Marble & Granite Designs C and Another v Custom Capital Finance (Pty) Ltd (A101/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 201 (15 August 2022)

80 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Contract — Rental agreement — Enforceability — Appellants contested the validity of a rental agreement for office equipment, claiming it was unenforceable due to incomplete terms and lack of delivery by the respondent. The trial court found that the appellants had signed the agreement and acknowledged delivery, thus establishing a binding contract. The appellants' defenses were rejected as meritless, affirming that a signatory is bound by the terms of a contract regardless of prior knowledge of its contents. The absence of a commencement date for rental payments did not invalidate the agreement. The court upheld the trial court's judgment in favor of the respondent for arrear and future rentals.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the High Court (Free State Division, Bloemfontein) against the whole judgment of the Magistrates’ Court, Hennenman, delivered on 12 May 2021. The appeal was heard on 25 April 2022 and judgment was delivered electronically on 15 August 2022.


The appellants were Marble & Granite Designs CC (first appellant/first defendant in the trial court) and Thomas François Greyling (second appellant/second defendant in the trial court). The respondent was Custom Capital Finance (Pty) Ltd (plaintiff in the trial court).


The matter originated as an action in the Magistrates’ Court in which the plaintiff sought (i) return of rented equipment and (ii) payment of arrear rentals and future rentals, alleging an uncured breach of a rental agreement. The Magistrates’ Court granted judgment for the plaintiff, ordering return of the equipment (with damage “still to be proven”), payment of arrears, payment of future rentals for a defined period, interest, and costs on an attorney-and-own-client scale.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the enforceability and performance of a rental agreement used to finance office equipment (PABX telephone systems), including whether the agreement was binding despite alleged incompleteness and whether the plaintiff had to prove delivery and installation as a condition for payment.


2. Material Facts


The plaintiff conducted business financing the supply of office equipment through rental agreements. On 27 September 2018, the second defendant signed a rental agreement relating to the rental of nine PABX telephone systems for a period of 60 months, at a monthly rental of R7 762.50. The second defendant also signed a deed of suretyship, binding himself personally as co-principal debtor with the first defendant for the first defendant’s obligations under the rental agreement.


It was common cause that after signature of the relevant documents, the first defendant paid rentals from October 2018 until June 2019, after which it fell into arrears and then stopped further payments.


The plaintiff’s case, accepted by the trial court, was that the plaintiff financed equipment supplied to the first defendant by IP Solutions (Pty) Ltd, and that the first defendant confirmed delivery and proper installation at its premises by signing documentation described as the delivery note/contract and installation confirmation/certificate of acceptance and the customer satisfaction report (referred to in the judgment as Exhibits “C” and “D”).


A point of factual and contractual controversy raised by the defendants was that, when the second defendant was presented with the rental agreement to sign, it was allegedly incomplete, including that the commencement date was not inserted, and that the reverse side was illegible and not properly presented for reading before signature. The defendants also advanced an alternative contention that their obligation to pay had not arisen because the plaintiff had allegedly not delivered and installed the equipment as required by the agreement (specifically with reference to clause 3.3).


The trial court rejected the defendants’ factual challenge, including their attempt to dispute (i) the validity of the agreement, (ii) the veracity of the second defendant’s signature, and (iii) the plaintiff’s performance, particularly because the defence evidence was presented through Mrs Greyling (the second defendant’s spouse), who was found not to be privy to the signing circumstances and whose versions were internally contradictory on whether the equipment was delivered, whether it was defective, and whether the first defendant wanted the equipment.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the appeal court was required to determine were whether the plaintiff had proved, on a balance of probabilities, that a binding rental agreement existed between the parties and that the defendants were in breach, entitling the plaintiff to the relief granted by the trial court.


A key issue of law applied to fact was whether the agreement was unenforceable because it was allegedly incomplete and/or illegible when signed (including the blank commencement date and alleged inability to read the reverse side), and what consequences flowed from a party signing such a document.


A further issue of interpretation and application of contract terms was whether the plaintiff bore the obligation to deliver and install the equipment, or whether those obligations were allocated to the renter (the first defendant) under clauses 3.1 to 3.3, and what evidentiary showing was required to establish performance sufficient to trigger the defendants’ payment obligation.


A subsidiary evaluative question concerned the extent to which an appellate court should interfere with the trial court’s credibility findings and factual conclusions, given the trial court’s rejection of the defence witness’s evidence as unreliable.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The appeal court endorsed the principle that a person who signs a contract is generally taken to be bound by what appears above their signature, whether or not they read the document before signing, in the absence of fraud being alleged. In this regard, the court referred to the approach that contract formation is assessed by external manifestations rather than undisclosed subjective states of mind, as articulated in South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704.


In applying that principle, the court held that it was for the signatory to explain the circumstances under which the signature was appended. The court reasoned that the onus rested on the second defendant to explain why he did not read the agreement before signing it and why he signed it despite alleging it was incomplete and illegible. The defendants’ case, however, did not rest on the second defendant’s evidence explaining signature; instead, it depended on the testimony of the second defendant’s spouse, who was not present for or privy to the signature process.


The appeal court found that the trial court was justified in rejecting the defence witness’s version as false, relying on the trial court’s assessment of discrepancies and improbabilities in her testimony. In this connection, the judgment referred to the approach to factual disputes and credibility assessments described in Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd and Another v Martell et Cie and Others 2003 (1) SA 11 (SCA). On the plaintiff’s accepted evidence, the appeal court considered the conclusion sound that the second defendant knew he was signing a rental agreement and assented to its terms, with the result that the defendants were not entitled to resile from it.


The appeal court then dealt specifically with the blank commencement date. It accepted that the parties had not agreed on a commencement date in the sense that the schedule contained the duration and amount of rentals but left the space for commencement blank. Nonetheless, the court held that this omission did not render the agreement invalid. It reasoned that the essential feature of a rental agreement is an undertaking by the renter to pay rent for use and enjoyment of the thing hired; the required certainty is the existence of an undertaking to pay rent. The court further reasoned that parties are free to agree on date and duration as terms, but failure to specify a commencement date does not necessarily invalidate the agreement. The court cited Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 16 (SCA), which cited with approval Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290, in support of the proposition that such an omission did not necessarily defeat contractual validity.


On the issue of performance, the appeal court examined clauses 3.1 to 3.3 and concluded that the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff had to deliver and install the equipment was contradicted by the contract’s express wording. The agreement recorded that the equipment was selected by the renter and that the renter, at its own cost, had to arrange collection and installation at the installation address. The renter would take delivery on the plaintiff’s behalf, and by signing the supplier’s delivery note the renter confirmed inspection and satisfaction that the equipment was free from defects and fit for purpose.


Applying those provisions, the appeal court held that the obligation to arrange delivery/collection and installation “fell squarely” on the first defendant, and that the first defendant had to confirm delivery and proper installation by signing the relevant documents. On the evidence, it was undisputed that the first defendant signed the delivery and satisfaction documentation, acknowledging delivery and installation. The court therefore rejected as unsound the contention that the plaintiff needed to lead further evidence to prove receipt and proper installation beyond that contractual mechanism and the signed confirmations.


Having concluded that there was no sustainable basis to disturb the trial court’s findings on contractual validity, performance, and breach, the appeal court held there was no basis to interfere with the judgment appealed against.


5. Outcome and Relief


The appeal was dismissed.


The appeal court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs. The effect was that the Magistrates’ Court order in favour of the plaintiff remained in place, including the orders for return of equipment (with damage to be proven), payment of arrear rentals and future rentals, interest, and costs on an attorney-and-own-client scale as ordered by the trial court.


Cases Cited


South African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd 1924 AD 704.


Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd and Another v Martell et Cie and Others 2003 (1) SA 11 (SCA).


Southernport Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd [2005] 2 All SA 16 (SCA).


Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290.


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The High Court held that the defendants’ grounds of appeal lacked merit. The signature on the rental agreement bound the second defendant, and the defendants did not provide a satisfactory factual foundation to avoid the agreement based on alleged incompleteness or illegibility, particularly given the absence of direct evidence from the signatory and the trial court’s rejection of the defence witness’s credibility.


The court further held that the absence of an inserted commencement date did not invalidate the rental agreement, as the undertaking to pay rent and the agreed duration and amount were sufficient for contractual validity in the context addressed.


Finally, the court held that, on the proper interpretation of clauses 3.1 to 3.3, the plaintiff was not contractually responsible for delivery and installation; those responsibilities lay with the renter. The signed delivery and satisfaction documents constituted acknowledgment of delivery and installation, supporting the plaintiff’s case that it had performed and that the defendants were in breach when payments stopped.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A contracting party who signs a written contract is generally taken to be bound by its terms, whether or not the document was read before signature, and contractual consensus is determined primarily by the parties’ external manifestations rather than undisclosed subjective intentions, in the absence of fraud.


Where a party seeks to avoid a contract on the basis that it was not read or was allegedly incomplete or illegible at signature, the evidentiary burden rests on that party to provide a satisfactory explanation of the circumstances of signature sufficient to displace the ordinary consequence of signature.


An appellate court will be slow to interfere with a trial court’s findings that depend on credibility assessments and evaluations of probabilities, particularly where the trial court identifies material contradictions and improbabilities in a witness’s testimony.


In a rental agreement, the absence of agreement on a particular term such as the commencement date of payments does not necessarily invalidate the contract where the essential undertaking to pay rent and other key terms (such as duration and rental amount) are present; such matters may constitute contractual terms but are not invariably essential to validity.


Where a contract allocates obligations for delivery and installation to one party and provides a mechanism by which that party confirms delivery and satisfactory condition (such as signing delivery and acceptance documents), the confirming party’s signature on those documents supports the conclusion that delivery and installation occurred as contemplated and may undermine later assertions that the plaintiff failed to perform those functions.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 201
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Marble & Granite Designs C and Another v Custom Capital Finance (Pty) Ltd (A101/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 201 (15 August 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number: A101/2021
Reportable:
YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
In
the matter between:
MARBLE
& GRANITE DESIGNS CC
1
st
Appellant / 1
st
Defendant
THOMAS
FRANCOIS GREYLING
2
nd
Appellant / 2
nd
Defendant
and
CUSTOM
CAPITAL FINANCE (PTY) LTD
Respondent / Plaintiff
CORAM:
MATHEBULA,
J et DANISO, J
JUDGMENT
BY:
DANISO,
J
HEARD
ON:
25
APRIL 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives by email and by release to SAFLII. The
date
and time for hand-down is deemed to be 12h00 on 15 August 2022.
[1]
This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Magistrate,
Hennenman delivered
on 12 May 2021.
[2]
The judgment emanates from an action instituted by the respondent
against the appellants
for the return of rented equipment and payment
of arrear and future rentals based on an uncured breach by the
appellants of a rental
agreement concluded by the parties. Judgment
was subsequently granted in favour of the respondent as the plaintiff
against the
appellants as the defendants jointly and severally one
paying the other to be absolved on the following terms:

1.
That the equipment be returned to plaintiff, damage still to be
proven.
2.
The defendants make payment to the amount of R15 609.82 in
respect of arrear rentals.
3.
Interest thereon at 6% above the prime rate from date of judgment to
date of payment.
4.
That the defendants make payment to the amount of R485 943.35 in
respect of future rentals
for the period 1 September 2019 to 30
September 2023.
5.
Interest thereon at the prevailing rate from date of judgment until
date of payment.
6.
Costs on attorney and own client scale.”
[3]
For the purposes of convenience, the parties are referred to as cited
in the trial.
[4]
In their plea, the defendants denied that the plaintiff was entitled
to payment as
claimed on several grounds. They alleged that the
agreement was unenforceable due to the fact that at the time when the
second
defendant was presented with the agreement to sign it, it was
incomplete. The commencement date was not inserted. Furthermore, the

reverse side of the agreement was illegible and he was not afforded
an opportunity to read the agreement before signing it. An

alternative contention was that the defendants’ obligation to
pay had not arisen as the plaintiff had not delivered and installed

the equipment as provided for in clause 3.3. of the agreement.
[5]
Accordingly, the issue to be determined by the trial court was
whether the plaintiff
had discharged its onus of proving the terms of
the agreement and the alleged breach.
[6]
The facts of this matter involve the following: The plaintiff carries
on a business
of financing the supply of office equipment by means of
rental agreements. On 27 September 2018, the second defendant signed
a
rental agreement pertaining to the rental of 9 PABX telephone
systems (“the equipment”) from the plaintiff for a period

of sixty (60) months at a monthly rental of R7 762.50
[1]
and a deed of suretyship in terms of which the second defendant bound
himself personally as co-principal debtor with the first
defendant in
respect of the latter’s obligations under the rental agreement.
The first defendant also appended his signature
on the delivery note

contract
and installation confirmation/certificate of acceptance

and the “
customer
satisfaction report.

[2]
[7]
It is common cause that pursuant to the signing of the said
documents, the first defendant
paid the rentals due in terms of the
agreement from October 2018 until June 2019 when first defendant fell
into arrears with the
monthly rentals and subsequently stopped
further payments.
[8]
In granting the judgment against the defendants, the court
a quo
was satisfied that the plaintiff’s evidence tendered by
Messrs Chris and Pierre du Toit had established that the second
defendant
had signed the agreement (Exhibit “A”) in terms
of which the plaintiff financed the equipment supplied to the first

defendant by an entity knows as IP Solutions (Pty) Ltd and pursuant
to the conclusion of the said agreement, the first defendant

confirmed delivery and proper installation  of the equipment at
its premises as per Exhibit “C” and “D.”
The
date of the commencement of the rental payments was left blank due to
the lapse of time that would arise due to the fact that
the agreement
was signed by the respective parties at different provinces, the
plaintiff in Kwazulu Natal and the first defendant
at the Free State.
The court
a quo
was satisfied that the parties had concluded a
binding agreement and that the plaintiff had performed its
obligations in terms of
the agreement.
[9]
On the other side, the defendants’ contentions pertaining to
the unenforceability
of the agreement and the plaintiff’s
failure to deliver the equipment was rejected on the grounds that the
witness who testified
for the defendants, Mrs Greyling (the second
defendants’ spouse) was unreliable, untrustworthy and clearly
fabricated her
testimony.  She sought to dispute the validity of
the agreement, the veracity of the second defendant’s signature
and
the plaintiff’s performance despite the fact that she was
not privy to the circumstances under which the agreement, the
delivery
note and the customer satisfaction report were signed. Her
testimony also did not assist the defendants’ case as she
contradicted
herself with regard to whether the equipment was
delivered at the first defendant’s premises or not. She told
the court
a quo
that not all the rented equipment was
delivered and the delivered equipment was defective, another version
was that the first defendant
had in fact not wanted the equipment.
[10]
In their grounds of appeal and in argument before us the defendants
persisted with the defences
raised in the court
a quo
by
essentially averring that the trial court erred by accepting the
plaintiff’s evidence as it did not prove that the parties

concluded a binding agreement and that the plaintiff had performed
its obligations in terms of that agreement which would require
the
defendants to make the rental payments.
[11]
The defendants’ defences are meritless. The principle
applicable where the validity of
a contract is disputed by a party on
the grounds that he was not aware of the contents of the agreement
before he signed it is
trite: A person who signs a contract is taken
to be bound by what appears above his signature whether or not he had
read the agreement
or not before signing it and would thus be liable
to perform the terms of the agreement. It was also pointed out in
South
African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd
[3]
that:

The law does
not concern itself with the working of the minds of parties to a
contract, but with the external manifestation of their
minds. Even
therefore if from a philosophical standpoint the minds of the parties
do not meet, yet, if by their acts their minds
seem to have met, the
law will, where fraud is not alleged, look to their acts and assume
that their minds did meet and that they
contracted in accordance with
what the parties purport to accept as a record of their agreement.
This is the only practical way
in which Courts of law can determine
the terms of a contract.”
[12]
It is for the signatory to explain the circumstances under which he
appended his signature on
the agreement. The onus was on the second
defendant to explain why he did not read the agreement before he
signed it and why he
signed it even though it appeared to be
incomplete and illegible.
[13]
In this matter the defence’s case rested on the testimony of
the second defendant’s
wife who was not privy to the facts
surrounding the conclusion of the agreement. Having regard to the
discrepancies and improbabilities
that exist in her version the court
a
quo
was
correct in rejecting it as false:
[4]
The
trial court was thus on solid ground in holding that on the
plaintiff’s accepted evidence, the plaintiff had proved on
a
balance of probabilities that the second defendant was well aware
that he was signing a rental agreement and that by appending
his
signature on the said agreement he assented to the terms of that
agreement therefore the defendants were not entitled to resile
from
the agreement.
[14]
It is indeed so that having regard to the contents of the agreement,
the parties have not agreed
on the commencement date of the rental
payments. As appears from the agreement’s “SCHEDULE OF
RENTAL” only the
duration of the rental and the amount of
rentals are reflected. The space provided for the insertion of the
commencement date of
the rental payments was left blank.
[15]
An essential term of a rental agreement is an undertaking by the
“renter” to pay
a fixed rental at which the renter is to
have use and enjoyment of that thing to be hired. The certainty that
is required is that
there must be an undertaking by the renter to pay
rent.
[5]
[16]
The parties are at liberty to agree on the date and the duration of
the rental payments and that
would merely constitute a term of the
agreement in that failure to do so does not invalidate the
agreement.
[6]
The trial court was
therefore
quite right in its conclusion that the absence of the
date
of commencement of the instalments does not render the agreement
invalid.
[17]
Regarding the disputed performance by the plaintiff, the material
terms of the agreement relevant
to this appeal are embodied in
clauses 3.1. to 3.3. of the agreement which provide thus:

3.
DELIVERY
3.1
It is recorded that the equipment has been or will be purchased by
CCF from the suppliers of the equipment
at the Renter’s request
and solely for the purpose of renting the equipment to the Renter in
terms of this agreement. The
equipment has been selected by the
Renter and CCF makes so warrantless or representations as to the
condition of the equipment.
3.2    The
Renter shall at its own cost, arrange for the collection of the
equipment and the installation of the equipment
at the installation
address specified on the front page. The Renter shall, in this
respect, take delivery of the equipment on CCF’s
behalf so that
ownership of the equipment shall pass to CCF will such delivery and
the Renter shall hold the equipment on CCF’s
behalf (or on
behalf of its cessionary as the case may be) for the duration of this
rental agreement.
3.3
The Renter shall upon taking delivery of the equipment from the
supplier, sign the supplier’s delivery
note and shall procure
that a copy of the delivery note is given, without delays, to CCF,
against which delivery note payment shall
be effected of the price
due to the supplier for the equipment. By signing the said delivery
note, the Renter confirms that it
has inspected the equipment and has
satisfied itself that the equipment is free from any defect and
satisfactory for the purpose
intended.”
[18]
The appellant’s allusion that the plaintiff was required to
deliver and install the equipment
is gainsaid by the provisions of
the agreement. Clauses 3.1. to 3.3. make it clear that the obligation
to arrange for the collection
or delivery and installation of the
equipment fell squarely on the first defendant who had to also
confirm the delivery and the
proper installation by signing the
delivery note and the customer satisfaction report (Exhibit “C”
and “D”).
On the available evidence, it is undisputed
that the first defendant acted accordingly by signing the said
documents thereby acknowledging
delivery and the proper installation
of the equipment. I’m of the view that the defendant’s
contention that more evidence
was required from the plaintiff to
prove that the first defendant had received the equipment and that it
was installed property
is unsound.
[19]
There i
s therefore no valid basis
to interfere with the conclusions reached by the court
a
quo.
[20]
In the light of the above reasons,
I
propose the following order:
Order
1.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
N.S.
DANISO, J
I
concur and it is so ordered
M.A.
MATHEBULA, J
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for Appellant:                                                 Adv.

H.J. van der Merwe
Instructed
by:
Symington

De Kok Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
Counsel
for respondents:                                            Adv.

S. Hoar
Instructed
by:                                                               Romer

Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
[1]
Exhibit “A”.
[2]
Exhibit “C” and “D” respectively.
[3]
1924 AD 704
at pages 715-6.
[4]
Stellenbosch
Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd and Another v Martell et Cie and
Others
2003 (1) SA 11
(SCA) at para 5.
[5]
Cooper,
Landlord
and Tenant
2
nd
edition at page 3.
[6]
Southernport
Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd
[2005]
2 All SA 16
(SCA), the Court at para 6 citing with approval
Kessler
v Krogmann
1908
TS 290
at 297.