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[2011] ZASCA 137
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International Trade Administration Commission and Another v SA Tyre Manufacturers Conference (Pty) Ltd and Others (738/2010) [2011] ZASCA 137 (23 September 2011)
THE SUPREME COURT
OF APPEAL
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Case No:
738/2010
In
the matter between:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION
….............
1
st
Appellant
THE
MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
….......................................
2
nd
Appellant
and
SOUTH AFRICAN TYRE MANUFACTURERS CONFERENCE
(PTY) LTD
…...........................................................................................
1
st
Respondent
BRIDGESTONE SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
…..................................
2
nd
Respondent
CONTINENTAL TYRE (SOUTH AFRICA) (PTY) LTD
…......................
3
rd
Respondent
DUNLOP TYRES INTERNATIONAL (PTY) LTD
…...............................
4
th
Respondent
GOODYEAR
TYRE AND RUBBER HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD `
…...........
5
th
Respondent
Neutral citation:
International Trade
Administration Commission v SA Tyre Manufacturers Conference
(738/2010)
[2011] ZASCA 137
(23 September 2011)
Coram:
Harms AP, Mthiyane, Cloete, Cachalia and
Shongwe JJA
Heard:
7 September 2011
Delivered:
23 September 2011
Summary:
Dumping ─ application to impose
anti-dumping duties ─ refusal ─ review
___________________________________________________________________
O R D E R
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from:
North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria (Hartzenberg J sitting as court of first instance):
1 The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs
of three counsel.
2 The order of the court below is set aside and replaced
with an order dismissing the application with costs, including the
costs
of three counsel.
___________________________________________________________________
J U D G M E N T
___________________________________________________________________
HARMS AP (MTHIYANE, CLOETE, CACHALIA and SHONGWE JJA
concurring)
Introduction
[1] This case is about the dumping of certain types of
tyres from China. Dumping is
the
introduction of goods into the commerce of a country or its common
customs area at an export price less than the normal value
of those
goods in the country of origin. According to the
General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (
GATT)
(referred to in more detail below) –
‘
[t]he
contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one
country are introduced into the commerce of another country
at less
than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry
in the
territory of a contracting party or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry.’
1
[2] The South African Tyre Manufacturers Conference
(Pty) Ltd is an industrial organisation representing the four local
manufacturers
of pneumatic rubber tyres, namely Bridgestone South
Africa (Pty) Ltd, Continental Tyre South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Dunlop
Tyres International
(Pty) Ltd and Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Holdings
(Pty) Ltd. As the names indicate, they are subsidiaries of or related
to major
international tyre manufacturers. These five (to whom I
shall refer to as ‘the manufacturers’) applied to the
International
Trade Administration Commission (‘ITAC’) to
investigate the possible dumping of tyres by manufacturers from the
Peoples’
Republic of China (PRC). ITAC, after a lengthy
investigation, recommended to the Minister of Trade and Industry that
he should
terminate the investigation. The Minister accepted the
recommendation.
[3] The manufacturers were dissatisfied and they applied
on 1 October 2007 to the High Court, Pretoria, for a review of ITAC’s
recommendation and the Minister’s decision. The grounds of
review were countless but, as the high court (Hartzenberg J) said,
‘
the
real and only objection raised by the applicants is that [ITAC]
either deliberately or otherwise wrongly failed to investigate
the
market economy status of the PRC, which it was obliged to do in the
light of the information available to it and in terms of
the ITA Act,
the Regulations and the relevant international treaties.’
The high court held that ITAC had a duty to investigate
the market economy status of the PRC, something it failed or refused
to
do so. The court accordingly reviewed the relevant recommendation
and decision, and set them aside. The present appeal by ITAC and
the
Minister is with the leave of the court below.
[4] The imposition of anti-dumping customs duties on
offending goods is permitted in terms of an international agreement
binding
on the Republic and under our municipal law, provided the
dumping harms or is likely to harm our domestic trade and industry.
‘
Anti-dumping
duties are harnessed to counteract or reduce harmful dumping and
other adverse trade practices.’
International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW
South Africa (Pty) Ltd
2010 (5) BCLR 457
(CC) para 1.
[5] The municipal law referred to is the International
Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 (‘the Act’ or ‘the
ITA Act’), and its regulations. One of its objects is to
provide for the control of the import of goods, and for the amendment
of customs duties. For this, ITAC must investigate and evaluate
applications for the amendment of customs duties with regard to
inter
alia anti-dumping duties, and to issue recommendations regarding the
rates of duty (s 26(1)(c)(i)). It must take appropriate
steps to give
effect to its recommendations (s 22). A report is provided to the
Minister who, if he adopts the recommendations,
may request the
Minister of Finance to amend schedules to the Customs and Excise Act
91 of 1964 by notice in the Government Gazette.
(See further s
55(2)(a) read with s 56(1) of the Customs and Excise Act and
Minister
of Finance v Paper Manufacturers Association
[2008] ZASCA 86
;
2008
(6) SA 540
(SCA)
para 7.)
[6] The international agreement is GATT. Malan AJA
explained the position as follows in
Progress
Office Machines v SARS
2008 (2) SA 13
(SCA)
para 5:
2
‘
South
Africa is a founding member of the World Trade Organisation Agreement
(“WTO”) and also a signatory to the General
Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (“GATT”). The South African
Government acceded to GATT and its accession was
published in the
Government
Gazette
.
Parliament approved the agreement in the Geneva General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade Act 29 of 1948. The World Trade Organisation
Agreement was the outcome of the so-called Uruguay Round of the GATT
negotiations and was concluded in Marrakesh by the signing
of some 27
agreements and instruments in April 1994 by the members including
South Africa. The WTO Agreement on the Implementation
of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the “Anti-Dumping
Agreement”) forms part of the WTO
Agreement.’
[7] Dealing with the relationship between our national
law and international law, Malan AJA added (at para 6):
‘
The
effect of international treaties on municipal law is regulated by ss
231, 232 and 233 of the Constitution. Section 231(4) provides
that
“[a]ny international agreement becomes law in the Republic when
it is enacted into law by national legislation.”
The WTO
Agreement was approved by Parliament on 6 April 1995 and is thus
binding on the Republic in international law but it has
not been
enacted into municipal law. Nor has the Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade been made
part of municipal law. No rights are therefore derived from the
international agreements themselves. However,
the passing of the [ITA
Act] creating ITAC and the promulgation of the Anti-Dumping
Regulations made under s 59 of [ITA Act] are
indicative of an
intention to give effect to the provisions of the treaties binding on
the Republic in international law. The text
to be interpreted,
however, remains the South African legislation and its construction
must be in conformity with s 233 of the
Constitution.’
Dumping in terms of the ITA Act
[8] Dumping is defined in the Act as the introduction of
goods into the commerce of the Republic or the Common Customs Area at
an
export price (the price actually paid or payable for goods sold
for export, net of all taxes, discounts and rebates actually granted
and directly related to that sale) that is less than the ‘normal
value’ of those goods (s 1(2) read with s 32(2)(a)).
[9] ‘Normal value’ means, first of all, the
comparable price paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade for
like
goods intended for consumption in the exporting country or
country of origin (s 32(2)(b)(i)). There is, accordingly, dumping if
the ordinary price of the goods in question in the country of origin
is less than their calculated export price to this country
or the
Common Customs Area.
[10] If the price in the country of origin is not
available, the Act permits ITAC to use one of two alternatives to
determine the
normal value of the goods. The first is a constructed
cost of production of the goods in the country of origin when
destined for
domestic consumption together with ‘a reasonable
addition for selling, general and administrative costs and for
profit’
(s 32(2)(b)(ii)(aa)). And the second is ‘the
highest comparable price of the like product when exported to an
appropriate
third or surrogate country, as long as that price is
representative’ (s 32(2)(b)(ii)(bb)).
[11] There is another relevant provision of the Act, s
32(4), which forms the cornerstone of the case. It reads:
‘
If the
Commission, when evaluating an application concerning dumping,
concludes that the normal value of the goods in question is,
as a
result of government intervention in the exporting country or country
of origin, not determined according to free market principles,
the
Commission may apply to those goods a normal value of the goods,
established in respect of a third or surrogate country.’
[12] All these provisions find their antecedents in the
WTO instruments mentioned but the Act does not replicate them in all
respects.
The regulations under the Act, however, supplement the Act
in this regard. Apart from prescribing an elaborate procedure for
investigation,
it contains a number of substantive provisions.
[13] Regulation 8 deals in detail
with the three methods to determine ‘normal value’ as
defined in s 32(2). Relevant
for present purposes is reg 8.14, which
provides that in cases where the normal value needs to be determined
as contemplated in
s
32(4)of the Act, ITAC may determine the normal value of the
products under consideration for the foreign producer or country
in
question on the basis of, inter alia, the normal value established
for or in a third or surrogate country. In a sense the regulation
merely replicates the sub-section.
[14] In terms of the WTO agreements, dumping may only be
subject to anti-dumping measures if there is material injury to the
local
industry and a causal link between the dumping and the material
injury. These requirements are reflected in the regulations.
Regulation
13 provides that in determining material injury to the
local industry ITAC must consider whether there has been a
significant depression
and/or suppression of the industry’s
prices and must further consider whether there have been significant
changes in the
domestic performance of the industry in respect of a
number of potential injury factors.
[15] Regulation 16 states that ITAC
must determine whether there is a causal link between the dumping and
the material injury determined
under reg
13. In considering whether there is a causal link ITAC must
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited
to those
listed. ITAC must also consider all relevant factors other than
dumping that may have contributed to the industry’s
injury; and
the injury caused by such other factors may not be attributed to the
dumping provided that (ie unless) an interested
party has submitted,
or ITAC otherwise has, information on such factor or factors.
[16] Save for a footnote or two I do not intend to refer
to the different WTO instruments that underpin the Act or regulations
because
it has not been suggested that they affect their clear
meaning. The interpretational duty imposed by s 233 of the
Constitution
accordingly has no material bearing on this case.
The China Protocol
[17] The manufacturers relied on the China Protocol
(‘Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of
China between
China and the WTO’), arguing that ITAC had to
investigate their complaint under art 15 of the Protocol. China
joined the
WTO by acceding to the WTO Agreement in terms of the
Protocol on 10 November 2001. The Protocol governs the terms of
China’s
membership of the WTO. Article 15 deals with the
determination of ‘normal value’ and it permits a member
country to
refuse to use China’s domestic prices unless the
producers under investigation ‘can clearly show that market
economy
conditions prevail in the industry’.
[18] It is not necessary to say more about the Protocol
because the manufacturers, quite rightly, accepted during argument
that
although South Africa was entitled to adopt the advantages of
the Protocol through legislation, it has not done so; and even if
South Africa were a party to the Protocol, which it is not, private
parties cannot derive any rights from it. As Malan AJA said,
no
rights are derived from international agreements themselves. And
since the Protocol is not part of international law, the ITA
Act and
regulations cannot be interpreted with reference thereto under s 233
of the Constitution.
The application for remedial action
[19] As mentioned, the manufacturers filed an
application with ITAC for remedial action against the alleged dumping
of tyres manufactured
or produced in or exported from the PRC during
June 2005. Their complaint was directed against Chinese exporters and
local importers.
The application was in the prescribed form and
consisted of answers to a detailed questionnaire. They did not state
the domestic
PRC prices of the tyres involved. Instead, the
information on which they relied was contained in a section entitled
‘Normal
value for countries with present or past government
intervention’, which dealt with the question whether the normal
value
of the goods concerned was affected by past or present
government intervention such that the normal value does not properly
reflect
the intrinsic value of the product. They nominated Chinese
Taipei as the surrogate country and provided a price list that had
been
supplied to them on a confidential basis by (presumably) a
Taiwanese importer. They found that exports to our country or common
customs area cost appreciably less than exports to the surrogate
country and they then calculated the dumping margin for different
types of tyres. Their calculations offered a compelling case for
dumping.
[20] As will be recalled, the use of a surrogate country
as a benchmark is possible under two circumstances. The first is
where
the normal value cannot be established and the second is under
s 32(4). Although the manufacturers did not refer to s 32(4) in their
submission, it is probably what they had in mind. However, they did
not allege that the normal value of the goods in question was
not
determined according to free market principles as a result of
government intervention in the exporting country or country of
origin, and no facts were set out in the submission which could
support such a conclusion.
ITAC’s investigation
[21] On 28 October 2005, ITAC published its notice of
initiation of the investigation into the alleged dumping of PRC
tyres. The
notice stated that the manufacturers had submitted
sufficient evidence and established a prima facie case that enabled
ITAC to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion that an investigation
should be initiated on the basis of dumping, material injury and
causality.
It said that the allegation of dumping was based on the
comparison between the normal values and the export prices from the
PRC.
The normal values were calculated using the price list for
Chinese Taipei. The export price was determined on local official
import
statistics.
[22] There is no indication in the initiation document
that ITAC considered the applicability of s 32(4). As mentioned, the
information
provided to it could also have been the basis for a
determination under the second alternative under s 32(2).
[23] The prescribed investigation followed. There is no
need to relate the detail which is to be found in the 4000 pages that
were
placed before us. The following should suffice: Seven Chinese
exporters and a number of local importers responded to the initiation
notice. The responses were in some respects deficient and deficiency
letters were issued. The manufacturers commented on the responses
as
amplified. Further deficiency letters were issued to three exporters.
Three qualified inspectors visited the Chinese companies
and local
companies. Finally, ITAC conducted an oral hearing on 26 May 2006
during which it listened to the manufacturers’
extensive
submissions.
[24] On 12 July 2006, ITAC published its preliminary
determination. It came to the conclusion that four exporters did not
dump tyres
but because of the lack of cooperation from other Chinese
exporters a provisional anti-dumping duty could be justified in
respect
of them. It so advised the Minister and on 28 July 2006
gazetting of the imposition of provisional payment on certain new
tyres
imported from or originating in the PRC occurred. The four
cooperating Chinese exporters were excluded.
[25] The manufacturers used the opportunity to comment
in great detail on the preliminary report. Avoiding the detail, the
crux
of the comments relating to the four cooperating exporters was
this:
‘
It was
not indicated that the investigation [into Aeolus, one of the
exporters] was initiated on the basis of treating China as
a
non-market economy country. The Commission initiated the
investigation using a surrogate country normal value, thereby
accepting
that any exporter in China has the burden of proof to
refute that it is operating under non-market conditions before it can
be
granted market economy status. Such burden can only be met if
specific information has been submitted to rebut the prima facie
case.’
Similar statements were made concerning the other three
exporters, Triangle, GITI and Shandong Chengshan.
[26] In support of the allegation that the exporters did
not discharge their onus to show that the PRC is a market economy
country
or that they were operating under market conditions, the
following general allegations concerning state involvement by the
PRC’s
government were made (taken from a footnote in the
judgment below):
‘
In
this regard the first applicant emphasized a number of aspects some
of which were the fact that some exporters were government
owned,
that some exporters may not undergo structural investment reform
without state approval, that organized labour has little
influence
over wage rates and working conditions of the labour force, that
State-owned banks provide capital at low rates to exporting
companies, that government policy was that the manufacturing industry
was quota driven which lead to overcapacity and deflation
of prices,
that despite increased costs of raw materials Chinese tyre prices had
not been increased, whilst manufacturers in the
rest of the world had
to increase their prices at least once during the preceding 18
months, that as the Chinese government controls
the Chinese energy
sector it is possible that through low oil prices carbon black is
supplied to tyre manufacturers at less than
market prices, that the
Chinese government does the research in the tyre industry whereas in
free market economies manufacturers
have to do their own research,
that many Chinese industries obtained their capital equipment free or
at less that market value,
that industries receive government loans
at low rates and that often the loans are only to be repaid
partially, that contrary to
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement there is a
double conversion of foreign exchange into domestic currency, that
the exchange rate
is fixed at a rate that discourages imports and
encourages exports, that US trade representatives allege a lack of
transparency,
that the US has yet to find any industry in the PRC
that operates under free market conditions and that the European
Commission
has only granted market economy status to a very limited
number of individual companies in the PRC.’
[27] The manufacturers’ case, accordingly, was
based on the assumption that, because of the China Protocol, they had
certain
rights and ITAC had duties not reflected in the Act or
regulations, and the exporters carried an onus to prove that the PRC
has
a market economy . As already mentioned, this assumption was
wrong. There is also no onus under the ITA Act: ITAC has to conduct
an investigation and has to reach a conclusion based on the facts at
its disposal. Before it can recommend the imposition of anti-dumping
duties, it has to be satisfied that its factual findings underpin the
recommendation.
The final determination
[28] ITAC published its final determination, the subject
of the review application, during February 2007. Two further
companies
had, in the meantime, submitted information that ITAC was
able to verify. ITAC confirmed its preliminary conclusion in respect
of the cooperating four companies and in addition found that these
two also did not dump tyres. But it assumed, in the absence of
cooperation from the other exporters, that they were guilty of
dumping by not having sought to displace the prima facie case set
out
in the initiation document. ITAC accordingly recommended to the
Minister that the investigation be terminated, something the
Minister
accepted.
[29] ITAC further found that the industry suffered
material injury but that other factors sufficiently detracted from
the causal
link between the unacceptable dumping and the material
injury experienced. (In the light of my conclusions later in this
judgment
it will not be necessary to revert to this issue.)
[30] Concerning the determination of ‘normal
value’, ITAC in respect of each of the six exporters concluded
that they
all set their selling prices in China in the ordinary
course of trade and that, therefore, the first definition of ‘normal
value’ – ‘the comparable price paid or payable in
the ordinary course of trade for like goods intended for consumption
in the exporting country or country of origin’ – had to
be applied in the calculation.
[31] In view of the findings of the court below and the
manufacturers’ argument it is necessary to refer to other
statements
and findings set out in the determination. ITAC explained
at the outset that it exceeded the normal 12-month investigation
period
because of, inter alia, non-market economy issues and issues
relating to the deficiencies of the responses of the exporters raised
during the investigation. It added pertinently the following:
‘
In
addition to the information supplied by the exporters in the
questionnaires, the Commission considered the following factors
which
affect the setting of prices by the tyre industry in the PRC:
1. There are more than four
hundred producers of tyres in the PRC, many of which are small.
2. The six exporters that
responded in this investigation are all large producers that produce
tyres to international standards
and are also suppliers of original
equipment to the motor vehicle assembly plants. All six companies are
profitable.
3. The multinational tyre
companies such as Firestone, Dunlop and Goodyear are also present in
the PRC market.
4. All the co-operating
producers export to many countries – one producer to more than
one hundred and sixty countries. One
company also produces tyres for
Goodyear under their own brand name.
5. It is clear that competition
exists between the tyre producers in the PRC.
6. All six of the co-operating
exporters have large advertising budgets promoting their own brand
names in the process of competing
for market share. Advertising
billboards promoting each of the company’s brands and their
products were evident at all major
centres, airports as well as on
buses.’
The judgment of the high court
[32] The judgment below proceeded on the basis that the
case presented to ITAC was that there was dumping from a country
without
a free market economy. Accordingly, said the learned judge,
‘
the
most important aspect of ITAC’s investigation was to determine
whether the economy of the exporting country is a free
market economy
or not. Only if the conclusion was that it was a free market economy
the next step in the exercise would have been
to determine what the
normal prices, in the ordinary course of business, are.’
Because ITAC failed or refused to perform this exercise,
he held, ITAC had failed to apply its mind properly to the
investigation.
[33] I am, with all due respect, unable to agree. The
judgment does not accord with the wording of s 32. The section
nowhere requires
any investigation into the question whether the
exporting country has a free market economy or not.
3
I also do not find anything in the section that entitles
an applicant to prescribe the method which ITAC has to adopt when it
determines
normal value.
[34] It will be recalled that s 32(4) provides as
follows:
‘
If the
Commission, when evaluating an application concerning dumping,
concludes that the normal value of the goods in question is,
as a
result of government intervention in the exporting country or country
of origin, not determined according to free market principles,
the
Commission may apply to those goods a normal value of the goods,
established in respect of a third or surrogate country.’
It appears to me to be evident that if ITAC concludes
that the normal value (local price) of the goods
in
question
was not determined according to free
market principles it only then proceeds to consider whether or not
that was as a result of
government intervention. If, however, it
concludes that the normal value of the goods in question was
determined according to free
market principles the question whether
or not there was government intervention does not arise.
[35] The words ‘goods in question’ indicate
that one is not concerned with the country as a whole or even any
particular
enterprise but with the particular goods from a particular
source.
[36] If the two jurisdictional facts are established, a
discretion arises and ITAC ‘may’ apply ‘to
those
goods
a normal value of the goods,
established in respect of a third or surrogate country.’
Although not expressly but necessarily
so qualified, it may(as in
respect of the second alternative) only do so ‘as long as that
price is representative’
– it is the price and not the
country that has to be representative.
4
[37] I accordingly find little fault with the following
statement of the law as set out in the answering affidavit (emphasis
added):
‘
ITAC
may only depart from the country of origin normal value if it
concludes, in the course of its determination, that the country
of
origin normal value is not determined according to free market
principles as a result of government intervention. It is not
obliged
to enquire in this question. It is not even obliged to consider it
unless
there is substantial reason to think that the country of origin
normal value may not be determined according to free market
principles
.
It must then consider the available evidence and come to a conclusion
one way or the other.’
[38] I also disagree on a factual level with the
approach of the high court. It is apparent that ITAC did not, in
determining the
‘normal value’, simply establish the
comparable price paid in the ordinary course of business in the PRC.
It had, in
addition to the factors mentioned earlier, regard to
shareholding and composition of boards of directors, raw materials
and other
cost components for production, finance and investment,
intellectual property rights and legal requirements, production
facilities,
production and investment, sales, financial statements,
accounting principles and practice and foreign currency transactions
–
all, I would venture to suggest, relevant not to actual local
prices but rather to free market economy principles.
[39] To the extent that the report might not be explicit
enough, the answering affidavit of the Chief Commissioner (Mr
Tsengiwe)
stated unequivocally that, having taken into account a list
of 13 factors, ITAC had determined that ‘the threshold test in
section 32(4) was not met.’ He said that they indicated to ITAC
that the prices and costs of the cooperating exporters were
determined according to free market principles and that because ITAC
did not come to a conclusion of the kind contemplated in s
32(4), it
was not permitted to use the surrogate country method for determining
country of origin normal value. It may be mentioned
that the replying
affidavit did not in any real terms traverse these allegations.
Conclusion
[40] The manufacturers were entitled, in terms of s
46(1) of the ITA Act, to apply to the high court for a review of any
determination,
recommendation or decision of ITAC that affected them.
The grounds of review are to be found in the Promotion of
Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’). In spite
of the shotgun approach in the affidavits (and to a lesser extent in
the heads
of argument) the manufacturers did not state in the heads
on which provision in PAJA they wished to rely.
[41] If regard is had to the summary of their argument
it would appear that their case may have been that ITAC was
materially influenced
by an error of law (s 6(2)(d)); or that the
determination was not rationally connected to the information before
ITAC (s 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc)).
Hartzenberg J, it seems, reviewed the
recommendation on the ground that a mandatory and material procedure
prescribed by the ITA
Act was not complied with (s 6(2)(b)).
[42] The problems with the manufacturers’ case are
manifold. They approached the matter as if it were a rehearing and
not
a review; they misread s 32 and consequently asked the court
below the wrong question (does the PRC have a market economy?) which
inevitably led to the wrong answer; they assumed that the China
Protocol gave them rights; they assumed that the Chinese exporters
had an onus to discharge under the Protocol; and they failed to have
regard to the functions of ITAC. In this regard it is necessary
to
refer to the
Scaw
case (supra) and more particularly to the
passage where Moseneke DCJ dealt with the doctrine of separation of
powers which concluded
in these words (at para 102):
‘
It
seems to me self-evident that the setting, changing or removal of an
anti-dumping duty in order to regulate exports and imports
is a
patently executive function that flows from the power to formulate
and implement domestic and international trade policy.
That power
resides in the kraal of the national executive authority.’
[43] As far as irrationality is
concerned, much was made of the fact that ITAC had held in the
interim report that the PRC did not
have a market economy and
nevertheless came to the opposite conclusion in the final report. I
have already indicated that the interim
report did not make any such
finding and, if it had, it would have been irrelevant. I also do not
find it incongruous that ITAC
made a prima facie finding based on ex
parte representations and came to another conclusion after having
heard both sides. I would
have thought that this is why we attach
value to the audi principle.
[44] Another ground of
irrationality raised was that ITAC had found that six Chinese
exporters did not dump but that all the others
did. Although there
are about 400 manufacturers, the percentage dumped by the
non-cooperating companies varied (depending on the
type of tyre)
between 4.2 and 6.5 per cent. These imports were then subjected to
anti-dumping duties. The court below, adopting
the argument, said
that it was impossible to understand on what basis some factories in
the same industry operating under the same
conditions could be
regarded as operating under free market conditions and the other 396
not. With due respect, as ITAC explained,
they had a prima facie case
of dumping. The cooperating exporters were able to rebut that case;
the others did not attempt to do
so. One may not agree with the
reasoning, but one cannot say that it was irrational.
[45] The manufacturers, in
conclusion, made some written submissions concerning bias, alleging
that ITAC had accommodated the exporters
unfairly. They wisely did
not make any oral submissions in this regard. This is understandable
because bias was not raised as a
ground of review in the founding or
the two supplementary founding affidavits; the ‘evidence’
on which they sought
to rely came from the replying affidavit; and
the argument did not take any account of ITAC’s evidence.
[46] It follows that the appeal
stands to be upheld with costs. The appellants asked for the costs of
three counsel which, in the
circumstances of the case, is justified.
Order
1 The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs
of three counsel.
2 The order of the court below is set aside and replaced
with an order dismissing the application with costs, including the
costs
of three counsel.
_____________________
L T C Harms
Acting President
APPEARANCES:
For
Appellant: W Trengove SC (with him F Ismail and K Hofmeyr)
Instructed
by:
The
State Attorney, Pretoria
The
State Attorney, Bloemfontein
For
Respondent: P J J de Jager SC (with him A Granova)
Instructed
by:
M
Wentzel Inc, Pretoria
Symington
& De Kok, Bloemfontein
1
Article
VI para 1.
2
The
footnotes have been omitted.
3
Article
VI Annex para 2 of GATT is instructive (emphasis added):
‘
It
is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has
a
complete
or substantially complete monopoly of its trade
and
where
all domestic prices are fixed by the State
,
special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability
for the purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing
contracting parties
may
find
it necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict
comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not
always be
appropriate.’
4
Compare
the wording of the Anti-dumping Agreement art 2.2.