Salman and Others v S (A59/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 306 (3 November 2022)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Robbery — Appeal against conviction — Appellants convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment — Appellants contending trial court erred in accepting State's version over theirs, failing to apply cautionary rule regarding single witness, and misapprehending discrepancies in evidence — Court found complainant's evidence credible and corroborated by witness — Appeal dismissed as trial court's findings were upheld and no material misdirections identified.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter was a criminal appeal to the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein, against convictions imposed by a Regional Court. The appeal was heard by Mbhele DJP and Mpama AJ, with Mpama AJ delivering the judgment.


The appellants were Paseka Issacs Salman (Appellant 1), Thabo Andy Sondag (Appellant 2), and Lebohang Mokgethi (Appellant 3). The respondent was the State. The appellants had been tried in the Regional Court sitting in Excelsior on a charge of robbery with aggravating circumstances, as defined in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, read with section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. They pleaded not guilty but were convicted on 1 August 2017 and each sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.


Following conviction and sentence, the appellants applied to the trial court for leave to appeal. They obtained partial leave, limited to an appeal against conviction only (and not sentence). The appeal before the High Court therefore concerned whether the trial court was correct to convict, with the primary focus on the evaluation of the complainant’s evidence as a single witness, the treatment of alleged contradictions, and whether the defence version was reasonably possibly true.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned events at the complainant’s tuck shop on 30 May 2016, where the State alleged that the appellants robbed the complainant while one appellant threatened him with a knife, and the appellants contended that they were present for a dispute relating to a cellphone and an alleged debt rather than a robbery.


2. Material Facts


On 30 May 2016 at about 14h30, the complainant, Mr Degefa Temesgen Dobamo, was at his premises where he operated a tuck shop. Three male persons entered. According to the complainant’s evidence, the three demanded money from him, and he identified the assailants as the three appellants.


The identity of the appellants as the persons who were present at the complainant’s shop was treated by the appeal court as not in dispute, because the appellants admitted being at the complainant’s shop. The disputed issue was therefore not whether they were present, but what occurred during that encounter and whether their conduct constituted robbery with aggravating circumstances.


On the complainant’s version, Appellant 3 went to the till and removed R900, and also took the complainant’s cellphone valued at R500. The complainant further testified that Appellant 1 wielded a knife and threatened to kill him, while Appellant 2 demanded money. After the incident, the complainant testified that Appellants 1 and 2 ran out, followed by Appellant 3, and that he chased them without success. The complainant denied that he repaired phones for business purposes and denied that he took Appellant 3’s phone.


The State also led the evidence of Ms Modiehi Mabokwane, who testified that she received a call at about 14h00 reporting that the complainant was being robbed. When she approached the complainant’s shop, she heard swearing from inside, and she observed two male persons run out of the premises with the complainant chasing them. She identified those two persons as Appellant 1 and Appellant 2.


A document relating to an identification parade, namely a SAP 329, was admitted as Exhibit “A” by formal admission. The contents recorded that the complainant positively identified the appellants at an identification parade.


The appellants’ version was that they went to the complainant’s premises at Appellant 3’s instance because the complainant allegedly owed Appellant 3 R1000 relating to a Blackberry phone sent for repairs, and that the complainant’s boss (referred to as “Zalek”) had allegedly taken the phone and promised payment. On this version, Appellant 3 spoke to the complainant without hostility; the complainant handed Appellant 3 a cellphone so that the complainant could contact Appellant 3 when the boss arrived; and they then left. Appellant 3 said he gave that phone to Appellant 2 for charging. Later, the appellants were arrested individually, and the complainant’s cellphone was recovered from Appellant 2.


A further material aspect addressed on appeal was that the complainant was cross-examined in the trial court on a previous statement to the police. The appeal court noted that the defence cross-examined on the statement without laying a proper basis, that the prosecution did not object, and that the trial court permitted this line of cross-examination.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the correctness of the trial court’s factual findings and credibility assessments, and whether the conviction could stand on the evidence as presented. Although framed as several grounds of appeal, the appeal court treated the core enquiry as whether the trial court was correct in accepting the State’s version and rejecting the appellants’ version, and specifically whether the appellants’ version was reasonably possibly true.


A significant issue was the proper application of the cautionary approach to single-witness evidence, given that the complainant was a single witness in relation to the commission of the robbery, and the appellants contended that the complainant was not satisfactory and that contradictions undermined his credibility.


There was also a legal issue concerning the permissible use of a witness’s prior police statement in cross-examination, including the requirement that a basis be laid and the consequences where the witness does not acknowledge ownership of the statement. This issue related to the probative value of evidence elicited through that cross-examination.


Overall, the dispute primarily involved the application of legal principles to facts (credibility evaluation, probabilities, and the reasonable-possibility standard), rather than the interpretation of legal rules in the abstract.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The appeal court began from the established principle that an appellate court is generally reluctant to interfere with a trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of evidence, particularly on credibility, and will only interfere where there is a wrong finding of fact and material misdirection. In this context, the appeal court referred to the appellate restraint principles in the cited authorities.


The appeal court identified the decisive question as whether the trial court was correct to accept the State’s version and reject the appellants’ version, asking whether the defence version was reasonably possibly true. In addressing the appellants’ complaint that the trial court failed to apply the cautionary rule, the appeal court accepted that the complainant was indeed a single witness, but emphasised that a conviction may be sustained on single-witness evidence if the witness is found credible and the evidence is satisfactory in material respects, or corroborated.


In relation to the alleged contradictions between the complainant’s viva voce evidence and his police statement, the appeal court recorded that counsel for the appellants was asked to identify material contradictions and ultimately conceded that there were no material contradictions in the complainant’s evidence. The appeal court accordingly did not accept that this ground undermined the complainant’s credibility.


The appeal court further considered the handling of the complainant’s police statement during cross-examination. It observed that the defence cross-examined on the statement without laying the necessary foundation, that the trial court failed to ensure that the basis was first laid, and that the complainant did not acknowledge ownership of the statement. In those circumstances, the appeal court accepted the submission that evidence arising from such cross-examination should be ignored and that no probative value could be attached to it.


On the merits of credibility and corroboration, the appeal court held that the trial court was correct to find the complainant to be a credible and honest witness who provided a clear account of what took place and of each appellant’s role during the robbery. The appeal court also relied on corroboration in respect of what happened immediately after the incident, noting that Ms Mabokwane’s evidence supported the complainant’s version insofar as she saw Appellants 1 and 2 running out of the shop while the complainant chased them.


Turning to the defence version, the appeal court endorsed the trial court’s rejection of that version as inherently improbable and not reasonably possibly true. The appeal court reasoned, first, that on the appellants’ own evidence there was no hostility in the interaction, and the complainant was said to have been cooperative (including handing over a phone), which the appeal court regarded as inconsistent with an inference that the complainant would then falsely implicate the appellants. Second, the appeal court found an internal improbability in the defence explanation for possession of the cellphone: if the phone was given to facilitate contact so that the complainant could reach Appellant 3 when the boss was available, the decision by Appellant 3 to leave the phone with Appellant 2 would undermine that very purpose.


In light of these considerations, the appeal court concluded that the trial court’s finding that the State proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt could not be faulted, and that the appeal against conviction had to fail.


5. Outcome and Relief


The High Court dismissed the appeal. The conviction for robbery with aggravating circumstances remained intact.


No further relief was granted. The judgment recorded no costs order, and the operative order was confined to dismissal of the appeal against conviction.


Cases Cited


R v Dhlumayo and Another 1948 (2) SA 677 (A); S v Francis 1991 (1) SACR 198 (A); Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC); S v Sauls 1981 (3) SA 172 (A); S v Webber 1971 (3) SA 754 (A); S v Mahlangu 2011 (2) SACR 164 (SCA); S v Jolingana 2016 (2) SACR 404 (ECBC).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 1 (definition of “robbery with aggravating circumstances” as referenced) and section 208; Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, section 51(2).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The High Court held that the trial court’s acceptance of the State’s version and rejection of the appellants’ version disclosed no basis for appellate interference under the applicable principles governing appeals on fact and credibility.


It held that, although the complainant was a single witness to the robbery, his evidence was found to be credible and satisfactory in material respects, and it was corroborated in part by the evidence of Ms Mabokwane regarding the appellants fleeing the premises.


It further held that cross-examination on the complainant’s prior police statement occurred without a proper foundation, that the complainant did not acknowledge ownership of the statement, and that evidence arising from that cross-examination carried no probative value and should be disregarded.


On these findings, the court held that the appellants’ version was inherently improbable and not reasonably possibly true, that the State proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the appeal against conviction had to be dismissed.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


An appellate court will generally be slow to interfere with a trial court’s factual findings, including credibility assessments, and will do so only where the trial court’s conclusions are shown to be wrong and affected by material misdirection.


A conviction may follow on the evidence of a single witness provided that the evidence is found to be credible and substantially satisfactory in material respects, or there is corroboration. The evaluation requires a weighing of merits and demerits rather than the application of a mechanical formula.


In a criminal trial, where an accused advances a version, the central enquiry remains whether that version is reasonably possibly true when assessed against the State case; if not, and if the State’s evidence is accepted, guilt may be found proved beyond reasonable doubt.


Where a witness is cross-examined on a previous police statement, a proper foundation should be laid to establish the making, adoption, and accuracy of the statement, and where this is not done and the witness does not acknowledge ownership, the resultant “contradictions” derived from that process may be treated as lacking probative value.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 306
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Salman and Others v S (A59/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 306 (3 November 2022)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE STATE DIVISION,
BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable: YES/NO
Of Interest to other
Judges: YES/NO
Circulate to
Magistrates: YES/NO
Appeal number:
A59/2021
In the matter between:
PASEKA ISSACS SALMAN

APPELLANT NO 1
THABO ANDY SONDAG

APPELLANT NO 2
LEBOHANG
MOKGETHI

APPELLANT NO 3
and
THE
STATE

RESPONDENT
CORAM
:
MBHELE, DJP et MPAMA, AJ
HEARD ON:
31 OCTOBER 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
03
NOVEMBER 2022
JUDGMENT
BY: MPAMA, AJ
[1]   The
appellants appeared in the Regional Court sitting in Excelsior, on a
charge of robbery with aggravating circumstances
as defined in s 1 of
Act 51 of 1977 and read with the provisions of section 51(2) of Act
105 of 1997. They pleaded not guilty and
despite their plea, they
were convicted on 01 August 2017 and sentenced, each to fifteen years
imprisonment.
[2]   Aggrieved
by their conviction and sentence they applied for a leave to appeal
their conviction and sentence in the
court a quo and were partially
successful as they were only granted leave to appeal their conviction
only.
[3]   The
appeal essentially raises the following issues whether the court a
quo:
(i)
Was correct in accepting the version of the State and
rejecting that of the appellants when the appellants had given a
chronological
and reasonable explanation regards their presence at
complainant's place.
(ii)
Correctly applied the cautionary rule in the
evidence of the complainant as a single witness.
(iii)
The court erred in finding that the discrepancies which existed
between the evidence of the complainant
and his statement were not
material contradictions which affected his credibility.
[4]   The
evidence of the State can be summarised as follows: On 30 May 2016
the complainant, Mr Degefa Temesgen Dobamo
was at his place where he
ran a tuck shop. At about 14h30, three male persons entered his shop.
All three of them demanded money
from him. The complainant identified
his assailants as the three appellants. I deem it appropriate to
mention at this stage already,
that the identity of the appellants
was not in dispute as they admitted being at complainant's shop.
[5]   The
complainant further testified that the appellant no. 3 proceeded to
the till and removed a cash amount of R900.00.
He also took his
cellphone valued at R500.00. The appellant no.1 at the time was
wielding a knife and was threatening to kill the
complainant. The
appellant no.2 stood there and demanded money from the complainant.
When they were done robbing him the appellant
no.1 and 2 ran out of
the shop simultaneously and were then followed by the appellant no.3.
He chased them but that yielded no
results. After a while police
arrived. The complainant denied that he was in the business of
repairing phones and that he took
the appellant no.3's phone.
[6]   Ms
Modiehi Mabokwane received a call from Mapaseka at about 14h00
reporting that the complainant  was being
robbed. She rushed to
the complainant's shop. As Ms Mabokwane was approaching, she could
hear that someone was swearing inside
the complainant's shop. Two
male persons immediately emerged out of the complainant's place
running. Complainant also came out
chasing after them. Ms Mabokwane
identified the two persons she saw running as appellant no1 and 2.
[7]   A SAP 329
pertaining to identity parade proceedings was handed in as Exhibit
"A". The appellants formally
admitted the contents of this
document. According to this document, the appellants were positively
identified by the complainant
during the identification parade.
[8]   This
concluded the State's case.
[9]   The
appellants' version as put to the witnesses and testified on by the
three appellants is as follows: On this
day, they were at the
complainant's place at appellant no.3's instance. The appellant no.3
had informed them that complainant owed
him R1000.00 for a Blackberry
phone that he had sent to him for repairs. The complainant's boss,
Zalek took this phone from the
complainant and promised to pay the
appellant no.3 an amount of R1000.00 in return for his phone.
However, the payment was not
forthcoming.
[10] The appellants
arrived at the complainant's tuck shop on this afternoon. The
appellant no.3 approached the complainant and
conversed with him. at
the time the appellant no.1 and 2 stood inside the shop, just few
metres from them. The complainant gave
appellant no.3 a cellphone and
they left. The appellant no.3 informed them that the complainant
handed him the cellphone so that
he can be able to get hold of him
when his boss has arrived in order for him to come and collect his
money.
[11] Appellant no.3
handed over this cell phone to the appellant no .2 so that he can
charge it as he was still proceeding to his
girlfriend's place and he
wanted the phone to be charged whilst he was at his girlfriend's
place. They parted ways. Later that
day they were individually
arrested by the police and the complainant's cellphone was recovered
from the appellant no.2.
[12] It is trite that a
court of appeal will be hesitant to interfere with the factual
findings and evaluation of the evidence by
a trial court. See
R
v DHLUMAYO AND ANO
1948 (2) SA 677
(A)
at 705.
[13] The appeal court is
not at liberty to depart from the trial court's findings of fact and
credibility. A court of appeal will
only interfere with the court a
quo's findings if it is satisfied that the trial court has made a
wrong finding of fact and there
are material misdirections. See
S
v FRANCIS
1991 (1) SACR 198
(A)
at 204 C - E. See also
MAKATE
v VODACOM LTD
2016 (4) SA 121
(CC)
at paras [37] - [41].
[14] The issue to be
decided is whether the trial court was correct in accepting the
version of the State and rejecting that of
the appellant. The
question is whether the appellants' version is reasonably possible
true.
[15] The trial court
dealt with the evidence of a single witness. It is the appellants'
contention that the court a quo failed to
apply the cautionary rule
that apply to the evidence of a single witness, as the complainant
was not a satisfactory witness. On
their heads of argument, the
appellants contended that there were material contradictions between
the complainant's viva voce evidence
and his statement made to the
police. It was argued that the court a quo should have rejected the
evidence of the complainant because
of these contradictions. Before
us the appellants' counsel was asked to point out the material
contradictions in the evidence of
the complainant. Appellants'
counsel, in my view correctly conceded that there were no material
contradictions in the evidence
of the complainant.
[16] It is so that the
complainant was a single witness.
In S v SAULS 1981 (3) SA172
(A) at 180 D-F
the following was held with reference to
section 208:
"The absence of the
word 'credible' is of no significance; the single witness must still
be credible, but there are, as Wigmore
points out 'indefinite degrees
in this character we call credibility'. (Wigmore on Evidence vol Ill
para 2034 at 262.) There is
no rule of thumb test or formula to apply
when it comes to a consideration of the credibility of the single
witness (see the remarks
of RUMPFF JA in S v Webber
1971 (3) SA 754
(A) at 758). The trial Judge will weigh his evidence; will consider
its merits and demerits and, having done so, will decide whether
it
is trustworthy and whether, despite the fact that there are
shortcomings, contradictions and defects in the testimony, he is

satisfied that the truth has been told."
[17] The Supreme Court of
Appeal further determined in
S v MAHLANGU
2011 (2) SACR 164
(SCA)
at para [21]that a finding can be based on the evidence
of a single as long as such evidence is "substantially
satisfactory
in every material respect, or if there is
corroboration".
[18] The court a quo was
correct to find that the complainant was a credible and honest
witness. The complainant gave a clear account
of what took place at
the time of robbery. He was able to explain in satisfactory terms the
role played by each appellant during
the robbery. The complainant's
evidence regards what happened after the robbery finds corroboration
in the evidence of Ms Mabokwane
who testified that as she approached
complainant's shop, appellant no 1 and 2 came out of the shop
running. I am unable to find
any material contradictions or
discrepancies in his evidence. Complainant's evidence was clear and
satisfactory in all material
respects.
[19]
The record shows that the complainant was cross-examined at length by
the defence attorney on
the previous statement he made to the police.
Of note is the fact that the defence cross-examined the complainant
on the aforementioned
statement without laying a basis. When this
occurred, the prosecution did not raise an objection, and
unfortunately, the court
allowed the defence to confront the
complainant with a statement previously made to the police whereas no
basis was laid.
[20] In
S v
JOLINGANA
2016 (2) SACR 404
CECB)
Mbenenge J, as he then was
expressed as follows:
"Our courts set out
guidelines in determining whether a witness maybe cross examined on a
previous statement made to the police.
In S v Govender and Others
Nepgen J, in relation to whether a state witness had owned a previous
statement made to the police,
held as that:
'(l)n the present matter
the cross- examination of the State witnesses, insofar as it was
directed at the contents of their police
statements was done
properly. In each instance, the witness was asked to confirm that he
made a statement to the police.
The witness was then
asked whether that which he told the policeman was written down ;
whether it was read back to him ; whether
he was asked to confirm the
correctness thereof; and whether , having done so , he was asked to
sign, or place his mark, or thumb-print
on the statement. The witness
was then asked to identify, with reference to his signature or mark
(except, obviously, where a thumbprint
had been placed on the
statement), that the statement in question was in fact the statement
he made. Once confirmation of this
has been obtained, the counsel
proceeded to go through the whole statement with the witness. After
each sentence, or on occasion
after a whole paragraph, had been read
to him (and therefore written down). Sometimes the answer was in the
affirmative, other
times not. Having gone through this exercise, the
witness was then referred to differences between such witness'
earlier evidence
and those portions of the police statement, which he
had confirmed, reflected what he had told the police. In some
instances, these
differences were marked, in others the differences
could be described as subtle. Where appropriate, the witness was
asked why certain
facts mentioned during his evidence did not appear
in the statement, with it being suggested that the reason for it was
that he
has not told the police. The witness was asked why there were
such contradictions and/or omissions".
[21] The approach adopted
in the aforementioned case offers a guideline as to how
cross-examination on a statement previously made
to the police should
be dealt with. The defence attorney had a duty to lay the basis for
cross­ examination on complainant's
statement. It remained the
duty of the judicial officer to see to it that the cross examiner
first laid the basis for cross­
examination and the judicial
officer failed on its duty.
[22] It was contended by
both counsels that evidence arising from cross­ examination of
the complainant on his statement should
be ignored. I am inclined to
agree with this submission; no probative value can be attached to
this evidence, as the complainant
did not acknowledge ownership of
the statement.
[23] The court a quo
rejected the version of the appellants. First, the appellants were at
the complainant's shop at the instance
of appellant no.3. They
testified that when they arrived at the complainant's shop, the
appellant no.3 had a conversation with
the complainant. There was no
argument or hostility between the complainant and appellant no.3. The
appellant no.3 was even given
a phone in order to facilitate a
meeting with the complainant's boss. There was absolutely no reason
for the complainant to falsely
implicate the appellants.
[24] Second, the
complainant handed over the cellphone to the third appellant so that
when his boss was available, he should be
able to reach the third
appellant. The third appellant was desperately in need of his money
and he needed to meet the complainant's
boss. However, he decided to
leave the cellphone with the second appellant, thereby thwarting all
the complainant's efforts to
help him recover his money from his
boss. With the phone left with the second appellant, the complainant
would not be able to reach
the third appellant when his boss was
available.
[25] The trial court was
therefore correct to reject the appellants' version as being
inherently improbable and not reasonably possibly
true. The trial
court's finding that the State proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt is correct and cannot be
faulted.
[26] In my view the
appeal must consequently fail.
[27] In the premises, I
would make the following order:
1. The appeal against the
conviction is dismissed.
MPAMA, AJ
I agree and it is so
ordered:
MBHELE, DJP
On behalf of the
appellant:
Ms S. Kruger
Instructed by:
Legal

Aid South Africa
Bloemfontein
On behalf of the
respondent:
Adv. D Pretorius
Instructed by:
Office

of the DPP
Bloemfontein