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[2022] ZAKZPHC 64
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Dekra Automotive (Pty) Ltd and Others v MEC for Transport, Kwazulu-Natal (1806/2021P) [2022] ZAKZPHC 64 (31 October 2022)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
CASE
NO: 1806/2021P
In
the matter between: -
DEKRA
AUTOMOTIVE (PTY) LTD FIRST
APPLICANT
DURBAN
TEST
&
DRIVE
CC SECOND
APPLICANT
PINETOWN
ROADWORTHY
CENTRE THIRD
APPLICANT
and
MEC
FOR TRANSPORT, KWAZULU-NATAL RESPONDENT
This
judgment was handed electronically by transmission to the parties'
representatives by email. The date and time for hand down
is deemed
to be handed down on 31 October 2022.
ORDER
The
following order is made:
1.
The Respondent's decision that the
applicants cease the performance
of
any other business aside from the examining/testing of motor
vehicles for certification of road
worthiness at the registered premises of the applicants' vehicle
testing stations, as set out
in the letter of demand dated 8 February
2021 of the Road Traffic Inspectorate of the KwaZulu Natal
Department of Transport,
is reviewed and set aside.
2.
The respondent is ordered to pay the
costs of this application.
JUDGMENT
Delivered
on
Balton
J
[1]
The
applicants
seek
to
review
and
set
aside
the
decision
of
the
respondent that the applicants cease the performance of any other
business ('the additional services') apart from the examining
and
testing of motor vehicles for certification of roadworthiness at the
registered premises of the applicants' vehicle testing
stations as
set out in the letter of demand dated 8 February 2021 from the Road
Traffic Inspectorate of the KwaZulu-Natal Department
of Transport.
[1]
[2]
Mr
Kruger
appeared on behalf of the applicants
and Mr
Myeni
on
behalf of the respondent.
[3]
The
first
applicant,
Dekra
Automotive
(Pty)
Ltd
('Dekra'),
operates vehicle testing stations
throughout South Africa.
The
second and third applicants are its franchises.
The second applicant operates a vehicle
testing station in Sydenham, Durban and the third applicant operates
vehicle testing stations
in New Germany, Pinetown and Ballito.
[4]
The respondent is the political
head of the Department of Transport ('the Department'), which is
responsible for inter alia the
enforcement
of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of
1996 ('the NRTA') in the Province.
[5]
A vehicle testing station is a
centre where motor vehicle fitness on public roads
is tested.
If
the
vehicle
passes
the test,
a
Certificate
of
Roadworthiness ('CRW') is issued.
[6]
Historically,
vehicle
roadworthy
certification
was
conducted
by
the
relevant municipality in the area in which the owner and/or car
dealer registering the vehicle was situated.
However, on 1 August 2000, the
implementation of the NRTA allowed for roadworthy certification of
motor vehicles by authorised private
entities.
The testing of motor vehicles for the
purpose of issuing CRWs falls under the functional areas of the
concurrent National and Provincial
legislature in terms of Schedule
4, Part A of the Constitution.
[7]
On
24
January
2014,
the
third
applicant
signed
a
Vehicle
Testing
Station Agreement with the respondent, who signed it on 14 January
2014.
[2]
On 27 July 2015, the
second applicant signed a Vehicle Testing Station Agreement
with
the respondent,
who
signed it on 22 July 2015.
[3]
[8]
On
8 February 2021, Mr VK Chetty, the Director of the Road Traffic
Inspectorate
sent
a letter to all Municipal Managers and vehicle testing station
proprietors in KwaZulu-Natal demanding cessation of any services
other than roadworthy examination
or
testing at the testing stations.
The
letter reads
inter
alia
as
follows:
[4]
'1.
The Department hereby wishes to advise
that in March 2020 it came to our attention that a number of vehicle
testing stations in
the Province were visited by the anti-fraud and
corruption unit of the Road Traffic Management Corporation (RTMC) and
were informed
that they cannot conduct any other business on the
premises of the testing station aside from the testing of vehicle for
roadworthiness.
For
clarity, the other businesses referred to include but not limited to
are, standalone brake test reports, microdot, mechanical
workshops
and technical reports, etc.
2.
The Department's Legal Services
Directorate has been consulted in this regard and hereunder is the
legal opinion as obtained:
"The
testing of motor vehicles within the Republic of South Africa, falls
under the functional areas of Concurrent National
and Provincial
legislative competence in terms of Schedule 4, Part "A" of
the Constitution of South Africa.
The
National Road Traffic Act,
(Act
No. 93 of 1996) read with its regulations
as
amended,
is the regulatory prescript for this particular functional area.
The provisions of the legislation
clearly outlines the limited functions of the vehicle testing
stations operating under the issued
certificate.
Where
a legal entity has made an application to the relevant authority for
the performance of vehicle testing services, the authority
processes
and issues the certificate for those services only.
Where
the proprietor is conducting other exclusive business under the
banner of the vehicle testing registration, such be thoroughly
investigated by the relevant authority."
3.
In light thereof, you are to with
immediate effect, cease performing any other business aside from the
examining/testing of motor
vehicles for certification of
roadworthiness at the registered premises of the vehicle testing.'
[9]
The
applicants' attorneys, Jordaan Smit Incorporated, responded to the
Road Traffic Inspectorate in a letter which reads
inter
a/ia
as
follows:
[5]
'Our
client, either directly or through franchised branches, conducts
inter alia,
services relating to roadworthiness, technical
inspections and conditioning reports on vehicles upon request.
It
is our instructions that your correspondence as referred to above
seeks to prohibit existing rights of vehicle testing stations
in the
province. The decision by your department to suspend the rendering of
services other than the certification of roadworthiness
is unlawful
in that same does not coincide with the relevant legislation and the
department's intent to amend the Road Traffic
Act, Act 93 of 1996
including amendments thereto, is noted with concern.
The
decision made by your department is unilateral does not comply with
the rules of natural justice and is therefore subject to
correction
in a court of law.
It
is therefore our instructions to demand that you recall said decision
made by your department and well so within the next 24
(twenty four)
hours, our client will have no other option but to proceed with the
necessary legal action to compel your office
to recall your decision.
We furthermore hold instructions to request the appropriate costs
order against the department.
We
await your reply on or before
12h00, Friday, 12
February
2021.
'
[10]
The Road Traffic Inspectorate failed to respond to the applicants'
letter and the applicants launched an urgent application
for interim
relief pending the finalisation of this review application.
[11]
On 25 February 2021, the court granted the applicants interim relief,
suspending the decision of the respondent, pending
finalization of
this review application.
The
applicants' version
[12]
The applicants operate their vehicle
testing stations in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV of
the NRTA.
They
have been operating Roadworthy Certification Centers since 2008 and
have since added additional services including, but not
limited to:
(a)
Safety checks for large bus and
transport operators who need to check the brakes on trucks once a
year and on buses every six months.
(b)
Multipoint check condition reports.
(c)
Technical reports.
(d)
Provision of number plates; and
(e)
Datadot or microdot services.
[13]
These services do not detract from the purpose of vehicle testing
stations but contribute to the purpose of the NRTA
to ensure improved
road worthiness of motor vehicles and thereby the safety of road
users.
[14]
The decision to demand the cessation of
any other services was arbitrary, irrational and failed to afford the
applicants an opportunity
to be heard.
[15]
The applicants, in providing the
additional services, do not contravene the NRTA or the National Road
Traffic Regulations, GN R225,
GG 20963, 17 March 2000 ('regulations')
and have conducted such additional services for several years without
complaint from the
authorities.
As
such, the applicants have a legitimate expectation to continue to
conduct such services without interference by the provincial
authorities. The respondent's decision also impacts on the safety of
the public which relies on the applicants.
[16]
There is no express statutory prohibition against the provision of
additional services at vehicle testing stations.
[17]
In
the
replying
affidavit,
the
applicants
contend
that
the
respondent
knew that the applicants supplied additional services at Dekra
testing stations. The respondent's representative, Mr
Du Plessis, the
Commander: Training and Advice, KZN Traffic
Training
College
('Mr Du Plessis') referred
to
the provision of additional services in a submission he made to the
Road Traffic Inspectorate dated 26 October 2017.
[6]
[18]
The
applicants have a legitimate expectation to continue supplying these
additional services without interference by the respondent.
[7]
The
respondent knew that there was no clear statutory prohibition to the
provision of additional services and the applicants were
supplying
such additional services.
The
respondent cannot deny that the provision of additional
services
contributes to road safety.
[8]
The
respondent's
version
[19]
Section 39 of the NRTA provides that
when the Department receives an application that complies with the
prescribed requirements
for registration of the testing station
concerned, it shall register and grade such testing station
on the conditions and in the manner
prescribed.
The
second and third applicants have been registered and graded to
conduct vehicle tests for purposes of issuing CRWs in terms of
the
NRTA.
These
testing stations are authorised to conduct these tests and nothing
else.
[20]
The deponent to the respondent's
opposing affidavit, Mr Roshan Singh, the Chief Provisional Inspector
of the Road Traffic Inspectorate
contends that it came to his
attention that the applicants and other testing station proprietors
were conducting other services
apart from assessing vehicles for
roadworthy certificates.
Several
stakeholder meetings, consultations and workshops were held to
address
inter a/ia
this
issue.
The
proprietors have been informed that vehicle testing stations are
exclusively for the purpose of CRWs and any other services
that they
wish to provide must not be done at the testing station. The
additional services performed by the applicants are beyond
the
authority granted to them to operate a testing station in terms of
the NRTA.
[21]
Regulation
136
of
the
regulations
deals
with
the
manner
in
which
registration of a testing station may be suspended or cancelled.
The procedure is clear, and it provides
for notification to a proprietor before the respondent takes such a
decision.
[22]
In September 2019, the proprietors of testing stations were advised
that they were not permitted
to provide any other services on the
premises of a vehicle testing station, besides those permitted by the
NRTA and regulations.
[23]
The respondent does not demand that the applicants terminate those
services, they can provide
them anywhere else. It simply requires
that they do not conduct them at the registered testing stations
because it creates a conflict
of interest and is not permitted in
terms of the regulatory framework.
[24]
The
regulatory framework provides for an agreement to be entered into
between the respondent and each testing station as contemplated
in
Schedule 3 of the regulations.
The
second and third applicants have each concluded such agreements ('the
agreements').
[9]
[25]
The additional services are not
expressly prohibited by legislation, but the scheme
of the NRTA
and regulations
make it
plain that the additional services ought
to be specifically authorised before they can be conducted at a
testing station.
Clause
6 of both agreements deals with the testing station's obligations.
In terms of clause 6.13.2.2 of the
agreement, the second and third applicants
were obliged to seek
authorisation
from the respondent
prior to providing additional services
at the testing station. This was not done.
The agreements thus expressly prohibit
the provision of such services without the written approval from the
respondent.
Issues
[26]
Two issues arise for consideration. The
first is whether the NRTA prohibits the provision of additional
services.
This
requires an analysis of the relevant provisions of the NRTA and the
agreements entered into with the second and third applicants
which
the respondent relies on.
The
second is whether
the
applicants have a legitimate expectation to continue to provide the
additional services.
Statutory
and contractual provisions
[27]
In
terms
of regulation 137(a) of the regulations:
'A
testing station proprietor shall-
(a)
notify
the
MEC
of
the
province
concerned
within
14
days
of
any
change
in
particulars
or circumstances in relation to any
information provided to the MEC on the testing station;
[28]
Clause
6.13 of the agreements
[10]
provides
the following:
'6.13:
The Testing Station hereby agrees to:
6.13.1.1
notify the MEC in writing of no less
than 30 (thirty) days prior to any change in its ownership or
corporate structure and provide
detailed information on such changes
in ownership or corporate structure, including but not limited to:
6.13.1.10
effecting any change in the purpose of the Testing Station, nature of
services offered by the Testing Station, location
of the Testing
Station;
6.13.1.12
providing any additional services at the
Testing Station;
6.13.1.2
apply for registration and grading:
6.13.1.3
no less than 90 (ninety) days before
effecting any contemplated change in its location, ownership or
corporate structure, including
but not limited to any change of legal
entity, name or ownership; and
6.13.1.4
: receive written approval from the MEC
prior to effecting any such changes, failing which the Testing
Station acknowledges that
the Testing Station premises may be closed
pending suspension and/or cancellation, registration and grading in
terms of this Agreement...
'
[29]
The agreements entered into by the
respondent with the second and third respondents respectively reads
as follows:
'5.0
Duration of Agreement
5.1
This Agreement
shall commence on the 07
th
day of July 2015 and shall remain in full force and effect for 5
(five) years and shall terminate on the 06
th
day of July 2020.
5.2
In
the event that the Testing Station wishes to extend or renew this
Agreement beyond the 06
th
day of July 2020 for additional periods, with each additional period
not to exceed 3 (three) years at any given time, the Testing
Station
shall make a written request for such extension or renewal to the
Department no later than 90 (ninety) days prior to the
termination of
this Agreement and such request shall include: .. .’
[11]
'5.0
Duration of Agreement
5.1
This Agreement shall commence on the
20
th
day of December 2013 and shall remain in full force and effect for 5
(five) years and shall terminate on the 19
th
day of December 2018.
5.2
In
the event that the Testing Station wishes to extend or renew this
Agreement beyond the 19
th
day of December 2018 for additional periods, with each additional
period not to exceed 3 (three) years at any given time, the Testing
Station shall make a written request for such extension or renewal to
the Department no later than 90 (ninety) days prior to the
termination of this Agreement and such request shall include: ..
.'
[12]
[30]
The applicants submit that the
respondent interprets both the NRTA and its regulations to prohibit
the provision of additional services
by testing stations but has
failed to point to any such express statutory prohibition.
Further, the agreements do not contain
any prohibition to that effect.
[31]
The
respondent
submits
that
in
terms
of
regulation
137
read
with clause 6.13 of the Agreements, the
applicants had an obligation to inform the respondent and obtain
written approval before
providing additional services unless they had
informed the respondent in the initial application. The applicants
were obliged to
obtain written authorization from the respondent.
Failure to notify the respondent amounts to a breach of both the
regulations
and the agreement.
[32]
It
is noted that the agreement with the third applicant was entered into
and signed by the respondent on 14 January 2014
[13]
and the agreement with the second
applicant
was
entered
into
and
signed
by
the
respondent
on
22
July 2015.
[14]
In
terms of clause 5 of both agreements, the agreement with the third
applicant terminated on 19 December 2018 and with the second
applicant on 6 July 2020.
The
respondent has not provided any further agreements to indicate that
there
was
a
current
written agreement in place and since both agreements have terminated
due to the effluxion of time, the respondent cannot
rely on the said
agreements.
[33]
The respondent contends that the NRTA
and the regulations are clear that vehicle testing stations ought to
conduct tests and assess
vehicles in line with the requirements
thereof.
The
respondent submits that neither the NRTA nor the regulations deal
with other services that can be provided at the vehicle testing
station and such silence is because the legislature did not
contemplate such services being conducted at its approved testing
stations.
[34]
It can equally be said that such silence
could indicate that such services may be
conducted
at
the
vehicle
testing
stations.
In
the
absence
of
any current agreements in force between
the parties and any prohibitory legislation, I
cannot find any substantiation for the
respondent's
contention
that the NRTA prohibits the provisions of additional services.
Further, on the facts of this case it is not possible
to even find
that there was an implied prohibition. In Minister
of
Police and Others v Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Limited
(CCT
195/21)
[2022] ZACC 16
(27 May 2022) the court held that:
'Words
cannot be read into a statute by implication unless the implication
is necessary in the sense that, without them, effect
cannot be given
to the statute as it stands and to the ostensible legislative
intent.'
Legitimate
expectation
[35]
The applicants submit that:
(a)
The
respondent knew that the applicants supplied additional services at
their vehicle testing stations in terms of the letter dated
26
October 2017.
[15]
(b)
The approval for the vehicle testing
station does not state that the approval was granted subject to the
applicants not providing
additional services.
(c)
The respondent alleges that several
meetings were held in September and November 2019 with vehicle
testing station proprietors to
inform them not to provide additional
services.
The
applicants were not invited to any of these meetings and the minutes
of the meetings do not reflect that the issue of additional
services
was discussed.
(d)
The applicants have a legitimate
expectation to continue supplying the additional services without
interference by the respondent.
[36]
The respondent submits that it sought to
enforce compliance with the regulatory framework and the fact that
there has not been enforcement
does not create a reasonable
expectation. Furthermore, the respondent has no obligation to engage
the applicant before enforcing
the law.
[37]
The applicants' contention that they
were entitled to a fair hearing
before
the respondent's 'decision' was made is premised on the contention
that the applicants had a legitimate expectation to continue
supplying additional services without interference by the respondent.
[38]
According to Hoexter
Administrative
Law in South Africa
2 ed (2012) at
324:
'The
doctrine [of legitimate expectation] holds that where a person has on
the basis of a promise or a past practice acquired a
reasonable
expectation as to an administrator's future conduct, the
administrator ought not to disappoint the expectation without
at
least hearing the person. In other words, procedural protection is
offered instead of direct enforcement of the representation.'
[39]
The
applicants contend that 'the practice of the applicant to provide
additional services is clear and not disputed, even if it
were done
in
contravention of the NRTA,
as
the respondent would have it.'
[16]
This statement by the applicants contradicts the requirement that an
applicant must show that its expectation
was
one that is
based
on a representation that is
competent
and lawful
for
the decision-maker to make.
[17]
However, the respondent has nevertheless conceded that the NRTA does
not expressly prohibit the provision of additional services,
only
that prior authorisation is required.
[18]
[40]
The
applicants contend that additional services have been supplied
to
the knowledge
of
the
respondent
by
the
applicants
at
the
vehicle
testing
stations for as long as the testing stations have been
registered,
[19]
and
thus a practice has been established that the applicants would be
permitted to continue to carry out these services.
[41]
The
applicants
base
their
contention
that
the
respondent
had
knowledge that the applicants supplied additional services on the
fact that in the motivation letter
[20]
attached to the replying affidavit, Mr Du Plessis referred to the
fact that additional services were being provided by the applicants.
[42]
The said letter dated 26 October 2017
reads inter alia as follows:
'1.
PURPOSE
The
purpose of this submission is to obtain the Head: Transport, Mr. BS
Gumbi's approval in principle in respect of an application
for the
registration of a vehicle testing station as received from Pinetown
Roadworthy Centre represented by Mr S Maharaj and to
obtain the Head
of Department's signature on the attached letter.
2.
BACKGROUND
2.1
The Motor Transport Services Directorate
on 24 August 2017 received an application for the registration of a
grade A vehicle testing
station from Pinetown Roadworthy Centre,
Pinetown represented by Mr S Maharaj.
2.2.
Mr. Maharaj has complied with the requirements for the application
and registration of a vehicle testing station in terms of
the
National Road Traffic Act, 1996 (Act No. 93 of 1996) attached as
Annexure A.
2.3
Mr. Maharaj has in his motivation cited
the following reasons for the need for a vehicle testing station in
the Pinetown area.
•
He
has served in the industry in the past 20 (twenty) years.
•
His
experience was initially as a Manager for the AA and more recently as
owner and operator of Ballito Test and Drive and Pinetown
Roadworthy
Centre.
•
During
his ten(ure] he has acquired the necessary skills and experience to
perform his tasks in accordance with the Road Traffic
Act and the
prescripts of the Department.
•
Mr
Maharaj has never been convicted nor found guilty of any misdemeanour
which would jeopardize the Road Traffic Act or could have
brought
disrepute to his character.
•
Mr
Maharaj is a member of the Dekra Franchise Group and due to Dekra
being appointed by the oil companies to conduct a safe loading
pass,
roadworthy and patron tests on all contractors carrying their
products, Mr Maharaj's customers have been inconvenienced to
test
their vehicles outside of KZN due to him not having an A grade
testing station in KZN.
•
Dekra
has also been appointed to
conduct
all pre inspections and final
inspections for all Man Truck and Bus vehicles and Man Truck and Bus
is located in Pinetown.
•
Dekra
is also appointed to conduct all inspections on agility vehicles for
Mercedes SA which are cars, trucks and buses in Pinetown.
•
Following
Mr Maharaj's investigation it has been established that there is no
such facility within the close proximity and based
on the number of
customers that call on his business,
it
would follow that
a
grade
A testing station in this area would be both beneficial to the local
community and his existing clients.
(my
emphasis)
2.4
Mr Maharaj has gained the support of the
Ethekwini Municipality to establish a vehicle testing station at the
said site, attached
as Annexure B.
5.
RECOMMENDATION
IT
IS RECOMMENDED THAT IN TERMS OF SECTION 38 OF THE NATIONAL ROAD
TRAFFIC ACT, 1996 (ACT NO. 93 OF 1996), READ WITH REGULATION
129
(4) OF THE SAID ACT, THE APPLICATION MADE BY THE PINETOWN ROADWORTHY
CENTRE REPRESENTED BY MRS
MAHARAJ
FOR THE REGISTRATION OF A GRADE A VEHICLE TESTING STATION IN PINETOWN
BE APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE, AND THE ATTACHED LETTER
BE SIGNED BY THE
HEAD: TRANSPORT.'
[21]
[43]
The
applicants
also
state
that the
'respondent
used
this provision
of
additional services as part of the motivation for the approval.'
[22]
It
is necessary to consider the said letter when deciding whether a
legitimate expectation has been proved.
[44]
The
letter
indicates
that
Mr
Du
Plessis
was
simply
recording
the
fact
that Mr Maharaj had, in his
own
motivation
for the need for a
vehicle
testing station in Pinetown, stated that additional services were
already being provided to customers.
[23]
The
letter also acknowledges that the respondent was aware of the
additional services at the testing station.
[45]
The question that then arises is whether
the MEC was aware that the applicant would be providing additional
services once the vehicle
testing centre was registered. The letter
indicates that the MEC was aware of the additional services but
failed to request the
applicants to cease the provision of the
services and allowed the practice to continue thus giving rise to a
legitimate expectation
of procedural fairness in the event that the
MEC were to decide to disallow the provision of those services.
[46]
In
Administrator,
Transvaal, and Others v Traub and Others
[1989] ZASCA 90
;
1989
(4) SA 731
(A), the court referred to a number of English cases where
the doctrine was developed:
'It
is clear from these cases that in this context "legitimate
expectations" are capable of including expectations which
go
beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have some reasonable
basis (Attorney-General of Hong Kong case supra at 350c.)
... The
following extracts from the speeches of Lord Fraser and Lord Roskill
are of particular relevance:
"But
even where a person claiming some benefit or privilege has no legal
right to it, as a matter of private law, he may have
a legitimate
expectation of receiving the benefit or privilege, and, if so, the
Courts will protect his expectation by judicial
review as a matter of
public law....Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either
from an express promise given on behalf
of a public authority or from
the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably
expect to continue "'
[47]
In light of my findings above and in
particular the concession by the respondent that the NRTA is silent
on the provision of additional
services, I am of the view that the
applicants have a reasonable expectation to expect that the
provisions of additional services
were in order.
[48]
The silence in the NRTA cannot only be
interpreted in favour of the respondent as various inferences can be
drawn from that.
Many
of the issues could
have
been
alleviated
if
the
NRTA
was
clear
in
respect
of
additional services
and
if
the
respondent
ensured
that
agreements
are
timeously terminated or renewed
[49]
The respondents
ought to have given the applicants an
opportunity to be heard
prior
to
stopping
the
provision
of
additional
services.
There
is
no proof that the applicants were
present at any of the meetings which the respondent submits it held
in September and November
2019.
Procedural fairness requires all
interested parties, including the applicants, to have been present at
such meetings.
Accordingly,
the respondent's decision in the circumstances of this case is
procedurally unfair and ought to be reviewed and set
aside.
[50]
The following order is
made:
1.
The respondent's decision that the
applicants cease the performance of any other business aside from the
examining / testing of
motor vehicles for certification of road
worthiness at the registered premises of the applicants' vehicle
testing stations, as
set out in the letter of demand dated 8 February
2021 of the Road Traffic Inspectorate of the KwaZulu Natal
Department of
Transport, is reviewed and set aside.
2.
The respondent is ordered to pay the
costs of this application.
BALTON
J
Appearances:
Date
of hearing:
7
March 2022
Date
of delivery: 31
October 2022
For
the applicant:
TP
Kruger SC
Instructed
by
:
Jordaan
& Smit Incorporated
Tel:
(012) 940 3579
Email:
LSmit@jordaansmit.co.za
Ref:
L SMIT/AL3271(1)MAT144
Clo
Shepstone
& Wylie Attorneys
Tel:
(033) 355 1780
Email:
jmanuel@wylie.co.za
Ref:
JTM/mm/JORD/28480.2
For
the respondent:
ND
Myeni
Instructed
by
:
H
Small (Senior Assistant State Attorney)
Tel:
(033) 355 5210
Email:
hsmal@justice.gov.za
Ref:
17/005914/21/D/P44/hvl
C/o State
Attorney
(KZN)
(Satellite office)
[1]
Page 15 of the indexed papers.
[2]
Pages 68-84 of the indexed papers.
[3]
Page 67 of the indexed papers.
[4]
Page 15 of the indexed papers.
[5]
Pages 16-17 of the indexed papers.
[6]
Page 96 of the indexed papers
[7]
Applicants' heads of argument, para 20
[8]
Applicants' heads of argument, para 20.
[9]
Pages 51-67: Agreement with respondent and second applicant; pages
68-84: Agreement with respondent and third applicant.
[10]
Pages 51-67: Agreement between respondent and second applicant;
pages 68-84: Agreement with respondent and third applicant.
[11]
Page 55 of the indexed papers.
[12]
Page 72 of the indexed papers.
[13]
Page 84 of the indexed papers.
[14]
Page 67 of the indexed papers.
[15]
Page 96 of the indexed papers.
[16]
Applicants' heads of argument, para 22.
[17]
National Commissioner of Police and Another v Gun Owners South
Africa
2020 (6) SA 69
(SCA) para 38.
[18]
Respondent's heads of argument, para 12.
[19]
Applicants' replying affidavit, para 14.2, p. 91 of the record.
[20]
Page 96 of the indexed papers.
[21]
Page 96 of the indexed papers.
[22]
Applicants' replying affidavit, para 7.2, p. 87 of the indexed
papers
[23]
See para 2.3 of the letter, page 96 of the indexed papers.