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[2022] ZAECBHC 39
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V.B.P v K.M.P and Another (247/2019) [2022] ZAECBHC 39 (30 August 2022)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE LOCAL
DIVISION, BHISHO)
Reportable
CASE
NO: 247/2019
DATE
HEARD: 04/08/2022
DATE
DELIVERED: 30/08/2022
In
the matter between:
V[....]
B[....]
P[....]
APPLICANT
and
K[....]
M[....]
P[....]
1
ST
RESPONDENT
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND
2
ND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
NOTYESI
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicant and the first respondent are estranged wife and
husband, respectively.
They were married to each other in community
of property at King Williams Town on 17 February 2009. The marriage
produced two offspring
currently aged 15 and 13 years, respectively.
The children attend school and are under the care of the applicant
and the first
respondent.
[2]
Having been of the view that the marriage has irretrievably broken
down, the applicant
launched divorce proceedings before this court on
09 April 2019. The divorce action is defended, but has not progressed
satisfactorily.
[3]
Pending the divorce action, the applicant seeks a preservation order
in respect of
pension interests held by the second respondent under
member number [....] due to be paid to the first respondent. Only the
first
respondent is opposing the application.
BACKGROUND
[4]
It is regrettable that approximately three years have lapsed since
the launch of the devorce
action, no date of hearing or trial has
been set down. (This is unfortunate). Notably, the applicant, in her
prayers for the divorce,
has asked that both parties retain their
respective pension interests as their sole and absolute property.
However, in the papers
filed in support of the present relief, the
applicant indicates that she has instructed her attorneys to amend
the particulars
of claim so as to include a prayer that the first
respondent’s pension interest held at the Government Employees
Pension
Fund, as same is an asset within the joint estate, be taken
into account at the time that the joint estate is divided between the
first respondent and her. It is not clear whether such an amendment
has been effected or not.
[5]
In her particulars of claim, the applicant has further asked for
maintenance in the
sum of R5,000 per month per child, payable to her
on or before the last day of each and every month until the children
become self-support.
There is other relief claimed in the divorce
action by the applicant, which I do not deem relevant to mention
these proceedings.
There is no suggestion that the applicant has
previously asked for a maintenance order nor rule 43 costs
contribution pursuant
to the divorce action.
[6]
Both parties aver that the first respondent moved out of the
matrimonial home in February
2018. They give conflicting versions of
the reasons why the first respondent moved out of the matrimonial
home. I do not deem it
necessary to incorporate these conflicting
versions as they are not relevant to the current application.
[7]
The genesis of the applicant’s complaint in these proceedings
seems to be an
alleged insufficient or total lack of financial
support from the first respondent ever since moving out of the
matrimonial home.
APPLICANT’S
CASE
[8]
The applicant alleges that the first respondent has not paid any cash
maintenance
to her for the minor children on a month-to-month basis
or at all, in any manner whatsoever. The applicant further alleges
that
the first respondent has failed to contribute in any manner
towards the payment of the costs associated with the immovable
property
situated at [....] Head Drive, Headlands, King Williams
Town, in which the minor children and the applicant reside. According
to
the applicant, the first respondent has also failed to contribute
towards the property situate at [....] Pine Lodge, King Williams
Town. These properties are jointly owned by the first respondent and
the applicant.
[9]
According to the applicant, although the property at [....] Pine
Lodge, King Williams
Town is being rented out, the tenant failed to
pay rentals for several months and that led to the rates, taxes and
levies being
in arrears. The applicant was thus forced to personally
take steps for the eviction of the tenant. The first respondent was
not
assisting, so the applicant alleges. At one stage, there was a
fire at the property which caused substantial damage. That, too,
according to the applicant, needed repairs so that the property could
once again be rented out. The first respondent did not financially
assist in effecting such repairs. The applicant had to assume the
responsibility in the absence of allegedly not being assisted
by the
first respondent.
[10]
The applicant also complains that the first respondent is not
timeously paying the monthly salary
of the domestic worker who
assists the minor children and the applicant at the matrimonial home,
although the first respondent
continued to pay the domestic worker
after moving out of the matrimonial home. For some reason, the first
respondent, according
to the applicant, fails to pay the domestic
worker her salary every month and also refuses to pay anything more
than R1,600 per
month.
[11]
The applicant also complains that the first respondent, since moving
out of the matrimonial home,
had stopped payment of rates, taxes and
services, to buy electricity and gas and pay for the DSTV at the
matrimonial home, including
payment of the gardener.
[12]
On being informed that the first respondent would be retiring, the
applicant became of the firm
view that she needs to take steps to
launch proceedings against the first respondent in order to ensure
that the future maintenance
needs of the minor children are provided
for, particularly insofar as their school fees and tertiary costs are
concerned. The applicant
alleges that, as the first respondent at the
time was 61 years of age, the chances of his further employment or
earning an income,
were becoming slimmer and slimmer. According to
the applicant, that would result in the pension interest of the first
respondent
being his only source of income. The applicant submitted
that it is for those reasons that the children’s future
maintenance
needs must be provided for before the pension interest is
paid to the first respondent.
[13]
In summary, the applicant submits that, if the first respondent gains
access to and dissipates
his pension interest, before the future
maintenance needs of the children are resolved, the children run the
very real risk of
not being able to rely on the first respondent in
any manner for their current or future financial needs.
[14]
The applicant alleges that the first respondent had refused to
confirm that he was indeed retiring
and in doing so, the first
respondent denied her access to his pension interest in the
Government Employees Pension Fund before
the divorce is finalised.
Through her own investigations, the applicant established that the
first respondent was retiring on 31
March 2021. Subsequent thereto,
several letters from the applicant’s attorneys for confirmation
in this regard, had proved
to be unsuccessful as no response was
provided.
[15]
The applicant seeks the preservation order
pendente lite
because she is unable to maintain the minor children on her own
without maintenance received from the first respondent and she
fears
that she will not be in a position to do so in future without
assistance from the first respondent. In essence, the applicant
asks
for the court to grant an order that the first respondent’s
pension interest be retained by the second respondent pending
the
finalisation of the divorce action and an order dealing with the
future maintenance needs of the minor children and the proprietary
consequences of the divorce.
THE
FIRST RESPONDENT’S CASE
[16]
The first respondent denies that he is not contributing to the
matrimonial home and the maintenance
of the minor children. He claims
to have continued making payment of the minor children’s school
fees, uniform, stationary
and the domestic worker. He also states
that he advised the applicant that he could afford R2800 towards the
school fees per child.
The first respondent has provided a breakdown
of the total monthly maintenance that he is currently paying. In a
summary these
are:
R2 800 school fees
per child
R900 uniform
R400 stationary
R1 600 domestic
worker
R5 000 contribution
towards the children on medical aid
[17]
The first respondent alleges that his contribution towards the minor
children at present amounts
to R13 500 and this aspect was
communicated to the applicant’s attorneys by his previous legal
representatives. The
first respondent points out that since moving
out of the matrimonial home, he is renting accommodation for himself.
That, too,
has had an impact on his income. The first respondent
submits that he is now a pensioner and has no income for his living
expenses.
The freezing of his pension interests also impacts his
ability to support himself and the children.
[18]
The first respondent resists the application on various grounds, but
mainly on the following:
18.1 The
applicant has failed to establish through acceptable and credible
evidence that he has an intention to dissipate
and/or conceal the
pension interest benefits to which he became entitled in terms of the
second respondent’s rules by virtue
of his retirement on 31
March 2021.
18.2 The
applicant, on her own papers, is pursuing the relief for reasons
wholly and totally unconnected with the true
substrate of what an
anti-dissipation and/or preservation order should be directed to
protect.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION
[19]
This court must determine -
(a)
whether the applicant has made out a case for the grant of an
anti-dissipation
order; and
(b)
the appropriate order of costs.
DISCUSSION
[20]
The remedy provided by the anti-dissipation interdict performs a
similar function to that of
Mareva injunction of the English law, but
the English law principles are not automatically applicable. The
interdict has its own
unique features. The interdict may be granted
where a respondent is believed to be deliberately arranging his
affairs in such a
way as to ensure that by the time the applicant is
in a position to execute a judgment, he would be without assets or
sufficient
assets on which the applicant expects to execute.
[1]
It is not a claim to substitute the applicant’s claim for the
loss suffered, but to enforce it in the event of success in
the
pending action so that he will not be left with a hollow judgment.
[2]
[21]
The interdict of this kind is an unusual one. In some cases, it has
been described as being draconian
in its nature. The applicant lays
no claim to the property in question, but it suffices to merely
allege a general right to damages
or to the matrimonial property. In
addition, thereto, the conduct sought to be interdicted, is usually
prima
facie
lawful, yet, its effect is that it prevents the respondent from
dealing freely with his assets. The applicant further obtains no
preferential rights over the assets forming the subject matter of the
interdict.
[3]
In order to
succeed in obtaining an order preventing the respondent from dealing
freely with his assets, the applicant must show
that the respondent
is wasting or secreting assets with the intention of defeating the
claims of the creditors.
[22]
The requirements that must be satisfied to obtain an anti-dissipation
interdict are the same
for any other interim interdict, provided that
it has been held that the interdict is
sui
generis
.
[4]
[23]
As for the standard of proof required and the manner in which
disputed facts are to be approached
in determining whether the
interdict should be granted or not, the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Knox
D’Arcy Limited v Jamieson
[5]
held :
“
The basis of
the petitioners’ claim as set out in the petition for leave to
appeal and their heads of argument is that they
have proved prima
facie that the First Respondents had an intention to defeat the
petitioners’ claims, or to render them
hollow, by secreting
their assets. It was common cause that if these facts could be
proved, together with the other requirements
for an interim
interdict, the petitioners would have a good case, and for the
reasons given above I agree with this approach. There
was some
argument on whether the fact that assets were secreted with the
intent to thwart the petitioners’ claim had to be
proved on a
balance of probabilities or merely prima facie. However, it seems to
me that here also the relative strength or weakness
of the
petitioners’ proof would be a factor to be taken into account
and weighed against other features in deciding whether
an interim
interdict should be granted.”
[24]
The nature and effect of the anti-dissipation interdict is to
establish or show a certain state
of mind of the respondent,
regarding his assets. The crucial consideration is that the debtor is
in some way getting rid of funds
or is likely to do so, with the
intention of defeating the claims of creditors. Accordingly, the
anti-dissipation interdict is
available to petitioners who seek to
prevent the respondents from concealing their assets. The petitioners
do not claim any proprietary
or quasi-proprietary right in these
assets. This is not a usual case where the purpose is to preserve an
asset which is an issue
between the parties. Here, the petitioners
lay no claim to the assets in question.
[25]
The onus rests on the applicant to establish the requirements for the
grant of the interdict.
The mere fact that the respondent has been
irreversibly inconvenienced while the interdict is in operation and
the resolution of
the main dispute is pending will not in itself be a
sufficient reason for the court either to refrain from making an
interlocutory
order or to treat interim relief as though it were
final relief; Irrevocable inconvenience is inherent in the temporary
regulations
of disputes by means of interim interdicts.
[6]
[26]
As previously pointed out, the general requirements for the grant of
interim interdicts are applicable
in respect of anti-dissipation
interdicts. In
L
F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality
[7]
Corbett J (as he then was) said :
“
Briefly these
requisites are that the Applicant for such temporary relief must show
–
(a)
that the right which is the subject matter of the main action
and which he seeks to protect by means of interim relief is clear or,
if not clear, is prima facie established, though open to some doubt;
(b)
that, if the right is only prima facie established, there is a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm to the Applicant if
the interim relief is not granted and he ultimately succeeds in
establishing his right;
(c)
that the balance of convenience favours the granting of
interim relief; and
(d)
that the Applicant has no other remedy.”
[27]
In
National
Gambling Board v Premier, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others
[8]
,
the court commented:
“
An interim
interdict is by definition a ‘court order preserving or
restoring the status quo pending the final determination
of the
rights of the parties. It does not involve a final determination of
these rights and does not affect the final determination.’
The
dispute in an application for an interim interdict is therefore not
the same as that in the main application to which the interim
interdict relates. In an application for an interim interdict, the
dispute is whether, applying the relevant legal requirements,
the
status quo should be preserved or restored pending the decision of
the main dispute. At common law, a court’s jurisdiction
to
entertain an application for an interim interdict depends on whether
it has jurisdiction to preserve or restore the status quo.”
[28]
In
Eriksen
Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton and Another
[9]
,
Holmes JA following the test laid down in
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
[10]
held that the applicant for an interlocutory interdict must show (i)
a
prima
facie
right, though open to some doubt, (ii) a well grounded apprehension
of irreparable injury; (iii) the absence of ordinary remedy;
and (iv)
a balance of convenience in favour of the granting of interim relief.
[29]
The
prima
facie
right which needs first to be identified by the applicant is one
which is, in less stringent terms than one where an applicant
claims
a final interdict. This means that the applicant bears the
onus
to place sufficient evidence before the court to show the existence
of a right, even though, by reason of denials by the respondent,
some
doubt is thrown on the existence of that right. If, on the
probabilities, there is great doubt, then the applicant will not
be
entitled to an interdict, even temporarily.
[11]
SUBMISSIONS
OF THE PARTIES
[30]
The thrust of Mr
Wood’s
submission, counsel for the
applicant, is that the first respondent has failed to put forward
information that the applicant and
minor children have security
pertaining to all future maintenance claims in respect of the minor
children. The essence of the submission,
which finds support from the
allegations made by the applicant in the founding affidavit, is that
the purpose of the anti-dissipation
interdict is for the protection
of the current and future maintenance of the children. The applicant
entertains fear that the first
respondent is unlikely, at his age of
61 years, and considering the fact that he has already retired, to be
gainfully employed
in the future. The pension interest would
therefore be the only source of income for the first respondent. On
this basis, the first
respondent may not be in a position to
contribute towards the maintenance of the applicant and the minor
children.
[31]
Mr
Wood
further submitted that this court ought to have regard
to the alleged historical conduct of irresponsibility by the first
respondent.
In this regard, Mr
Wood
pointed out that the first
respondent has not paid any cash maintenance to the applicant for the
minor children on a monthly basis
or at all or in any manner
whatsoever since moving out of the matrimonial home in 2018. In
addition thereto, the first respondent,
according to the applicant,
is not contributing to the maintenance of the immovable properties
and that puts a financial burden
upon the applicant.
[32]
Mr
Schultz
, counsel for the first respondent, countered this
submission by pointing out that the application lacks merit in that
the applicant,
having accepted that it is incumbent on her to
establish by way of credible evidence, that the first respondent has
an intention
to dissipate and/or conceal the pension interest
benefits, has failed to do so. Mr
Schultz
, in this regard,
further submitted that the applicant is pursuing the relief for
reasons wholly and totally unconnected with the
true substrate of
what an anti-dissipation and/or preservation order should be directed
to protect. Let me turn to consider these
submissions.
[32]
It is common cause that there is no maintenance order against the
first respondent and the applicant
has not invoked Rule 43
proceedings which,
inter alia
, deal with interim relief in
matrimonial matters. The applicant has elected to invoke the remedy
provided by the anti-dissipation
interdict. This court must decide
the dispute in accordance with the requirements relevant to the grant
of anti-dissipation interdict.
[33]
I approach this matter on the basis that the applicant and the first
respondent, as shown from
the papers, have two immovable properties,
one of which is the primary residence and the other is rented out.
The applicant collects
rentals. The applicant is in gainful
employment. The real dispute between the parties relates to the
contribution towards the maintenance
of the minor children, the exact
amount of maintenance which the first respondent should pay and the
timing of such maintenance
payments by the first respondent. In this
regard, I agree with the submission by Mr
Schultz
that the
maintenance court or some other forum would be best equipped to deal
with the above disputes. In the absence of a court
order or
determination, it is hard to determine how much and by when the first
respondent ought to have paid maintenance for the
minor children. In
my view, rule 43 was specifically designed to deal with such dispute
in pending divorce proceedings. The applicant
has not deemed it
necessary to invoke rule 43 and she elected to base her case on the
anti-dissipation interdict remedy.
[34]
The first respondent accepts, in the answering affidavit, that the
children have to be maintained
and that, in this regard, a reciprocal
obligation exists for him and the applicant. The evidence which has
been put up by the first
respondent shows that he is contributing
towards the maintenance of the children and in this regard, I do
consider these payments:
R2 800 school fees per
child per month
R900 uniform
R400 stationary
R1 600 domestic
worker
R5 000 contribution
towards the children on medical aid.
[35]
It may well be that the first respondent is not making punctual
payments or at times does not
pay, however, that cannot be enough to
suggest an intention to dissipate or conceal assets, which is a
critical consideration in
respect of anti-dissipation order. The
purpose of the anti-dissipation interdict is to prevent a respondent
who can be shown to
have assets and is about to defeat the
applicant’s claim, or to render it hollow, by securing or
dissipating assets before
judgment can be obtained or executed,
thereby successfully defeating the ends of justice. I am not
convinced that this is the case.
[36]
I agree with Mr Wood’s submission that it is not essential to
establish an intention on
the part of the first respondent to
frustrate an anticipated judgment for as long as the conduct of the
first respondent is likely
to have that effect, then the applicant
would have succeeded. However, in the present case, the applicant
failed to even meet that
threshold. Some state of the mind in respect
of the first respondent which points to the intention of dissipating
the assets is
required and the applicant failed to establish this in
evidence. Late or non-payment of maintenance on its own cannot be a
decisive
factor. More is required for an inference or conclusion to
be drawn that the first respondent is conducting himself in a manner
that is likely to frustrate an anticipated judgment. This demands for
more information which must link up to the state of the mind
for the
first respondent.
[37]
In
Bassani
Mining (Pty) Ltd v Sebosat (Pty) Ltd and Others
,
[12]
the SCA reaffirmed the approach in
Knox
D’Arcy Ltd and Others v Jamieson & Others
that the remedy provided by anti-dissipation interdict is available
where an applicant has shown on the established basis for an
interim
interdict : (a) a claim against the respondent; (b) that the
respondent is concealing or dissipating assets with the intent
of
frustrating the claim. Whilst I accept that the pension interest of
the first respondent is an asset in the joint estate and
that the
applicant has some rights, however, the applicant dismally fails to
establish the second leg that the first respondent
is concealing the
pension interests or is dissipating same.
[38]
In the particulars of claim in respect of the divorce proceedings,
the applicant made it patently
clear that the first respondent
retains his pension interest as his sole and absolute property. I do
accept that the applicant
intends to amend such a prayer in due
course. However, that cannot detract from my conclusion that she
always knew about the pension
and the age of retirement of the first
respondent, since they are a married couple.
[39]
Most significantly, it has been disclosed that the first respondent’s
pension fund benefit, as
on 31 March 2021, was a sum of R5 955 836.
In terms of the second respondent’s rules, the first respondent
is only
entitled to withdraw one-third of the pension interest and
the balance is payable as an annuity for the rest of his life. It is
obvious that the first respondent would not be in a position to
dissipate the pension interest in the manner contemplated for the
grant of an anti-dissipating interdict.
[40]
The first respondent is unemployed and for his livelihood, he would
depend on the payment of
this one-third share of the pension interest
and that would assist as well towards the payment of maintenance of
the children.
The court should not likely decide to freeze the
pension payment, in circumstances where the first respondent would be
unable to
sustain his own living.
[41]
The facts of this particular case do not establish the need for the
proposed intervention. I
have taken into account the provisions of
section 28 of the Bill of Rights which pertains to the right of
children to proper parental
care. In this case, the first respondent
is contributing to the maintenance of the children, albeit in an
unsatisfactory manner,
according to the applicant. The applicant has
a remedy in this regard.
[42]
I have also considered the judgments to which Mr
Wood
has referred this court dealing with the children’s rights and
the obligations of parents. All those cases have no application
to
the circumstances of the present case. The case of
Bannatyne
v Bannatyne & Another
[13]
and Magewu v Zozo & Another
[14]
find no relevance. I have also considered the judgment of
SR
v DR
and
Another
[15]
.
In this case, the court considered the fact that the applicant was in
arrears of payment of maintenance and that he had sold his
property.
Those facts were enough to satisfy the court to grant an
anti-dissipating interdict. In the circumstances of this case,
there
is simply no evidence that the first respondent is concealing assets
or property. All the complaints relate to the insufficient
support or
financial contributions to the matrimonial home and the maintenance
of the minor children. I have no doubt in my mind
that this family
has sufficient assets in the form of immovable property and all these
properties are in the control of the applicant
at present, including
the rented home. The maintenance court or rule 43 proceedings may
effectively regulate the payment of maintenance
and first
respondent’s contributions.
[43]
The applicant has failed to make out a case and is, in my view, not
entitled to any relief.
COSTS
[44]
In the consideration of the costs, I do take into account the history
of litigation which reflects
an unsatisfactory state of affairs. The
applicant approached the court on an urgent basis. The certificate of
urgency was submitted
for directions by the court on 12 March 2021.
The directions were issued on the basis of such urgency.
[45]
The matter was enrolled for hearing on 30 March 2021 and timelines
were truncated for the filing
of papers. On 30 March 2021, the
parties took an order by consent which effectively allowed for an
interim order and the application
was postponed to 13 April 2021. On
13 April 2021, the matter was postponed
sine die
.
[46]
Since 13 April 2021, the applicant, who had approached the court on
an urgent basis, took no
steps to have the matter finalised. In May
2022, the first respondent took the initiative to apply for a date of
hearing of the
application and the matter was enrolled for hearing on
4 August 2022. It is well to remember that the divorce proceedings,
although
instituted approximately 3 years ago, are yet to be heard.
No trial date has been set for the hearing of the divorce.
[47]
It is becoming a common trend that once parties, as is the case here,
obtain an interim relief
on an “
urgent
” basis,
they adopt a supine position with regard to the finalisation of such
urgent applications. This is undesirable. I
do share Mr
Schultz’s
concerns that the first respondent, a pensioner, was unable to use
his personal pension fund benefits for the duration of the order
and
that was likely to endure for an indefinite period as it seems that
the divorce proceedings are nowhere near to finalisation.
The
submissions of Mr
Wood
that this court should consider
unfreezing a portion of the pension benefit is not an answer to the
concerns of Mr
Schultz
. The applicant has chosen a cause of
action and she must make a case in relation to that cause of action,
which she has failed
to do. I also reject the submissions on punitive
costs. None of the parties has made out a case for a punitive costs
order. Whilst
there was mention of a court order investigation,
neither evidence nor serious submissions were made in this regard.
[48]
Both parties had asked for costs in the event of success. The trite
legal position is that costs
follow the results. I have not been
persuaded differently.
CONCLUSION
[49]
In the circumstances of this case and for all the reasons set out
above, the applicant has failed
to make out a case and it follows
that the application should be dismissed with costs and the rule
nisi
issued on 30 March 2021 discharged.
ORDER
[50]
In the result, I grant the following order:
1.
The rule
nisi
issued on 30 March 2021 is discharged.
2.
The application is dismissed with costs.
M
NOTYESI
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
Counsel
for the applicant
:
C Wood
Instructed
by
: Difford Underwood Inc.
c/o Squire Smith &
Laurie inc
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
Counsel
for the 1
st
respondent :
NCF Schultz
Instructed
by
: Smith Tabata Inc
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
[1]
Carmel
Trading Company Ltd. v Commissioner for the South African Revenue
Services and Others
(447/07)
[2007] ZASCA 160
; [2007] SCA 160 (RSA);
[2008] 2 All SA 125
(SCA);
2008 (2) SA 433
(SCA) (29 November 2007)
[2]
Msundunzi
Municipality v Natal Joint Municipality p/p Fund
2007
(1) SA 142
(N) at 157
[3]
The
Civil Practice of the High Court of South Africa, Herbstein and Van
Winsen, vol 2, 5
th
ed at 1488-1493 and the authorities cited in Chapter VII titled ;
“Anti-dissipation Interdicts (the So-called “Mareva-Type
Injunctions” or “Freezing Injunctions”. See also
the unreported judgment of Hartley J in
JLT
v CHT & Another
(EL 819/2020) [2021] ZAECELLC 4 (22 January 2021) – the
judgment is available in SAFLII
[4]
Knox
D-Arcy Limited v Jamieson
1995
(2) SA 579
(W) AT 600 – B - C
[5]
[1996] ZASCA 58
;
1996
(4) SA 348
(A) at 373 E - H
[6]
Knox
supra
at
603 - 604
[7]
1969
(2) SA 256
(C) at 267A-F
[8]
[2001] ZACC 8
;
2002
(2) SA 715
CC at 730-731
[9]
1973
(3) SA 685
(A) at 691 C-E
[10]
1914 AD 221
[11]
Msunduzi
Municipality v Natal Joint Municipal P/P Fund supra at 152E-G
[12]
(835/2020)
[2021] ZASCA 126
(29 September 2021)
[13]
[2004]
3 All SA 235
(C) at para 18 p 7
[14]
[2004]
3 All SA 235
(C) at para 21, p 9
[15]
(2980/2007)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 172 (22 March 2022) by Adams J