Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Zungu (11066/2021P) [2022] ZAKZPHC 28 (21 June 2022)

80 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Execution — Summary judgment — Defendant's liability as guarantor — Plaintiff sought summary judgment for amounts owed under a guarantee for debts of ZKZ Security CC, which was in provisional liquidation — Defendant raised defences based on the National Credit Act and alleged unilateral termination of a debit order — Court held that the National Credit Act did not apply to the defendant's guarantee as it was linked to a credit transaction exempt from the Act, and the defences raised did not constitute a bona fide defence — Summary judgment granted in favour of the plaintiff.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an application for summary judgment in an action in which a commercial bank sought to enforce a written guarantee (suretyship) against a natural person who had guaranteed the indebtedness of a close corporation.


The plaintiff was The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and the defendant was Zenzo Khulumangifile Zungu. The defendant was sued in his capacity as guarantor for the debts and liabilities of ZKZ Security CC, of which he was the sole member.


The procedural history was that the plaintiff issued summons and the defendant delivered a notice of intention to defend and a plea. The plaintiff then proceeded by way of a Rule 32 summary judgment application. Summary judgment was granted on 11 May 2022 in favour of the plaintiff for two monetary amounts, interest, and costs on the attorney-and-client scale. The reasons for that order were subsequently delivered on 21 June 2022.


The dispute fell within the general subject-matter of enforcement of a guarantee for corporate debts, and whether defences raised by the guarantor—particularly a defence based on section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and an alleged debit-order arrangement—constituted bona fide defences sufficient to defeat summary judgment.


2. Material Facts


The court treated as material the contractual matrix giving rise to the principal debt and the guarantee, as well as the subsequent default and liquidation of the principal debtor.


It was pleaded that on 18 September 2014 the plaintiff and ZKZ Security CC concluded a written fleet management system agreement, in terms of which the plaintiff provided ZKZ Security CC with a credit card facility for repairs, fuel purchases, and related on-road costs. It was further pleaded that on 5 July 2019 the defendant executed a written guarantee in favour of the plaintiff, limited to R1 million, in terms of which he unconditionally guaranteed and undertook payment of ZKZ Security CC’s debts to the plaintiff, whether existing or future.


It was also pleaded that on or about 30 December 2019 the plaintiff and ZKZ Security CC (represented by the defendant) concluded a written overdraft agreement, in terms of which the plaintiff lent and advanced R550 000 to ZKZ Security CC on agreed interest terms.


The court identified as common cause that ZKZ Security CC breached the relevant agreements and committed an act of default when it was placed into provisional liquidation by order of the High Court on 6 October 2021. On the plaintiff’s pleaded case, and pursuant to the defendant’s guarantee, the defendant became indebted to the plaintiff for the amounts claimed, namely R311 179,85 and R166 190,83, together with interest.


As to the defences, the defendant raised two contentions in the plea. First, he alleged (as a point in limine) that the plaintiff was obliged to comply with section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 before instituting proceedings against him, even though (on his own case) the National Credit Act did not apply to the agreements between the plaintiff and ZKZ Security CC. Second, he alleged that the plaintiff had agreed to facilitate a debit order against the bank account of Ncwane Investments (Pty) Ltd (a related entity of which the defendant was the sole director and shareholder) and that the plaintiff unilaterally terminated the debit order, resulting in arrears.


On the debit-order aspect, the court recorded that the plaintiff admitted that ZKZ Security CC had been reducing its indebtedness by way of a monthly debit order from the related entity, but the plaintiff’s case was that the debit order lapsed automatically because it was returned unpaid on two occasions. The court treated this as decisive in evaluating whether the debit-order allegation constituted a defence.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine were whether the defences pleaded disclosed a bona fide defence and a defence good in law so as to resist summary judgment under Rule 32, and in particular whether the plaintiff was required to deliver a section 129 notice under the National Credit Act before suing the defendant as guarantor.


The dispute concerned primarily the application of legal rules to largely common-cause facts, rather than a factual contest requiring oral evidence. The Rule 32 enquiry required a value judgment about whether the pleaded defences amounted to genuine triable issues or were insufficient in law and indicative of delay.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter through the principles governing summary judgment and the legal character of suretyship (guarantee) obligations where the principal debt arises from agreements to which the National Credit Act does not apply.


On the National Credit Act defence, the court accepted the plaintiff’s contention that compliance with section 129 was not required because the defendant was sued as guarantor for ZKZ Security CC’s obligations arising from a credit transaction to which it was common cause the National Credit Act did not apply. The court relied on authority for the proposition that a surety who binds himself as surety and co-principal debtor remains a surety, and that the surety’s liability arises from the contract of suretyship. In applying those principles, the court reasoned that, because the principal obligation fell outside the National Credit Act, the defendant could not claim entitlement to a section 129 notice.


In this regard, the court referred to decisions interpreting the National Credit Act’s provisions dealing with credit guarantees, including that the Act applies to a credit guarantee only to the extent that it applies to the underlying credit facility or transaction in respect of which the guarantee is granted. The court treated this as determinative of the point in limine: since the Act did not apply to the principal debt, it did not apply to the guarantee in a manner that would trigger the section 129 notice requirement.


On the debit-order defence, the court accepted the plaintiff’s explanation that the debit order lapsed automatically because it was returned unpaid twice. The court concluded that this defence did not constitute a defence to the claim and was, instead, consistent with a breach of the agreements by ZKZ Security CC and with the defendant’s ensuing liability under the guarantee. The court also had regard to an admission in the plea that, on the court’s reading, amounted to an admission of arrears by ZKZ Security CC, which the court considered further undermined any suggestion of a triable defence.


Applying Rule 32, the court stated the procedural purpose of summary judgment as being available where the plaintiff can show that the defendant has no bona fide defence and that the notice of intention to defend and plea were delivered solely for delay. Having evaluated the nature of the two defences, the court concluded that they were not bona fide and were not legally sustainable. It followed, in the court’s assessment, that summary judgment was properly granted.


On costs, the court reasoned that, since the plaintiff was successful and the agreements provided for costs on the attorney-and-client scale, there was no basis to depart from the usual costs order contemplated by the parties’ contractual arrangements.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant for payment of R311 179,85 and R166 190,83, together with interest and costs of suit on the attorney-and-client scale.


The court rejected the defendant’s point in limine based on section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and held that the debit-order-related defence did not constitute a bona fide defence sufficient to resist summary judgment under Rule 32.


Cases Cited


FirstRand Bank Ltd v Carl Beck Estates (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (3) SA 384 (T)


Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (5) SA 523 (GSJ)


Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (including sections 129, 4(2)(c), and 8(5))


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 32


Held


The court held that the plaintiff was not required to comply with section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 before suing the defendant on the guarantee, because the National Credit Act did not apply to the principal credit transaction giving rise to the guaranteed debt and, on the court’s application of the Act, a credit guarantee is regulated only to the extent that the underlying credit agreement is regulated.


The court further held that the defendant’s debit-order complaint did not constitute a bona fide defence, particularly where the debit order had lapsed after being returned unpaid and where the plea was treated as containing an admission of arrears, with the result that summary judgment was appropriate under Rule 32.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A surety (including one who signs as surety and co-principal debtor) remains a surety, and the surety’s liability arises from the contract of suretyship, with any renunciation of benefits (such as excussion and division) not converting the surety into a principal debtor for purposes of determining the applicable statutory regime.


The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 applies to a credit guarantee only to the extent that it applies to the underlying credit facility or credit transaction in respect of which the guarantee is granted. Where the principal debt arises from a transaction to which the Act does not apply, statutory mechanisms such as the section 129 notice requirement are not triggered in an action against the surety based on that guarantee.


Under Uniform Rule 32, summary judgment is granted where the defendant fails to disclose a bona fide defence that is good in law, and where the opposition is assessed as lacking a genuine triable issue. Where the pleaded defences do not legally answer the claim and are inconsistent with material admissions, summary judgment may be granted, including contractual costs consequences such as attorney-and-client costs where provided for in the governing agreements.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAKZPHC 28
|

|

Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Zungu (11066/2021P) [2022] ZAKZPHC 28 (21 June 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
CASE
NO: 11066/2021P
In
the matter between:
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMITED
PLAINTIFF
and
ZENZO
KHULUMANGIFILE
ZUNGU                                                                                                                        DEFENDANT
REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
HENRIQUES
J
[1]
On 11 May 2022, I granted summary judgment as prayed for in the
application
against the respondent for payment of the sums of R311
179,85 and R166 190,83 together with interest and costs of suit on
the attorney
and client scale.
[2]
The defendant, although not present in motion court, was represented
by
Ms S. Ndaba of Ndaba & Associates who confirmed having been
instructed to make a settlement proposal to the plaintiff’s

attorneys of record that morning, which was rejected. She confirmed
that she advised the defendant that in the event of the settlement

offer not being accepted, judgment would be entered against the
defendant and the ramifications of this were explained to him.
Having
satisfied myself that the defendant was legally represented at the
time and further, that the ramifications of a default
judgment had
been canvased with him, judgment was entered as prayed for.
The
cause of action
[3]
The plaintiff instituted action against the defendant in respect of a
written guarantee signed by the defendant in favour of the debts and
liabilities of ZKZ Security CC of which he was the sole member.
[4]
In the particulars of claim, the plaintiff pleads that on 18
September
2014, the plaintiff and ZKZ Security CC also concluded a
written fleet management system agreement in terms of which the
plaintiff
provided ZKZ Security CC with a credit card facility,
repairs, fuel purchases and related on-road costs. On 5 July 2019,
the defendant
concluded a written guarantee in favour of the
plaintiff limited to an amount of R1 million and unconditionally
guaranteed and
undertook to pay the due, punctual and full payment of
all the debts which ZKZ Security CC owed or may owe in the future to
the
plaintiff.
[5]
The plaintiff further pleads that on or about 30 December 2019, it

and ZKZ Security CC, duly represented by the defendant, concluded a
written overdraft agreement. In terms of such agreement the
plaintiff
lent and advanced an amount of R550 000 to ZKZ Security CC which
would attract interest in terms of the loan agreement.
[6]
It is common cause that ZKZ Security CC breached the agreements
aforementioned
and committed an act of default as it was placed into
provisional liquidation by order of this court on 6 October 2021.
Pursuant
to the defendant’s guarantee for the debts of ZKZ
Security CC, the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for the
amounts
as claimed.
[7]
The defendant who opposed the action, filed a plea raising two
defences.
The first is a point
in
limine
in terms of which he alleges
that the plaintiff was obliged to comply with the pre-emptory
provisions of s 129 of the National Credit
Act 34 of 2005 (the NCA)
prior to instituting the legal proceedings against the defendant. The
second
defence
is that the plaintiff agreed to facilitate a debit order against the
bank account of Ncwane Investments (Pty) Ltd of which
the defendant
is the sole director and shareholder. The defendant alleges that the
plaintiff unilaterally terminated the debit
order resulting in ZKZ
Security CC’s account falling into arrears.
[8]
In respect of the first point
in
limine
, the defendant avers that the
NCA is not applicable to the agreements between the plaintiff and ZKZ
Security CC but applies to
the claims against him as he is a natural
person. In my view, the plaintiff is correct that there was no need
for it to comply
with the provisions of the NCA as the defendant is
sued as a guarantor for ZKZ Security CC obligations in terms of a
credit transaction
to which it is common cause the NCA does not
apply.
[9]
In
FirstRand Bank Ltd v Carl Beck
Estates (Pty) Ltd and Another
2009
(3) SA 384
(T), the court held that ‘[a] surety who has bound
himself as surety and co-principal debtor remains a surety whose
liability
arises wholly from the contract of suretyship [and that]
signing as surety and co-principal debtor does not render a surety
liable
in any capacity other than [that of] a surety who has
renounced the benefits of excussion and division’.
[10]
The court also found that
in casu
the
second respondent was sued as a guarantor to the obligations of the
first respondent in terms of a credit transaction to which
the Act
did not apply. It therefore followed that he could not claim that he
was entitled to have received a s 129 notice in terms
of the NCA
(because the NCA did not apply to the principal obligation).
[11]
In
Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings
(Pty) Ltd and Others
2010 (5) SA 523
(GSJ), the court held the following:

[9]
The defendants contend, however, that the
National Credit Act does
apply to sureties who are natural persons. This approach is incorrect
as
s 4(2)(
c
) of the
National Credit Act provides
expressly
that the Act “applies to a credit guarantee only to the extent
that this Act applies to a credit facility or credit
transaction in
respect of which the credit guarantee is granted”. It is
accordingly evident that the
National Credit Act does
not apply to a
suretyship if the principal debt does not arise from a credit
agreement which falls within the scope of the Act.
[10]
This conclusion is also confirmed by the provisions of
s 8(5)
of the
National Credit Act, to
the effect that a credit guarantee
constitutes a credit agreement for purposes of the Act only if in
terms of the credit guarantee
a person undertakes or promises to
satisfy an obligation of another consumer in terms of a credit
facility or a credit transaction
to which the Act applies. Since the
National Credit Act does
not apply to the credit transaction which
gave rise to the principle debt, the suretyships in the present
matter do not constitute
credit agreements for purposes of the
Act…The plaintiff was accordingly not obliged to give notice
to the defendants, as
required by s 129 of the Act in respect of
credit agreements which are subject to the
National Credit Act.’
[12
]
In respect of the second defence, the plaintiff admits that ZKZ
Security
CC was reducing its indebtedness by way of a monthly debit
order from Ncwane Investments (Pty) Ltd, a related entity. However,
the debit order lapsed automatically as it was returned unpaid on two
occasions.
[13]
I agree that these defences raised do not constitute a defence to
the
plaintiff’s claim and is also indicative of the breach of the
agreements by ZKZ Security CC and the defendant’s
liability. In
addition, having regard to paragraph 3 of the defendant’s plea,
he admits the arrears of ZKZ Security CC and
consequently there is no
defence to the plaintiff’s claims against him.
[14]
The provisions of
Rule 32
apply in circumstances where a plaintiff
can prove that a defendant has no bona fide defence to its claims and
that a notice of
intention to defend and plea has been delivered
solely for the purposes of delay.
[1]
Given the nature of the defences advanced by the defendant, I am of
the view that he has no bona fide defence to the action and
claims of
the plaintiff and it is for those reasons that summary judgment was
granted as prayed for in the notice of application.
Costs
[15]
In addition, given that the plaintiff has been successful, there
is
no reason to depart from the usual order in relation to costs and
both agreements make provision for costs of suit on an attorney
and
client scale and there is no reason to depart from same.
HENRIQUES
J
CASE
INFORMATION
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the Plaintiff:

Adv Reddy
Plaintiff
Attorneys:

Shepstone & Wylie
First
Floor, Absa House
15
Chatterton Road
Pietermaritzburg
Tel:
033 355 1780
Email:
jmanuel@wylie.co.za
Ref:
JTM/mm
Counsel
for the Defendant :

Ms N Ndaba
Defendant
Attorneys:

Ndaba & Associates
First
Floor
49
Peter Kerchoff Street
Pietermaritzburg
Cell:
076 810 1924
Email:
info@ndabaassociates.co.za
Ref:
NNdaba-ZUN306/0034
Date
of orders:                                            11

May 2022
Date
of reasons:                                         21

June 2022
[1]
In Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint
Venture
2009 (5) SA 1
(SCA), the court stated:

[32]
The rationale for summary judgment proceedings is impeccable. The
procedure is not intended to deprive a defendant with a
triable
issue or a sustainable defence of her/his day in court. After almost
a century of successful application in our courts,
summary judgment
proceedings can hardly continue to be described as extraordinary.
Our courts, both of first instance and at
appellate level, have
during that time rightly been trusted to ensure that a defendant
with a triable issue is not shut out.
In the Maharaj case at 425G -
426E, Corbett JA was keen to ensure, first, an examination of
whether there has been sufficient
disclosure by a defendant of the
nature and grounds of his defence and the facts upon which it is
founded. The second consideration
is that the defence so disclosed
must be both bona fide and good in law. A court which is satisfied
that this threshold has been
crossed is then bound to refuse summary
judgment.’