ABSA Bank Limited v Phiri N.O. and Others (3881/2022) [2022] ZAFSHC 365 (28 October 2022)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Ownership — Movable assets — Claim for possession of movable assets financed under Instalment Sale Agreements — Applicant (ABSA Bank) asserts ownership of 67 movable assets, 24 of which have been paid off — Business rescue practitioners resist application — Court interprets ownership clause in Instalment Sale Agreements, concluding that ownership of paid-off assets transferred to New Beginnings Projects CC — Section 133 of the Companies Act provides moratorium on enforcement actions during business rescue, protecting assets in lawful possession of the company — Application for interim relief denied as to paid-off assets, but granted for those with outstanding balances.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This was an urgent interim application brought in the Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein, in which ABSA Bank Limited sought a rule nisi and interim interdictory relief for the return of certain movable assets pending the institution and finalisation of declaratory proceedings to determine ownership.


The applicant was ABSA Bank Limited, acting as a creditor of New Beginnings Projects CC (in voluntary business rescue and supervision). The first and second respondents were Charles Phiri N.O. and Lebogane Grace Mpakati N.O., cited in their capacities as the duly appointed business rescue practitioners of New Beginnings Projects CC. The third respondent, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), was cited due to its statutory interest but no relief was sought against it, and it did not oppose the application.


Procedurally, the matter served as an urgent application under Uniform Rule 6(12). The respondents opposed on multiple grounds, including urgency, jurisdiction, alleged non-joinder, and alleged failure to notify affected persons. The court recorded that the matter had been postponed on 15 September 2022 to the opposed roll of 20 October 2022 with directions for further affidavits and heads of argument, and it was ultimately heard on 20 October 2022 and delivered on 28 October 2022.


The general subject-matter concerned ownership and possession of financed movable assets used by a close corporation in business rescue, and the interaction between instalment sale agreements, contractual cancellation, and the business rescue moratorium (including protection of property in the company’s lawful possession).


Material Facts


ABSA historically financed 67 movable assets for New Beginnings Projects CC under multiple instalment sale agreements, concluded long before the commencement of business rescue. ABSA relied on the standard ownership clause in those agreements, which provided that ownership remained with ABSA until all financial obligations under the relevant agreement were paid, while the customer was entitled to possession and use provided it was not in default, and ownership would be transferred once payment was complete.


It was common cause on the papers, and confirmed in further heads of argument, that by the time the application papers were filed, 24 of the 67 movable assets had been paid off. The court treated as material that 43 assets still had outstanding balances. Although the respondents’ counsel asserted in additional heads that there were “further payments” and that other assets may have been settled, the respondents did not identify which additional assets were allegedly paid off. The court therefore determined the position on the papers, with particular reference to the affidavit of Mr Gerril Stephanus Gouws (annexure “AB5” to the founding affidavit).


A central factual element for the court’s reasoning was that ABSA had cancelled the instalment sale agreements (in relation to the unpaid assets) before business rescue proceedings commenced, due to arrears. The court treated this cancellation as resulting in New Beginnings Projects CC being unable to claim lawful possession of the unpaid assets thereafter.


The court distinguished between two categories of assets based on payment status. The 24 paid-off assets were treated as assets in relation to which ownership had passed to New Beginnings Projects CC, and which were, on the court’s interpretation, in the company’s lawful possession during business rescue and therefore protected by the statutory business rescue provisions. By contrast, the 43 unpaid assets were treated as assets in respect of which ABSA retained ownership and, following cancellation, the close corporation’s continued holding was not lawful for purposes of the statutory protection.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were:


Whether ABSA established the requirements for an interim interdict (pending declaratory proceedings) compelling business rescue practitioners to return the movable assets, including whether ABSA showed a prima facie right to the relief sought and whether the balance of convenience favoured granting interim relief.


Whether, on a proper construction of the instalment sale agreements’ ownership clause, ABSA retained ownership of all 67 assets until every financed asset was fully paid, or whether ownership passed asset-by-asset once each individual asset was paid off.


Whether the statutory business rescue protections—particularly the moratorium on legal proceedings and the protection of property interests in property belonging to or lawfully in the possession of the company—prevented ABSA from obtaining interim relief in respect of the assets.


Whether the application was defective or should fail due to alleged lack of urgency, alleged lack of jurisdiction, alleged non-joinder of New Beginnings Projects CC, and alleged failure to notify the company’s creditors/affected persons.


These issues involved a combination of interpretation of contractual terms, the application of statutory provisions to largely common-cause facts (especially payment status and cancellation), and the application of established principles governing interim interdicts and vindicatory-type claims in an interlocutory setting.


Court’s Reasoning


The court first addressed the question of ownership under the instalment sale agreements. ABSA contended that the ownership clause meant that, so long as any asset financed by ABSA had an outstanding balance, ABSA retained ownership of all 67 assets, including those already paid off. The court rejected that interpretation, holding that the wording of the clause referred to “this agreement” in the singular and to “the asset” rather than “assets”, indicating that ownership retention operated per agreement/per asset, not collectively across multiple agreements and assets. On that interpretation, once a particular asset was fully paid, ownership of that asset transferred to New Beginnings Projects CC.


The court further reasoned that even if the clause were ambiguous, it would be construed contra proferentem against ABSA as the party relying on the clause, with reference to Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). This reinforced the conclusion that ABSA’s “all assets” interpretation could not be sustained. As a result, the court found that ABSA did not retain ownership in respect of the 24 assets that had been paid off.


In relation to the mechanics of transfer, the court held that insofar as delivery was required to effect transfer of ownership after payment, transfer occurred by traditio brevi manu, because New Beginnings Projects CC was already in bona fide possession of the assets and, upon payment, held them as owner.


The court then considered the interaction with the Companies Act 71 of 2008 business rescue provisions. It referred to the statutory description of business rescue (including a temporary moratorium) and relied particularly on section 133 (moratorium on legal proceedings) and section 134(1)(c) (restriction on exercising rights in respect of property in the company’s lawful possession, irrespective of ownership, absent written practitioner consent). The court held that the 24 paid-off assets, now belonging to and lawfully possessed by the close corporation, were protected against ABSA’s vindicatory or quasi-vindicatory attempt to recover them in this application.


However, the court reasoned differently in respect of the 43 unpaid assets. It accepted that ABSA had lawfully cancelled the relevant agreements prior to business rescue due to arrears. In the court’s view, following such cancellation the close corporation could not be in lawful possession of those assets. On that basis, section 134(1)(c) did not apply to the 43 unpaid assets, and the statutory protection for property “lawfully in possession” could not be invoked to defeat ABSA’s interim relief. The court referred in this context to Southern Value Consortium v Tresso Trading 102 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 501 (WCC) for the proposition that if the owner could not vindicate from an unlawful possessor under these circumstances, it would lead to an untenable position.


Having identified which assets ABSA could properly claim, the court applied the established requirements for an interim interdict, referencing Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221. It characterised the relief sought as compelling the respondents (business rescue practitioners) to perform a positive act—returning movable assets—so as to remedy an alleged wrongful state of affairs pending the declaratory proceedings.


On the prima facie right, the court held that ABSA had established such a right, but only in relation to the 43 assets with outstanding balances. Regarding the remaining requirements commonly associated with interim interdicts, the court adopted the approach applicable where the applicant seeks interim relief in aid of a vindicatory-type claim. It held that the applicant need not show irreparable harm in the ordinary way because there is a presumption of irreparable injury, citing SA Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Chesane 2010 (6) SA 577 (GSJ). It also held that such an applicant need not show the absence of an alternative remedy, relying on Fedsure Life Assurance Life Company Limited v Worldwide Africa Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2003 (3) SA 268 (W) for the proposition that a party entitled to vindicate property cannot be forced to accept merely its value.


On the balance of convenience, the court found that it favoured ABSA in relation to the 43 assets, because the respondents had no lawful entitlement to continued possession of them and their continued use would result in deterioration of value. The court also emphasised that ABSA did not seek to sell or alienate the assets pending the declaratory proceedings; instead, ABSA would be responsible for safekeeping and storage in terms of the relief sought.


The court then dealt with the respondents’ procedural and preliminary defences. It rejected the contention that the application lacked urgency or involved self-created urgency, holding that the issue had become moot given the earlier postponement to the opposed roll, the agreed procedural steps, and the fact that urgency was not reserved, with protracted negotiations explaining the timing.


The court rejected the jurisdictional challenge, relying on section 21(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, and additionally noting section 7 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, the close corporation’s principal place of business being in Bloemfontein, the conclusion of agreements in Bloemfontein, and the presence of a number of the assets in the Free State.


On the alleged non-joinder of New Beginnings Projects CC, the court held there was no merit because the business rescue practitioners were cited nomine officio and represented the close corporation, meaning the company was effectively before court. The court drew support from Gainsford and Others N.N.O. v Tanzer Transport (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 468 (SCA), treating business rescue practitioners as analogous, for citation purposes, to liquidators litigating in their official capacities.


On the argument that creditors/affected persons had to be notified, the court held that the contention lacked merit, relying on the rejection of this approach by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Timasani (Pty) Ltd and Another v Afrimat Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd [2021] 3 All SA 843 (SCA).


Finally, on costs, the court reasoned that because ABSA succeeded substantially—obtaining relief in respect of 43 of the 67 assets—it was entitled to the ordinary costs order that costs follow the result.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted prayer 1 and prayer 2 of the notice of motion, namely condonation for urgency-related procedural deviations under Uniform Rule 6(12) and leave under section 133(1)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to commence and proceed with the relief.


The court issued a rule nisi granting interim relief pending the final determination of an action or application to be instituted by ABSA (within 30 days from finalisation of this application) for a declaration that ABSA is the owner of the 43 movable assets identified in annexure “X” as item numbers 1, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22 to 36, 38 to 40, 43 to 53, 55 to 58 and 63.


The first and second respondents were ordered to return those assets forthwith. Failing compliance, the Sheriff and the South African Police Service were authorised to enter premises and construction sites where the assets were located, attach them, and return them to ABSA. ABSA was ordered to attend to the safekeeping and storage of the assets pending finalisation of the contemplated proceedings.


The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the application on a party-and-party scale, including costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel where used.


Cases Cited


Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA).


Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.


Southern Value Consortium v Tresso Trading 102 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 501 (WCC).


SA Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Chesane 2010 (6) SA 577 (GSJ).


Fedsure Life Assurance Life Company Limited v Worldwide Africa Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2003 (3) SA 268 (W).


Gainsford and Others N.N.O. v Tanzer Transport (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 468 (SCA).


Timasani (Pty) Ltd and Another v Afrimat Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd [2021] 3 All SA 843 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 71 of 2008, including section 128, section 133(1)(b), section 133(1), and section 134(1)(c).


Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, section 21(1).


Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, section 7.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule of Court 6(12).


Held


The court held that ABSA did not retain ownership of the 24 movable assets that had been paid off; on a proper construction of the instalment sale agreements, ownership transferred per asset once that asset was fully paid, and any required delivery occurred by traditio brevi manu.


The court held that the business rescue statutory protections relating to property belonging to the company or lawfully in its possession operated to protect the paid-off assets from recovery in this application, but did not prevent ABSA from obtaining interim relief in respect of the 43 unpaid assets where ABSA had cancelled the agreements before business rescue and the close corporation could not be in lawful possession.


The court held that ABSA satisfied the requirements for interim relief (in a vindicatory context) in relation to the 43 unpaid assets, and it rejected the respondents’ defences based on urgency, jurisdiction, non-joinder, and lack of notice to creditors/affected persons.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The interpretation of an instalment sale agreement ownership clause was approached according to its language, with the court treating the clause as operating in relation to each agreement and each asset, rather than across a portfolio of separate agreements. Where ambiguity was suggested, the court endorsed that an exemption/disclaimer-type clause should be construed contra proferentem against the party relying on it, in line with the cited authority.


Where an asset is already in bona fide possession of a party, the court accepted that ownership may transfer upon payment through traditio brevi manu, so that continued holding shifts from possession as a user to possession as an owner.


In business rescue, the moratorium and protection of property interests under the Companies Act were applied as protecting property belonging to the company or lawfully in its possession, but not extending protection to property held unlawfully after valid cancellation of the underlying agreements.


For interim interdictory relief, the court applied the classical requirements from Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221, while emphasising that in vindicatory-type situations an applicant is not required to demonstrate irreparable harm or absence of alternative remedies in the usual manner, and that the balance of convenience may favour the owner where the respondent lacks a legal right to continued possession and continued use causes deterioration in value.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 365
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ABSA Bank Limited v Phiri N.O. and Others (3881/2022) [2022] ZAFSHC 365 (28 October 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN)
Case
no. 3881/2022
Reportable:
Yes / No
Of
Interest To Other Judges: Yes / No
Circulate
To Magistrates: Yes / No
In
the matter between:
ABSA
BANK LIMITED                                              Applicant
and
CHARLES
PHIRI N.O.                                             First

Respondent
LEBOGANE
GRACE MPAKATI N.O.                       Second

Respondent
THE
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COMMISSION
("CIPC")                                           Third

Respondent
CORAM:

POHL,AJ
HEARD
ON:

20 OCTOBER 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
28 OCTOBER 2022
INTRODUCTION:
[1]
The Applicant, ABSA Bank Ltd, as creditor of New Beginnings Projects
CC (in voluntary business rescue and
supervision) in the alleged
amount of R23 796 525.97, moves for interim relief in terms of which
it is, inter alia, placed in possession
of certain movable assets in
respect of which assets, it asserts to be owner. The relief which the
Applicant seeks is interim to
the institution and finalisation of
declaratory proceedings to be instituted by ASSA by way of action or
application proceedings,
as the case may be, against the First and
Second Respondents, being the business rescue practitioners, duly
appointed as such for
the firm known as New Beginnings Projects CC
(in voluntary business rescue and supervision), within thirty (30)
days from the finalisation
of this application before Court. No
relief is claimed against the Third Respondent and the Third
Respondent also did not oppose
the application. The Third Respondent
was merely cited because it has a direct, substantial and statutory
entrenched right and
interest in the outcome of this application.
[2]
The prospective declaratory relief is relevant to the aspect of the
Applicant's alleged ownership of the sixty
seven (67) movable assets
which the Applicant has financed. The particularity of the sixty
seven (67) movable assets, which form
the subject matter of the
present application are more fully evident from annexure "X"
affixed to the Notice of Motion
which serves before this Court.
[3]
It is evident from the papers before the Court that the Applicant has
historically financed the movable assets
at issue at the special
instance and request of New Beginnings Projects CC, long prior to New
Beginnings being placed in business
rescue.
[4]
The business rescue practitioners, who are cited in their nominal
capacities as duly appointed business rescue
practitioners of New
Beginnings, have elected to resist the present application on several
grounds, which will be dealt with below.
THE
NOTICE OF MOTION:
[5]
In the Applicant's Notice of Motion the Applicant prays for an order
in the following terms:
"1.  That
condonation be granted to the Applicant in respect of the form,
service, process and prescribed time limits
pertaining to the
exchange of pleadings in accordance with the provisions of Uniform
Rule of Court 6(12) and that this application
be enrolled and heard
on an urgent basis;
2.   That leave
be granted in terms of
Section 133(1)(b)
of the
Companies Act, 71 of
2008
, as amended, to the Applicant to commence and proceed with the
relief sought in paragraph 3 (inclusive of the subparagraphs
thereto);
3.   Pursuant
to granting of the relief sought in prayers 1 and 2 above, a rule
nisi be issued in the following terms:
3.1 pending the final
determination of an action or application as the case may be, to be
instituted by the Applicant against inter
alia, the First and Second
Respondents for an order declaring that the Applicant is the owner of
67 (sixty seven) movable assets,
the particularity of which are as
evident from annexure "X" affixed to this Notice of Motion
("the movable assets''),
within thirty (30) days from date of
finalisation of this application, the following interim interdict is
issued:
3.1.1  the First and
Second Respondents are ordered to return to the Applicant the movable
assets forthwith;
3.1.2  that in the
event of the First and Second Respondents failing and/or refusing to
return the movable assets to the Applicant
forthwith, the Sheriff
with Jurisdiction as well as the South African Police Services be are
hereby authorised to enter into and
upon the various premises and
building construction sites of New Beginnings CC (in voluntary
business rescue and supervision) or
wherever same may be found, to
attach the movable assets and to return such movable assets to the
Applicant forthwith;
3.1.3  that the
Applicant is ordered to attend upon the safekeeping and storage of
the movable assets pending the finalisation
of the action to be
instituted in terms of paragraph 3.1 above;
3.1.4  that in the
event of opposition, the First and Second Respondents are ordered to
pay the costs of this application on
the scale as between attorney
and own client, including the costs consequent upon the employment of
two (2) counsel when used."
OWNERSHIP
OF THE MOVABLE ASSETS:
[6]
From the papers before Court it is clear that the Applicant claims
ownership of the respective movable assets
as a result of Instalment
Sale Agreements in terms whereof the Applicant financed these movable
assets.
[7]
The standard terms of the respective Instalment Sale Agreements bear
the following clause 2:
"2.
OWNERSHIP:
Under
this agreement:

The
asset purchased with the loan belongs to us until you have paid all
your financial obligations;

Provided
you are not in default, you are entitled to possession and use of the
assets; and

When
you have paid all your financial obligations we will transfer
ownership of the asset to you."
[8]
From the Applicant's papers it is evident that twenty four (24) of
the sixty seven (67) movable assets have
already been paid off by the
time the papers were filed. Forty three (43) of the movable assets
have balances outstanding. At the
conclusion of the argument before
Court I requested Counsel for the Applicant and the First and Second
Respondents to submit Heads
of Argument to the Court identifying the
said movable assets with outstanding balances and the movable assets
which have been paid
off. The Applicant indeed filed such additional
heads of argument identifying these assets. The First and Second
Respondents, also
filed additional heads of argument. In these heads
of argument, counsel for the First and Second Respondents confirm the
assets
that have been paid off or settled as indicated by the
Applicant in its additional heads of argument. He however goes
further and
submits that there were "further payments in respect
to some assets and further that others have been settled". He
then
submits that the list of assets with outstanding balances (the
43) are in dispute. What counsel for the Respondents however did
not
do, is to identify any of the "further assets allegedly paid
off'. The Court will therefore decide this aspect on the
papers and
in particular on the affidavit by Mr Gerri! Stephanus Gouws, filed as
annexure "AB5" to the founding affidavit.
[9]
In the premises, the movable assets which have not been paid off and
still has outstanding balances, are reflected
on annexure "X"
to the Notice of Motion as item no. 1, 5, 7, 12 to 16, 18, 22 to 36,
38 to 40, 43 to 53, 55 to 58 and
63.
[10]
Adv van der Merwe SC, who appeared with Mr Tsangarakis on behalf of
the Applicant, submitted that the proper interpretation
of the above
mentioned ownership clause is that as long as any of the assets thus
furnished by the Applicant still have outstanding
balances, the
Applicant retains ownership, of all sixty seven (67) assets, even
though some of them may have been paid off.
[11]
I disagree with this interpretation. The language of clause 2 dealing
with the retention of ownership, clearly refers
only to that
particular agreement being "this agreement in the singular. The
first, second and third bullet points also refer
to the asset and not
assets. It clearly does not refer to all sixty seven (67) assets. The
normal interpretation to be afforded
to this clause and the wording
used therein is that once an asset has been paid off, the ownership
of that asset will be transferred
to New Beginnings Projects CC.
[12]
I find the interpretation of the clause to be unambiguous and clear.
If I am however wrong in this regard, I find guidance
in the decision
of Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another
1999 (1)
SA 982
(SCA), at p 989 H, where the Supreme Court of Appeal dealt
with the language of a disclaimer or exemption clause as follows:
"Against this
background it is convenient to consider first the proper construction
to be placed on the disclaimer. The correct
approach is well
established. If the language of a disclaimer or exemption clause is
such that it exempts the proferens from liability
in express and
unambiguous terms, effect must be given to that meaning. If there is
ambiguity, the language must be construed against
the proferens. ...
but the alternative meaning upon which reliance is placed to
demonstrate the ambiguity must be one to which
the language is fairly
susceptible; it must not be fanciful or remote."
[13]
In the premises, it follows that even if the clause appears to be
ambiguous, it should be interpreted contra proferentem,
and thus
against the Applicant.
[14]
I therefore find that in respect of the twenty four (24) movable
assets that have been paid off, the Applicant did not
retain
ownership. Insofar as delivery of the movable assets were required
upon the payment in full of such an asset to transfer
ownership, I
find that this occurred in the form of traditio brevi manu, because
the close corporation, New Beginnings Projects
CC, were at all
relevant limes hereto in the bona fide possession of these assets and
after payment, it held same as owner.
[15]
Section 128
of the
Companies Act, Act
71 of 2008, inter alia has the
following description of business rescue:
"Business
rescue" means proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a
company that is financially distressed by providing
for-
(ii)    A
temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company
or in respect of property in its possession;"
[16]
Section 133
of the
Companies Act inter
alia, provides as follows:
"133.
MORATORIUM ON LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST COMPANY:-
(1) During business
rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement
action, against the company, or in relation to
any property belonging
to the company, or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or
proceeded with in any forum”
[17]
Section 134
of the
Companies Act, inter
alia, provides as follows:
"134.
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS:
(c) Despite any provision
of an agreement to the contrary, no person may exercise any right in
respect of any property in the lawful
possession of the company,
irrespective of whether the property is owned by the company, except
to the extent that the practitioner
consents in writing."
[18]
It is therefore to my mind abundantly clear, that the movable assets
that were settled or paid off by the close corporation,
had the
effect that these assets were in the lawful possession of the close
corporation. On a proper interpretation of the abovementioned

sections in the
Companies Act, Act
71 of 2008, referred to in
paragraphs [16] and [17], these assets, are protected against the
vindicatory or quasi vindicatory
action of the Applicant in
this application. It thus applies to the abovementioned 24 assets
which can be identified in annexure
"X" to the notice of
motion as item numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19, 20, 21, 37,
41, 42, 54, 59, 60, 61, 62,
64, 65, 66 and 67.
THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS:
[19]
By way of this application, the Applicant requires the business
rescue practitioners to do some positive act (i.e. they
must return
the movable assets to ABSA) in order to remedy a wrongful state of
affairs (i.e. the continued unlawful possession
of the movable assets
by the business rescue practitioners over which ABSA is the owner)
pending the finalisation of the declaratory
proceedings already
alluded to above.
[20]
As far back as 2014, the Appellate Division, in the matter of
Setlogelo v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221
at 227, set out the requirements
for an interim interdict. The law relevant to interdicts is trite and
well settled.
[21]
It is clear from the papers that the Applicant, long before the
business rescue proceedings commenced, validly cancelled
the
agreements because the close corporation fell in arrears with the
payments in respect of at least, the abovementioned forty
three (43)
movable assets. After the said lawful cancellation of the contracts,
the close corporation could never be in lawful
possession of those
assets and therefore,
Section 134(1)(c)
does not apply to the said
forty three (43) movable assets. If this was not so, the owner, being
the Applicant, cannot vindicate
the property from the unlawful
possessor and the latter cannot use it as it would be unlawful. See
in this regard: Southern Value
Consortium v Tresso Trading 102 (Pty)
Ltd and others
2016 (6) SA 501
(WCC) at para [33].
[22]
In the premises, I find that the Applicant has proven that it has a
prima facie right in respect of the relief which
it seeks by way of
this application, but limited to the forty three (43) assets which
are not paid off.
[23]
An Applicant for an interdict, relying upon vindicatory action, such
as the present Applicant, to recover that which
it alleges is its own
property, need not show that it will suffer irreparable loss if the
interdict is not granted. There is a
presumption, which may be
rebutted by a Respondent, that the injury is irreparable. See in this
regard: SA Securitisation (Pty)
Ltd v Chesane
2010 (6) SA 577
(GSJ)
at 563 I - 564 D
[24]
Nor need such an Applicant show that it had no other satisfactory
remedy at its disposal- a person who is entitled to
vindicate
property in the hands of another cannot be forced by action of that
person lo accept merely the value of the property.
See in this
regard: Fedsure Life Assurance Life Company Limited v Worldwide
Africa Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd
2003 (3) SA 268
(W) at 278 E-F
[25]
Insofar as the balance of convenience is concerned, the same favours
the Applicant in this case. The reasons for this
is quite simply that
the Respondents, as a matter of law, have no right of continued
possession of the forty three (43) movable
assets referred to above.
The continued use of the forty three (43) movable assets unavoidably
results in the assets' deterioration
in value. It is also important
to have regard to the fact that the Applicant does not intend to sell
or alienate the forty three
(43) assets. The relief, formulated in
paragraph 3.1.3 of the Notice of Motion, clearly and in terms
provides that:
"The Applicant is
ordered to attend upon the safekeeping and storage of the movable
assets pending the finalisation of the
action to be instituted in
terms of paragraph 3.1 above."
RESPONDENTS
DEFENCES:
[26]
Mr Moloi, who appeared for the First and Second Respondents in this
matter, strenuously argued that the application ought
to be dismissed
for lack of urgency, alternatively for self-created urgency. I
disagree with this contention. -On   15-
September 2022,
whilst all the parties were duly represented, -the application was
postponed to the opposed roll of 20 October
2022. It was further
ordered that the Applicant must deliver its replying affidavit on or
before 28 September 2022 and the Court
further issued orders with
regards to the times upon which Heads of Argument were to be
delivered. All this was done and all the
issues have now been
ventilated. The issue of urgency was not reserved by the First and
Second Respondents. It is furthermore abundantly
clear from the
papers that there were protracted negotiations between the parties
before this application was brought by the Applicant.
This puts paid
to the Respondents' submission of self-created urgency and in view of
the above, I find that urgency has become
moot.
[27]
The First and Second Respondents also raised the Court's alleged lack
of jurisdiction as a defence. I disagree with this
contention.
Section 21(1) of the Superior Courts Act, Act 10 of 2013, reads as
follows:
"A Division has
jurisdiction over all persons residing or being in, or in relation to
all causes arising and all offences triable
within its area of
jurisdiction and all other matters of which it may according to Jaw
take cognisance, ..."
[28]
It must furthermore be remembered that this case involves assets in
the possession of a close corporation under business
rescue. Section
7 of the Close Corporations Act, Act 69 of 1984, provides that, for
purposes of that Act, any High Court and any
Magistrate's Court
within whose area of jurisdiction the registered office or main place
of business of a Close Corporation is
situated, shall have
jurisdiction. In this particular case before this Court, the Close
Corporation under business rescue had its
principal place of business
in Bloemfontein. It is furthermore abundantly clear that the relevant
Instalment Sale Agreements attached
to the Applicant's founding
affidavit, were concluded in Bloemfontein. It is also clear from the
papers that a number of the movable
assets that form the subject
matter of this application are in the Free State. A number of the
incidents of jurisdiction thus "occurred"
within the
jurisdictional area of this Court. In the premises I find that this
Court indeed has the necessary - jurisdiction to
entertain this
matter.
[29]
The First and Second Respondents also submitted that the Applicant
should have joined the Close Corporation New Beginnings
Projects CC
(in voluntary business rescue supervision), as a party. The
submission was further that because this was not done,
the
application stands to be dismissed for non­ joinder. I find that
this submission also holds no water. It is important to
have regard
to the fact that the business rescue practitioners are before Court
in their representative capacities as representatives
of the said
Close Corporation. They are not before Court in their personal
capacities. By citing the business rescue practitioners
in their
aforesaid representative capacities, it is in fact New Beginnings
Projects CC (in voluntary business rescue supervision)
that is before
Court. It is furthermore abundantly clear that the business rescue
practitioners which may represent the interests
of the Close
Corporation with reference to the relief requested by way of this
present application, indeed did represent its interests.
The position
relevant to the citation of companies under liquidation was decided
in the matter of
Gainsford and others N.N.O. v Tanzer Transport
(Pty) Ltd
2014 (3) SA 468
(SCA).
In that matter the Supreme Court
of Appeal held that the liquidators engaged in legal proceedings for
the recovery of debts owed
to companies in liquidation may sue in
their own names nomine officio or in the name of the company
concerned. The same applies
to the business rescue practitioners in
their official capacities and in my judgment and there is thus no
merit in this submission
on behalf of the First and Second
Respondents.
[30]
It was furthermore submitted on behalf of the business rescue
practitioners that the Applicant was obliged to notify
the creditors
of the Close Corporation under business rescue as they had a
substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings
and that the
failure to notify these affected persons robs them of the opportunity
to enable them to participate in the present
application. I find that
there is also no merit in this contention. This point of view has
authoritatively been considered, dealt
with and rejected by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in the matter of
Timasani (Pty) Ltd and
another v Afrimat Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd
[2021] 3 All SA 843
(SCA)
by
way of inter alia paragraphs [14], [15], [16], [17], [19] and [20] of
the said decision.
[31]
This Court's view that the Applicant is entitled to 43 of the 67
assets has the nett result that the Applicant was substantially

successful with this application and therefore the Applicant is
entitled to the normal order as to costs, namely that costs follow

the successful party.
ORDER:
In
the premises I make the following order:
1.   Prayer 1
and 2 of the Notice of Motion is granted;
2.   A rule
nisi is issued in the following terms:
3.   Pending
the final determination of an action or application, as the case may
be, to be instituted by the Applicant
against the First and Second
Respondents for an order declaring that the Applicant is the owner of
the forty three (43) movable
assets, which assets can be identified
on annexure "X" to the notice of motion as item numbers 1,
5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 18, 22 to 36, 38 to 40, 43 to 53, 55 to 58
and 63, within thirty (30) days from date of finalisation of this
application, the
following interim interdict is issued:
3.1.2  the First and
Second Respondents are ordered to return to the Applicant the said
movable assets referred to in paragraph
3, supra, forthwith;
3.1.3  that in the
event of the First and Second Respondents failing and/or refusing to
return the movable assets to the Applicant
forthwith, the Sheriff
with jurisdiction as well as the South African Police services be and
are hereby authorised to enter into
and upon the various premises and
building construction sites of New Beginnings CC (in voluntary
business rescue and supervision)
or wherever same may be found, to
attach the movable assets referred to in paragraph 3, supra, and to
return such movable assets
to the Applicant forthwith;
3.1.4  that the
Applicant is ordered to attend upon the safekeeping and storage of
the movable assets pending the finalisation
of the application or
action to be instituted in terms of paragraph 3 above;
3.1.4  the First and
Second Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application
on the scale as between party and
party including the costs
consequent upon the employment of two (2) counsel when used.
L LE R POHL AJ
ON
BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT:             ADV
M P VAN DER MERWE SC
AND
ADV S TSANGARAKIS
INSTRUCTED
BY:                                       SYMINGTON
& DE KOK BLOEMFONTEIN
ON
BEHALF OF THE FIRST
AND
SECOND RESPONDENTS:
ADVT MOLOI
INSTRUCTED
BY:

RAMS ATTORNEYS
- SANDTON