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[2022] ZAFSHC 306
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Salman and Others v S (A59/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 306 (3 November 2022)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE STATE DIVISION,
BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable: YES/NO
Of Interest to other
Judges: YES/NO
Circulate to
Magistrates: YES/NO
Appeal number:
A59/2021
In the matter between:
PASEKA ISSACS SALMAN
APPELLANT NO 1
THABO ANDY SONDAG
APPELLANT NO 2
LEBOHANG
MOKGETHI
APPELLANT NO 3
and
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
CORAM
:
MBHELE, DJP et MPAMA, AJ
HEARD ON:
31 OCTOBER 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
03
NOVEMBER 2022
JUDGMENT
BY: MPAMA, AJ
[1] The
appellants appeared in the Regional Court sitting in Excelsior, on a
charge of robbery with aggravating circumstances
as defined in s 1 of
Act 51 of 1977 and read with the provisions of section 51(2) of Act
105 of 1997. They pleaded not guilty and
despite their plea, they
were convicted on 01 August 2017 and sentenced, each to fifteen years
imprisonment.
[2] Aggrieved
by their conviction and sentence they applied for a leave to appeal
their conviction and sentence in the
court a quo and were partially
successful as they were only granted leave to appeal their conviction
only.
[3] The
appeal essentially raises the following issues whether the court a
quo:
(i)
Was correct in accepting the version of the State and
rejecting that of the appellants when the appellants had given a
chronological
and reasonable explanation regards their presence at
complainant's place.
(ii)
Correctly applied the cautionary rule in the
evidence of the complainant as a single witness.
(iii)
The court erred in finding that the discrepancies which existed
between the evidence of the complainant
and his statement were not
material contradictions which affected his credibility.
[4] The
evidence of the State can be summarised as follows: On 30 May 2016
the complainant, Mr Degefa Temesgen Dobamo
was at his place where he
ran a tuck shop. At about 14h30, three male persons entered his shop.
All three of them demanded money
from him. The complainant identified
his assailants as the three appellants. I deem it appropriate to
mention at this stage already,
that the identity of the appellants
was not in dispute as they admitted being at complainant's shop.
[5] The
complainant further testified that the appellant no. 3 proceeded to
the till and removed a cash amount of R900.00.
He also took his
cellphone valued at R500.00. The appellant no.1 at the time was
wielding a knife and was threatening to kill the
complainant. The
appellant no.2 stood there and demanded money from the complainant.
When they were done robbing him the appellant
no.1 and 2 ran out of
the shop simultaneously and were then followed by the appellant no.3.
He chased them but that yielded no
results. After a while police
arrived. The complainant denied that he was in the business of
repairing phones and that he took
the appellant no.3's phone.
[6] Ms
Modiehi Mabokwane received a call from Mapaseka at about 14h00
reporting that the complainant was being
robbed. She rushed to
the complainant's shop. As Ms Mabokwane was approaching, she could
hear that someone was swearing inside
the complainant's shop. Two
male persons immediately emerged out of the complainant's place
running. Complainant also came out
chasing after them. Ms Mabokwane
identified the two persons she saw running as appellant no1 and 2.
[7] A SAP 329
pertaining to identity parade proceedings was handed in as Exhibit
"A". The appellants formally
admitted the contents of this
document. According to this document, the appellants were positively
identified by the complainant
during the identification parade.
[8] This
concluded the State's case.
[9] The
appellants' version as put to the witnesses and testified on by the
three appellants is as follows: On this
day, they were at the
complainant's place at appellant no.3's instance. The appellant no.3
had informed them that complainant owed
him R1000.00 for a Blackberry
phone that he had sent to him for repairs. The complainant's boss,
Zalek took this phone from the
complainant and promised to pay the
appellant no.3 an amount of R1000.00 in return for his phone.
However, the payment was not
forthcoming.
[10] The appellants
arrived at the complainant's tuck shop on this afternoon. The
appellant no.3 approached the complainant and
conversed with him. at
the time the appellant no.1 and 2 stood inside the shop, just few
metres from them. The complainant gave
appellant no.3 a cellphone and
they left. The appellant no.3 informed them that the complainant
handed him the cellphone so that
he can be able to get hold of him
when his boss has arrived in order for him to come and collect his
money.
[11] Appellant no.3
handed over this cell phone to the appellant no .2 so that he can
charge it as he was still proceeding to his
girlfriend's place and he
wanted the phone to be charged whilst he was at his girlfriend's
place. They parted ways. Later that
day they were individually
arrested by the police and the complainant's cellphone was recovered
from the appellant no.2.
[12] It is trite that a
court of appeal will be hesitant to interfere with the factual
findings and evaluation of the evidence by
a trial court. See
R
v DHLUMAYO AND ANO
1948 (2) SA 677
(A)
at 705.
[13] The appeal court is
not at liberty to depart from the trial court's findings of fact and
credibility. A court of appeal will
only interfere with the court a
quo's findings if it is satisfied that the trial court has made a
wrong finding of fact and there
are material misdirections. See
S
v FRANCIS
1991 (1) SACR 198
(A)
at 204 C - E. See also
MAKATE
v VODACOM LTD
2016 (4) SA 121
(CC)
at paras [37] - [41].
[14] The issue to be
decided is whether the trial court was correct in accepting the
version of the State and rejecting that of
the appellant. The
question is whether the appellants' version is reasonably possible
true.
[15] The trial court
dealt with the evidence of a single witness. It is the appellants'
contention that the court a quo failed to
apply the cautionary rule
that apply to the evidence of a single witness, as the complainant
was not a satisfactory witness. On
their heads of argument, the
appellants contended that there were material contradictions between
the complainant's viva voce evidence
and his statement made to the
police. It was argued that the court a quo should have rejected the
evidence of the complainant because
of these contradictions. Before
us the appellants' counsel was asked to point out the material
contradictions in the evidence of
the complainant. Appellants'
counsel, in my view correctly conceded that there were no material
contradictions in the evidence
of the complainant.
[16] It is so that the
complainant was a single witness.
In S v SAULS 1981 (3) SA172
(A) at 180 D-F
the following was held with reference to
section 208:
"The absence of the
word 'credible' is of no significance; the single witness must still
be credible, but there are, as Wigmore
points out 'indefinite degrees
in this character we call credibility'. (Wigmore on Evidence vol Ill
para 2034 at 262.) There is
no rule of thumb test or formula to apply
when it comes to a consideration of the credibility of the single
witness (see the remarks
of RUMPFF JA in S v Webber
1971 (3) SA 754
(A) at 758). The trial Judge will weigh his evidence; will consider
its merits and demerits and, having done so, will decide whether
it
is trustworthy and whether, despite the fact that there are
shortcomings, contradictions and defects in the testimony, he is
satisfied that the truth has been told."
[17] The Supreme Court of
Appeal further determined in
S v MAHLANGU
2011 (2) SACR 164
(SCA)
at para [21]that a finding can be based on the evidence
of a single as long as such evidence is "substantially
satisfactory
in every material respect, or if there is
corroboration".
[18] The court a quo was
correct to find that the complainant was a credible and honest
witness. The complainant gave a clear account
of what took place at
the time of robbery. He was able to explain in satisfactory terms the
role played by each appellant during
the robbery. The complainant's
evidence regards what happened after the robbery finds corroboration
in the evidence of Ms Mabokwane
who testified that as she approached
complainant's shop, appellant no 1 and 2 came out of the shop
running. I am unable to find
any material contradictions or
discrepancies in his evidence. Complainant's evidence was clear and
satisfactory in all material
respects.
[19]
The record shows that the complainant was cross-examined at length by
the defence attorney on
the previous statement he made to the police.
Of note is the fact that the defence cross-examined the complainant
on the aforementioned
statement without laying a basis. When this
occurred, the prosecution did not raise an objection, and
unfortunately, the court
allowed the defence to confront the
complainant with a statement previously made to the police whereas no
basis was laid.
[20] In
S v
JOLINGANA
2016 (2) SACR 404
CECB)
Mbenenge J, as he then was
expressed as follows:
"Our courts set out
guidelines in determining whether a witness maybe cross examined on a
previous statement made to the police.
In S v Govender and Others
Nepgen J, in relation to whether a state witness had owned a previous
statement made to the police,
held as that:
'(l)n the present matter
the cross- examination of the State witnesses, insofar as it was
directed at the contents of their police
statements was done
properly. In each instance, the witness was asked to confirm that he
made a statement to the police.
The witness was then
asked whether that which he told the policeman was written down ;
whether it was read back to him ; whether
he was asked to confirm the
correctness thereof; and whether , having done so , he was asked to
sign, or place his mark, or thumb-print
on the statement. The witness
was then asked to identify, with reference to his signature or mark
(except, obviously, where a thumbprint
had been placed on the
statement), that the statement in question was in fact the statement
he made. Once confirmation of this
has been obtained, the counsel
proceeded to go through the whole statement with the witness. After
each sentence, or on occasion
after a whole paragraph, had been read
to him (and therefore written down). Sometimes the answer was in the
affirmative, other
times not. Having gone through this exercise, the
witness was then referred to differences between such witness'
earlier evidence
and those portions of the police statement, which he
had confirmed, reflected what he had told the police. In some
instances, these
differences were marked, in others the differences
could be described as subtle. Where appropriate, the witness was
asked why certain
facts mentioned during his evidence did not appear
in the statement, with it being suggested that the reason for it was
that he
has not told the police. The witness was asked why there were
such contradictions and/or omissions".
[21] The approach adopted
in the aforementioned case offers a guideline as to how
cross-examination on a statement previously made
to the police should
be dealt with. The defence attorney had a duty to lay the basis for
cross examination on complainant's
statement. It remained the
duty of the judicial officer to see to it that the cross examiner
first laid the basis for cross
examination and the judicial
officer failed on its duty.
[22] It was contended by
both counsels that evidence arising from cross examination of
the complainant on his statement should
be ignored. I am inclined to
agree with this submission; no probative value can be attached to
this evidence, as the complainant
did not acknowledge ownership of
the statement.
[23] The court a quo
rejected the version of the appellants. First, the appellants were at
the complainant's shop at the instance
of appellant no.3. They
testified that when they arrived at the complainant's shop, the
appellant no.3 had a conversation with
the complainant. There was no
argument or hostility between the complainant and appellant no.3. The
appellant no.3 was even given
a phone in order to facilitate a
meeting with the complainant's boss. There was absolutely no reason
for the complainant to falsely
implicate the appellants.
[24] Second, the
complainant handed over the cellphone to the third appellant so that
when his boss was available, he should be
able to reach the third
appellant. The third appellant was desperately in need of his money
and he needed to meet the complainant's
boss. However, he decided to
leave the cellphone with the second appellant, thereby thwarting all
the complainant's efforts to
help him recover his money from his
boss. With the phone left with the second appellant, the complainant
would not be able to reach
the third appellant when his boss was
available.
[25] The trial court was
therefore correct to reject the appellants' version as being
inherently improbable and not reasonably possibly
true. The trial
court's finding that the State proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt is correct and cannot be
faulted.
[26] In my view the
appeal must consequently fail.
[27] In the premises, I
would make the following order:
1. The appeal against the
conviction is dismissed.
MPAMA, AJ
I agree and it is so
ordered:
MBHELE, DJP
On behalf of the
appellant:
Ms S. Kruger
Instructed by:
Legal
Aid South Africa
Bloemfontein
On behalf of the
respondent:
Adv. D Pretorius
Instructed by:
Office
of the DPP
Bloemfontein