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[2022] ZAFSHC 361
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B.S.K v A.R (A80/2022) [2022] ZAFSHC 361 (29 December 2022)
HEADNOTE:
CHILD
AND RELOCATION TO IRELAND
FAMILY
– Children – Relocation – Job opportunity for
mother in Ireland – Allegations of parental
alienation
against mother – Mother having made arrangements for
schooling and having support of sister in Ireland
–
Relocation in best interests of child.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
No: A80/2022
Reportable:
NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: NO
In
the matter between:
BSK
APPELLANT
VS
AR
RESPONDENT
HEARD
ON:
30 NOVEMBER 2022
CORAM:
MUSI
JP, MBHELE, DJP et REINDERS J
JUDGMENT
BY:
MBHELE DJP
ORDER
ON:
_
23 DECEMBER 2022
REASONS:
29 DECEMBER 2022
[1]
This is an appeal against a
judgment of a single Judge of this Division following a litany
of
applications brought by both parties concerning their 5-year-old
minor child (IGK). The respondent approached the court
a quo
to obtain an order authorising her relocation to Ireland with IGK. On
18 March 2022 the court
a quo
granted the application in
favour of the respondent on the following terms:
1.
The Applicant is
granted leave
to
remove the minor child,
IGK
, permanently from the Republic of
South Africa to
Ireland.
2.
The Respondent is ordered to forthwith sign all documents
pertaining
to the relocation of the minor child,
IGK
and to take all such steps that may be necessary to enable the
Applicant to apply for the issuing of passports and/or for the
issuing
of visas for the minor child, failing which the Sheriff of
the Honourable Court is authorised and directed to take all such
steps
and to sign all such documents on the Respondent’s
behalf.
3.
The Respondent is ordered to forthwith sign all such documents and to
take all
such steps that may be necessary to enable the Applicant to
lawfully remove the minor child from the Republic of South Africa,
failing which the Sheriff of the Honourable Court is authorised to
take all such steps and to sign all such documents on the
Respondent’s
behalf.
4.
Upon the relocation of the Applicant and the minor child to Ireland,
the Respondent
will be entitled to maintain contact with the minor
child as follows:
4.1
The Respondent shall be entitled to continue contact as set out in
the Children’s Court
Order dated 10 November 2020, subject to
the condition that such contact rights must be exercised within
Ireland.
4.2
Telephonic, Skype, Zoom, and WhatsApp contact at all reasonable
times. To enable the Respondent to exercise
these contact rights, the
Applicant must:
4.2.1
Ensure that the minor child has, at all reasonable times, a cell
phone and/or a computer at her disposal
through which the Respondent
can contact the minor child;
4.2.2
Ensure that at all reasonable times there is Wi-Fi and/or any other
data and/or any other internet
facilities available at the
Applicant’s home in Ireland to facilitate the aforementioned
contact right;
4.2.3
Supply the contact numbers and/or any other contact details and/or
connection links, which will be
required by the Respondent to
exercise his contact rights with the minor child.
5.
Upon the relocation of the Applicant and the minor child to Ireland,
the Respondent’s
assistance shall be solicited to perform the
following future acts as and when the need may arise:
5.1
To administer and to safeguard the minor child’s property
and/or any other
interest which the minor child may acquire;
5.2
To apply, as and when necessary, for the issuing of any citizen
documents, identity
documents and/or any passport and/or any visas in
respect of the minor child from the relevant authorities with the
Respondent
consenting thereto and/or with the need of the Respondent
signing any documents in respects of such an application;
5.3
To take and/or to make any decisions involving the minor child;
5.4
To assist the minor child in any administrative, contractual and/or
any other
legal matter;
5.5
To give consent required by law in respect of the minor child;
5.6
To consent to the minor child’s departure and/or removal from
Ireland
to any other country.
6.
The Respondent’s Counter-Application is dismissed with no order
as to costs.
7.
Each party their own costs.
8.
Upon relocation to Ireland, the Applicant is to obtain a mirror Court
Order of
this Court’s Order.
[2]
The germane facts are the
following. The appellant (the father) and the respondent (the
mother)
are the unmarried biological parents of IGK, who was born on 30 June
2017. The appellant and the respondent were engaged
to be married.
Their engagement terminated in October 2017. IGK has been staying
with the respondent since birth. After the parties
separated they
could not agree on the appellant’s contact rights to IGK.
[3]
During March 2018 the appellant
approached the children’s court for an order defining
his
contact rights. It made an interim order granting him contact rights
with IGK and ordered the Family Advocate to prepare a
report. The
appellant stays in Johannesburg while the respondent in Bloemfontein.
[4]
On 10 November 2020 the
children’s court granted an order awarding the appellant
phased
in contact with IGK. In addition, the parties were ordered to refrain
from having any conflicts in IGK’s presence
and to stop talking
ill of each other in IGK’s presence or when speaking to her.
[5]
During May 2020 the respondent
informed the appellant that she has secured employment in
Ireland and
that she and her husband are considering to relocate to Ireland with
their son and IGK. Subsequent to her appointment,
the Irish
Department of Trade and Employment issued her with a Critical Skill
Employment permit. She requested the appellant to
consent to IGK’s
relocation to Ireland. The appellant suggested that the respondent
consider relocating to Australia instead
as he is originally from
Australia.
[6]
On 26 January 2021 the
respondent’s Attorneys wrote a letter to the appellant’s
Attorneys requesting the appellant’s consent for IGK to
relocate to Ireland with the respondent. The appellant declined the
request. After the respondent’s request was denied she
successfully approached the court
a quo
for an order
authorising her relocation to Ireland together with IGK. It is that
order that is the subject of this appeal.
[7]
On 2 December 2021, while the
main application was pending, the appellant approached the
court a
quo with a counter- application in which he,
inter alia
,
sought an order allowing him to take IGK on holiday between 11 and 25
December 2021. Additionally, he applied that a psychologist
be
appointed to prepare a report with recommendations regarding IGK’s
best interests, including the exercise by the parties
of their
parental rights and responsibilities with regards to IGK and whether
or not it is in IGK’s best interests to be
removed permanently
from South Africa and the effect on IGK if she relocates to Ireland
leaving the appellant behind.
[8]
The court
a quo
only granted an order allowing the appellant
to take the minor child on holiday between 11 and 25 December 2021.
The acrimonious
relationship between the parties deteriorated further
after IGK spent the two weeks with the appellant on holiday in Cape
Town.
The parties blame each other for IGK’s hostile behaviour
towards the appellant. Since the return of IGK from holiday with
the
appellant it became difficult for the appellant to exercise overnight
contact with her.
[9]
The appellant could not take IGK
with him for a period of 11 weeks between January and
18 March 2022.
IGK refused to accompany the appellant and would cry hysterically
every time the appellant attempted to exercise
his contact rights.
This led to the appellant filing a supplementary affidavit in which
he detailed incidences which he alleges
constituted parental
alienation. Around the weekend of 21 January 2022 when the appellant
tried to take IGK away for a visit she
cried hysterically to a point
where she asked the respondent when will the appellant die and
refused to leave with the appellant.
[10]
The appellant accuses the respondent of parental alienation based on
IGK’s constant reluctance
to accompany him whenever he wanted
to exercise contact. He alleges that the respondent and her husband
monitor IGK’s video
calls with him and sometimes interfered
during calls and distract her by putting toys in front of her while
she was busy on a video
call with him to divert her attention. The
respondent disputes that putting a toy next to IGK was aimed at
distracting her. She
states that the toy was used to help her stay
focused during video calls because her concentration span is too
short, considering
her age.
[11]
In another incident the appellant and respondent’s husband had
a disagreement which led
to them manhandling each other when IGK was
crying and refusing to leave with the appellant. While the
respondent’s husband
was comforting IGK he remarked that it was
not nice for IGK to be forced to leave with the appellant, creating
an impression that
he encourages IGK to be rude and dismissive
towards the appellant.
[12]
The respondent denies that she is orchestrating
parental alienation from the appellant. She amplified her
version by
attaching photos showing bruises on IGK’s inner upper left arm
which she alleges were sustained when the appellant
pulled IGK out of
her hands during one of their many confrontational encounters.
The respondent had to take IGK to the hospital for medical attention
as a result thereof.
[13]
The court
a quo
found that there is no
evidence of parental alienation necessitating further psychological
assessment of IGK as she had already
been subjected to assessment and
evaluation twice in preparation of the two Family Advocate’s
reports. The record is replete
with stories of these parents who are
at war with each other and nit-picking at every turn. They are
suspicious of each other and
view each other’s actions through
a magnifying glass. IGK is being followed with cameras and recording
devices to capture
her activities and conversations with either
parent, with an intention to point out or cast a spotlight on even
the most insignificant
faults of the other parent. They are both on a
fault–finding mission and judging each other on trivial issues.
[14]
The respondent is the current primary caregiver.
The investigations and evaluations done by the family Advocate,
the
social workers in the Family Advocate’s office as well as H.
Joubert, an independent social worker recommended that IGK’s
primary place of residence must be with the respondent. Primary
residence of IGK was never an issue between the parties until the
respondent communicated her intentions to relocate to Ireland with
IGK. There is no evidence advanced that IGK’s best interests
are at jeopardy under the respondent’s eye. What came out
clearly from the appellant is his fear that the respondent may
violate the court order and frustrate his right to access if she is
allowed to relocate with IGK to Ireland.
[15]
Parental alienation is defined as follows by
Richard Gardner,
a child psychiatrist:
‘
…
.
a disorder that arises primarily in the context of child-custody
disputes. Its primary manifestation is the child's campaign of
denigration against the parent, a campaign that has no justification.
The disorder results from the combination of indoctrinations
by the
alienating parent and the child's own contributions to the
vilification of the alienated parent
[1]
’
[16]
Richard Gardner
opines that it occurs when
,
in the context of child custody disputes, one parent deliberately or
unconsciously attempts to alienate a child from the other
parent. In
the current matter the child started displaying hostility towards her
father after she had been away with him for the
first time for an
uninterrupted period of 14 days. The appellant fails to appreciate
that although IGK was happy to spend time
with him on holiday for 14
days, this was the first time she was separated from her mother for
such a long period. The experience
could have overwhelmed her.
[17]
IGK
started displaying discomfort with accompanying the appellant on 7
January 2022 when he came to exercise his contact rights, just
two
weeks after they came back from holiday. There is no evidence
suggesting that the respondent had indoctrinated IGK in any manner
in
the two weeks that she spent with the respondent and her family after
the holiday. What the record shows is that she was happy
in the
appellant’s company when they were in Cape Town. The fact that
she was happy during the 14 days she spent with the
appellant is not
an indication that she adjusted with ease and did not miss her mother
during that period. I am unable to find
fault in the court
a
quo’s
finding that there is no need to subject IGK to an assessment by a
clinical psychologist. The appeal against the dismissal of the
counter- application ought to fail.
[18]
The respondent and her husband contemplated relocating to Ireland
when her husband was informed
of possible retrenchment at his place
of employment. Her decision to move was motivated by the prevailing
crime rate and economic
climate in South Africa.
She
believes that her economic prospects are better in Ireland. She
resigned as a director of a software development company and
sold her
shares therein. She will be receiving a better salary in Ireland. She
believes that Ireland will provide a stable, safe
and stimulating
environment which will be conducive to their emotional and
psychological wellbeing. IGK will receive free education
which is
ranked high in the world’s educational systems. The cost of
groceries in Ireland is more reasonable than in South
Africa.
[19]
She intends settling in Bray where her sister, who
is her support structure, resides. She has already made
arrangements
for IGK to attend school at Little Eaton Montessori.
[20]
The
legal principles applicable in relocation cases were set out in the
majority judgment of Scott JA in
Jackson
v Jackson
[2]
as
follows:
"It
is trite that in matters of this kind the interests of the children
are the first and paramount consideration. It is no
doubt true that,
generally speaking, where, following a divorce, the custodian parent
wishes to emigrate, a Court will not lightly
refuse leave for the
children to be taken out of the country if the decision of the
custodian parent is shown to be bona fide and
reasonable. But this is
not because of the so called rights of the custodian parent; it
is because, in most cases, even if
the access by the non-custodian
parent would be materially affected, it would not be in the best
interests of the children that
the custodian parent be thwarted in
his or her endeavour to emigrate in pursuance of a decision
reasonably and genuinely taken.
Indeed, one can well
imagine
that in many situations such a refusal would inevitably result in
bitterness and frustration which would adversely affect
the children.
But what must be stressed is that each case must be decided on its
own particular facts. No two cases are precisely
the same and, while
past decisions based on other facts may provide useful guidelines,
they do no more than that. By the same token,
care should be taken
not to elevate to rules of law the dicta of Judges made in the
context of the peculiar facts and circumstances
with which they were
concerned."
[21]
The above dictum finds relevance in the
circumstances of the current matter. We need to balance the
respondent
‘s right to be economically active and the best
interests of IGK when dealing with this matter. When parents of minor
children
separate, it is normal that they would move on and pursue
different interests. The courts will not dictate to parents how to
run
their lives after separation in the spirit of maintaining the
environment that children born out of relationships of estranged
parents are familiar with. The mere fact that children have to adjust
to parents living apart is an indication that none of the
parents
should be shackled to one place at all cost, especially when that
parent’s livelihood is at stake
[22]
In
F
v F
[3]
Maya
AJA remarked as follows, when dealing with the rights of custodial
parents to choose how they organise their lives after a
divorce:
‘
[10] It is an
unfortunate reality of marital breakdown that the former spouses must
go their separate ways and reconstitute their
lives in a manner that
each chooses alone. Maintaining cordial relations, remaining in the
same geographical area and raising their
children together whilst
rebuilding their lives will, in many cases, not be possible. Our
Courts have always recognised and will
not lightly interfere with the
right of a parent who has properly been awarded custody to choose in
a reasonable manner how to
order his or her life. Thus, for example,
in
Bailey
v Bailey
,
the Court, in dealing with an application by a custodian parent for
leave to take her children with her to England on a permanent
basis,
quoted with approval the following extract from the judgment of
Miller J in
Du
Preez v Du Preez
:
'[T]his is not to say
that the opinion and desires of the custodian parent are to be
ignored or brushed aside; indeed, the
Court takes upon itself a
grave responsibility if it decides to override the custodian parent's
decision as to what is best in
the interests of his child and will
only do so after the most careful consideration of all the
circumstances, including the reasons
for the custodian parent's
decision and the emotions or impulses which have contributed to it.'
The
reason for this deference is explained in the minority judgment of
Cloete AJA in the
Jackson
case as follows:
'The
fact that a decision has been made by the custodian parent does not
give rise to some sort of rebuttable presumption that such
decision
is correct. The reason why a Court is reluctant to interfere with the
decisions of a custodian parent is not only because
the custodian
parent may, as a matter of fact, be in a better position than the
non-custodian parent in some cases to evaluate
what is in the best
interests of a child but, more importantly, because the parent who
bears the primary responsibility of bringing
up the child should as
far as possible be left to do just that. It is, however, a
constitutional imperative that the interests
of children remain
paramount. That is the ''central and constant consideration''.'
[11]
From a constitutional perspective, the rights of the custodian parent
to pursue his or her own life or career involve fundamental
rights to
dignity, privacy and freedom of movement. Thwarting a custodian
parent in the exercise of these rights may well have
a severe impact
on the welfare of the child or children involved. A refusal of
permission to emigrate with a child effectively
forces the custodian
parent to relinquish what he or she views as an important life
enhancing opportunity. The negative feelings
that such an order must
inevitably evoke are directly linked to the custodian parent's
emotional and psychological wellbeing. The
welfare of a child is,
undoubtedly, best served by being raised in a happy and secure
atmosphere. A frustrated and bitter parent
cannot, as a matter of
logic and human experience, provide a child with that environment.
This being so, I cannot agree with the
views expressed by the Full
Court that 'the impact on S of the appellant's feelings of resentment
and disappointment at being tied
to South Africa, or the extent to
which her own desires and wishes are intertwined with those of S' did
not deserve 'any attention'
and that '[i]n arriving at a just
decision [a Court] cannot be held hostage to the feelings of
aggrieved litigants'.
[12] It is also important
that Courts be acutely sensitive to the possibility that the
differential treatment of custodian parents
and their non-custodian
counterparts who have no reciprocal legal obligation to maintain
contact with the child and may relocate
at will may, and often does,
indirectly constitute unfair gender discrimination. Despite the
constitutional commitment to equality,
the division of parenting
roles in South Africa remains largely gender based. It is still
predominantly women who care for children
and that reality appears to
be reflected in many custody arrangements upon divorce. The refusal
of relocation applications therefore
has a potentially
disproportionate impact on women, restricting their mobility and
subverting their interests and the personal
choices that they make to
those of their children and former spouses
’
[23]
In my view it cannot be said that the respondent’s
decision to relocate is unreasonable. She has already
found
employment in Ireland. She has made arrangements for IGK and her
brother’s schooling in case her request is upheld.
She will be
closer to her sister who will provide support. She is willing to
bring IGK to South Africa once a year, at her expense,
in case
relocation is allowed. I am persuaded that the proposed relocation of
IGK with her mother, with whom she is residing from
birth, is in her
best interest.
[24]
The court
a
quo
misdirected
itself when it ordered the appellant to exercise physical contact
only in Ireland. The order did not provide for instances
when the
child is on holiday in South Africa. The appeal ought to succeed on
this basis only. The children’s order of 10
November 2020
granting phased in contact to the appellant has not been challenged,
the court
a
quo
also
did not deal with it. The understanding has always been that contact
during the period before relocation, if granted, would
be regulated
in terms of the 10 November 2020 order. It is, therefore, unnecessary
for this court to make any order in relation
because the phase from
November 2021
[4]
remains in
force until IGK relocates permanently to Ireland.
[25]
Attorneys for the appellant presented us with a
draft order dealing with contact in case the relocation
order is
granted. Clause 10 of the draft order proposed that the respondent be
directed to apply for a mirror order to the one
that this court would
grant in the event that IGK is removed permanently from Ireland to
another country. There is no evidence
that the respondent intends
relocating permanently to any other country. It is therefore not
necessary to deal with an eventuality
of relocation to any other
country. We also deemed it unnecessary to make an order that would
micro manage relations between the
parties by ordering the respondent
to provide the appellant with her itinerary and prescribing how and
when the appellant must
see IGK before departure to Ireland.
[26]
In the result, the following order is made:
1.
The appeal succeeds.
2.
The order of the court a quo is set aside and
replaced with the following:
2.1
The
respondent is authorised to have contact with the child born between
the parties, IGK, from 25 December 2022 to 10 January 2023;
2.2
The respondent is authorised to collect IGK from
the applicant at the applicant’s residence in Bloemfontein on
25 December
2022 between 09h00 and 15h00;
2.3
The applicant is directed to:
2.3.1 on or before
25 December 2022, furnish to the respondent IGK’s birth
certificate to enable IGK to travel by air
on a local flight with the
Respondent;
2.3.2 hand over
IGK and her possessions required by her for the duration of the
contact referred to above, to the respondent
on 25 December 2022 when
he arrives to collect IGK;
2.3.3
abstain from encouraging IGK not to accompany the respondent or to
enlist the help of Mr ER or any third
party to do so on her behalf;
3
The Applicant is granted leave to remove the child born between the
parties,
(“IGK”)
, permanently from the Republic of
South Africa to Ireland;
4
The Respondent is ordered to forthwith sign all
documents pertaining to the relocation of the child,
IGK
,
and to take all such steps that may be necessary to enable the
Applicant to apply for the issuing of passports and/or for the
issuing of visas for
IGK,
it
being directed that the signing and steps referred to herein are to
take place in Gauteng;
5
Upon the relocation of the Applicant and IGK to
Ireland the Respondent is awarded specific parental responsibilities
and rights
with regard to contact with IGK as follows:
5.1
telephonically, Skype, Zoom, WhatsApp, FaceTime or any other
appropriate social-media platform
which is accessible to the
Respondent and compatible with such platforms which exist in South
Africa:
5.1.1 every day
between 17:00 and 19:00 local time in Ireland unless either party
gives the other 24 hours’ prior notice
to of a change in time
of a call for any specific day;
5.2
every July/August Irish school holiday for a period of 10 days when
IGK
will
be in the Republic of South Africa;
5.2.1 the
Applicant is directed to pay for IGK’s travel costs to and from
the Republic of South Africa to enable the
Respondent to exercise
contact with IGK in the Republic of South Africa during such school
holidays;
5.2.2 bring or
ensure that IGK is brought to the Republic of South Africa every
July/August school holidays;
5.2.3 notify the
Respondent at least one month in advance of the dates on which IGK
will be in the Republic of South Africa
and furnish him with her
itinerary and flight details together with documentary proof thereof;
5.3
for the duration of any period during which the
Respondent is in Ireland, subject to the Respondent giving the
Applicant or her
spouse Mr ER not less than 3 days’ notice
telephonically or by text message or WhatsApp, or by e mail of the
dates on which
he will be in Ireland. The Applicant is directed to
confirm receipt of such notice within not less than 12 hours after
such notice
having been sent to her;
5.4
in the February, October or any other Irish short
school holiday(s), during which holiday(s) the Respondent is
authorised to exercise
contact in Ireland or to remove IGK from
Ireland to any country of his choice and return her to Ireland to the
Applicant at his
expense;
5.5
every alternate Christmas and Easter Irish school
holiday, during which holiday the Respondent is authorised to remove
IGK from
Ireland to any country of his choice and return her to
Ireland to the Applicant;
6
Upon her relocation to Ireland the Applicant is
directed to forthwith furnish the Respondent with:
6.1 her residential
address in Ireland and any change of address in Ireland should she
relocate from one address to another;
6.2 her e-mail
address(es) and those of her spouse, Mr ER;
6.3 her mobile phone
number(s) and those of her spouse Mr ER;
7.
The Applicant is directed to:
7.1
Ensure that IGK has a mobile phone and/or computer and/or laptop to
enable the Respondent to have
daily contact with her as set out in
4.1 above;
7.2
Ensure that there are Wi-fi and/or data and/or internet facilities
available to enable the Respondent
to have daily contact with IGK as
set out in 4.1 above;
7.3
Supply the Respondent with the contact numbers and/or contact details
and/or connection links to enable
the Respondent to have daily
contact with IGK as set out in 4.1 above;
8.
The Applicant is interdicted from:
8.1
interfering with or monitoring IGK’s calls with the Respondent,
or enlisting her spouse,
Mr ER or any third party to do so on her
behalf;
8.2
causing IGK to terminate a call with the Applicant or enlisting her
spouse, Mr ER or any third party
to do so on her behalf;
8.3
denigrating the Respondent to IGK, suggesting to IGK that the
Respondent forces her to accompany
him, encouraging IGK not to
accompany the Respondent, preventing or obstructing the Respondent
from having contact with IGK, discussing
any dispute regarding the
parties’ parental responsibilities with IGK, or enlisting her
spouse Mr ER or any third party to
do so on her behalf;
9.
Upon the relocation of the Applicant and IGK to Ireland, the
Respondent’s consent shall
be solicited to perform the
following future acts as and when the need may arise:
9.1
To apply, as and when necessary, for the issuing of any citizen
documents, identity documents, and/or
passport and/or visas for IGK;
9.2 To
consent to IGK’s departure or removal from Ireland to any other
country;
10. The
Applicant is directed at her cost, to apply for a mirror order of
this order within one month of her relocation
with IGK to Ireland and
to furnish a copy of such order to the Respondent within one week
after it has been granted
11. The
Respondent’s Counter-Application is dismissed.
12. Each
party is to bear his/her own costs.”
N.M. MBHELE, DJP
I concur
C.J MUSI, JP
I concur
C. REINDERS, J
On behalf of the
Appellant:
Adv Giorgio
Instructed by:
Sheryl Michelow Attorneys
C/O : Bezuindehouts
Inc.
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
Respondent:
Adv. Coetzer
Instructed by:
Honey Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
[1]
Gardner,
RA
(2001).
"Parental
Alienation Syndrome (PAS): Sixteen Years Later"
.
Academy
Forum.
45
(1):
10–12. Retrieved 2022-12-20.
[2]
2002
(2) SA 303
(SCA)
para 2 at 318EI.
[3]
F
v F 2006(3) SA 42 (SCA) par. 10, 11 &12
[4]
3.5
FROM
NOVEMBER 2021
3.5.1
Every alternative weekend from a Friday at 17h00 to Sunday 17h00;
3.5.2
One short school holiday to rotate between the parties and 50% of
all long school holidays, Christmas,
New year and Easter to rotate
between the
parties;
3.5.3
The biological father will be allowed to have contact with the minor
child on
her
birthday for 4 hours up until Grade 00 where after it will become 2
hours;
3.5.4
The biological father will have contact with the minor child on his
birthday from
09h00 to 17h00, both parties to
have contact alternatively on Father’s or Mother’s day
from 09h00 to 17h00;
3.5.5
Public holidays to rotate between the parties;
4.
The biological father will have telephonic contact with the minor
child on
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday for 20 minutes
which will Include Skype
and/or
“WhatsApp” video call. The biological mother will
facilitate the calls. The parties must both consider the age of the
child and always act in the best interests of the child during these
calls.
5.
The biological father will on his cost visit the child or exercise
his contact
with the child.
6.
The parents are not allowed to have any conflict in the presence of
the child.
7.
The parents are not allowed to badmouth the other parent in the
presence of,
or while speaking with the child.