delivered:
This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. As a
courtesy gesture,
it will be sent to the parties/their legal representatives by email.
Counsel
for the plaintiff:
B
P GEACH, SC
Instructed
by:

Masapha Attorneys Inc
Counsel
for the Respondent:
ADV
NC RANGULULU
Instructed
by:                                                      Makhubela

Attorneys
Date
of the hearing:                                            06

September 2022
Date
of judgment:
26

September 2022
[1]
PRASA’s written submissions para 1
[2]
The issue of quantum was postponed and the matter continued only on
the issue of liability in accordance with the agreement between
the
parties as well as the certification of trial readiness this Court
ruled that the merits, as the issue of liability is more
commonly
known, be separated from quantum in terms of Rule 33(4); and that
the issue of quantum be postponed sine die for subsequent

adjudication. The parties had agreed that the matter was ready to
proceed on that basis.
[3]
PRASA’s written submissions para 1
[4]
PRASA’s written submissions para 8
[5]
PRASA’s written submissions para 11.8
[6]
PRASA’s written submissions para 23
[7]
In Mthombeni v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (13304/17)
[2021] ZAGPPHC 614 (27 September 2021) the Court held -
"It bears yet
another repetition that there is a high demand for the use of train
since they are arguably the most affordable
mode of transportation
for the poorest members of society, for this reason, trains are
often packed to the point where some passengers
have to stand very
close or even lean against doors. Leaving doors of a moving train
open therefore poses a potential danger
to passengers on board".7
"Doors exist not
merely to facilitate entry and exit of passengers, but also to
secure those inside from danger. PRASA appreciated
the importance of
keeping the doors of a moving train closed as a necessary safety and
security feature. This is borne out by
a provision in its operating
procedures requiring that doors be closed whenever the train is in
motion. Leaving them open is
thus an obvious and well known
potential danger to passengers".
In Baloyi v Passenger
Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) 2018 JDR 2044 (GJ) para 20 it
was repeated that ‘it was a basic
fundamental requirement for
the safe operation of a passenger train in any country that “a
train should not depart with
a door open”. The prohibition of
trains travelling with open doors keeping the doors of the train
closed whilst in motion
is an “essential safety procedure”
(paragraph 26). Travelling with open trains doors is a negligent
act. (paragraph
27)
[8]
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Transnet Ltd t/a Metro Rail and
Another v Witter (517/2007)
2008 ZASCA 95
(16 September 2008) has
categorically stated that “a train leaving with open doors
constitutes negligence”. Similarly
in Rodgers v Passenger Rail
Agency of South Africa 2018 JDR 0347 (GP) at para 14 it was held
that “PRASA has an obligation
to protect its passenger's
bodily integrity and failure to do so attracts liability to
compensate for damages suffered as a result
thereof.”
In
Maruka v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2016 JDR 0720 (GP) at
34 the plaintiff was ejected from a moving train by the
pushing and
jostling for space from fellow commuters while the doors were open.
The Court held that there is a “heavier
burden” placed
on PRASA “where greater risk exists”. A reasonable
person or organ of state would have reasonably
foreseen a commuter
would fall as a result of a train disembarking with open doors. It
is also expected that PRASA should have
taken reasonable steps to
prevent that harm from taking place.
[9]
2017 JDR 1039 (GJ) par [28]
[10]
At para 18
[11]
Ngubane v SA Transport Services
[1990] ZASCA 147
;
1991 (1) SA 576
(A) at 777D
[12]
Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail v Witter
[2008] ZASCA 95
;
2008 (6) SA 549
(SCA) par [1] at
552 and par [5]-[11] at 555
[13]
AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Nomeka
1976 (3) SA 45
(A) at
55D)
[14]
The last two pages of Exhibit A
[15]
P.O TSOAGANG stating that it was only after the paramedics had
arrived (which he confirmed as per par 6 of his handwritten

statement was only at 23:15), whilst P.O. Hassim conceded it had
been much earlier, by 22:26 (as per OB (Occurrence Book) entry
1100
p305).