Victor and Another v Wonderhoek Farms (Pty) Ltd and Others (5049/2014) [2022] ZAFSHC 153 (10 June 2022)

80 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Execution — Variation of court order — Application for variation of order issued under Rule 42(1)(b) due to alleged ambiguity — Applicants sought to correct a patent error in an order that was intended to be final but was issued as a rule nisi — Court held that the initial order had indeed been adjudicated on the merits, rendering the rule nisi inappropriate and constituting an error — Order varied to reflect the finality of the relief granted.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an application for the variation (or correction) of a prior court order under Rule 42(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court, on the basis that the earlier order allegedly contained a patent error or ambiguity. The applicants sought to alter the form of an order granted by Van Zyl J on 4 August 2021, contending that the court ought to have granted a final order (or at least not a rule nisi) because, on their version, the merits of the urgent relief had already been fully argued and determined.


The parties were Vaugh Victor (first applicant) and Maria Magrietha Catharina Victor (second applicant) on the one hand, and Wonderhoek Farms (Pty) Ltd (first respondent) and various other respondents (including trustees/office-bearers, Firstrand Bank Limited, and the Master of the High Court, Bloemfontein) on the other. Only Wonderhoek opposed the Rule 42 application; the other respondents did not oppose.


The procedural history arose from an urgent application launched on 24 March 2020 (framed as a rule nisi), seeking interim interdictory relief in Part A pending the finalisation of broader relief in Part B, which included setting aside an earlier court order (dated 20 February 2020 under case number 5049/2014) and attacking a settlement agreement (including reliance on section 75(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936). On 25–26 March 2020, Van Zyl J dealt with urgency, standing, and the merits of Part A, reserving judgment. After substantial delay (including the commencement of the Covid-19 lockdown), Van Zyl J delivered an order on 4 August 2021 granting a rule nisi with interim interdictory effect pending finalisation of Part B, and reserving costs. The rule nisi was thereafter extended on the return dates.


The general subject-matter of the dispute in the Rule 42 application was narrow: whether the wording and form of the 4 August 2021 order reflected an error/ambiguity attributable to the court, justifying variation under Rule 42(1)(b), or whether it accurately reflected what was sought and decided, namely interim relief via a rule nisi procedure.


2. Material Facts


The applicants launched an urgent application on 24 March 2020 seeking, in Part A, a rule nisi with interim interdictory relief restraining the first respondent (Wonderhoek) and those acting under its instructions from, among other things, breaking and entering buildings on the farm Portion 1 of the farm Aanvang (district Wepener) and harassing or intimidating the applicants. Part A also sought to interdict implementation of a settlement agreement. Part B sought substantive relief aimed at setting aside an earlier court order and declaring the settlement agreement void, including an allegation that Wonderhoek’s claim had lapsed for non-compliance with section 75(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.


The urgent application was served on Wonderhoek on 24 March 2020 and set down for 25 March 2020. Wonderhoek filed an answering affidavit on 25 March 2020. No other answering affidavits were filed by other respondents, and several respondents present in court did not participate because they had no interest in Part A relief.


On 25 March 2020, Van Zyl J heard argument on urgency and the first applicant’s locus standi. On 26 March 2020, Van Zyl J dismissed the first applicant’s Part A relief relating to interdicting implementation of the settlement agreement (prayer 2.4) due to lack of standing, and struck the second applicant’s corresponding relief for want of urgency. The court found that the remaining Part A relief was urgent and heard argument on it. Judgment was reserved on 26 March 2020, shortly before the national Covid-19 lockdown commenced.


On 4 August 2021, Van Zyl J issued an order in the form of a rule nisi returnable on 26 August 2021, granting interim interdictory relief with immediate effect, pending finalisation of Part B, and reserving costs. The order interdicted specified conduct on the farm (including breaking and entering buildings, and harassment/intimidation). The rule nisi was later extended, and costs remained reserved at those stages.


On 19 October 2021, the applicants instituted the present Rule 42(1)(b) application seeking variation of the 4 August 2021 order. The applicants contended that it was a patent error or ambiguity for Van Zyl J to have issued a rule nisi with a return date, because (so it was argued) Part A had already been argued in full and finally adjudicated on the merits, rendering the relief effectively final and res judicata. Wonderhoek opposed the application and contended that the order properly granted interim relief in accordance with what the applicants had sought, and that the transcript demonstrated a request for interim relief pending a return day.


The material evidentiary feature relied upon by the court in deciding the Rule 42 application was the transcript of the proceedings of 25 and 26 March 2020, which the parties were permitted to address in supplementary heads of argument. The transcript recorded, in the court’s assessment, that applicants’ counsel sought an order in terms of Part A that would operate as an interim interdict with immediate effect pending a return date, and that the court engaged with the concept of a return date and confirmation of Part A on that return date.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the order granted by Van Zyl J on 4 August 2021 contained an ambiguity, patent error, or omission contemplated in Rule 42(1)(b), such that it could be varied “but only to the extent” of the ambiguity, error, or omission.


This question turned primarily on the interpretation of the prior order and whether the alleged defect was attributable to the court itself (as required for Rule 42(1)(b) relief), rather than being a complaint about the correctness of the order or the litigation choices of a party. The dispute accordingly concerned the application of procedural law to the record and circumstances, including the transcript, rather than a reconsideration of the merits of Part A or Part B.


A further issue raised in argument (though not treated as determinative to the Rule 42 enquiry) was the applicants’ attempt to attribute blame to Wonderhoek’s legal representatives and seek a costs order de bonis propriis, premised on the stance taken by Wonderhoek after the 4 August 2021 order.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter from the starting point that, once a court has duly pronounced a final judgment or order, it generally becomes functus officio and lacks authority to correct, alter, or supplement its order except within recognised exceptions. Rule 42 exists to provide an expeditious mechanism to correct an obviously wrong judgment or order in limited circumstances, including where there is an ambiguity or patent error or omission.


Applying Rule 42(1)(b), the court emphasised that a “patent error or omission” is one where the order granted does not reflect the intention of the judicial officer who pronounced it, and that the ambiguity/error/omission must be attributable to the court itself. The court stressed that Rule 42(1)(b) does not authorise a court to revisit the entire order or reconsider its correctness; it is confined to correcting the specific ambiguity, error, or omission, and it is irrelevant whether the original reasoning was sound or unsound.


To determine whether the wording of the 4 August 2021 order failed to reflect Van Zyl J’s true intention, the court considered it “crucial” to ascertain what transpired during the hearing of 25 and 26 March 2020, and therefore had regard to the transcript together with Van Zyl J’s judgment and order. The transcript recorded applicants’ counsel expressly requesting relief corresponding to an interim interdict with immediate effect pending the return date, and engaging with the court on the return date itself. The transcript further reflected the court’s recognition that Part A carried a return date and that confirmation could be addressed on that return date.


The court also relied on the manner in which Van Zyl J expressed her conclusion in the judgment, namely that the applicants had made out a case for the relief sought in specified prayers of Part A and for the request that the relief serve as an interim interdict with immediate effect. This, in the court’s assessment, cohered with the form of the order granted (a rule nisi with interim effect). The court considered that, even if events had moved on (including the answering affidavit having been filed promptly and delays caused by the Covid-19 lockdown period), the record did not demonstrate that Van Zyl J unintentionally issued a rule nisi contrary to her actual decision.


The court further noted the established procedural role of the rule nisi in urgent matters, citing authority that the practice is embedded and frequently used to grant interim protection where urgency requires it. This supported the conclusion that issuing a rule nisi in the urgent interdict context was not inherently anomalous and did not, without more, indicate a mistake.


On the applicants’ contention that the matter had effectively become res judicata on Part A and should therefore have produced a final order rather than a rule nisi, the court’s reasoning was that Rule 42(1)(b) is not concerned with whether the order should have been differently framed as a matter of preference or litigation strategy, but whether the order as granted failed to reflect the court’s intention. On the court’s reading of the transcript and judgment, it did not.


Regarding the applicants’ criticisms of Wonderhoek’s post-order conduct and the sought costs de bonis propriis, the court recorded Wonderhoek’s position that the rule nisi was a valid court order that had to be obeyed until set aside, and that compliance (including filing further affidavits pursuant to the rule) did not constitute unprofessional or vexatious conduct. The court did not grant the extraordinary costs relief sought; instead it dismissed the Rule 42 application with costs, indicating that the Rule 42 challenge itself was unsuccessful.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the application brought under Rule 42(1)(b) to vary the order of 4 August 2021. It held, on the basis of the judgment and the transcript of the March 2020 proceedings, that there was no ambiguity, patent error, or omission in the order that would justify variation under Rule 42(1)(b), because the order reflected Van Zyl J’s considered decision and the relief sought at the hearing.


The court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs. No separate costs order de bonis propriis against Wonderhoek’s legal representatives was granted in the order made.


Cases Cited


Firestone South African (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro A.G. 1977 (4) SA 298 (AD)


Estate Garlick v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1934 AD 499


Promedia Drukkers & Uitgewers (Edms) Bpk v Kaimowitz 1996 (4) SA 411 (C)


Seatle v Protea Assurance Co Ltd 1984 (2) SA 537 (C)


Safcor Forwarding (Johannesburg) (Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission 1972 (3) SA 654 (A)


First Consolidated Leasing Corporation Ltd v McMullin 1975 (3) SA 606 (T)


Marshall v Ahmed and Another 1937 CPD 435


Vellyammal v Winser 1928 NPD 36


Florence v Florence 1948 (3) SA 71 (N)


Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W)


Legislation Cited


Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, section 75(1)


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 42(1)(b)


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(12)


Held


The court held that Rule 42(1)(b) permits variation only where an ambiguity, patent error, or omission exists in the order and is attributable to the court, meaning that the order does not reflect the presiding judge’s true intention. On an interpretation of Van Zyl J’s judgment together with the transcript of argument, the court found that the order granted on 4 August 2021 was intended to be, and was sought as, a rule nisi granting interim interdictory relief pending a return date and pending finalisation of Part B. The order therefore did not contain a correctable ambiguity or patent error.


The Rule 42(1)(b) application was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Rule 42(1)(b) is directed at the expeditious correction of an order where there is an ambiguity, patent error, or omission, but only to the extent of that defect. It does not permit a general reconsideration of the merits, nor does it allow a court to revisit and reformulate an order merely because a party later contends it should have taken a different form.


A court that has delivered a final judgment is generally functus officio, meaning that its jurisdiction is exhausted; any power to correct is confined to recognised exceptions. Under Rule 42(1)(b), the defect must be attributable to the court, in the sense that the order as issued does not reflect the true intention of the judicial officer who made it, and the enquiry is one of interpretation of the order against the relevant record.


The practice of issuing a rule nisi is firmly embedded in South African procedure, particularly in urgent matters where interim relief is required to protect immediate interests, and the inclusion of a return date is consistent with the rule nisi mechanism where confirmation of interim relief may be addressed later.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 153
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Victor and Another v Wonderhoek Farms (Pty) Ltd and Others (5049/2014) [2022] ZAFSHC 153 (10 June 2022)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case No.:
5049/2014
Reportable: YES/NO
Of Interest to other
Judges: YES/NO
Circulate to Magistrates:
YES/NO
In the matter between:
VAUGH
VICTOR
First Applicant
MARIA
MAGRIETHA CATHARINA
VICTOR
Second
applicant
and
WONDERHOEK
FARMS (PTY)
LTD
First
Respondent
DONOVAN
MAJIEDT N.O.
Second
Respondent
KARIN
FORTEIN
N.O.
Third
Respondent
JERRY
SEKELE KOKO N.O.
Fourth Respondent
FIRSTRAND
BANK
LIMITED
Fifth
Respondent
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
Sixth
Respondent
MARYNA
SYMES
N.O.
Seventh
Respondent
ANTON
OTTLY NOORDMAN N.O.
Eight
Respondent
CORAM:

VAN RHYN, AJ
HEADS OF ARGUMENT
RECEIVED
ON:

14 APRIL 2022
DELIVERED
ON:

10 JUNE 2022
INTRODUCTION.
[1]
On 4 August 2021 an order was granted by Van Zyl J pursuant to an
urgent application
launched by the applicant. The question to be
determined in the present application is whether the order granted on
4 August 2021
stands to be varied in terms of the provisions of Rule
42(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court as a result of an alleged
ambiguity
or a patent error or omission in the order made by Van Zyl
J.
[2]
The first applicant is a major business man from the farm Portion 1,
Aanvang, district
Wepener (“the farm Aanvang”). The
second applicant is the wife of the first applicant. First respondent
is Wonderhoek
Farms (Pty) Ltd (“Wonderhoek”), a company
which has subsequent to the hearing of the initial urgent
application, become
the registered owner of the farm Aanvang.
Wonderhoek opposes this application, unlike the other respondents who
do not oppose this
application.
RELEVANT
BACKGROUND
.
[3]
The applicants issued an urgent application on 24 March 2020 in which
they applied
for the following relief:

PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE THAT the Applicants will apply on 25 March 2020, at
14h15, or as soon thereafter as counsel for the Applicants
may be
heard, for the following order:
1.
That the requirements of notice and service
be dispensed with and that this application be heard as one of
urgency in terms of rule
6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court;
PART
A
2.
That a rule
nisi
be issued with return date 23 April 2020, at 09h30, calling upon the
First to Fifth Respondents why the following order should
not be made
final:
2.1
First Respondent and all those acting on instruction of the First
Respondent who is present on Portion
1 of the Farm Aanvang, in the
district of Wepener, be interdicted and restrained, pending
finalisation of the relief claimed in
Part B of the Notice of Motion,
from:
2.2
Breaking and entering any of the chalets,
storerooms or any other buildings on the farm, or in any way
interfering with the Applicants’
undisturbed possession and
occupation of the said farm;
2.3
Harassing, intimidating, victimising and/or
threatening the Applicants.
2.4
That the First to Fifth Respondents be
interdicted from implementing the Settlement Agreement;
2.5
That prayers 2, 2.1 to 2.4 shall serve as
an interim interdict with immediate effect, pending the return day;
2.6.
Further and or alternative relief.
PART
B
3.
That the Court order under number 5049/2014 dated 20 February 2020 be
set aside;
4.
That it is declared that the claim of the First Respondent, as
Plaintiff in the main action, lapsed, due to
non-compliance with
section 75(1) of the Insolvency Act, Act 24 of 1936;
5.
That the Settlement Agreement incorporated in the above Court order
be declared null and void
ab initio
;
6.
Alternatively, and in the event that the Court is not inclined to
grant prayer 5
supra
, that the First to Fifth Respondents be
interdicted from implementing the Settlement Agreement, pending the
institution and finalisation
of an action, to declare the Settlement
Agreement null and void, ab initio, which action must be instituted
within 30 (thirty)
days from date of this order;
7.
That the First Respondent pays the costs of the
application on an attorney and client scale.”
[4]
The urgent application was served upon Wonderhoek on 24 March 2020.
The application
was set down for hearing on 25 March 2020. The urgent
application was drafted in the form of a rule
nisi
, with
return day on 23 April 2020 to afford the respondents the opportunity
to file opposing papers whilst the interim relief would
serve as an
interim interdict with immediate effect pending the return day.
However, Wonderhoek filed its answering affidavit during
the morning
of 25 March 2020. No other answering affidavits by any of the other
respondents were filed.  The second to fifth
respondents as well
as the seventh and eighth respondents, who attended court on the 26
th
March 2020, did not participate in the proceedings since they had no
interest in the relief sought in Part A of the notice of motion.
[5]
On 25 March 2020 Van Zyl J heard arguments in respect of urgency
pertaining to the
relief under Part A and the
locus standi
of
the first applicant.  On 26 March 2020 the relief claimed by the
first applicant, an unrehabilitated insolvent, in respect
of
paragraph 2.4 of the notice of motion was dismissed on the ground
that the first applicant had no legal standing. The court
held that
the second respondent’s relief in respect of prayer 2.4 was not
urgent and same was struck from the roll. Van Zyl
J made a finding
that the first and second applicants’ relief in respect of the
remainder of the relief sought in Part A
was urgent. Arguments were
heard on behalf of the applicants and Wonderhoek on the remainder of
the relief sought in Part A. Judgment
was reserved on 26 March 2020.
At midnight, on 27 March 2020, the Covid-19 lockdown commenced for a
period of 5 weeks.
[6]
On 4 August 2021 Van Zyl J issued the following order:

1.
A rule
nisi
is issued, returnable on 26 August 2021 at 09h30, calling upon the
respondents to show cause, if
any, why
the following order should not be made       final:
1.1
That the first respondent and all those acting on instruction of the
first respondent
who is present on a Portion 1 of the farm Aanvang,
in the district of Wepener, be interdicted and restrained, pending
finalisation
of the relief claimed in Part B of the Notice of Motion,
from:
1.1.1
Breaking and entering any of the chalets, storerooms or any other
buildings on the farm.
1.1.2
Harassing, intimidating, victimising and/or
for frequenting the applicants.
2.
Prayers 1.1, 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 shall serve as an interim interdict with
immediate effect, pending
the finalisation of the aforesaid part of
the application.
3.
The cost stand over for later adjudication.”
[7]
Costs have not been argued as at date of hearing hereof. It had been
envisaged that
the relief claimed in respect of Part B of the Notice
of Motion would be argued on the return day, but to date Part B has
not been
heard. On 3 June 2020, the applicants filed their replying
affidavit which dealt with certain aspects in respect of Part A of
the
Notice of Motion.  On 16 August 2021 the first respondent
filed a supplementary answering affidavit.  On the return date,

26 August 2021 the rule
nisi
was extended until 17 September
2021 for adjudication. The issue of costs was reserved.  On 17
September 2021 the rule
nisi
was again extended until 2
December 2021 with a further order that costs is reserved.
[8]
On 19 October 2021 the applicants issued the present application in
terms of the provisions
of Rule 42(1)(b) on the basis that the order
issued on 4 August 2021 contains a patent error, alternatively an
ambiguity in respect
of the formulation of the order in that a rule
nisi
was issued and not a final order.  This application
was heard on 10 March 2022. During the hearing of arguments on behalf
of counsel for applicants and Wonderhoek, a ruling was made that the
parties are granted leave to file supplementary heads of argument

pertaining to the contents of the transcript of the proceedings
before Van Zyl J on 25 March 2020 and 26 March 2020.  The

transcript of the proceedings was handed up and the applicants filed
their supplementary heads of argument on 30 March 2022. Wonderhoek’s

supplementary heads of argument was filed with the Registrar on 14
April 2022, but only came to my attention on 28 April 2022.
LEGAL
PRINCIPLES.
[9]
Rule 42(1) (b) provides as follows:

(1)
The court may, in addition to any other powers it may have,
mero
motu
or upon the application of any
party affected, rescind or vary:
(a)
...
(b)
an order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity, a patent error
or omission,
but only to the extent of such ambiguity, error or
omission;
(c)
...”
[10]
The general, well-established principle is that once the court has
duly pronounced a final judgment
or order, it has itself no authority
to set aside or to correct, alter or supplement it.
[1]
The court has become
functus
officio –
its
jurisdiction in the case having been fully and finally exercised, its
authority over the subject matter ceases.
[2]
The purpose of Rule 42 is to correct expeditiously an obviously wrong
judgment or order.
[3]
A ‘patent
error or omission’ has been defined as ‘an error or
omission as a result of which the judgment granted
does not reflect
the intention of the judicial officer pronouncing it’,
[4]
in other words, the ambiguous language or the patent error or the
omission must be attributable to the court itself.  The
court is
thus not entitled to revisit the whole of its order or judgment and
its competence is limited to the interpretation of
the order. This
subsection effectively confines the powers of this court to the
exclusion of the ambiguity, error or omission.
THE APPLICANTS’
ARGUMENTS.
[11]
Mr Lüderitz SC, counsel on behalf of the applicants argued that,
despite the fact that the
relief under Part A was argued in full on
the merits on 26 March 2020 and that the initial relief sought by the
applicants for
a rule
nisi
had been overrun by events, in that
Wonderhoek filed an answering affidavit in respect of both Part A and
Part B on 25 March 2020,
Van Zyl J “curiously” still
issued a rule
nisi
with a return date, 26 August 2021, calling
upon Wonderhoek to advance reasons why the order should not be made
final. It is argued
that the court had in fact adjudicated the relief
in Part A on the merits as is evident from the following reasons as
it appears
from the written judgment of Van Zyl J:

[4]
...I subsequently entertained arguments on the merits of prayer 2.1,
2.2 and 2.3 of the application the afternoon
of 26 March 2020 after
conclusion of Motion Court.”
And
further’

[35]
...Considered in conjunction with the conduct of the security guards,
the Applicants have in my view made out a proper
case for the relief
sought in terms of prayer 2.1, 2.2 (as amended) and 2.3 of Part A of
the notice of motion and for the request
that the said relief should
serve as an interim interdict with immediate effect.”
[12]
The applicants therefore argue that the court has finally pronounced
upon the merits of the relief
under Part A and it is therefore clear
that the relief in respect of Part A has become
res judicata
.
It was therefore a patent error by the court to have included a rule
nisi
returnable 26 August 2021. The applicants furthermore
rely on the conduct of the legal representatives of Wonderhoek for a
costs
order sought
de bonis propriis
on the basis that,
despite a request subsequent to the order of Van Zyl J being issued,
to agree that the rule
nisi
be confirmed and that Wonderhoek
pay the costs in line with the principle that costs follow the
result, alternatively and if Wonderhoek
is not in agreement with the
proposal, that the parties’ legal representatives should
approach Van Zyl J in chambers to have
the mistake rectified.
Wonderhoek did not agree with applicants’ proposals.
ARGUMENTS
ON BEHALF OF WONDERHOEK.
[13]
The application in terms of the provisions of Rule 42(1)(b) is
opposed by Wonderhoek, mainly
on the basis that the interim relief,
prayed for by the applicants in the notice of motion and requested
during the hearing of
the matter on 26 March 2020, was granted by the
court. Furthermore, the conduct of the applicants, by filing a
replying affidavit
approximately three months after the hearing of
the matter, is consistent with the applicants’ request for
interim relief.
The first respondent merely complied with the
interim court order issued on 4 August 2021 by filing a further
answering affidavit
when ordered to show cause why the interim order
should not be made final.  In compliance with the rule
nisi
issued on 4 August 202, it had filed a further answering affidavit on
16 August 2021.
[14]
With regard to the cost order sought
de bonis propriis
against
the legal representatives of Wonderhoek, the arguments raised on
behalf of Wonderhoek are that the rule
nisi
constitutes an
order of a Court of Law and stands until set aside, varied or altered
by a court of competent jurisdiction and must
be obeyed.  That
is in accordance with the Rule of Law.  The order in fact called
upon the respondents to file a further
affidavit and on this basis
alone Wonderhoek was entitled to do so.  The legal practitioners
acting on behalf of Wonderhoek
did not make themselves guilty of
conduct covered by the principles pertaining to costs
de bonis
propriis
and therefore did not make themselves guilty of
unprofessional, vexatious and opportunistic conduct or any other such
conduct warranting
a
de bonis propriis
order of costs.
DISCUSSION.
[15]
Rule 42(1)(b) clearly provides that an order or judgment in which
there is an ambiguity, or a
patent error or omission may be varied,
but only to the extent of such ambiguity, error or omission. To my
mind, it is crucial
for the outcome in this application, to ascertain
what transpired at the hearing of the urgent application on 25 and 26
March 2020
in order to understand and interpret the order and the
judgment handed down by Van Zyl J.
[16]
On 26 March 2020, Mr Janse van Rensburg, counsel on behalf of the
applicants addressed the court
on the merits of the application and
the return day as follows:

MR
JANSE VAN RENSBURG: ...  I do not want the parties in these
circumstances of the Covid- 19 lockdown to run to court for
every
small incident and on that basis I submit that the applicants would
be satisfied with an order in terms of prayer 2.1, 2.2
but excluding
the part that I had indicated yesterday to stop after ‘
buildings
on the farm’
[full stop]”
and to delete, “
or in any way
interfering with the applicants undisturbed possession and occupation
of the said farm”
, which may be
open to interpretation that is going to inconvenience the Court and
then obviously prayer 2.3 and also 2.5: ‘That
it serves as an
interdict with immediate effect pending the return date.’
COURT: Talking about the
return date?
MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG:
Yes, M’Lady, at 23 April.
COURT: That was requested
as 23 April.
MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG:
Yes.”
[17]
The uncertainty regarding the period of the lockdown was discussed as
well as problems relating
to further consultations and the filing of
further affidavits during lockdown. The discussion that followed
regarding return date
was as follows:

COURT:
He will in any event constitute extra motion court both unopposed and
opposed for the Wednesday and the Friday. So..
MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As
the Court pleases. So in other words ….[intervenes]
COURT: You can keep it on
23 April.
MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We
will keep it on 23 April, subject to my learned friend’s
submissions. As the Court pleases.”
[18]
Counsel on behalf of Wonderhoek, Mr Kloek, then raised the question
that the second applicant
does not have any connection with the
relief claimed in Part B of the Notice of Motion. She is married out
of community of property
to the first applicant and is not a party to
the Settlement Agreement. On the basis that the court already made a
finding that
the first applicant has no
locus standi
in
respect of prayer 2.4 of the notice of motion, it simply equates that
he will also have no
locus standi
in respect of Part B of the
notice of motion. Mr Kloek then made the following submission:

MR
KLOEK: ... So in essence what the second applicant now seeks is an
order for an interim interdict that simply will come back
to court on
a future date and it wants the court to re-adjudicate as to whether
an interim interdict should be confirmed or not,
but Part B in the
notice of motion does not ask for confirmation of the interim
interdict.  It deals with other relief.
It deals with
other relief that does not concern the second applicant.”
COURT:
No, but Part A has got a return date as it stands.  So obviously
on the return date confirmation can be asked for orders
issued in
Part A.”
[19]
Mr. Kloek referred to the relief sought by the applicants being an
interim interdict and the
principles as set out in
Webster v
Mitchell
pertaining to the question whether the applicants have
in fact made out a case in the founding affidavit for final relief.

Mr. Janse van Rensburg argued that in respect of the evidence
relating to the harassment, the applicants would file a replying

affidavit as to when there was an attendance at the police station,
an aspect which played an important role in respect of Part
A of the
notice of motion. Mr Janse van Rensburg submitted that he requested
an interim interdict on behalf of the applicants and
not a final
interdict which is evident from the following submission:

...
I submit that it is clear and there is no basis to argue that this is
a final interdict.  This is an interim interdict,
pending the
return day and pending the setting aside of the Court Order and the
Settlement Agreement...”
[20]
In paragraph 27 of her judgment, Van Zyl J mentioned that, during his
presentation of argument
on the merits of the application, Mr Janse
van Rensburg
“…
indicated
that the applicants will, with regard to prayer 2.2 of the Notice of
Motion, be satisfied if a rule
nisi
is to be issued in terms of only the first part thereof up to after
the words “or any other building on the farm”
and that

...the
applicants do not persist with an order in terms of the remainder of
the said prayer.  The applicants are consequently
persisting
with their request for a rule
nisi
in terms of prayers to 2.1, 2.2 as amended, as aforesaid and 2.3,
with the additional relief that the said order is to serve as
an
interim interdict with immediate effect.”
[21]
In paragraph [35] of her judgment Van Zyl J concluded as follows:

Considered
in conjunction with the conduct of the security guards, the
applicants have in my view made out a proper case for the
relief
sought in terms of prayers 2.1, 2.2 (as amended) and 2.3 of Part A of
the Notice of Motion and for the request that the
same should serve
as an interim interdict with immediate effect”
[22]
In matters of urgency, the utilisation of the rule
nisi
procedure
is to be encouraged. In
Safcor
Forwarding (Johannesburg) (Pty)Ltd v National Transport Commission
[5]
Corbett JA (as he then was) held as follows:

The
Uniform Rules of Court do not provide substantively for the granting
of a rule
nisi
by the Court. Nevertheless, the practice, in certain circumstances,
of doing so is firmly embedded in our procedural law.
And further.

The
procedure of a rule
nisi
is usually resorted to in matters of urgency and where the applicant
seeks interim relief in order adequately to protect his immediate

interests.”
[23]
Rule 42(1) (b) provides for the variation of an order or judgment in
which there is an ambiguity
or a patent error or omission. In
First
Consolidated Leasing Corporation Ltd v McMullin,
[6]
as followed in
Seatle
v Protea Assurance Co Ltd,
[7]
it was held that the ambiguous language or the patent error or the
omission must be attributable to the court itself. Under the

subsection, relief will only be granted where the terms of the
judgment do not reflect the true intention of the presiding judge.
It
is also irrelevant whether the reasoning of the court was sound or
unsound
[8]
.
[24]
In the
Seatle
case, Caney AJ (as he then was) held as follows:

The
judgment which was expressed in the action between the parties in
1946 did ‘express that true intention and decision of
the
Court’.
There was no
mistake, inadvertent omission or oversight on the part of the Court
or in the issue of the order, which was the very
order for which the
plaintiff had asked;
and the relief for
which she now asks would not add a supplementary detail or give
consequential or accessory relief claimed but
inadvertently omitted;
on the contrary,
it would be in direct
conflict with what was granted.
If a litigant, by mistake of himself or his legal advisers, abandons
relief to which he is, or may be, entitled, the Court
has no
jurisdiction or power to recall or amend the order it has in
consequence deliberately made, in the absence of fraud or the
other
party in the course of the proceedings including the order.
Vellyammal v Winser
1928 N.P.D 36
; Florence v Florence
1948 (3) SA 71
(N).” (My underlining)
[25]
In
Marshall
v Ahmed and Another
[9]
the court held as follows:

The
result of this mistake is that the discretion which the magistrate
intended to exercise as to costs was not carried into effect
by the
order which he made and that is equivalent to saying that in making
the order he failed to exercise a discretion at all.
His failure to
do so is an irregularity which should entitle the aggrieved party to
a remedy. This irregularity cannot be remedied
by way of appeal
because it does not appear
ex facie
the record but it was argued for the respondent that the procedure of
review was unnecessary and wrong inasmuch as the magistrate
had power
to correct his order if it did not carry out his intention. Now it is
true that under s 36(3) of Act 32 of 1971 a magistrate’s
court
may correct patent errors in any judgment in respect of which no
appeal is pending; but this was not a patent error.
On
the face of the record there was nothing whatever to show that the
order made was not the order which the magistrate intended
to make.
As a matter of fact the magistrate made the order which he intended
to make
and it was not till some time
afterwards that he became aware of the fact that the order which he
had made did not have the effect
which he intended it to have. This
fact could only be ascertained
dehors
the record and could only be
brought to the notice of this court by means of affidavits. (My
underlining)
[26]
In the present matter the judgment, read in conjunction with the
transcript of the proceedings,
do not disclose that Van Zyl J
expressed herself ambiguously or committed an error in granting an
interim order with a return date
set for 26 August 2021. In my view,
it is quite clear that the order made by Van Zyl J on 4 August 2021
reflects her considered
decision as given expression to in her
judgment, which is in any event in accordance with the relief prayed
for by the applicants
at the time when the matter was argued on 26
March 2020.
[27]
The transcription demonstrates that Mr Janse van Rensburg requested
interim relief pending a
return day, anticipated to be 23 April 2020.
Even though Mr Kloek tried to convince Van Zyl J that, in the event
of an interim
order with a return date being granted, it will
inevitably result in the merits being re-argued on the return date.
Van Zyl J responded
as follows:

No,
but Part A has got a return date as it stands. So obviously on the
return date confirmation can be asked for the orders issued
in Part
A”
[28]
The parties were alive to the fact that Part B will have to be
adjudicated upon on a future date.
I agree with Mr Kloek that there
can be no doubt that the application was understood by Van Zyl J that
a return day was to be included
in her order as sought in the notice
of motion in respect of part A. The issue of costs pertaining to the
urgent application heard
on 25 and 25 March 2020 has not been argued
and adjudicated upon.
[29]
ORDER:
In the
result the following order is made:
1.
The application is dismissed with costs.
VAN
RHYN AJ
On
behalf of the Applicants:
Adv

KW Luderitz SC
Adv
F G Janse Van Rensburg
Instructed
by:
Willers

Attorneys
Bloemfontein
On
behalf of the First Respondent:

Adv J W Kloek
Instructed
by:
MDP

Attorneys
Bloemfontein
On
behalf of the legal representatives
of
the First Respondent:
Adv

M C Louw
Instructed
by:                                                                   MDP

Attorneys
Bloemfontein
[1]
Firestone South African (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro A.G.
1977 (4) SA 298
(AD) at 306F-G.
[2]
Estate Garlick v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
1934 AD 499
at 502.
[3]
Promedia Drukkers & Uitgewers (Edms) Bpk v Kaimowitz
1996 (4) SA
411
(C) at 417B – I.
[4]
Seatle v Protea Assurance Co Ltd
1984 (2) SA 537
(C) at 541.
[5]
1972 (3) SA 654
(A) at 674 H-675C.
[6]
1975 (3) SA 606 (T).
[7]
1984 (2) SA 537 (C).
[8]
Seatle
v Protea Assurance Co Ltd
1984 (2) SA 537
(CPD) at 541A -D.
[9]
1937 CPD 435
at 438