Zululand District Municipality and Others v MEC: Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal and Another (5660/2020) [2022] ZAKZPHC 19 (6 May 2022)

85 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Administrative Law — Review of administrative action — Investigation into allegations of maladministration — Applicants sought to review and set aside a forensic investigation report conducted under section 106(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act — Applicants contended that the investigation was ultra vires, procedurally unfair, and did not comply with the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act — Court held that the MEC's failure to conduct public hearings and allow affected parties to be heard constituted a breach of procedural fairness, rendering the investigation and report unlawful.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings took the form of a review application in which the applicants sought declaratory and review relief to have certain decisions and a forensic investigation report declared unlawful and set aside. The impugned conduct concerned a forensic investigation authorised by the provincial executive authority responsible for local government oversight in KwaZulu-Natal.


The parties were, on the one hand, the Zululand District Municipality (first applicant) together with three of its political office-bearers, namely the Speaker (second applicant), the Mayor (third applicant), and the Deputy Mayor (fourth applicant). On the other hand, the respondents were the MEC: Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal (first respondent) and Mdledle Inc (second respondent), the entity designated to conduct the investigation.


In procedural history, the MEC authorised an investigation purportedly under section 106(1)(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. A forensic report was later presented to the municipal council, together with a letter from the MEC requiring tabling of the report and the provision of a council resolution and proposed actions. The applicants then challenged the process and legality of the investigation and report. The matter proceeded as an opposed application, with the court noting that only the MEC opposed the relief.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether a section 106(1)(b) forensic investigation into alleged maladministration, fraud, and corruption at a municipality in KwaZulu-Natal had to comply with the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act 3 of 1999 (as amended), and whether the investigation process had to meet the requirements of procedural fairness, including the audi alteram partem principle, before adverse findings and recommendations were made.


Material Facts


The court relied on a sequence of largely common-cause facts about how the investigation was initiated and conducted, and what process was (and was not) afforded to the affected parties.


In August 2019 the municipality was informed by the Head of Department in the MEC’s office, Mr Tubane, that the MEC had instituted an investigation purportedly in terms of section 106(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act into 16 allegations of maladministration, fraud, and corruption at the municipality. The second respondent was designated to conduct the investigation. The notifying letter recorded that it would be necessary for the investigators to liaise verbally and in writing with councillors, officials, stakeholders, and service providers of the municipality.


After this initial notification, the municipality received no further correspondence until May 2020. On 11 May 2020 the Speaker received an email from the MEC’s Senior Manager indicating that the investigation had been finalised, that a report was ready to be tabled, and requesting attendance for tabling at a virtual council meeting scheduled for 14 May 2020. At that virtual meeting, the investigators presented a report of 387 pages with 61 annexures, and a letter from the MEC (dated 1 May 2020 but signed on 14 May 2020) requiring the municipality to table the report and provide the MEC within 21 days with a certified council resolution and detailed comments and proposed actions, including possible disciplinary steps, civil recovery, and/or criminal charges.


The applicants, through attorneys, wrote to the MEC on 10 June 2020 pointing to deficiencies in the report and inviting the MEC to withdraw the directive pending resolution of the issues raised. A material complaint raised was that various affected persons were not given a hearing before the report was compiled, which was alleged to be unlawful and procedurally unfair.


In response, the MEC reiterated that the investigation had been completed and treated the report as final and “ripe for implementation”, while also indicating (as an asserted act of good faith) that the investigator would nevertheless afford implicated persons an opportunity to state their side of the story. However, the judgment records that the MEC ultimately pressed ahead with the investigation process without input from affected persons, and reaffirmed the stance that the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act was not peremptorily applicable to section 106(1)(b) investigations.


Two procedural facts were treated as not in dispute and central to the outcome. First, no hearings were held at all, whether public or otherwise. Second, the report was finalised and presented without the applicants having been afforded an opportunity to be heard on allegations implicating them, notwithstanding the earlier indication that liaison would occur. The MEC’s position (advanced through Mr Tubane) was that natural justice and audi rights were not applicable at the investigative/report stage because the report comprised recommendations and any audi rights would be afforded later in disciplinary proceedings, and that the report had no direct external legal effect.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions for determination concerned both law and the application of law to largely common-cause facts.


A first issue was whether, in KwaZulu-Natal, an investigation designated under section 106(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act had to comply with the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act 3 of 1999 (as amended), including provisions requiring public hearings unless the chairperson decides otherwise for good reasons. This was primarily a question of statutory interpretation and the legal consequences of non-compliance.


A second issue was whether, independently of statutory compliance, the investigation and report process had to comply with the requirements of procedural fairness, including the audi alteram partem principle, before a report containing serious findings and prejudicial recommendations could be finalised and acted upon. This involved an application of administrative-law fairness principles to the investigative process and an evaluation of whether the process was unfair given the nature and potential impact of the report and recommendations.


A third ground advanced by the applicants was that the evidence before the investigators was not rationally connected to the findings in the report. The court identified this as a review ground but ultimately did not decide it because it found the first two grounds sufficient.


Court’s Reasoning


On the applicability of provincial commission legislation, the court approached section 106 of the Municipal Systems Act as establishing a framework in which an MEC may either request information by notice (section 106(1)(a)) or, if necessary, designate persons to investigate (section 106(1)(b)). The court emphasised section 106(2), which provides that in the absence of applicable provincial legislation, sections 2 to 6 of the national Commissions Act 8 of 1947 (and regulations) apply to a section 106(1)(b) investigation.


The court treated it as settled that in KwaZulu-Natal there is applicable provincial legislation, namely the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act, and relied on the Supreme Court of Appeal’s statement in Minister of Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal v Umlambo Trading 29 CC and Others 2008 (1) SA 396 (SCA) that the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act “certainly constitutes applicable provincial legislation” contemplated by section 106(2). On that footing, the court accepted that section 106(2) makes the national Commissions Act applicable only where there is no applicable provincial legislation, and therefore compliance with the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act was required for a section 106(1)(b) investigation in the province.


The court accepted that the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act regulates key procedural aspects of a commission-type investigation, including the taking of evidence and the conduct of sittings. A particular provision relied upon was section 3(2), which provides that, unless the chairperson for good reasons decides otherwise, all evidence and addresses must be heard in public, with notice given in a manner determined by the chairperson. Against that statutory background, the court treated the absence of any hearings as decisive: it was not disputed that no hearings were held, and thus the investigation did not comply with the applicable provincial statute. The court agreed with the applicants’ submission that compliance was not a mere formality because it gives effect to procedural rights and the requirements of fairness in an inquiry of this kind.


In evaluating why procedural protections mattered, the court relied on the Constitutional Court’s discussion in Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State v Zuma [2021] ZACC 2; 2021 (5) SA 1 (CC); 2021 (5) BCLR 542 (CC), noting the distinction between commissions that gather information and those that are fact-finding inquiries aimed at conclusions. The court characterised the present investigation as falling within the latter category because it produced serious findings and prejudicial recommendations, including recommendations that the municipality consider criminal or civil proceedings against those implicated. This reinforced, in the court’s assessment, the public-interest character of the inquiry and the need for fairness.


On procedural fairness and audi, the court rejected the respondents’ position that audi rights were unnecessary at the investigation/report stage because affected persons could be heard later in disciplinary hearings. The court applied established administrative-law principles, drawing on South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991 (4) SA 1, Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v Traub and Others [1989] ZASCA 90; 1989 (4) SA 731, and Du Preez and Another v Truth and Reconciliation Commission [1997] ZASCA 2; [1997] JOL 1149 (AD). These authorities were used for the propositions that the audi principle operates where a statute empowers action prejudicially affecting an individual’s rights or interests, or where there is a legitimate expectation entitling a person to be heard, unless excluded expressly or by implication; and that the duty to act fairly is concerned with the manner in which decisions are taken.


Applying those principles to the facts, the court relied on the undisputed features of the process. The court noted that the municipality had initially been told that investigators would liaise verbally and in writing, yet the applicants only heard again once the investigation was complete and the report finalised. The court accepted that the applicants were denied an opportunity to be heard, and regarded the MEC’s position—namely that the report comprised only recommendations and audi would come later—as insufficient, given the nature of the findings and the prejudicial character of the recommendations. On that basis, the court concluded that the investigators were under a duty to act fairly towards the applicants by affording an opportunity to be heard, and that the failure to do so constituted procedural unfairness warranting the setting aside of the impugned decisions.


Having found in favour of the applicants on the two grounds of non-compliance with the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act and procedural unfairness, the court considered it unnecessary to decide the further rationality ground relating to the connection between evidence and findings.


On costs, the court exercised a discretionary judgment based on the litigation stance of the parties. It recorded that only the MEC opposed the relief and concluded that there was no justification to burden the second respondent with costs.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted the application and made an order granting relief “in terms of para’s 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the notice dated 27 August 2020.” In substance, the relief encompassed the setting aside of the impugned section 106(1)(b) forensic investigation report and the MEC’s related decisions (including publication/adoption of the report and the refusal to comply with the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act in relation to the investigation), on the basis of unlawfulness arising from statutory non-compliance and procedural unfairness.


The court ordered that the first respondent (the MEC) pay the costs of the application, and it declined to impose costs on the second respondent because the MEC was the only party opposing the relief.


Cases Cited


Administrator, Transvaal, and Others v Traub and Others [1989] ZASCA 90; 1989 (4) SA 731.


Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v Blom and Others 1988 (4) SA 645 (A).


Du Preez and Another v Truth and Reconciliation Commission [1997] ZASCA 2; [1997] JOL 1149 (AD).


Minister of Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal v Umlambo Trading 29 CC and Others 2008 (1) SA 396 (SCA).


Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State v Zuma [2021] ZACC 2; 2021 (5) SA 1 (CC); 2021 (5) BCLR 542 (CC).


South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 1991 (4) SA 1.


Van Huyssteen and Others NNO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 1996 (1) SA 283 (C).


Legislation Cited


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, section 106.


KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act 3 of 1999 (as amended by the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Amendment Act 4 of 2015), sections 2(1), 3, 4 and 8.


Commissions Act 8 of 1947, sections 1, 2, 3 and 4.


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 127(2)(e).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, in KwaZulu-Natal, an investigation designated under section 106(1)(b) of the Municipal Systems Act is subject to applicable provincial legislation, namely the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act, and that the investigation in issue was unlawful because it did not comply with those statutory requirements, including the conduct of hearings contemplated by the Act.


The court further held that the investigation and report process was procedurally unfair because the applicants were not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the report, containing serious findings and prejudicial recommendations, was finalised and presented. The argument that audi rights could be postponed to later disciplinary proceedings was rejected as insufficient in the circumstances.


The impugned decisions and report were accordingly set aside in terms of the notice of motion, and costs were awarded against the MEC, with no costs order against the investigator because the MEC alone opposed the relief.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Compliance with section 106(2) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 requires that, where there is applicable provincial legislation governing investigative mechanisms akin to commissions, that provincial legislation governs a section 106(1)(b) investigation; the national Commissions Act framework applies only in the absence of applicable provincial legislation.


In KwaZulu-Natal, the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act 3 of 1999 constitutes applicable provincial legislation for purposes of section 106(2), with the consequence that a section 106(1)(b) investigation must be conducted consistently with the procedural requirements laid down in that Act, including the statutory approach to public hearings unless good reasons justify a different approach.


The audi alteram partem principle forms part of the broader duty on administrative actors (and those exercising public power) to act procedurally fairly. Where an investigative process culminates in a report containing serious findings and prejudicial recommendations, fairness may require that those affected be given a meaningful opportunity to respond before the report is finalised, unless such fairness requirements are excluded by the empowering framework.


Procedural fairness focuses on the manner in which a decision or outcome is arrived at. A later opportunity to be heard (for example, in subsequent disciplinary proceedings) does not necessarily cure the unfairness of an earlier process where adverse findings and recommendations have already been made without hearing affected parties.

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[2022] ZAKZPHC 19
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Zululand District Municipality and Others v MEC: Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal and Another (5660/2020) [2022] ZAKZPHC 19 (6 May 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case
no: 5660/2020
Reportable
In
the matter between:
ZULULAND
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

FIRST APPLICANT
THE
SPEAKER, ZULULAND DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY
SECOND APPLICANT
THE
MAYOR, ZULULAND DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY
THIRD
APPLICANT
THE
DEPUTY MAYOR,
ZULULAND
DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY

FOURTH APPLICANT
and
THE
MEC: COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND
TRADITIONAL
AFFAIRS, KWAZULU-NATAL                                FIRST

RESPONDENT
MDLEDLE
INC

SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Delivered on.
06/05/2022
Chili
J:
[1]
The applicants brought an application to declare unlawful, review and
set aside:
(a)
the report issued in the Forensic Investigations into allegations of
Maladministration, Fraud and Corruption at Zululand District

Municipality authorized by the first respondent (hereinafter ‘the
MEC’), and purportedly conducted in terms of s 106(1)
(b)
of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (hereinafter
‘the Municipal Systems Act’);
(b)
the decision of the MEC to publish and/or adopt the report; and
(c)
the decision of the MEC communicated on 18 April 2020, to refuse to
comply with the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act 3 of 1999
(hereinafter
‘KZN Commissions Act’) in relation to the investigation
referred above. The case for the applicants is
that the investigation
and subsequent report are ultra-vires, procedurally unfair, contrary
to the empowering statute and unsustainable.
Moreover, the decision
to refuse to comply with the KZN Commissions Act is unlawful.
Background
[2]
On 21 August 2019 the first applicant (through the second applicant)
was informed by Mr T Tubane (Head of Department in the
MEC’s
office) that the MEC had instituted an investigation purportedly in
terms of s 106(1)
(b)
of the Municipal Systems Act, into 16 allegations of
maladministration, fraud and corruption allegedly taking place at the
first
applicant. The second respondent had been designated to conduct
the said investigations. Of relevance to note, the letter from Mr

Tubane recorded, that ‘it [would] be necessary for the
investigators (second respondent) to liase both verbally and in
writing
with Councillors, officials, stake-holders and service
providers of the first applicant’
[1]
.
The first applicant received no further correspondence thereafter
until 11 May 2020.
[3]
On 11 May 2020 the second applicant received an email from Mr S
Govender, (the MEC’s Senior Manager) the relevant portion
of
which reads:
‘…
The
investigation authorized by the MEC in terms of section 106 of the
Systems Act has been finalized and a report is ready for
tabling at
Zululand Municipality. For this reason, we hereby request attendance
for a short item for the tabling of the forensic
report, at your
virtual council meeting due to be held on 14 May 2020.’
A
virtual meeting was subsequently held on 14 May 2020 by the first
applicant’s council whereupon the second respondent presented
a
report comprising 387 pages and an additional 61 annexures, and a
letter from the MEC dated 1 May 2020 but signed by the MEC
on 14 May
2020,
[2]
the relevant part of
which reads:

You
are required to table this report before council and provide me
within 21 days of receipt hereof, with a certified copy of the

council resolution taken at the ordinary special council meeting
convened to deal with this matter, together with your detailed

comments and proposed actions (disciplinary action, civil recovery
and/or criminal charges registered)’.
[4]
On 10 June 2020 the first and second applicants, through their
attorneys, Garlicke and Bousfield, addressed a letter to the
first
respondent pointing to deficiencies in the report and inviting the
first respondent to withdraw the letter dated 14 May 2020
until the
issues raised had been addressed.
[3]
In para 10 of the letter the author observed that failure by the
investigators to give various affected persons a hearing before

compiling a report is unlawful, procedurally irrational and in breach
of the right to be heard (
audi
alteram partem
rule). In his reply the MEC in a letter dated 15 June 2020 reiterated
that the investigation had been completed and added,
‘…
The
mere fact that there may be certain information and/or documentation
required by the investigator and/or documentation required
by the
investigator, subsequent to the submission of the investigation
report,
does
not detract from its status as final report which is ripe for
implementation’
.
(My emphasis.)
[4]
With
regards to respective complainants’ rights to be heard, the
first respondent sought to suggest that ample opportunity
had been
afforded to the respective complainants to ‘contest or
challenge whatever allegations may have been made against
them’.
Immediately thereafter he remarked:

However,
notwithstanding the above, and as an act of good faith to demonstrate
that my only intention is to deal with the matter
at hand as fairly
as possible, I have directed the investigator to nevertheless afford
your client(s) an opportunity to state their
side of the story and
thereafter report to me once that exercise has been completed.’
[5]
[5]
Following on numerous correspondences exchanged by the parties, the
MEC ultimately forwarded a letter to the first and second
applicants’
attorneys in which he re-affirmed his decision, that the provisions
of the KZN Commissions Act are not peremptorily
applicable to s106
(1) (b) investigations.  He pressed on with the finalization of
the investigation without the input of
the affected complainants. In
support of the MEC’s decision, Mr Tubane reiterated that rules
of natural justice do not apply
in s 106(1)
(b)
investigations.
In amplification he stated, that the recommendations that follow on a
s 106 investigation and subsequent report,
have no adverse
effect on the rights of the persons implicated in the report and
added that the said recommendation and report
‘have no direct
external legal effect’.
The
applicants’ case
[6]
The applicants’ application is founded on three grounds,
firstly, that the investigation failed to comply with the peremptory

provisions of the KZN Commissions Act, read with s 106 of Municipal
Systems Act, including the holding of public hearings; secondly,
that
the investigation was conducted in a procedurally unfair manner and
contrary to the requirements of the
audi alteram parterm
rule;
and thirdly, that the evidence before the investigators was not
rationally connected to the findings in the report.
The
applicability of the KZN Commissions Act
.
[7]
The investigation by the second respondent (as directed by the MEC)
was purportedly conducted in accordance with the provisions
of s 106
of the Municipal Systems Act the relevant portion of which reads:

106
Non-performance and maladministration. — (1) If an MEC has
reason to believe that a municipality in the province cannot
or does
not fulfil a statutory obligation binding on that municipality or
that maladministration, fraud, corruption or any other
serious
malpractice has occurred or is occurring in a municipality in the
province, the MEC must —
(a)
by written notice to the municipality, request the municipal council
or municipal manager to provide the MEC with information required
in
the notice; or
(b)
if the MEC considers it necessary, designate a person or persons to
investigate the matter.
(2)
In the absence of applicable provincial legislation, the provisions
of sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Commissions Act, 1947
(Act No. 8
of 1947), and the regulations made in terms of that Act apply, with
the necessary changes as the context may require,
to an investigation
in terms of subsection (1)
(b)
.
(3)
(a)
An MEC issuing a notice in terms of subsection (1)
(a)
or designating a person to conduct an investigation in terms of
subsection (1)
(b)
, must within 14 days submit a written
statement to the National Council of Provinces motivating the action.
(b)
A copy of the statement contemplated in paragraph
(a)
must
simultaneously be forwarded to the Minister and to the Minister of
Finance.’
It
is settled, that in KwaZulu-Natal, the provincial legislation
applicable to investigations under s 106(1)
(b)
is the KZN Commissions Act. Confirming the finding of Nicholson J,
the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Minister
of Local Government, KwaZulu-Natal v Umlambo Trading
[6]
held, that the ‘KZN Commissions Act
certainly
constitutes applicable provisional legislation as contemplated by s
106(2) of the Municipal Systems Act
.’
(My emphasis). The court proceeded as follows:

Moreover,
having regard to the ordinary grammatical meaning of s 106(2), it is
clear that it is only in the absence of applicable
provincial
legislation that ss 2 to 6 of the (national) Commissions Act, apply,
“with the necessary changes as the context
may require”,
to an investigation in terms of s 106(1)
(b)
.’
[8]
It was submitted on behalf of the applicants that the provisions of
the KZN Commissions Act, inserted by an amendment in 2015,

specifically provides, that sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the KZN
Commissions are applicable to investigations under s 106(1)
(b)
of the Municipal Systems Act. The KZN Commissions Act regulates every
aspect of a commission, including the appointment of the
commission,
terms of reference to be investigated, the collection of evidence,
the evidence of witnesses, (including the right
to legal
representation), the sittings of the commission, (including a
requirement that hearings be conducted in public) and publication
of
any report.
[7]
In particular, s
3(2) of the KZN Commissions Act which is applicable to investigations
under s 106(1)
(b)
of the Municipal Systems Act provides:

Unless
the chairperson for good reasons decides otherwise, all evidence and
addresses shall be heard by a commission in public,
and the
chairperson shall give notice thereof in such manner as he or she may
determine.’
It
is not in issue that no hearings were held at all, let alone public
hearings. It is further not in issue that the report was
finalized
without any input from the applicants.
[9]
Mr Gauntlet for the applicant, submitted, correctly in my view, that
compliance with the KZN Commissions Act is not merely a
formality. It
gives expression to important procedural rights and the requirements
of procedural fairness. In
Secretary
of the Judicial Commission of Enquiry into Allegation of State
Capture v Zuma
[8]
the court drew a distinction between two types of commissions,
viz,
a commission established for purposes of gathering information and to
inform and a fact finding commission aimed at reaching conclusions
on
issues. There is no doubt that the commission set up by the MEC in
the present application falls squarely under the category
of the
second type of commission. The investigation conducted by the second
respondent resulted in a report which makes serious
findings and
highly prejudicial recommendations against the applicants. It called
on the applicants to answer to serious allegations
of mismanagement
of funds belonging to the public. In addition, the MEC, following on
the recommendations made by the second respondent,
invited the second
applicant to consider institution of either criminal or civil
proceedings against those implicated in the report.
That clearly is a
matter of public interest entitling the applicants to at the very
least, an opportunity to explain themselves.
When dealing with the
commission in which a matter of public interest is at issue, the
Constitutional Court (in the context of
a commission conducted under
the National Commissions Act 8 of 1947) stated:
[9]

In
addition to the function of advising the President, a commission of
inquiry may also serve the purpose of holding a public inquiry
in
respect of a matter of public concern. The purpose of a public
hearing under those circumstances is to restore public confidence
in
the institution in which the matter that caused concern arose. Here
the focus is not what the President decides to do with the
findings
and recommendations of a particular commission. Instead, the
objective is to reveal the truth to the public pertaining
to the
matter that gave rise to public concern. Affirming this purpose in
Minister of Police, this Court stated:

In addition to
advising the executive, a commission of inquiry serves a deeper
public purpose, particularly at times of widespread
disquiet and
discontent.”’
Failure
to comply with the requirements of procedural fairness
.
[10]
It was argued on behalf of the applicants that in addition to the
failure to comply with the KZN Commissions Act, the investigators

also failed to comply with the requirements of procedural fairness in
that they failed (1) to give the applicants a clear statement
of the
case they were required to meet and (2) to give the applicants a
meaningful opportunity to respond to allegations levelled
against
them. There is merit in this argument. It was submitted both in the
papers and in argument (on behalf of the respondents)
that procedural
fairness is not a requirement at an investigation and report stage.
In para 33 of his affidavit Mr Tubane (on behalf
of the MEC) stated:
“…
Full
rights of
audi alteram partem
and the other principles of
natural justice would be accorded to the affected persons in their
disciplinary hearings “[subsequent
disciplinary hearings].”
The
Appellate Division in
South
African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council
[10]
described the
audi
alteram partem
principle as being:
‘…
a rule of natural justice
which comes into play whenever a statute empowers a public official
or body to do an act or give a decision
prejudicially affecting an
individual in his liberty or property or existing rights, or whenever
such an individual has a legitimate
expectation entitling him to a
hearing, unless the statute expressly or by implication indicates the
contrary…’
In
the words of Lord Denning quoted in
Administrator,
Transvaal v Traub
:
[11]
‘…
an administrative body
may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by
their decision an opportunity of making
representations. It all
depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add,
some legitimate expectation, of which
it would not be fair to deprive
him without hearing what he has to say’.
In
Du Preez
v Truth and Reconciliation Commission
[12]
it was held, that the

audi
principle is but one facet, albeit an important one, of the general
requirement of natural justice that in the circumstances postulated

the public official or body concerned must act fairly . . . The duty
to act fairly, however, is concerned only with the manner
in which
decisions are taken: it does not relate to whether the decision
itself is fair or not.’
[13]
[11]
It is common cause, or at least not in dispute, that when informing
the applicants about the pending investigation, Mr Tubane
expressly
stated in a letter dated 29 August 2019, that the investigators
would, as part of their investigation, liase both verbally
and in
writing, with the applicants. That did not happen. The applicants
received correspondence from the MEC and his Senior Manager,
Mr S
Govender, only after the investigation had been completed and the
report finalized. In fact, it is not in dispute that the
applicants
were denied a right to be heard. In his answering affidavit Mr Tubane
stated:

It
was argued by applicants that the named persons were not accorded the
right of
audi
alteram partem
.
The MEC responded to this issue by pointing out that the report
merely contained recommendations and that full rights of
audi
alteram partem
and the other principles of natural justice would be accorded to the
affected persons in their disciplinary hearing.’
[14]
It
is my view that the investigators (second respondent) were under a
duty to act fairly towards the applicants by affording them
the
opportunity to be heard and that failure to do so amounted to
procedural unfairness necessitating the grant of the relief sought.
[12]
In light of the view I take, I do not consider it necessary to deal
with the third ground of review, viz, that the evidence
before the
investigators was not rationally connected to the findings in the
report.  I am satisfied that on the first two
grounds, namely,
failure to comply with the KZN Commissions Act and procedural
unfairness, individually or cumulatively considered,
the applicants
succeeded in establishing that the impugned decisions are unlawful
and that they stand to be set aside.
[13]
It was common cause at the hearing of the opposed application that
the only party opposed to the relief sought is the first
respondent.
There is therefore no justification in burdening the second
respondent with costs.
[14]
In the circumstances I make the following order:
Order
1.
The order is granted in terms of para’s 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the
notice dated 27 August 2020.
2.
The first respondent is to pay the costs of the application.
_____________
Chili
J
Cases
cited
1.
Administrator, Transvaal, and others v Traub
and others
[1989] ZASCA 90
;
1989 (4) SA 731:
applied.
2.
Attorney-General,
Eastern Cape v Blom and others
1988 (4) SA 645
(A): referred to.
3.
Du Preez and another v Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
[1997] ZASCA 2
;
[1997] JOL
1149
AD: applied.
4.
Minister of Local Government, Housing and
Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal v Umlambo Trading 29 CC and others
2008 (1) SA 396
(SCA): applied.
5.
Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry
into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public
Sector including
Organs of State v Zuma
[2021]
ZACC 2
;
2021 (5) SA 1
(CC);
2021 (5) BCLR 542
(CC): applied.
6.
South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City
Council
1991 (4) SA 1:
applied.
7.
Van Huyssteen and others NNO v Minister of Environmental Affairs
and Tourism and others
1996 (1) SA 283
(C): referred to.
Legislation
cited
1.
The
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000
:
section
106.
0
cm; line-height: 150%">
2.
KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act No. 3 of 1999 (as amended by
KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Amendment Act 4 of 2015): sections 2(1),
3,
4 and 8.
3.
Commissions Act No. 8 of 1947: sections 1, 2, 3 and 4.
4.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: section 127 (2)
(e).
Appearances
Counsel
for the applicant: Adv. J Gauntlett SC QC and S Pudifin-Jones
Instructed
by:
Garlicke
& Bousfield Inc.
7 Torsvale Crescent
La Lucia Ridge Office
Estate
La Lucia
Tel: 031 570 5405
Email:
chuma.vabaza@gb.co.za
Ref: C
Vabaza/rds/P1175/20
Counsel
for the respondent: Adv. AJ Dickson SC and D Crompton
Instructed
by:

Mathew Francis Inc.
Suite 4 1
st
Floor Block A
21 Cascades Crescent
Montrose
Pietermaritzburg
Ref: Yuri Maharaj
Email:
yuri@mfilaw.co.za
Date
of hearing:
21 January
2022
Date
of judgment:
06 May 2022
[1]
See
letter dated 21/08/2019, Annexure BJ 2 at pages 35-39 of the indexed
papers.
[2]
See
letter Annexure BJ 5 at pages 428 to 431 of the indexed papers.
[3]
See
Annexure BJ 6 at pages 432 to 435 of indexed papers.
[4]
See
para 4 of first respondent’s letter at page 441 of indexed
papers.
[5]
See
para 6 of Annexure BJ 7 at page 441 of indexed papers.
[6]
Minister
of Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs, KwaZulu-Natal
v Umlambo Trading 29 CC and others
2008
(1) SA 396
(SCA) para 24.
[7]
See
sections 2(1) 3, 4 and 8 of the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act 3 of
1999, respectively.
[8]
Secretary
of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State
Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including
Organs
of State v Zuma
[2021]
ZACC 2
;
2021 (5) SA 1
(CC);
2021 (5) BCLR 542
(CC) paras 5 and 6.
[9]
Secretary
of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State
Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including
Organs
of State v Zuma
[2021]
ZACC 2
;
2021 (5) SA 1
(CC);
2021 (5) BCLR 542
(CC) para 5.
[10]
South
African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council
1991
(4) SA 1
at 10G – I. See also,
Attorney-General,
Eastern Cape v Blom and others
1988 (4) SA 645
(A) at 660H – 662I.
[11]
See
Administrator,
Transvaal, and others v Traub and others
[1989] ZASCA 90
;
1989 (4) SA 731
at 754I – J.
[12]
Du
Preez and another v Truth and Reconciliation Commission
[1997]
ZASCA 2
;
[1997] JOL 1149
AD.
[13]
Cf
the remarks of Farlam J in
Van
Huyssteen and others NNO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism and others
1996 (1) SA 283
(C) at 304A – 305D.
[14]
See
para 33 of Mr Tubane’s affidavit (on behalf of the MEC) at
page 580 of the indexed papers.