Molatseli v Speaker: Dihlabeng Local Municipality and Others (1041/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 277 (10 October 2022)

78 Reportability
Municipal Law

Brief Summary

Local Government — Municipal Manager — Appointment and removal — Applicant, Busa Petrus Molatseli, sought to review and set aside resolutions from a council meeting held on 9 February 2022, which unlawfully appointed a new Acting Municipal Manager and placed him on special leave — Respondents conceded the unlawfulness of the meeting and resolutions — Court held that the Applicant acted mala fide by ensuring the Municipality was unrepresented while seeking costs against it, leading to a denial of costs against the Municipality and punitive costs against the Third and Fifth Respondents personally.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned an opposed review application brought in the Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein. The applicant, Mr B P Molatseli, approached the court to review and set aside resolutions taken at a purported meeting of the Dihlabeng Local Municipality’s council held on 9 February 2022 at 12h00.


The respondents were the Speaker of the Dihlabeng Local Municipality (first respondent), the Dihlabeng Local Municipality itself (second respondent), the Executive Mayor (third respondent), the relevant MEC for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (fourth respondent), and Ms M A B Mosima (fifth respondent), a municipal director who was appointed at the impugned meeting as acting municipal manager.


Procedurally, the litigation unfolded in two stages. On 25 March 2022, the applicant obtained interim interdictory relief on a semi-urgent basis under Part A of the notice of motion, pending the finalisation of the review under Part B. By the time Part B was argued, the respondents had conceded the merits of the review in relation to the lawfulness of the 12h00 meeting and its resolutions. The judgment therefore primarily addressed the reserved and subsequent costs, and whether any costs should be awarded (including whether punitive and personal costs orders were warranted).


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned municipal governance and authority within the municipal council, specifically the lawfulness of a council meeting convened after the Speaker had adjourned proceedings, and the validity of resolutions taken at that purported reconvened meeting, including decisions affecting the office of the municipal manager.


Material Facts


On 28 January 2022, the Speaker convened a council meeting at which the applicant (as municipal manager) was present. The council dealt with items on the agenda except for an item relating to a report about allegations of fraud and corruption. That outstanding item could not be finalised because certain councillors left the meeting, with the result that quorum was lost. The Speaker then adjourned the meeting to be continued on 9 February 2022.


An agenda was circulated for a continuation meeting scheduled for 9 February 2022. On that date, the meeting commenced at 10h00 under the chairmanship of the Speaker. It was closed and adjourned at 11h10 after the Speaker refused to add an additional item to the agenda, and the Speaker then left.


It was common cause that later the same day, at 12h00, the Executive Mayor purported to reconvene another meeting of the council. At this reconvened meeting, Councillor Nhlapo was appointed as acting Speaker for the day. The council then adopted resolutions including the appointment of the fifth respondent, Ms Mosima, as acting municipal manager, and the placement of the applicant on “special leave”. The dispute arose from the purported convening of this 12h00 meeting and the resolutions adopted there.


In relation to the interim proceedings, the applicant obtained an order on 25 March 2022 pending the review, interdicting the fifth respondent from acting as municipal manager and directing that the applicant be allowed to continue performing the functions of municipal manager. The order also restrained the Mayor from calling or conducting council meetings in the manner described in the interim order. The costs of Part A were reserved for later adjudication in the review.


On the papers and argument in Part B, the respondents conceded that the 12h00 meeting was unlawful and that its resolutions should be set aside. The remaining live dispute was therefore directed to costs, including the applicant’s attempt to obtain costs against the municipality and punitive costs in personal capacities against the Mayor and the fifth respondent.


Facts material to the costs enquiry included that the municipality, the Mayor, and the fifth respondent were initially represented by Peyper Attorneys (Mr Louis Radley), a panel attorney of the municipality. The instruction to oppose the litigation was given by the fifth respondent purportedly acting as acting municipal manager, an appointment made at the unlawful 12h00 meeting. After the interim order, the applicant addressed a letter (on the municipality’s official letterhead and in his capacity as municipal manager) to Peyper Attorneys demanding their withdrawal as attorneys for the municipality on the basis that the fifth respondent could not act for the municipality. Peyper Attorneys thereafter withdrew, with the consequence that the municipality was left without legal representation for the hearing. The court further noted correspondence indicating that the applicant’s own attorney (also a panel attorney), acting on instructions attributed to the applicant, pressed for Peyper Attorneys to withdraw for the municipality. The court treated this conduct as central to whether the applicant, although successful on the merits, should receive a costs order.


Legal Issues


The court was required to determine two principal questions.


The first question, though ultimately not contested, concerned the reviewability and validity of the council meeting held on 9 February 2022 at 12h00, and whether the resolutions adopted there should be reviewed and set aside. This was a question involving the application of legality principles to largely common-cause facts, and the merits were conceded.


The second and decisive question concerned the proper costs order. This involved the court’s discretion in costs, including whether the applicant should be awarded costs against the municipality despite being successful on the merits, and whether the Mayor and the fifth respondent should be ordered to pay punitive costs in their personal capacities. This required an evaluative judgment about litigation conduct, the ethical and institutional implications of the applicant’s actions, and the relevance of statutory protections relating to councillors and municipal proceedings.


A further legal issue arose incidentally in the costs debate: whether it was competent or appropriate to impose personal costs on certain councillors in light of statutory protections and, if personal liability were contemplated, whether there was a material non-joinder of other councillors who participated in the impugned resolutions.


Court’s Reasoning


On the merits of the review, the court proceeded from the fact that the respondents had conceded that the 12h00 meeting convened by the Mayor was unlawful and that resolutions adopted at that meeting were invalid. In those circumstances, the court granted the review and set aside the meeting and its decisions.


The court’s substantive reasoning focused on costs. It reaffirmed the general principle that costs typically follow success, but emphasised that costs are ultimately within the discretion of the court. In doing so, the court relied on the approach articulated in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others: Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others, which recognises both the general rule favouring costs for the successful party and the flexible circumstances in which a court may deprive a successful party of costs, including the conduct of parties and their legal representatives and the nature of proceedings.


The court considered the applicant’s position and responsibilities as municipal manager, referring to the statutory framework describing the municipal manager’s role as head of administration and accounting officer. Against that background, the court evaluated the applicant’s conduct after obtaining the interim order. It concluded that the applicant was conflicted in relation to the municipality and that he should have informed the council of the interim order and ensured appropriate institutional decision-making regarding ongoing litigation and legal representation, rather than acting unilaterally. The court regarded it as particularly significant that the applicant wrote to the municipality’s attorneys on an official letterhead and in his capacity as municipal manager, instructing or pressuring withdrawal, thereby leaving the municipality unrepresented, while simultaneously continuing to seek a costs order against it.


In the court’s assessment, this conduct effectively ensured that the municipality’s ability to participate was constrained, and it considered the applicant’s insistence on costs against the municipality in these circumstances to be unjustified. The court characterised the applicant’s conduct as mala fide, and held that, notwithstanding his success on the merits, he should be deprived of costs against the municipality.


The court further criticised the conduct of the applicant’s attorney, noting that the attorney was also a panel attorney of the municipality and appeared to have acted on instructions where the applicant purported to operate both as municipal manager (in relation to the municipality’s representation) and in his personal capacity (as litigant). The court found it difficult to accept that the applicant and his attorney could view such duality as ethically and legally permissible, and treated that conduct as reinforcing the conclusion that a costs order in the applicant’s favour against the municipality was not warranted.


As to the applicant’s request for punitive costs against the Mayor and the fifth respondent personally, the court addressed the submission that they did not participate in legitimate council business and should be personally liable. The applicant relied on Swartbooi and Others v Brink and Others, particularly concerning the protection afforded to councillors for participation in legitimate council deliberations and the relationship between costs orders and potential civil liability. The court accepted that the impugned meeting was convened by the Mayor, but emphasised that the resolutions were taken by a collective majority of councillors who attended and voted, and were not decisions of the Mayor and fifth respondent alone. It held that participation in the meeting by the Mayor and the fifth respondent did not, on the facts presented, remove the protection contemplated by the relevant statutory scheme.


The court added that, even if personal liability could theoretically be considered, the applicant had failed to join the other councillors (described as the remaining 30 councillors) who participated and voted. Because those councillors would have a substantial interest in any order imposing civil liability via costs, the failure to join them constituted a serious non-joinder, which was an additional basis undermining the applicant’s attempt to single out only the Mayor and the fifth respondent for personal punitive costs.


Finally, the court highlighted further considerations supporting a no-costs outcome, including the applicant’s role in precipitating the withdrawal of the municipality’s attorneys, the service of a Rule 7(1) notice by the applicant’s attorney, and the practical effect that the municipality remained unrepresented at the hearing while the Mayor and the fifth respondent were compelled to obtain new attorneys primarily to resist adverse costs consequences. It also reasoned that the continuation of Part B might have been unnecessary had the parties reached agreement on costs, and criticised the applicant’s failure to facilitate a council meeting to address representation and the way forward. In the court’s overall evaluation, the interests of justice did not favour mulcting any party with costs.


Outcome and Relief


The court reviewed and set aside the council meeting of 9 February 2022 commencing at 12h00 and all decisions taken at that meeting.


On costs, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs in respect of Part A (the interim proceedings) and the further proceedings pertaining to Part B (the review application), thereby refusing the applicant’s request for costs against the municipality and refusing punitive personal costs against the Mayor and fifth respondent.


Cases Cited


Ferreira v Levin NO and Others: Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others [1996] ZACC 27; 1996 (2) SA 621 (CC).


Swartbooi and Others v Brink and Others 2006 (1) SA 203 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 239.


Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, section 12(1).


Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, section 28(1)(b)(i).


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, sections 55 and 59, including section 55(1)(m).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 7(1).


Held


The court held that the 9 February 2022 council meeting commencing at 12h00 was unlawful and that the resolutions adopted at that meeting fell to be reviewed and set aside, a conclusion reached on the basis of the respondents’ concession on the merits.


The court further held that, despite the applicant’s success on the merits, the circumstances justified a departure from the usual costs principle. The applicant’s conduct, viewed against his institutional role and the conflict inherent in acting both as municipal manager and litigant, together with the conduct of his legal representative in relation to the municipality’s representation, warranted an order that each party pay its own costs. The court also held that punitive personal costs against the Mayor and the fifth respondent were not justified on the facts, and that, in any event, the absence of joinder of other participating councillors constituted a serious obstacle to such relief.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A costs award is primarily discretionary, even though the general rule is that costs follow the result. A court may deprive a successful party of costs where the circumstances justify it, including where the conduct of the successful party or their legal representatives makes such an order equitable, having regard to fairness and the interests of justice.


In disputes involving municipal governance, the statutory functions and duties of the municipal manager as head of administration and accounting officer may be relevant to the court’s evaluation of litigation conduct and institutional propriety, particularly where the municipal manager’s actions affect the municipality’s ability to take decisions or participate in litigation.


Statutory protections relating to municipal councillors, including protection from certain forms of civil liability arising from participation in council deliberations, are relevant when litigants seek personal costs orders against councillors. Where relief sought could implicate multiple councillors who participated in a decision, principles of joinder apply: parties with a direct and substantial interest in potential liability should be joined, and failure to do so may amount to a serious non-joinder.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 277
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Molatseli v Speaker: Dihlabeng Local Municipality and Others (1041/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 277 (10 October 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
No: 1041 /2022
In
the matter between:
B
P
MOLATSELI

APPLICANT
and
THE
SPEAKER:
DIHLABENG
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY                                   1
st
RESPONDENT
DIHLABENG
LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY                                                                       2
nd
RESPONDENT
THE
EXECUTIVE MAYOR:
DIHLABENG:
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY                                  3
rd
RESPONDENT
THE
MEC: FREE STATE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT:
DEPARTMENT OF
COOPERATIVE
GOVERNANCE AND
TRADITIONAL
AFFAIRS                                                        4
th
RESPONDENT
M
A B
MOSIMA                                                                       5
th
RESPONDENT
CORAM:
DAFFUE,

J et MOLITSOANE, J
JUDGMENT
BY:
MOLITSOANE,
J
HEARD
ON:
30
MAY 2022
DELIVERED
ON
:           The
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email and released to SAFLII
on 10 October 2022. The date and time for hand down is deemed
to be
10 October 2022 at 08:30.
[1]
On 25 March 2022 the Applicant obtained the following interim relief
on a semi urgent
basis in accordance with Part A, of the notice of
motion:

1.

2.
Pending the finalisation of a review
application the Applicant is to institute in accordance with prayer 3
below:
2.1
The Fifth Respondent is interdicted and
restrained from performing any functions associated with the office
of the Second Respondent’s
Municipal Manager;
2.2
The Fifth Respondent is interdicted and
restrained from holding herself out as the Second Respondent’s
duly appointed Municipal
Manager;
2.3
The Second and Third Respondents are
ordered to allow the Applicant to continue to perform the functions
associated with that of
the Municipal Manager of the Second
Respondent.
2.4
The Third Respondent is interdicted and
restrained from calling any meeting of the Council of the Second
Respondent, to conduct
such meeting under his own chairmanship or
that of any person other than the First Respondent, to perform the
functions of the
First Respondent in any capacity whatsoever, and to
take any resolutions or cause to be taken any resolutions at such a
meeting
2.5
The costs to stand over for adjudication
in the review.’
[2]
a)         The Applicant is
Busa Petrus Molatseli,
a duly appointed Municipal Manager of the
Dihlabeng Local Municipality (the Municipality);
b)
The First Respondent is the Speaker of the Municipal Council of the
Municipality (the Speaker);
c)
The Second Respondent is the Dihlabeng Local Municipality, a local
sphere of government and organ of state as envisaged in s
239 of the
Constitution and established in terms of
s 12(1)
of the
Local
Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998
;
d)
The Third Respondent is the Executive Mayor of the Municipality (the
Mayor);
e)
The
Fourth Respondent is the Member of the Executive Council:
Free State
Provincial Government: Department of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs;
f)
The Fifth Respondent is Ms M.A.B. Mosima, a Director of the
Municipality.
[3]
The opposed review application in accordance with Part B of  the
notice of motion
wherein the Applicant sought that all resolutions
taken at the meeting of 9 February 2022 commencing at 12h00 be
reviewed and set
aside was allocated to us.  I shall briefly
refer to the background facts in the next paragraphs to set the scene
for the
conclusions to be arrived at.
[4]
On 28 January 2022 the Speaker convened a Council meeting in terms of
her general
powers. The Applicant was part of the meeting. All
business on the agenda of the meeting was dealt with except for an
item which
dealt with a report that had to be submitted to the
Municipality concerning allegations of fraud and corruption allegedly
committed
by certain individuals. The outstanding item could not be
deliberated upon because certain Councillors of the African National
Congress walked out of the meeting. The end result was that the
quorum for the meeting could not be maintained. The Speaker adjourned

the meeting to be continued on 9 February 2022.
[5]
Prior to the meeting an agenda was circulated entitled ‘Continuation
Meeting
of the Council Meeting 9 February 2022’.  On 9
February 2022 the meeting chaired by the Speaker commenced at 10h00
but
was closed and adjourned at 11h10 after the Speaker had refused
to place a further item on the agenda.  The Speaker then left

the scene.
[6]
It is common cause that hardly fifty minutes later, at 12h00 the same
day, the Mayor
purported to reconvene another meeting of the Council.
In the reconvened meeting Councillor Nhlapo was appointed Acting
Speaker
of the day. In the said meeting the Fifth Respondent was
appointed as the Acting Municipal Manager of the Municipality. A
decision
was taken in the meeting to place the Applicant on ‘special
leave’.  The dispute between the parties arose as a
result
of this meeting of the Council convened by the Mayor and the
resolutions taken.
[7]
The Respondents already conceded during argument in respect of Part A
of the notice
of motion that the last mentioned meeting was unlawful
and consequently, any resolutions taken at the meeting are unlawful
and
ought to be set aside.  This remained the attitude of the
Third and Fifth Respondents in an affidavit filed by them to deal

with costs only.  The merits of the application having been
conceded, the only issue left for adjudication is the costs reserved

on 25 March 2022 and the further costs incurred in these proceedings
thereafter.
[8]
It is trite law that a successful party is entitled to costs subject
to certain exceptions.
While the purpose of an award of costs is to
indemnify the successful party, this general rule is subject to the
rule that the
award of costs lies in the discretion of the Court. The
Applicant seeks costs against the Second Respondent and punitive
costs
against the Third and Fifth Respondents in their personal
capacities.
[9]
The principles with regard to
costs were set out as follows in
Ferreira
v Levin NO and Others: Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and
Others
:
[1]

The
Supreme Court has, over the years, developed a flexible approach to
costs which proceeds from two basic principles, the first
being that
award of costs, unless expressly otherwise enacted, is in the
discretion of the presiding judicial officer, and the
second that the
successful party should, as a general rule, have his or her costs.
Without attempting either comprehensiveness
or complete analytical
accuracy, depriving successful parties of their costs can depend on
circumstances such as, for example,
the conduct of parties, the
conduct of their legal representatives, whether a party achieves
technical success only, the nature
of the litigants and the nature of
the proceedings. I mention these examples to indicate that the
principles which have been developed
in relation to the award of
costs are by their nature sufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet
new needs which may arise in
regard to constitutional litigation.’
[10]
Section 55
read with
s 59
of the
Local Government: Municipal Systems
Act 32 of 2000
sets out the functions and duties of the Municipal
Manager who is both the head of administration and accounting officer
of a Municipality.
In terms of
s 55(1)(m)
the Municipal Manager also
exercises powers and performs duties delegated by the Municipal
Council or sub-delegated by other authorities
of the Municipality.
[11]
Mr Louis Radley of Peyper Attorneys is a panel attorney of the
Municipality and he was at all
relevant times during the proceedings
until a few days before the hearing of the review application the
attorney of record for
the Municipality, the Mayor and the Fifth
Respondent. His instruction to oppose the application was given by
the Fifth Respondent
in her capacity as the Acting Municipal Manager,
having been appointed in that capacity at the aforesaid meeting of 9
February
2022 which has now been conceded to be unlawfully held.
[12]
Following the interim order of 25 March 2022 the Applicant resumed
his duties as Municipal Manager
of the Municipality. On 23 March 2022
he addressed correspondence to Mr Radley in which the following was
inter alia said:

2.1
Your office is acting for and on behalf of the 2
nd
,3
rd
and 5
th
respondents;
2.2
As you are aware, and in terms of the Court Order
granted on 25 March 2022, the 5
th
respondent cannot act on
behalf of the 2
nd
respondent.
2.3
You are immediately to file a Notice of Withdrawal of
Attorneys on behalf of the second respondent, failing which
you will
be acting in contravention of your service agreement entered into
with Dihlabeng Local Municipality in that you will be
acting against
your own client.’
[13]
Pursuant to this letter Mr Radley withdrew as the attorney of the
Municipality as well as the
Third and Fifth Respondents.
Consequently, the Municipality was without legal representation after
this withdrawal.
[14]
In my view the Applicant was obliged to urgently inform the Council
of the state of affairs particularly
with regard to the interim order
obtained as well as the way forward in respect of the review
application. He was conflicted in
this matter and there was an
obligation on him to advise the Council of the need, if any, to
terminate the mandate of Peyper Attorneys
and he was duty bound to
advise Council that a decision had to be taken on further legal
representation if so advised instead of
acting unilaterally.
[15]
What is most disturbing is that he ensured that the Municipality was
not legally represented
and over and above that the Council was not
asked to take a decision on the way forward in the review application
and yet he continued
to seek costs against it. In my view he acted
mala fide. He is the head of the administration and accounting
officer of the Municipality.
The letter that he wrote was written on
the official letterhead of the Municipality and in his capacity as
the Municipal Manager.
He could not claim relief against the Second
Respondent and still give instructions on its behalf. As he was
conflicted, he should
have refrained from taking any action against
the Municipality save in respect of relief conceded. He cannot
honestly insist that
he is entitled to costs against the Municipality
when he ensured that the hands of the Municipality were ‘bound
behind its
back’ during these proceedings.
[16]
The problem is compounded further by the conduct
of his attorney, Mr Lessing. He, like Mr Radley, is a panel
attorney
of the Municipality. He is the instructing attorney of the Applicant.
When this court became aware that Peyper Attorneys
had withdrawn as
attorneys just when the application was to be heard, it sought an
explanation for the withdrawal as attorneys
of record of the
Respondents. In the explanation given to this court, a letter was
appended from the Applicant’s attorneys
dated 26 April 2022 in
which Mr Lessing, inter alia, said the following to Peyper Attorneys:

It
is our instructions that the Municipal Manager, Mr Busa Molatseli,
instructed you to immediately withdraw as representatives
of the
Second Respondent in this matter.
We
urgently require that you file your notice of withdrawal as attorneys
of record for the Second Respondent as soon as possible.’
[17]
It is clear that Mr Lessing took instructions from the Applicant
acting on behalf of the Municipality
as well as from the Applicant
personally. It is difficult to fathom how the Applicant and Mr
Lessing could believe that it was
ethically and legally possible to
act as such. It is exactly this conduct of the Applicant and his
legal representatives which
calls on this court to deprive the
successful party of his costs. I am of the view that the Applicant,
though successful on the
merits, is not entitled to costs against the
Municipality.
[18]
The Applicant contended that the Mayor and the Fifth Respondent
should be mulcted with punitive
costs in their personal capacities in
that they did not participate in deliberations of the full Council in
the course of the legitimate
business of the Council. The Applicant
relies heavily on
Swartbooi
& Others
[2]
where the Constitutional Court held that the order requiring from
Councillors voting in favour of the decision to pay the costs
of the
application amounted to civil liability in civil proceedings in terms
of s 28(1)(b)
[3]
of the
Municipal Structures Act. The Court observed that:

[18]
For the purpose of this case it is therefore sufficient to say that
section 28 protection covers the conduct of members of
a Municipal
Council (as distinct from a meeting of any of its committees) that
constitutes participation in deliberations of the
full council in the
course of the legitimate business of the council.’
[19]
It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that the Mayor, in
continuing with the impugned meeting
of 9 February 2022 could not
claim that he participated in the legitimate business of the Council.
With regard to the Fifth Respondent
it is contended by the Applicant
that the Fifth Respondent involved herself in the position of Acting
Municipal Manager and should
have foreseen the perils in taking the
office of the accounting officer of the Municipality.
[20]
It is common cause that the meeting of 9 February
2022 was convened by the Mayor. According to the evidence
32
Councillors attended the meeting and took resolutions which were
later set aside. It is the undisputed evidence of the Respondents

that the decisions taken during that meeting were the decisions of
the majority of the Councillors who voted therefor. It is undisputed

that such decisions were not taken by the Mayor and the Fifth
Respondent alone. They were decisions of the collective. The
decisions
taken by the Councillors including the Third and Fifth
Respondents were not taken by the said parties in their personal
capacities.
The opposition of Part A of the notice motion by the
Third and Fifth Respondent was also at the instance of the
Municipality. It
cannot be said that participation in the meeting by
the Mayor and the Fifth Respondent lifted the cover of protection
afforded
by s 28 of the Structures Act.
[21]
Even if it could be said that I am wrong in this regard, the
Applicant failed to join the remaining
30 Councillors who
participated in the meeting of 9 February 2022. All the Councillors
who participated in the meeting have a substantial
interest in the
outcome of the relief sought should the Court find that their
participation in the meeting of 9 February 2022 attracted
liability
for civil costs against them. Failure to join them constitutes a
serious non-joinder.
[22]
Finally, the following should be emphasised to show why the applicant
shall not be entitled to
the costs of the application:
22.1
As mentioned, he caused Mr Radley to withdraw as attorney for the
Municipality in a letter on an official letterhead
of the
Municipality;
22.2
His attorney, Mr Lessing, caused a Rule 7(1) notice to be served on
Peyper Attorneys claiming that they may not act further
on behalf of
the Municipality until such time as they have satisfied the Court of
their authority to do so;
22.3
A few days before the hearing of the review application the Mayor and
Ms Mosima were forced to obtain the services of
new attorneys after
the withdrawal of Peyper Attorneys notwithstanding the fact that they
did not intend to oppose the review application
on the merits, but
merely did not want a costs order against them;
22.4
The Applicant’s actions resulted in the Municipality being
without legal representation during the hearing before
us as Mr Louw
appeared only on behalf of the Mayor and Ms Mosima, the third and
fifth respondents;
22.5
The prosecution of Part B of the notice of motion would have been
entirely unnecessary if the parties could reach an
agreement on costs
and in this regard the Applicant’s failure to arrange that a
special Council meeting be convened to consider
the issue cannot be
over-emphasised.
22.6
The interests of justice do not favour that we mulct any of the
parties with costs.
ORDER
[23]
The following order is issued:
1.
The Council meeting of 9 February 2022
which commenced at 12h00 and all decisions taken thereat are reviewed
and set aside;
2.
Each party shall bear their own costs in
respect of Part A of the proceedings as well as the further
proceedings pertaining to the
review application.
P
E MOLITSOANE, J
I
concur,
J
P DAFFUE, J
On
behalf of the Applicant:

Adv J S
Rautenbach
Instructed
by:

Honey Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the 3
rd
and 5
th
Respondent:
Adv M C
Louw
Instructed
by:

Peyper

Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
[1]
[1996] ZACC 27
;
1996 (2) SA 621
(CC) para [3].
[2]
2006 (1) SA 203 (CC).
[3]
Section 28(1)(b)(i) of The Structures Act provides as follows:

(1)
Provincial legislation in terms of section 161 of the Constitution
must provide at least-
(b)
that councillors are not liable to civil or criminal proceedings,
arrest, imprisonment or damages for-
(i)
anything that they have said in, produced before or submitted to the
council or any of its committees…”