THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 117/2020
In the matter between:
THE MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR HEALTH,
EASTERN CAPE APPELLANT
and
D L obo AL
RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: The Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape v DL
obo AL (Case no 117/2020) [2021] ZASCA 68 (03 June 2021)
Coram: MBHA, MOLEMELA and NICHOLLS JJA, GOOSEN and POYO-DLWATI AJJA
Heard: 16 March 2021
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
legal representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal
website and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down is deemed
to be 09H45 on 03 June 2021.
2
Summary: Delict – medical negligence – child suffering cerebral palsy as a result of acute
profound hypoxic ischaemic event during labour – whether negligence of hospital staff was
causally connected to the child’s brain damage – causation not established on the fa cts –
appeal upheld
3
ORDER
On appeal from: Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Bhisho (Mfenyane AJ sitting as
court of first instance): judgment reported as sub nom: Member of the Executive Council for
Health Eastern Cape v Danene Levonia Lottering [2016] ZAECBHC X; (2019) XX ILJ XXX
(ECB); [2021] x All SA XXX (ECB):
1. The appeal is upheld.
2. The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed’.
JUDGMENT
Molemela, JA (Mbha and Nicholls JJA and Goosen and Poyo-Dlwati AJJA concurring)
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal against an order granted by the Eastern Cape Division of the
High Court, Bhisho (Mfenyana AJ) (the high court) in favour of the respondent who,
as the plaintiff, had instituted a medical negligence claim against the appellant, the
Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape (the MEC). The
respondent’s claim was on behalf of her minor child, AL, who had suffered cerebral
palsy as a consequence of a hypoxic ischemic event during the birth process. Having
been called upon to adjudicate the matter on the issue of liability only, the high court
found that the respondent had succeeded in proving negligence and causation. It
found that the MEC was vicariously liable to compensate the respondent, as the
hospital staff had dispensed medical care to the respondent within the course and
scope of their employment. Aggrieved by th at decision, the MEC sought leave to
appeal the high court’s judgment. The appeal is with the leave of that court. The basis
of the appeal is that the high court erred in fact and in law, misdirected itself and
committed several irregularities. A further ground of appeal was that the judgment of
the high court was tainted by bias.
4
Background Facts
[2] The factual matrix is largely common cause. The common cause facts are that
on 20 October 2011, the highly expectant respondent was picked up from her home
by an ambulance and arrived at Midlands Hospital , Graaf -Reinet at 01h45. Her
pregnancy was at full term. Midlands hospital (the hospital) is a public hospital under
the administration of the Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Health. Shortly after
the respondent’s arrival at the hospital, she was seen by a nurse. H er time of
admission at the labour ward was recorded as 01h50. Upon arrival at the labour ward,
the respondent was medically examined. A vaginal examination revealed that her
dilation at that stage was 2cm. It was common cause that at the time of the
respondent’s admission, she was in the first phase of the first stage of labour.1
[3] Following the vaginal examination, the nurse connected the cardiotocography
(CTG) equipment to the respondent’s abdomen for purposes of monitoring the uterine
contractions as well as the foetal2 heart rate. The CTG tracing was done from 02h01
until 02h18. The printout showed a baseline foetal heart rate of just below 160 beats
per minute, but was recorded in the clinical notes as 160 beats per minute, with a
variability of 5-10 minutes. There were no accelerations and no decelerations of the
foetal heart rate. There were 5 -6 contractions in 10 minutes, which were categorised
as borderline high. It is common cause that after the CTG monitoring was discontinued
at 02h18, no further monitoring of the respondent was done until 06h00.
[4] A CTG tracing done from 06h11 to 06h23 (the 6 o’clock CTG monitoring)
showed a baseline foetal heart rate of 175 -180 beats per minute, with normal
variability. During that period, no acceleratio ns nor decelerations were noted. The
clinical notes recorded that at 06h30, the nurse notified Dr Mpependuku about the
respondent’s condition and he promised to come and see the respondent.
respondent’s condition and he promised to come and see the respondent.
1 In terms of the National Maternal Guidelines applicable in South Africa, t he first stage of labour
consists of two phases – the latent phase (during which the cervical dilation is less or equal to 3cm
dilation; whilst, the second phase of the first stage is from 4cm dilation until the cervix is fully dilated.
The second stage is from full dilation until delivery. The third stage is from the delivery of the foetus until
delivery of the placenta.
2 There are different ways of spelling the medical terms for foetus (fetus) , foetal (fetus), ischaemic
(ischemic) etc. In this judgment, I have used the English spelling in the text but have retained the original
spelling when used in quotes.
5
Dr Mpependuku arrived at the labour ward at 07h00 and saw the respondent. He then
indicated that he would ask another doctor , Dr Othman, to assess the respondent. It
is undisputed that Dr Mpependuku deferred to Dr Othman. Dr Othman examined the
respondent at 07h15 and ordered delivery by caesarean section. The baby, AL, was
delivered by caesarean section at 08h40. AL’s subsequent assessment revealed that
he had developed cerebral palsy. It was common cause that there were no antenatal
problems that could have contributed to that outcome.
[5] In her particulars of claim, the respondent averred that the hospital staff failed
to recognise that she was experiencing complications during labour and to enlist the
service of duly qualified personnel to attend to her. The respondent’s case was that
AL developed cerebral palsy because of the hospital’s failure to monitor her
adequately and to take appropriate action when foetal distress arose. Various grounds
of negligence were advanced. The respondent’s main contention was that the failure
of the hospital staff to monitor her in accordance with the National Maternal Guidelines
published in 2007 (2007 guidelines) constituted a negligent omission which caused the
foetus to suffer a hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy of an acute profound nature. The
respondent asserted that if the monitoring of her labour had taken place according to
the 2007 guidelines, a change in the foetal condition would have been timeously
observed and AL’s delivery would then have been expedited, thereby preventing the
brain injury that eventuated as a result of hypoxic ischemia. It was alleged that the
hospital staff had acted negligently by failing to expedite delivery when the presenting
circumstances warranted it. It was also contended that the caesarean section, contrary
to the provi sions of the 2007 guidelines, was not performed within one hour of the
decision to operate being taken.
decision to operate being taken.
[6] The appellant’s case was that all the hospital staff members who had attended
to the respondent had acted with the necessary skill, care and dilige nce as could
reasonably have been expected in similar circumstances, and had not been negligent
in dispensing medical care to the respondent. Furthermore, the appellant denied that
there was any causal link between the negligent omission alleged by the respondent
and the brain injury that was ultimately sustained by AL. The question before the high
court related only to liability. Thus, the question for determination was whether the
respondent had proven the elements of her medical negligence claim. As the trial
6
progressed, the issues became distilled, with the result that the remainin g issues for
determination were whether the respondent had proven the elements of negligence
and causation on a balance of probabilities. As regards negligence, the issue in
dispute was whether or not the CTG reading taken at 02h01 to 02h18 was suspicious.
Allied to that was the question whether the non-monitoring of the respondent between
02h00 and 06h00, coupled with the failure to deliver AL within one hour of the decision
to perform the operation, constituted negligence which caused AL’s cerebral palsy.
Relying on the expert evidence of Dr Murray and Dr Alheit, the high court found that
negligence and causation were proven on a balance of probabilities, and consequently
found in favour of the respondent.
Issues to be decided
[7] The central issues at t he trial in the high court, as in this Court, were whether
the hospital staff were negligent in their treatment of the respondent and, if so, whether
their negligence caused AL’s hypoxic ischemic injury and the resultant cerebral palsy.
Negligence
[8] The proper approach for establishing the existence or otherwise of negligence
was laid down in Kruger v Coetzee 3 decades ago and remains the same. This test
rests on two bases, namely, reasonable foreseeability and the reasonable
preventability of damage. 4 It is important to emphasise that what is required is
foresight of the reasonable possibility of harm ensuing; foresight of a mere possibility
of harm does not suffice.5 What is or is not reasonably foreseeable in a particular case
is a fact bound enquiry that entails the consideration of all the circumstances of the
case.6 Health professionals such as doctors and nurses are required to dispense
reasonable care by adhering to the level of skill and diligence exercised by members
of their profession, failing which they would be negligent.7 In the circumstances of this
of their profession, failing which they would be negligent.7 In the circumstances of this
case, the hospital staff who attended to the respondent will be found to have been
3 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A); [1966] 2 All SA 490 (A); Lee v Minister of Correctional
Services [2012] ZACC 30 ; 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC) at para 18; Oppelt v Head: Health, Department of
Health Provincial Administration: Western Cape [2015] ZACC 33; 2016 (1) SA 325 (CC) para 63.
4 Jacobs v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail [2014] ZASCA 113; 2015 (1) SA 139 (SCA) para 6.
5 Road Accident Fund v Sauls [2001] ZASCA 135; 2002 (2) SA 55 (SCA) para 8.
6 Pitzer v Eskom [2012] ZASCA 44 para 24. Kruger v Coetzee, note 2 above, at 430G.
7 Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 at 444.
7
negligent if, in dispensing medical care to the respondent, they failed to foresee the
possibility of harm occurring in circumstances where similarly qualified health
professionals in the same position would have reasonably foreseen this possibility and
would have taken steps to prevent it.
Causation
[9] The test for factual causation is whether the act or omission of the defendant
has been proved to have caused or materially contributed to the harm suffered. Where
the defendant has negligently breached a legal duty and the plaintiff has suffered
harm, it must still be proved that the breach is what caused the harm suffered.8 In the
present matter, the question is whether the brain damage sustained by AL would have
been averted if the hospital staff had properly monitored the mother and foetus and
had acted appropriately on the results? If so, factual causation is established. If not,
factual causation has not been established and one is left with only wrongful conduct
without proof that it caused the harm suffered.9
The evidence
[10] The only evidence before the trial court was expert testimony. Both oral and
documentary evidence was adduced. The respondent d id not testify. Two experts,
Dr Murray, an obstetrician and Dr Alheit, a paediatric neurological radiologist, testified
on behalf of the respondent. Prof Buchmann, an obstetrician, testified on behalf of the
appellant. As the determination of the issues in this case is depend ent on the correct
evaluation of expert evidence, it is prudent to preface this part of the judgment with the
applicable principles. This Court in Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung MBH10 stated as follows:
‘An expert's opinion represents his reasoned conclusion based on certain facts or data, which
are either common cause, or established by his own evidence or that of some other competent
witness. Except possibly where it is not controverted, an expert's bald statement of his opinion
is not of any real assistance. Proper evaluation of the opinion can only be undertake n if the
8 AN obo EN v Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape [2019] ZASCA 102; [2019]
4 All SA 1 (SCA) para 4.
9 Ibid para 8.
10 Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung MBH 1976 (3)
SA 352 (A) at 371F-G. Also see BEE v Road Accident Fund [2018] ZASCA 52; 2018 (4) SA 366 (SCA)
para 73.
8
process of reasoning which led to the conclusion, including the premises from which the
reasoning proceeds, are disclosed by the expert.’
[11] As regards the functions of an expert witness, t his Court in McGregor and
another v MEC Health, Western Cape11 stated as follows:
‘The functions of an expert witness are threefold. First, where they have themselves observed
relevant facts that evidence will be evidence of fact and admissible as such. Second, they
provide the court with abstract or general knowledge concerning their discipline that is
necessary to enable the court to understand the issues arising in the litigation. This includes
evidence of the current state of knowledge and generally accepted practice in the field in
question. Although such evidence can only be given by an expert qualified in the relevant field,
it remains, at the end of the day, essentially evidence of fact on which the court will have to
make factual findings. It is necessary to enable the court to assess the validity of opinions that
they express. Third, they give evidence concerning their own inferences and opinions on the
issues in the case and the grounds for drawing those inferences and expressing those
conclusions.’
[12] With those principles in mind, it is now opportune to examine the salient aspects
of the evidence that was placed before the high court. It bears mentioning that the
respondent placed reliance on the provisions of the 2007 guidelines. There are three
stipulations in the 2007 guidelines that are centr al to this case. The first relevant
provision, under the heading of ‘routine monitoring of the first stage of labour, provides
that the foetal heart rate of a woman in the first stage of labour should be monitored
2-hourly. The second provision relevant to this case is that uterine contractions should
be monitored every 2 hours. The third relevant provision, u nder the heading of
‘emergencies during labour’, is couched as follows in relation to foetal distress:
‘FETAL DISTRESS
‘FETAL DISTRESS
This is suspected when the following signs are observed:
• Baseline fetal heart rate ≥160 beats per minute
• Baseline fetal heart rate <110 beats per minute
• Variability persistently <5 beats per minute on CTG, in the absence of sedating drugs
• Late decelerations of the fetal heart rate.’
11 McGregor and another v MEC Health, Western Cape [2020] ZASCA 89 para 17.
9
It is plain from the above, that a foetal heart rate that is equal or greater than 160 beats
per minute or less than 110 beats per minute is not, on its own, sufficient to justify a
conclusion that a foetus is in distress.
[13] An issue was raised about the frequency of the respondent’s monitoring at the
hospital. There was also a dispute as to whether the 2015 national guidelines, which
had replaced the 2007 national guidelines, were to be considered as the applicable
standard of medical care. T he issue arose because Prof Buchmann had mentioned
that the 2007 guidelines were reviewed and were replaced with the 2015 guidelines
so as to align them with the UK -based National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence Guidelines published in 2007 (NICE guidelines). He pointed out that the
NICE guidelines recommended a 4-hourly monitoring for women in the first phase of
labour, which is why the 2015 national guidelines replaced the 2 -hourly monitoring
with the 4-hourly one. He advanced that as the reason why he considered a 4-hourly
monitoring as reasonable even in relation to an inc ident that happened in 2011.
Dr Murray was adamant that the 2-hourly monitoring specified in the 2007 guidelines
was the standard that was applied in South African public hospi tals in 2011.
Notwithstanding Prof Buchmann’s explanation, I am satisfied that since the
respondent’s accouchement occurred in 2011, the 2007 guidelines were , in the
absence of a protocol stating otherwise, a pplicable during her admission and labour
at the hospital. For reasons that will become evident later, there is no need for the
discrepancy in the monitoring recommended by the 2007 guidelines and the NICE
guidelines to detain us any further.
[14] A contentious issue was whether the baseline CTG reading of 160 beats per
minute, recorded during the CTG monitoring that was done from 02h01 to 02h18 (the
2 o’clock CTG monitoring), warranted other interventions being resorted to over and
2 o’clock CTG monitoring), warranted other interventions being resorted to over and
above the steps taken by the nurse who attended to the respondent. The respondent
asserted that there had been no foetal monitoring from 02h18 until a non -reassuring
heart pattern was observed during the CTH monitoring that was done from 06h11 to
06h23. The two obstetricians called as witnesses by the parties (Prof Buchmann a nd
Dr Murray, respectively) gave mutually destructive accounts on whether a CTG
reading of 160 beats per minute was non -reassuring or fell within the normal range.
The obstetrician called by the respondent, Dr Murray, described a baseline heart rate
10
of 160 beats per minute as ‘a borderline heart rate’. When pressed on the issue under
cross-examination, she stated that a baseline heart rate of 160 beats per minute was
‘enough to be suspicious by definition’ and warranted that the CTG monitoring be
continued.
[15] An important consideration on whether a baseline of 160 beats per minute is
suspicious or within the normal range is that Prof Buchmann testified that in terms of
the NICE guidelines, which were applicable in 2011, a baseline foetal heart rate of 110
to 160 b eats per minute was considered normal. Dr Murray conceded that those
specific guidelines were also being applied at hospitals in South Africa. The NICE
guidelines stipulate that ‘if there is a stable baseline fetal heart rate between 110 and
160 beats/minute and normal variability, continue usual care as the risk of fetal
acidosis12 is low’. Prof Buchman testified that regardless of the guidelines relied upon,
the decisive foetal heart rate was a baseline foetal heart rate, which he described as
the average foetal heart rate over a period of 10 minutes. He opined that in this matter,
despite the fact that the nurse who was responsible for the CTG monitoring recorded
the baseline foetal heart rate as 160 beats per minute, the baseline foetal heart r ate
was actually below 160 beats per minute. Dr Murray conceded this point. It is evident
from the CTG printout that the baseline foetal heart rate (in other words the average
heart rate) was slightly less than 160 beats per minute and therefore falling within the
normal baseline range.
[16] Prof Buchmann expounded that a baseline of 160 beats per minute did not, on
its own, suggest that the foetus was in distress. Notably, Dr Murray agreed with him
on this point. Prof Buchmann and Dr Murray were agreed t hat in addition to the
baseline foetal heart rate, there were two other equally important facets of heart
normality that are monitored via CTG by the nursing staff monitoring a patient, namely
normality that are monitored via CTG by the nursing staff monitoring a patient, namely
the baseline variability of the heartbeat , which normally should be between 5 – 10
beats per minute , on the one hand and accelerations and decelerations in the
heartbeat, on the other hand.
12 Acidosis is caused by an overproduction of acid in the blood that builds up in the blood or by a build -up of
carbon dioxide in the blood that results from depressed breathing or lack of oxygen. (Own footnote.)
11
[17] According to Dr Murray, strong contraction s would normally cause a
deceleration, which in itself was dangerous as it was associated with a change in the
foetal heart rate . Dr Murray and Prof Buchmann were agreed that a series of late
decelerations of the heartbeat were generally a cause for concern, as they could
suggest that a foetus was in distress. They were eventually in agreement that during
the 2 o’clock CTG monitoring, t here was good variability and there were no
accelerations nor decelerations that were noted. Dr Murray also conceded that even
though she had initially expressed the view that furthe r monitoring with CTG would
have been advisable because the respondent was experiencing relatively strong
contractions, it was unlikely that the foetus was in distress, given the normal variability
and the absence of accelerations and decelerations. The fo llowing exchange on that
aspect speaks for itself:
‘Mr de Bruin: But nothing points to HI or anything like that on this 2 o’clock [CTG readings]?
Dr Murray: What do you mean by HI, sorry?
Mr de Bruin: Hypoxia or ischemia.
Dr Murray: Well we cannot really measure it directly on a CTG, but I would not have
thought this foetus was hypoxic or ischemic at this point.
. . .
‘Mr de Bruin: If there was stress doctor I must put to you with all these contractions the heart
rate would have differed, it would have dipped with the contractions.
Dr Murray: Well that is why the contractions are unusual, firstly because they are there,
they are frequent, they are there in early labour. And although yesterday it might have been
misleading, I did speak about tachysystole,13 I have not anywhere made a link to say that this
baby was distressed, because of too many contractions . They are simply there, I cannot
explain them and I do believe they were potentially significant, but they are unusual
contractions and so I pointed them out as an abnormality that may have played a role.
contractions and so I pointed them out as an abnormality that may have played a role.
Mr de Bruin: But on the baseline, on the fetal heart rate you do not see an obvious
[interrupted].
Dr Murray: No, they are not typically causing decelerations, which is what you would
typically see, so it is all [interrupted].
Mr de Bruin: Yes, you do not see decelerations?
Dr Murray: No.’ (Own emphasis.)
13 Tachysystole is a condition of excessively frequent uterine contractions. Dr Murray opined that five
contractions and upwards were regarded as tachysystole. (Own footnote.)
12
[18] Given the various concessions made by Dr Murray on this aspect, there is no
basis for disagreeing with Prof Buchmann’s te stimony that based on the readings of
the 2 o’clock CTG monitoring, there were no circumstances calling for the nursing staff
to conclude that there was foetal distress. As nothing, at that stage, necessitated that
the hospital staff should follow the procedures laid down for dealing with foetal distress
in the 2007 guidelines, it was reasonable to discontinue the 2 o’clock CTG monitoring.
[19] It is common cause that after the 2 o’clock CTG monitoring , the next CTG
monitoring was done from 06h11 to 06h23 (the 6 o’clock monitoring) and revealed that
the ba seline heart rate was 175 to 180 b eats per minute. In her evidence -in-chief,
Dr Murray asserted that the 6 o’clock CTG monitoring was borderline pathological and
was a cause for concern. Under cross-examinations, she conceded that even at that
stage, the variability was normal and there were no decelerations . The exchange on
that aspect was as follows:
‘Mr de Bruin: I am sorry M’Lady, I should have referred to it. In your summary doctor you deal
with a 6 o’clock hear rate . . .
Dr Murray: In respect [of] the trace performed at 6 o’clock I did refer to variability being
reduced.
Mr de Bruin: But still normal.
Dr Murray: No, well I said it was reduced, but what I am saying now in Court is that if I were
to look at it more critically, it is probably acceptable.
Mr de Bruin: Yes.
Dr Murray: So I would retract that and call it about five at least on the second half, but
within normal.’ (Own emphasis).
[20] It is clear that even though tachycardia was observed during the 06h11 tracing,
there were no decelerat ions. By Dr Murray’s own admission, variability was still
normal. Significantly, Prof Buchmann’s evidence that there could not have been any
significant episode between the 2 o’clock and 6 o’clock monitoring due to the fact that
significant episode between the 2 o’clock and 6 o’clock monitoring due to the fact that
variability was still maintained by 06h00, was not challenged. Once it is accepted that
there could not have been any significant episode of foetal distress between the 2
o’clock and 6 o’clock CTG monitoring, the issue of whether the monitoring should have
been on a 2-hourly or 4-hourly basis becomes immaterial. This view is fortified by this
13
Court’s judgment in AN obo EN v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape ,14 in which it was
held that even in circumstan ces where hospital staff have acted negligently by not
monitoring the condition of a woman in labour and foetus and acting appropriately on
the results, their wrongful conduct does not, in and of itself, suffice to found delictual
liability. It is trite th at a successful delictual claim entails the proof of a causal link
between a defendant’s actions or omissions, on the one hand, and the harm suffered
by the plaintiff, on the other hand. 15 Ultimately, a crucial enquiry in this matter is the
cause of AL’s injury, an aspect to which I now turn.
The nature of AL’s brain injury
[21] In this regard, an important piece of the mosaic of evidence is the nature of the
injury that caused AL to develop cerebral palsy. Prof Andronikou, a specialist
paediatric radiologist, interpreted the Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scan of AL’s
brain. He described the brain injury suffered by AL as an acute profound hypoxic
ischemic injury sustained during labour. 16 Of significance is that in hi s report,
Prof Andronikou concluded that the MRI features were ‘in keeping with a global insult
to the brain due to hypoxic ischemic injury of an acute profound nature occurring at
term.’ Prof Andronikou’s report was admitted into evidence by agreement of both
parties. A medico-legal report prepared by another specialist paediatric radiologist,
Prof Lotz, was also admitted into evidence by agreement between the parties. These
two radiologists’ reports were attached to the Rule 36(9) notices filed by the
respondent.17 Prof Lotz concurred with Prof Andronikou’s finding that AL’s brain injury
was an acute profound hypoxic ischemic injury. In addition, he also opined that the
brain injury was as a result of severe in utero hypoxia and ischemia that evolved rapidly
‘over a matter of minutes.’ He concluded that, from an imaging perspective, AL’s injury
‘over a matter of minutes.’ He concluded that, from an imaging perspective, AL’s injury
implied ‘a sudden and severe sentinel event that rendered the neonate severely
hypoxic and ischemic, constituting an obstetrical emergency situation at the time.18
14 AN obo EN v Member of the Executive Council for Health Cape note 8 above, para 3.
15 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) at 700F-I.
16Acute’ is defined as meaning ’of sudden onset’ in T L Stedman Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (2012)
at 28. Hypoxia is a prolonged reduction in oxygen supply to the brain. Ischaemia is a restriction in
blood supply which leads to a shortage of oxygen.
17 These notices were filed in terms of rule 36(9) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
18 Sudden’ is defined as meaning ‘occurring unexpectedly or without warning’ in the Concise Oxford
dictionary (2016) at 1153. ‘Emergency’ is defined as meaning ‘unexpected situation’ in the Concise
Oxford Dictionary (2016) at 382.
14
[22] Whereas Prof Lotz had opined that the hypoxia and ischemia had evolved over
a matter of minutes, Dr Alheit, in his testimony, stated that the sentinel event that AL
suffered was a collapse of circulation that happened due to a process that had
developed ‘over a period of time’. He opined that it was not a sudden, unexpected
event. This testimony is plainly irreconcilable with the findings set out in
Prof Andronikou and Prof Lotz’s respective reports. Dr Alheit seemed to suggest a
hybrid of a partial prolong ed and an acute profound insult as a cause of AL’s injury
even though Prof Andronikou and Prof Lotz were agreed that the injury was of an
acute profound nature. The high court accepted Dr Alheit’s thesis despite the fact that
he had conceded that he had no facts specifically relating to this case , on which he
based his opinion.19 It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the high court had
misdirected itself by disregarding the uncontested findings of Prof Andronikou and
Prof Lotz and preferring the evidence of Dr Alheit despite his evidence being contrary
to the former’s admitted evidence. As authority for that submission the appellant relied
on the provisions of s 15(1) of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965, which
states:
‘It shall not be ne cessary for any party in any civil proceedings to prove nor shall it be
competent for any such party to disprove any fact admitted on the record of such proceedings.’
I am not aware of any authority that has deviated from the trite principle enunciated in
this provision.
[23] It bears noting that this Court in Bee v Road Accident Fund ,20 observed as
follows:
‘. . . I agree that in . . . cases [where a court deals with contested expert testimony], a court
must determine whether the factual basis of a particular opinion, if in dispute, has been proved
and must have regard to the cogency of the expert’s process of reasoning. Matters are quite
and must have regard to the cogency of the expert’s process of reasoning. Matters are quite
different, in my respectful opinion, where experts in the same field reach agreement. In such
a case, as I h ave said, a litigant cannot be expected to adduce evidence on the agreed
matters. Unless the trial court itself were for any reason dissatisfied with the agreement and
alerted the parties to the need to adduce evidence on the agreed material, the trial court would,
19 See Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung MBH at
371G where it was stated that ‘except possibly where it is not controverted, an expert's bald statement
of his opinion is not of any real assistance.
20 Bee v Road Accident Fund [2018] ZASCA 52; 2018 (4) SA 366 (SCA) para 73.
15
I think, be bound, and certainly entitled, to accept the matters agreed by the experts .’ (Own
emphasis.)
[24] Based on the passage quoted above, I am of the view that by parity of
reasoning, the high court was obliged to accept the nature and mechanism of the injury
as agreed upon by Prof Andronikou and Prof Lotz in their respective reports . It was
therefore not open to the high court to disregard their findings and to prefer the contrary
opinion proffered by Dr Alheit in his testimony. Moreover, he indicated that it would be
for the obstetrician to establish what happened in this specific case. The obstetrician,
Dr Murray, testified that she did not know what had caused the insult. It is of
significance that notwithstanding his earlier evidence, Dr Alheit admitted, under cross-
examination, that if there were no signs that the foetus was stressed, then the hypoxic
ischemic injury would have been an unpredictable event. Notably, Dr Murray conceded
that she did not consider the foetus to be in distress during the 2 o’clock CTG
monitoring.21
[25] I am inclined to agree that the high court’s preference of Dr Alheit’s evidence
despite it (a) not being supported by facts and (b) being contrary to the findings of the
joint minute in relation to the nature of the injury, was not in accordance with the legal
principles laid down in the authorities mentioned in the preceding paragraphs and
therefore constituted a misdirection. In this regard, it is of significance that Dr Murray
admitted that even at 07h20, there was no indication of hypoxia . It must be borne in
mind that the determination of negligence is a fact-bound enquiry. Despite the fact that
the monitoring of the foetal heart was not in strict accordance with the 2007 guidelines,
the facts of this case, cumulatively considered, do not suggest that the nurse who
attended to the respondent could, based on the 2 o’clock monitoring, reasonably have
foreseen that harm would ensue. N either do they suggest that a reasonable health
foreseen that harm would ensue. N either do they suggest that a reasonable health
professional in the position of that nurse would have foreseen any reasonable
possibility of harm ensuing and taken steps to prevent it.
[26] This brings me to another ground of negligence relied upon by the respondent,
namely, that the doctor who performed the caesarean section failed to perform the
21 See the exchange between Dr Murray and the appellant’s counsel, quoted in para 17 of this
judgment.
16
operation within one hour of the decision to operate being made. It is common cause
that whereas the decision to perform the caesarean section was made at 07h15 , the
caesarean section was performed at 08h37. As stated before, A was delivered at
08h40. The respondent is correct in contending that the appellant did not adduce any
evidence explaining why the procedure was not performed within one hour as
stipulated in the 2007 guidelines. However, Dr Murray’s concession that sometimes it
was not possible to perform the caesarean section operation within hour of the
decision to operate at public hospitals, is a relevant consideration. To get a better
perspective of th e issue, it is necessary for the provisions of the guidelines to be
carefully considered. The following is stated in relation to a caesarean section
operation:
’INDICATIONS FOR CAESAREAN SECTION
Common indications for caesarean section include:
• Cephalopelvic disproportion
• Fetal distress
• Previous caesarean section
• Failed induction of labour
• Intrauterine growth restriction
• Breech presentation
• Placenta praevia
• Transverse lie
• Previous third-degree tear
THE OPERATION
All hospitals, as described in the chapter on levels of care, must have facilities and staff for
the performance of caesarean section. Surgical techniques vary according to the
circumstances and the experience of the operator. The following principles should be followed
in all hospitals:
• Obtain informed consent for surgery, with the operation and its indication clearly explained
to the mother
• Ensure that stored blood for transfusion is available in the hospital
• Ensure that caesarean section can be performed within one hour of the decision to operate
• Check the mother’s Hb level
• Just before starting the operation, ensure that:
- If sterilisation is to be done, consent has been obtained
17
- The fetal heart can still be heard
- The indication22 for operation is still valid
- The fetal presentation and position are known’
[27] The 2007 guidelines provide that the hospital staff must ensure that the
caesarean section can be performed within an hour of the decision to operate. They
also stipulate that ‘just before’ starting the operation, it must be established whether
the indication for the operation is still valid. A number of factors would need to be taken
into account when assessing whether the delivery of AL, outside the one -hour period
constituted negligence. T he hospital records show that from 07h15, when it was
decided that a caesarean section was to be performed, some steps were being taken
by the hospital staff. A CTG monitoring was done at 07h20. The respondent’s consent
was obtained at 07h30. From 07h30 -08h00, the premedication was administered to
her in preparation for the operation. She w as handed over to the operating theatre
staff at 08h00. The anaesthetic was administered at 08h28. Clearly, there was action
from the time the decision to operate was taken at 07h15 up to when the caesarean
operation was performed at 08h37, culminating in the delivery of the baby, AL, at
08h40.
[28] It seems to me that all the actions that were taken from 07h15, when the
decision to operate was made, fall within the scope of ascertaining whether the
indications for performing the caesarean section operati on were still extant, as
contemplated in the provisions of the 2007 guidelines. Under those circumstances, I
am not persuaded that the failure to perform the operation within an hour of the
decision being made was unreasonable. Notably, Dr Murray conceded that the
reaction time of the hospital staff after the decision to operate was made, was not
unreasonable.
[29] What is crucial is whether the brain injury suffered by AL would have
eventuated, but for the alleged negligence of the hospital staff.23 In this regard, it bears
eventuated, but for the alleged negligence of the hospital staff.23 In this regard, it bears
noting that it was not disputed that the brain injury sustained by AL was an acute
22 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ‘indication’ as ‘a symptom or particular circums tance that
indicates the advisability or necessity of a specific medical treatment or procedure’. (Own footnote.)
23 See the elucidation of the ‘but for’ test in Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South
Africa Africa [2015] ZACC 36; 2016 (3) SA 528 (CC).
18
profound hypoxic sentinel event that constitutes an obstetric emergency . It was
undisputed that the CTG reading recorded at 07h20, a mere 10 minutes befor e the
respondent was brought to the theatre staff, still did not confirm the presence of foetal
distress. In response to the question posed by the court at the conclusion of her
evidence, Dr Murray stated that she could not say that the sentinel event would not
have happened if the operation had been performed within an hour. On this aspect Dr
Murray testified as follows:
‘Dr Murray: … I think that it is fairly agreed, or it seems to be the case that no one in this
matter is really sure as to when the e xact injury occurred. We say it occurred, it most likely
occurred leading up to the delivery, because we know that acute profound injuries in general
usually occur close to delivery. Whether it occurred within the 60 minutes, or within the 86
minutes is hard to say. So the increased time may have made a difference, I do not know. We
would then to be able to say that with certainty, we would have to exactly pinpoint as to what
minute the injury occurred, but of course with any emergency time is always of the essence.
So it may have made a difference, but I cannot say definitively.
Court: It may not?
Dr Murray: It may not.’
This concession by Dr Murray undoubtedly speaks specifically to causation. It leads
me to conclude that even if it were to be accepted that some negligence may be found
in (a) not monitoring the respondent between approximately 02h00 and 06h00 or (b)
failing to deliver AL within 1 hour from the time the decision to perform a caesarean
section was taken, the respondent has not shown on a balance of probabilities that
any of these omissions had any causal link with the brain injury that was subsequently
suffered by AL.
[30] It seems to me that the high court focused on Dr Murray’s evidence-in-chief and
paid little or no regard to the concessions and retractions she made under cross -
paid little or no regard to the concessions and retractions she made under cross -
examination. The fact of the matter is that the case pleaded by the respondent was
fatally weakened by those concessions. As stated before, Dr Alheit’s version was
inconsistent with the admitted evidence of Prof Andronikou and Prof Lotz.
Consequently, his evidence did not take the respondent’s case any further. The upshot
is that on the respondent’s own version, the claim fell to be dismissed. In so far as the
high court found to the contrary, it erred.
19
[31] It is trite that the power of appellate courts to overturn credibility findings made
by a trial court is restricted. However, where the findings of a trial court are based on
wrong premises, or where relevant facts have been ignored, or where the factual
findings are clearly wrong, the appeal court is entitled to reverse them. 24 I am of the
view that the credibility findings made by the high court to support its conclusion are
not borne out by the conspectus of the evidence on record. It follows that it is open to
this Court to tamper with them. This brings me to the appellants’ contention that the
adverse findings of the high court were tainted by bias.
[32] The facts and allegations upon which the appellant relies in support of bias
relate to the remarks made about certain witnesses and incorrect factual findings
made in the judgment of the high court. It was argued that those aspects, cumulatively
considered, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, alternatively to a
conclusion that the factual findings were premised on ‘unconscious bias.’ The
Constitutional Court in Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd 25 held that a mistake made by a
judicial officer on the facts, even if correct, is not ordinarily sufficient on its own to give
rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. A mistake on the facts will only give rise to
a reasonable apprehension of bias if it is so unreasonable on the record that it is
inexplicable except on the basis of bias.26 Although I have concluded that the credibility
findings made by the high court are not borne out by the record and found that it
committed errors that amount to a misdirection, I am satisfied that none of those errors
and misdirection meet the threshold of bias as laid down in the seminal judgment of
Bernert v ABSA Bank Ltd. The allegations of bias simply have no merit and this ground
of appeal need not detain this Court any further.
[33] The findings made above are dispositive of this appeal. It is therefore not
[33] The findings made above are dispositive of this appeal. It is therefore not
necessary for this Court to pronounce itself on the rest of the submissions made on
behalf of the respondent. For all the reasons stated above, the appeal stands to be
upheld.
24 R v Dlumayo and Another 1948 (2) SA 677 (A) at 705 – 706; R B v Smith [2019] ZASCA 48; 2020
(4) SA 51 (SCA).
25 Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd [2010] ZACC 28; Ltd 2011 (4) BCLR 329 (CC); 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC).
26 Ibid paras 102 - 103.
20
[34] With regard to costs, the appellants’ counsel advised us that his instruction s
are not to ask for costs, both at the trial court and in the appeal. That being the case,
there is no reason to apply the general rule that the costs must follow the result.
Order:
[35] The following order is made:
1. The appeal is upheld.
2. The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following: ‘The
plaintiff’s claim is dismissed’.
___________________
M B MOLEMELA
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Appearances
For appellant: PJ De Bruyn SC
Instructed by: The State Attorney, East London
The State Attorney, Bloemfontein
For respondent: J Mullins SC
Instructed by : Gary Austin Inc. Attorneys
Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein