Ioannides N.O. and Others v Western National Insurance Company Limited and Another (5056/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 113 (23 May 2022)

80 Reportability
Insurance Law

Brief Summary

Insurance — Non-disclosure — Claim for indemnity — Trust failed to disclose prior double claim for water damage — Insurer declined indemnity on grounds of material non-disclosure — Trust sought declaratory relief for indemnity following fire damage — Court held that non-disclosure of the double claim constituted a moral risk, justifying the insurer's refusal to indemnify — Application dismissed with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter was brought as motion proceedings for final declaratory relief in the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein. The applicants were Rodos Ioannides N.O., Christos Ioannides N.O., and Wayne Gareth Beelders N.O., cited in their official capacities as the duly appointed trustees of the Caramello’s Trust (IT 730/04). The first respondent was Western National Insurance Company Limited, an insurer. The second respondent, Stepp Bloemfontein, was cited for notice purposes only and no substantive relief was sought against it.


The Trust sought an order declaring that the first respondent was liable to indemnify it for losses suffered in a fire at its business premises. The dispute arose after the insurer declined indemnity and asserted that the policy was void (or voidable) due to an alleged material non-disclosure relating to an earlier incident in 2018. The application was argued on 10 February 2022 and judgment was delivered on 23 May 2022 by Reinders ADJP.


The general subject-matter concerned insurance law, specifically whether an insured’s non-disclosure of prior conduct (described as creating a “moral risk”) entitled the insurer to avoid liability under the policy, and whether the applicants could obtain final relief on affidavit in the face of the respondent’s version.


2. Material Facts


The applicants were the trustees of the Trust operating a Caramello’s outlet at Preller Plein Shopping Centre in Bloemfontein. The Trust obtained an insurance quotation from the first respondent on 1 February 2019, and an insurance policy was concluded on that basis.


On 16 May 2021, a fire damaged property on the premises, and the Trust lodged a claim with the first respondent under the policy. The first respondent, acting through its legal and compliance manager, declined to indemnify the Trust. The basis for the declinature was the insurer’s stance that the policy was void due to the Trust’s failure to disclose a prior incident during 2018.


A central factual aspect was treated as common cause by the court: during April 2018 the Trust suffered water damage. At that time, the Trust (represented by the first applicant) was insured by Renasa Insurance Company and claimed for that loss. At the same time, the Bean & Bagle Restaurant trading as Caramellos, also represented by the first applicant, submitted a claim to the insurer of the contractor for the same damage. As recorded in the judgment, both insurers paid in respect of the same loss.


The subsequent developments in 2018 were material to the dispute. Renasa, on 30 October 2018, addressed a letter to the Trust in which Renasa regarded the claim as fraudulent, sought repayment, and indicated cancellation of future business with the Trust. The Trust repaid an undisclosed amount to Renasa.


It was not in dispute that this 2018 history, including the double payment and Renasa’s reaction, was not disclosed to the first respondent when the insurance relationship with Western National was entered into. The underwriting evidence of the first respondent (through Mr Botha, its head of underwriting) was that, had it known of the double claim, it would not have insured the Trust because the incident represented a “moral risk”, described as a propensity to use dishonest means to obtain insurance monies.


The applicants’ contrary position, as advanced in argument, was that the application form required disclosure only of “full claims history and/or losses” for the preceding three years, and that the 2018 incident did not fall to be disclosed in the way the insurer contended. The court approached the matter on the basis appropriate to final relief in motion proceedings, which required acceptance of the respondent’s version where genuine disputes of fact existed and the version could not be rejected as untenable.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the legal consequences of non-disclosure in an insurance contract and the availability of final declaratory relief on affidavit in the face of the insurer’s evidence.


More specifically, the court was required to determine whether the Trust’s failure to disclose the 2018 double-compensation incident constituted a material non-disclosure (assessed objectively under the governing law), and whether that non-disclosure induced the insurer to enter into the contract of insurance and assume the risk. These questions involved the application of legal standards to the facts, including an objective assessment of materiality and a causation/inducement enquiry.


A further procedural issue concerned the appropriate approach to factual disputes in motion proceedings where final relief is sought, namely the application of the Plascon-Evans rule. Although certain points in limine were raised, the first (authority) was abandoned and the second (the legal tenability of the specific form of relief in light of the insurer’s alleged election to repair/replace/compensate) was not decided because it was unnecessary in light of the dispositive finding on non-disclosure.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court treated the matter as an application for final relief and applied the principle that the dispute must be determined on the respondent’s version unless that version is so far-fetched or untenable that it can be rejected on the papers. In doing so, the court referred to the established approach in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd and noted authority confirming that this approach is not reversed merely because the onus on a particular issue may rest on the respondent.


On the substantive insurance question, the court considered the insurer’s reliance on the policy’s general conditions, which provided that misrepresentation, misdescription, or non-disclosure in a material particular renders the affected part of the policy voidable. The court also engaged with the statutory and common-law aligned test for materiality and inducement as articulated in the authorities placed before it, including the discussion in Regent Insurance Co Ltd v King’s Property Development (Pty) Ltd t/a King’s Prop 2015 (3) SA 85, which emphasised the objective nature of the materiality enquiry under section 53(1) of the Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998, and the insurer’s burden to prove both materiality and inducement.


In applying these principles, the court accepted, on the papers as they stood, that the insurance industry treats conduct resulting in two insurers paying for the same damage as a species of moral risk. The court found no basis to reject the insurer’s underwriting evidence (particularly Mr Botha’s evidence) as palpably false or untenable. The court further considered the fact that Renasa had terminated its relationship with the Trust upon discovering the double claim as supporting the insurer’s contention that the undisclosed history was significant to an insurer’s risk assessment.


The court reasoned that, on the accepted evidence, the non-disclosed incident was material because it directly bore on the insurer’s assessment of the insured’s risk profile, including moral risk, and the insurer’s willingness to underwrite the risk at all. The court also accepted the insurer’s evidence that it would not have insured the Trust had it been aware of the double claim, which addressed the element of inducement/causation in the sense discussed in the cited authority. The court described the insurer’s viewpoint as not objectively untenable and indicated an inclination to endorse it.


Given the adoption of the respondent’s version under the motion-proceedings approach, and the findings on materiality and the insurer’s underwriting stance, the court concluded that the applicants could not obtain the final declaratory order sought. The court therefore dismissed the application. It noted additionally that the first respondent had abandoned its first point in limine (authority), and that it was unnecessary to decide the second point in limine concerning the legal form of the order sought; the court added, without deciding, that the second point would probably not have found favour with it in principle.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the application. The declaratory relief sought—namely an order declaring the first respondent liable to indemnify the Trust for the fire loss under the policy—was refused.


The court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs, applying the ordinary principle that costs follow the result.


Cases Cited


Bruwer v Nova Risk Partners Ltd 2011 (1) SA 234 (GSJ).


Regent Insurance Co Ltd v King’s Property Development (Pty) Ltd t/a King’s Prop 2015 (3) SA 85.


Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 263 (A).


Orestisolve (Pty) Ltd t/a ESSA Investments v NDFT Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another 2015 (4) SA 449 (WCC).


Ngqumba en ’n Ander v Staatspresident en Andere; Damons NO en Andere v Staatspresident en Andere; H Jooste v Staatspresident en Andere 1988 (4) SA 224 (A).


Rawlins and Another v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd [1992] ZASCA 204; 1993 (1) SA 537 (A).


Legislation Cited


Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998, section 53.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, applying the approach to final relief in motion proceedings, the insurer’s version had to be accepted on the papers. On that version, the insured’s failure to disclose the 2018 incident in which two insurers paid for the same loss constituted a material non-disclosure that affected the insurer’s assessment of the insured’s moral risk. The court accepted evidence that the insurer would not have underwritten the risk had it known of that history. The applicants therefore failed to establish entitlement to the declaratory relief compelling indemnification, and the application was dismissed with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Materiality in relation to misrepresentation or non-disclosure under short-term insurance law is assessed on an objective basis, consistent with section 53(1) of the Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 as applied in the cited authority.


An insurer seeking to avoid a policy (or resist liability) on grounds of non-disclosure bears the burden to prove materiality and to prove that the non-disclosure induced it to conclude the contract and assume the risk, in the sense that the policy would not have been issued (or would have been issued differently) had disclosure occurred.


In applications seeking final relief on affidavit, factual disputes are resolved by applying the Plascon-Evans approach: the matter is decided on the respondent’s version unless that version is so far-fetched or untenable that it can be rejected on the papers. This approach applies even where the onus on a particular issue may rest on the respondent.


A contractual term providing that a policy is voidable in the event of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure is enforceable in accordance with the objective materiality enquiry and the insurer’s assessment of risk, including where the undisclosed facts relate to an insured’s moral risk relevant to underwriting.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 113
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Ioannides N.O. and Others v Western National Insurance Company Limited and Another (5056/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 113 (23 May 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
No: 5056/2021
Reportable:
YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
In
the matter between:
RODOS
IOANNIDES N.O.
First Applicant
CHRISTOS
IOANNIDES N.O.
Second Applicant
WAYNE
GARETH BEELDERS N.O.
Third Applicant
(
in
their respective official capacities as duly appointed
Trustees
of the Caramello’s Trust (IT 730/04))
and
WESTERN
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
First
Respondent
STEPP BLOEMFONTEIN
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
BY:
C REINDERS,
ADJP
HEARD
ON:
10 FEBRUARY 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
23 MAY 2022
[1]

The three Applicants
are the three duly appointed trustees of the
Caramello’s Trust (“the Trust”). The First
Respondent is an insurance
company against whom relief is sought in
the form of declaratory relief. The Second Respondent had been cited
for purposes of notice
and no relief is sought against it.
[2]
The Trust operates and does business at its Caramello’s outlet
at the Preller
Plein Shopping Centre in Boemfontein. It obtained a
quotation on the 1
st
February 2019 in respect of insurance
from the First Respondent. On the 16
th
of May 2021 a fire
damaged the property on the premises resulting in the Trust lodging a
claim with the First Respondent. Ms Ankia
Pelser, the legal and
compliance manager and acting on behalf of First Respondent, declined
to indemnify the Trust in terms of
the insurance policy and decided
that the aforementioned policy is void due to the Trust’s
failure to disclose an incident
in 2018 when the Trust was double
compensated for water damage that occurred in April 2018.
[3]
The Trust therefore by way of notice of motion applies for an order
declaring the
First Respondent to be liable to indemnify the trust
for the loss suffered as a result of the fire based on the agreement
of insurance/indemnity
concluded between the parties.
[4]
From the papers, it would appear to be common cause that during April
2018 the Trust
suffered water damages. At the time the Trust,
represented by the First Applicant, enjoyed insurance cover from
Renasa Insurance
Company (“Renasa”) and submitted a claim
for the damage. At the same time the Bean & Bagle Restaurant
trading as
Caramellos and represented by the First Applicant
submitted a claim to the insurer of the contractor for the same
damage for which
compensation had been claimed from Renasa. Both
insurers paid for the same damage. Renasa on the 30
th
of
October 2018 addressed a letter to the Trust considering the Trust’s
claim to be fraudulent and claiming repayment. The
Trust repaid an
undisclosed amount to Renasa and the aforementioned letter disclosed
Renasa’s cancellation of future business
with the Trust.
[5]
The history as alluded to herein above was not disclosed to the First
Respondent and
Mr Jan Hendrik Botha (“Mr Botha”), the
head of the First Respondent’s underwriting department, avers
that had
First Respondent been aware of the double claim, it would
not have insured the Trust. He considered the double claim to be a
text
book example of what First Respondent and the insurance industry
would treat as a “moral risk” to which it is not prepared

to extend insurance cover. Such moral risk is described as “the
possible propensity of an insured using dishonest means to
extract
insurance monies”.
[6]
On behalf of the Trust it was submitted that the Trust in the
application form was
only asked to disclose or supply “its full
claims history and/or losses to the respondent for the preceding
three years.”
I was referred to the judgment of
Bruwer v
Nova Risk Partners Ltd 2011(1) SA 234 (GSJ)
and in particular
paras [27] and [28], the gist thereof being that the Trust was only
compelled to answer to the questions which
the First Respondent posed
- the argument being that the insurer drafted the policy and “it
has the duty to make clear and
spell out plainly the limitations it
wishes to impose and the risks it wishes to exclude.”
Reliance
was further placed on the provisions of
s53
of the
Short-Term
Insurance Act 53 of 1998
. My attention was invited to
Regent
Insurance Co Ltd v King’s Property Development (Pty) Ltd t/a
King’s Prop
2015 (3) SA 85
where the Supreme Court of
Appeal stated at para [23]:

It is clear now,
however, that since the introduction of
s 53(1)
of the
Short-term
Insurance Act (and
pursuant to its amendment in 2003) the test in
respect of both misrepresentations and non-disclosures is an
objective one, thus
bringing the legislation in line with the common
law. Two principles enunciated in
Clifford
remain applicable. First the onus rests on
the insurer to prove materiality (at 155E-G), this in accordance with
the decision in
Qilingele
;
and second, the insurer must prove that the non-disclosure or
representation induced it to conclude the contract. Thus the insurer

must show that the representation or non-disclosure caused it to
issue the policy and assume the risk. As Schultz JA pointed out
(at
156E-I), however, once materiality has been proved it would be
difficult for the insured to overcome the hurdle of showing
no
causation, …”
[7]
The First Respondent referred me to the general terms and conditions
of the policy
in force which contains the following conditions in
clause 1:

General
Conditions
1.
Misrepresentation, Misdescription And
Non-Disclosure
Misrepresentation,
misdescription or non-disclosure in material particular shall render
voidable the particular item, section or
sub-section of the policy,
as the case may be, affected by such misrepresentation,
misdescription or non-disclosure”
[8]
Reliance was likewise placed by First Respondent on
Regent
Insurance v Kings Property Insurance supra
in general, but in
particular to para [54] where Wallis JA (as he then was) held as
follows:

The reason why an
insured must make a proper disclosure is to enable the insurer to
make a proper assessment of the risk it is being
asked to cover. It
cannot do that if it is not told what the risk is. This is not a case
of a slightly inaccurate or insufficient
description of the actual
risk being covered, which may raise issues of materiality. It is a
case where there was no disclosure
at all of the particular risk. It
is hard to see how a complete non-disclosure of the risk could not be
material.”
[9]
The Applicants move for final relief. The well-known rule in
Plascon
Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
1984 (3) SA 263
(A)
at 634e-635c is to be applied which in essence boils down thereto
that the relief is to be adjudicated on the respondent’s

version safe where it is so far-fetched or untenable and to be
rejected. This is also the position where the onus of proof is on
the
respondent.
See:
Orestisolve (Pty) Ltd t/a ESSA Investments v NDFT Investment
Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another
2015 (4) SA 449
(WCC)
468
para [67]:

I
must emphasize, though, that the
Badenhorst
rule is conventionally formulated as requiring the company to satisfy
the court of two things: its bona fides and the reasonableness
of its
grounds for disputing the claim. If the respondents were to fail in
their reliance on the
Badenhorst
rule,
it would be for failure to satisfy the second of these requirements.
As to the first, I cannot find on the papers that
the respondents are
not genuine in disputing the claim. Bona fides is a question of fact.
At the stage of a
final order, it must be assessed in accordance with
the
Plascon-Evans
rule
.
Even though the onus
on a particular issue in motion proceedings might rest on the
respondent, this does not reverse the operation
of
the
Plascon-Evans
rule
(see
Ngqumba en
'n Ander v Staatspresident en Andere; Damons NO en Andere v
Staatspresident en Andere;
H
Jooste
v Staatspresident en Andere
1988
(4) SA 224
(A) at 259E – 263D;
Rawlins
and Another v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd
[1992] ZASCA 204
;
1993
(1) SA 537
(A) at 541I – 542B). (own emphasis)
[10]
Applying the aforementioned principles I have to accept that the
insurance industry treats conduct
which causes two insurance
companies to make payment in respect of the very same damage to be a
moral risk which insurers are not
prepared to insure. There is no
basis upon which I can reject such evidence to be palpably false. I
have to accept that such information
is material and therefore the
Applicants had to disclose same to the First Respondent. There is
support for the First Respondent’s
point of view in that Renasa
terminated its business agreement with the Applicants on realizing
the double claim. First Respondent
was not made aware by the
Applicants of the aforementioned double claim. According to Mr Botha
before the First Respondent determines
a premium at which it is
prepared to ensure a risk, it determines the insured’s risk
portfolio which includes the moral risk
of the insured. Claiming
compensation from two different insurance companies for the same
damage constituted a moral risk which
the respondent would not have
insured had it been aware thereof. Objectively speaking, I cannot on
the accepted evidence before
me, conclude that such a viewpoint is
untenable. On the contrary, I would be inclined to endorse it.
[11]
It follows that I cannot in applying the aforementioned principles
grant the Applicants final
relief in motion proceedings. The
application, therefore, is to be dismissed and I see no reason why
the costs should not follow
suit. I may add that First Respondent
abandoned its first point
in limine
as to the First
Applicant’s authority to bring the application, and rightly so.
Having come to the conclusion I have, it
is not necessary to
adjudicate the second point raised
in limine
whether the order
sought is not legally tenable based on the argument that the option
is that of the insurer to indemnify, compensate
or replace and/or
repair of damaged goods. Without deciding this point, I may add that
it Case No: 5056/2021
Case
No: 5056/2021
probably
would not have found favour with me in principle.
[12]
In the result the following order is made:
The
application is dismissed with costs.
C.
REINDERS, ADJP
On
behalf of the Applicants:

Adv C Snyman
Instructed by:
Phatsoane Henney
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the first respondent:

Adv DJ Coetsee
Instructed by:
BDP Attorneys
c/o Kramer Weihmann
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN