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[2022] ZAFSHC 201
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Marble & Granite Designs C and Another v Custom Capital Finance (Pty) Ltd (A101/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 201 (15 August 2022)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number: A101/2021
Reportable:
YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
In
the matter between:
MARBLE
& GRANITE DESIGNS CC
1
st
Appellant / 1
st
Defendant
THOMAS
FRANCOIS GREYLING
2
nd
Appellant / 2
nd
Defendant
and
CUSTOM
CAPITAL FINANCE (PTY) LTD
Respondent / Plaintiff
CORAM:
MATHEBULA,
J et DANISO, J
JUDGMENT
BY:
DANISO,
J
HEARD
ON:
25
APRIL 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' representatives by email and by release to SAFLII. The
date
and time for hand-down is deemed to be 12h00 on 15 August 2022.
[1]
This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Magistrate,
Hennenman delivered
on 12 May 2021.
[2]
The judgment emanates from an action instituted by the respondent
against the appellants
for the return of rented equipment and payment
of arrear and future rentals based on an uncured breach by the
appellants of a rental
agreement concluded by the parties. Judgment
was subsequently granted in favour of the respondent as the plaintiff
against the
appellants as the defendants jointly and severally one
paying the other to be absolved on the following terms:
“
1.
That the equipment be returned to plaintiff, damage still to be
proven.
2.
The defendants make payment to the amount of R15 609.82 in
respect of arrear rentals.
3.
Interest thereon at 6% above the prime rate from date of judgment to
date of payment.
4.
That the defendants make payment to the amount of R485 943.35 in
respect of future rentals
for the period 1 September 2019 to 30
September 2023.
5.
Interest thereon at the prevailing rate from date of judgment until
date of payment.
6.
Costs on attorney and own client scale.”
[3]
For the purposes of convenience, the parties are referred to as cited
in the trial.
[4]
In their plea, the defendants denied that the plaintiff was entitled
to payment as
claimed on several grounds. They alleged that the
agreement was unenforceable due to the fact that at the time when the
second
defendant was presented with the agreement to sign it, it was
incomplete. The commencement date was not inserted. Furthermore, the
reverse side of the agreement was illegible and he was not afforded
an opportunity to read the agreement before signing it. An
alternative contention was that the defendants’ obligation to
pay had not arisen as the plaintiff had not delivered and installed
the equipment as provided for in clause 3.3. of the agreement.
[5]
Accordingly, the issue to be determined by the trial court was
whether the plaintiff
had discharged its onus of proving the terms of
the agreement and the alleged breach.
[6]
The facts of this matter involve the following: The plaintiff carries
on a business
of financing the supply of office equipment by means of
rental agreements. On 27 September 2018, the second defendant signed
a
rental agreement pertaining to the rental of 9 PABX telephone
systems (“the equipment”) from the plaintiff for a period
of sixty (60) months at a monthly rental of R7 762.50
[1]
and a deed of suretyship in terms of which the second defendant bound
himself personally as co-principal debtor with the first
defendant in
respect of the latter’s obligations under the rental agreement.
The first defendant also appended his signature
on the delivery note
“
contract
and installation confirmation/certificate of acceptance
”
and the “
customer
satisfaction report.
”
[2]
[7]
It is common cause that pursuant to the signing of the said
documents, the first defendant
paid the rentals due in terms of the
agreement from October 2018 until June 2019 when first defendant fell
into arrears with the
monthly rentals and subsequently stopped
further payments.
[8]
In granting the judgment against the defendants, the court
a quo
was satisfied that the plaintiff’s evidence tendered by
Messrs Chris and Pierre du Toit had established that the second
defendant
had signed the agreement (Exhibit “A”) in terms
of which the plaintiff financed the equipment supplied to the first
defendant by an entity knows as IP Solutions (Pty) Ltd and pursuant
to the conclusion of the said agreement, the first defendant
confirmed delivery and proper installation of the equipment at
its premises as per Exhibit “C” and “D.”
The
date of the commencement of the rental payments was left blank due to
the lapse of time that would arise due to the fact that
the agreement
was signed by the respective parties at different provinces, the
plaintiff in Kwazulu Natal and the first defendant
at the Free State.
The court
a quo
was satisfied that the parties had concluded a
binding agreement and that the plaintiff had performed its
obligations in terms of
the agreement.
[9]
On the other side, the defendants’ contentions pertaining to
the unenforceability
of the agreement and the plaintiff’s
failure to deliver the equipment was rejected on the grounds that the
witness who testified
for the defendants, Mrs Greyling (the second
defendants’ spouse) was unreliable, untrustworthy and clearly
fabricated her
testimony. She sought to dispute the validity of
the agreement, the veracity of the second defendant’s signature
and
the plaintiff’s performance despite the fact that she was
not privy to the circumstances under which the agreement, the
delivery
note and the customer satisfaction report were signed. Her
testimony also did not assist the defendants’ case as she
contradicted
herself with regard to whether the equipment was
delivered at the first defendant’s premises or not. She told
the court
a quo
that not all the rented equipment was
delivered and the delivered equipment was defective, another version
was that the first defendant
had in fact not wanted the equipment.
[10]
In their grounds of appeal and in argument before us the defendants
persisted with the defences
raised in the court
a quo
by
essentially averring that the trial court erred by accepting the
plaintiff’s evidence as it did not prove that the parties
concluded a binding agreement and that the plaintiff had performed
its obligations in terms of that agreement which would require
the
defendants to make the rental payments.
[11]
The defendants’ defences are meritless. The principle
applicable where the validity of
a contract is disputed by a party on
the grounds that he was not aware of the contents of the agreement
before he signed it is
trite: A person who signs a contract is taken
to be bound by what appears above his signature whether or not he had
read the agreement
or not before signing it and would thus be liable
to perform the terms of the agreement. It was also pointed out in
South
African Railways & Harbours v National Bank of South Africa Ltd
[3]
that:
“
The law does
not concern itself with the working of the minds of parties to a
contract, but with the external manifestation of their
minds. Even
therefore if from a philosophical standpoint the minds of the parties
do not meet, yet, if by their acts their minds
seem to have met, the
law will, where fraud is not alleged, look to their acts and assume
that their minds did meet and that they
contracted in accordance with
what the parties purport to accept as a record of their agreement.
This is the only practical way
in which Courts of law can determine
the terms of a contract.”
[12]
It is for the signatory to explain the circumstances under which he
appended his signature on
the agreement. The onus was on the second
defendant to explain why he did not read the agreement before he
signed it and why he
signed it even though it appeared to be
incomplete and illegible.
[13]
In this matter the defence’s case rested on the testimony of
the second defendant’s
wife who was not privy to the facts
surrounding the conclusion of the agreement. Having regard to the
discrepancies and improbabilities
that exist in her version the court
a
quo
was
correct in rejecting it as false:
[4]
The
trial court was thus on solid ground in holding that on the
plaintiff’s accepted evidence, the plaintiff had proved on
a
balance of probabilities that the second defendant was well aware
that he was signing a rental agreement and that by appending
his
signature on the said agreement he assented to the terms of that
agreement therefore the defendants were not entitled to resile
from
the agreement.
[14]
It is indeed so that having regard to the contents of the agreement,
the parties have not agreed
on the commencement date of the rental
payments. As appears from the agreement’s “SCHEDULE OF
RENTAL” only the
duration of the rental and the amount of
rentals are reflected. The space provided for the insertion of the
commencement date of
the rental payments was left blank.
[15]
An essential term of a rental agreement is an undertaking by the
“renter” to pay
a fixed rental at which the renter is to
have use and enjoyment of that thing to be hired. The certainty that
is required is that
there must be an undertaking by the renter to pay
rent.
[5]
[16]
The parties are at liberty to agree on the date and the duration of
the rental payments and that
would merely constitute a term of the
agreement in that failure to do so does not invalidate the
agreement.
[6]
The trial court was
therefore
quite right in its conclusion that the absence of the
date
of commencement of the instalments does not render the agreement
invalid.
[17]
Regarding the disputed performance by the plaintiff, the material
terms of the agreement relevant
to this appeal are embodied in
clauses 3.1. to 3.3. of the agreement which provide thus:
“
3.
DELIVERY
3.1
It is recorded that the equipment has been or will be purchased by
CCF from the suppliers of the equipment
at the Renter’s request
and solely for the purpose of renting the equipment to the Renter in
terms of this agreement. The
equipment has been selected by the
Renter and CCF makes so warrantless or representations as to the
condition of the equipment.
3.2 The
Renter shall at its own cost, arrange for the collection of the
equipment and the installation of the equipment
at the installation
address specified on the front page. The Renter shall, in this
respect, take delivery of the equipment on CCF’s
behalf so that
ownership of the equipment shall pass to CCF will such delivery and
the Renter shall hold the equipment on CCF’s
behalf (or on
behalf of its cessionary as the case may be) for the duration of this
rental agreement.
3.3
The Renter shall upon taking delivery of the equipment from the
supplier, sign the supplier’s delivery
note and shall procure
that a copy of the delivery note is given, without delays, to CCF,
against which delivery note payment shall
be effected of the price
due to the supplier for the equipment. By signing the said delivery
note, the Renter confirms that it
has inspected the equipment and has
satisfied itself that the equipment is free from any defect and
satisfactory for the purpose
intended.”
[18]
The appellant’s allusion that the plaintiff was required to
deliver and install the equipment
is gainsaid by the provisions of
the agreement. Clauses 3.1. to 3.3. make it clear that the obligation
to arrange for the collection
or delivery and installation of the
equipment fell squarely on the first defendant who had to also
confirm the delivery and the
proper installation by signing the
delivery note and the customer satisfaction report (Exhibit “C”
and “D”).
On the available evidence, it is undisputed
that the first defendant acted accordingly by signing the said
documents thereby acknowledging
delivery and the proper installation
of the equipment. I’m of the view that the defendant’s
contention that more evidence
was required from the plaintiff to
prove that the first defendant had received the equipment and that it
was installed property
is unsound.
[19]
There i
s therefore no valid basis
to interfere with the conclusions reached by the court
a
quo.
[20]
In the light of the above reasons,
I
propose the following order:
Order
1.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
N.S.
DANISO, J
I
concur and it is so ordered
M.A.
MATHEBULA, J
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for Appellant: Adv.
H.J. van der Merwe
Instructed
by:
Symington
De Kok Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
Counsel
for respondents: Adv.
S. Hoar
Instructed
by: Romer
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
[1]
Exhibit “A”.
[2]
Exhibit “C” and “D” respectively.
[3]
1924 AD 704
at pages 715-6.
[4]
Stellenbosch
Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd and Another v Martell et Cie and
Others
2003 (1) SA 11
(SCA) at para 5.
[5]
Cooper,
Landlord
and Tenant
2
nd
edition at page 3.
[6]
Southernport
Developments (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd
[2005]
2 All SA 16
(SCA), the Court at para 6 citing with approval
Kessler
v Krogmann
1908
TS 290
at 297.