Firstrand Bank v Van der Heever and Others (4620/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 83 (29 April 2022)

80 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Suretyship — Enforcement of suretyship agreements — Applicant sought judgment against Respondents as sureties for a principal debtor who defaulted on a credit facility — Respondents raised defences based on pending business rescue and liquidation proceedings of the principal debtor — Court held that the Respondents' suretyship obligations remained enforceable despite the principal debtor's status, as they had waived the benefit of excussion — Application for condonation for late filing of answering affidavit dismissed due to lack of reasonable explanation — Judgment granted against Respondents for the outstanding debt plus interest.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an application in the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein, for judgment sounding in money against three respondents in their capacities as sureties and co-principal debtors for the obligations of a close corporation described as the principal debtor, Heever Boerdery CC (in liquidation).


The applicant was Firstrand Bank Ltd. The respondents were Janette van den Heever (first respondent), Theodorus I van den Heever (second respondent), and Therese van den Heever (third respondent). The bank sought a monetary judgment against them jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved.


Procedurally, the matter comprised two interrelated applications: first, the main claim for payment under the suretyships; and secondly, an application by the respondents for condonation for the late filing of their answering affidavit. The court heard the matter on 10 February 2022 and delivered judgment on 29 April 2022.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was the enforcement of suretyship obligations arising from a credit facility advanced to the principal debtor, and whether the respondents could resist judgment on the basis of (i) a pending business rescue application involving the principal debtor and (ii) the principal debtor’s liquidation, as well as whether their late answering affidavit should be condoned.


2. Material Facts


The court accepted as material that, on or about 12 July 2018, the applicant concluded an agreement with the principal debtor in terms of which the applicant made available a credit facility limited to the capital amount of R197 000.00. The court proceeded on the basis that the applicant complied with its obligations under that agreement.


It was material that the principal debtor failed to maintain the minimum monthly instalments, and that the last payment made by the principal debtor was on 24 March 2021. Despite written demand duly served on the principal debtor, payment was not made.


The outstanding indebtedness relied upon by the applicant (and accepted by the court) was that the principal debtor was indebted to the applicant in the amount of R205 884.78, together with interest calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from 1 September 2021.


It was also material that the respondents had concluded suretyship agreements with the applicant in terms of which they bound themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors in solidum for amounts that might become due under the credit facility. The court further treated it as material that the suretyships included terms preserving the applicant’s rights to recover the balance from the respondents if full recovery from the principal debtor could not be achieved, and that the respondents had renounced the benefit of excussion.


As to matters raised in defence, the respondents relied on two factual circumstances. First, a creditor of the principal debtor (Mr Oosthuizen) had lodged an application on 10 May 2021 to place the principal debtor under business rescue, which was heard on 4 November 2021, and at the time of the present judgment no decision had yet been handed down in that business rescue application. Secondly, the principal debtor was stated to be in liquidation and a liquidator had been appointed. The respondents asserted uncertainty as to whether the applicant had submitted a claim in the liquidation, and contended that the applicant was not entitled to obtain judgment against both the principal debtor and the sureties.


Regarding the condonation application, the respondents’ explanation for lateness included their expectation that judgment in earlier opposed motion proceedings involving the principal debtor would be delivered before the due date for their answering affidavit, and that they experienced logistical constraints relating to distance between their places of residence and Bloemfontein, the third respondent’s inability to secure leave from employment to sign a confirmatory affidavit, and the fact that their attorney of record was in Pretoria.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the applicant was entitled to judgment against the respondents as sureties and co-principal debtors for the outstanding amount, and whether the respondents’ pleaded defences provided a legally sustainable basis to resist judgment.


Within that enquiry, the court was required to consider whether the respondents could rely on the prospect of business rescue proceedings (and their understanding of section 133(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008) as a basis to stay or dismiss the enforcement proceedings against them. This aspect primarily involved a question of law, namely the interpretation and applicability of the statutory moratorium provision relied upon.


The court also had to determine whether the principal debtor’s liquidation, and the alleged uncertainty regarding the applicant’s conduct in the liquidation process, constituted a valid defence to enforcement against sureties who had bound themselves jointly and severally and renounced excussion. This involved the application of legal principles concerning suretyship, co-principal debtor liability, and the effect of a renunciation of excussion.


A further issue was whether condonation should be granted for the late answering affidavit. This was a discretionary evaluation involving a combination of fact and value judgment, guided by established principles regarding non-compliance with procedural requirements and the adequacy of explanations tendered.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On the business rescue defence, the court considered the statutory text relied upon by the respondents, namely section 133(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and treated it as dealing with the enforcement of claims against a company founded on guarantees and suretyships. The court’s reasoning was that the provision, on a plain reading, regulates circumstances in which a person seeks to enforce a guarantee or surety by a company and limits enforcement against the company without leave of the court. In this regard, the court referred to Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2021 (5) SA 430 (WCC).


The court then addressed the respondents’ contention that the mere possibility that the principal debtor might be placed under business rescue justified staying or dismissing the applicant’s claim against the respondents as sureties. The court rejected that proposition, reasoning that the possible granting of the business rescue application would not affect the respondents’ indebtedness to the applicant. The court placed weight on the suretyship clauses identified as preserving the applicant’s rights to recover the balance from the respondents if full recovery from the principal debtor could not be achieved.


On the liquidation defence, the court reasoned from the contractual position created by the suretyships. It held that each respondent had bound themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors, jointly and severally, which meant the applicant had an election and could proceed against one or more of them as co-principal debtors. The court further emphasised that the respondents had renounced the benefits of excussion. On that basis, the court reasoned that the respondents were precluded from insisting that the applicant first pursue the principal debtor, and the applicant was entitled to proceed directly against the sureties.


In relation to condonation, the court applied the discretionary principles governing condonation, including factors such as the degree of non-compliance, the explanation provided, the importance of the case, the interest in finality, convenience to the court, and avoidance of unnecessary delay. The court referred to the statement of principle in Dengetenge Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sphere Mining Development Company Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 251 (SCA). It further relied on authority emphasising the need for a reasonable and acceptable explanation, that non-compliance should be remedied as soon as possible, and that prospects of success are relevant but not determinative; a flagrant disregard of the rules may justify refusal of condonation notwithstanding prospects. In this respect the court referred to Darries v Sheriff, Magistrate’s Court Wynberg and Another 1998 (3) SA 34 (SCA).


Applying those principles, the court concluded that the respondents’ explanation demonstrated a deliberate decision to refrain from filing their answering affidavit timeously because they expected another judgment to be handed down. The court characterised this as confirming the default was wilful. As to logistical constraints, the court held that the respondents’ allegations lacked sufficient detail and substance, particularly because they did not explain why alternative arrangements could not have been made (including the potential use of correspondent attorneys, after-hours commissioning services, or electronic/virtual means). The court also considered it material that the respondents gave no explanation for failing to apply for an extension of time at the earliest opportunity. The court therefore found that the condonation application was not shown to be bona fide and that the reasons advanced were not reasonable or acceptable, with the result that no good cause was established.


Finally, the court recorded that all aspects required for the applicant to obtain judgment in the main action had been admitted by the respondents, and that the defences raised were not sound in law. On that basis, the main claim succeeded.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the respondents’ application for condonation for the late filing of their answering affidavit, and ordered the respondents to pay the costs of that condonation application.


The court granted judgment in favour of the applicant against the respondents, jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved, in the sum of R205 884.78, together with interest at the prime rate plus 11% per annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from 1 September 2021 until date of payment, both days inclusive.


The court further ordered the respondents to pay the costs of the application on the scale of attorney and client.


Cases Cited


Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2021 (5) SA 430 (WCC)


Dengetenge Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sphere Mining Development Company Ltd and Others [2013] 2 All SA 251 (SCA)


Darries v Sheriff, Magistrate’s Court Wynberg and Another 1998 (3) SA 34 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 71 of 2008 (section 133(2) referred to; section 132(2) is mentioned in the judgment text)


Rules of Court Cited


The judgment referred generally to the Rules of Court in the context of condonation, without identifying a specific rule.


Held


The court held that the respondents’ reliance on a pending business rescue application involving the principal debtor did not provide a basis to stay or dismiss the claim against the respondents as sureties and co-principal debtors, and that the statutory provision relied upon concerned enforcement against a company in respect of guarantees and suretyships.


The court held that the principal debtor’s liquidation and uncertainty about the applicant’s participation in the liquidation process did not defeat the applicant’s contractual entitlement to proceed directly against the respondents, particularly given that they bound themselves jointly and severally as co-principal debtors and renounced the benefit of excussion.


The court held that condonation should be refused because the respondents’ failure to comply with time limits was wilful, the logistical explanations were insufficiently substantiated, and no good cause was shown. Given admissions establishing the applicant’s claim and the failure of the defences in law, judgment was granted for the claimed amount and interest, together with attorney-and-client costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that a creditor who holds a suretyship in which the surety also binds themselves as a co-principal debtor, and where liability is joint and several, may elect to proceed against the surety directly, and the surety cannot insist that the creditor first proceed against the principal debtor where the surety has renounced the benefit of excussion.


The judgment applied the principle that the operation of statutory restrictions or moratoria associated with business rescue (as discussed with reference to section 133(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008) concerns the enforceability of certain claims against the company in specified circumstances, and does not, on the court’s reasoning, operate to extinguish or suspend the independent contractual liability of sureties who have bound themselves to the creditor on terms preserving the creditor’s rights.


On condonation, the judgment applied the principle that condonation is discretionary and depends on factors including the extent of non-compliance and the adequacy of the explanation, that an applicant must provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation and act promptly to remedy non-compliance, and that even where prospects may exist, a wilful or insufficiently explained disregard of procedural requirements may justify refusal of condonation, particularly where no good cause is shown.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 83
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Firstrand Bank v Van der Heever and Others (4620/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 83 (29 April 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
No.: 4620/2021
Reportable:
Yes/No
Of
interest to other judges: Yes/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: Yes/NO
In
the matter between:
FIRSTRAND
BANK LTD
Applicant
and
JANETTE
VAN DEN HEEVER
1
st
Respondent
THEODORUS
I VAN DEN HEEVER
2
nd
Respondent
THERESE
VAN DEN HEEVER
3
rd
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BY:
AK RAMLAL, AJ
HEARD
ON:
10 FEBRUARY 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
29 APRIL 2022
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, and release to SAFLII.

The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 13h30 on 29 April
2022.
[1]
The application before this court is for a judgment sounding in money
against the Respondents, jointly and severally, the one
to pay, the
other(s) to be absolved, in their capacities as sureties and
co-principal debtors.
[2]
The
Respondents also apply for condonation for the late filing of their
Answering Affidavit.
[1]
[3]
The Applicant concluded an agreement with Heever Boerdery CC (in
liquidation)
(“the
principal debtor”)
on
or about 12 July 2018 in terms of which the Applicant made available
a credit facility to the principal debtor, limited to the
capital
amount of R197 000.00
[2]
[4]
The Applicant has complied with its obligation in terms of the
agreement.
[3]
[5]
The principal debtor failed to maintain the minimum monthly
instalments in terms of the agreement and the last payment made
by
the principal debtor was on 24 March 2021
[4]
[6]
Notwithstanding written demand, which was duly served on the
principal debtor, the principal debtor has failed to pay the
outstanding
amount due to the Applicant under the credit facility.
[5]
[7]
The principal debtor is accordingly indebted to the Applicant in the
amount of R205 884.78 plus interest calculated daily
and
compounded monthly in arrears from 1 September 2021.
[6]
[8]
In terms of the suretyship agreements concluded between the Applicant
and the First, Second and Third Respondents, the Respondents
bound
themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors
in
solidium
to the Applicant for the repayment of the amounts that may from time
to time become due in terms of the credit facility advanced
by the
Applicant to the principal debtor.
[7]
[9]
The
first defence raised by the Respondent’s to the Applicant’s
claim is that on 10 May 2021, Mr Oosthuizen (a creditor
of the
principal debtor) lodged an application to place the principal debtor
under business rescue.
[8]
This
business rescue application was heard on 4 November 2021 and the
judgment has to date not been handed down.
[9]
[10]
The Respondents have been advised that
Section 133(2)
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
, provides for a moratorium on the legal
proceedings against the sureties of a company which is placed under
business rescue and
because there is a possibility that the principal
debtor might be placed under business rescue, it would be prudent for
the present
application to be stayed, alternatively, dismissed.
[10]
[11]
Section 133(2)
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
reads:

During
business rescue proceedings, a guarantee or surety by a company in
favour of any other person may not be enforced by any
person against
the company except with leave of the court and in accordance with the
terms the court considers just and equitable
in the circumstances”
[12]
A plain reading of
Section 132(2)
[11]
is that it is a provision that deals specifically with the
enforcement of claims against a company based on guarantees and
suretyships,
and it contains a stipulation that in such cases the
claims against the company may be enforced only with the leave of the
court.
See
Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns
2021 (5) SA 430
(WCC)
[13]
The possible granting of the business rescue application will have no
effect on the Respondents’ indebtedness to the
Applicant. All
three Respondents, have specifically entered into suretyship
agreements which contain clauses which preserve the
rights of the
Applicant to recover the balance owing from the Respondents in the
event of it being unable to recover the full amount
from the
principal debtor.
[12]
[14]
The second defence raised by the Respondents is that the principal
debtor is in liquidation and a liquidator has been appointed.
[13]
It
is not clear to the Respondents whether the Applicant has submitted a
claim in the liquidation at the first meeting of creditors
that was
held on 21 April 2021,
[14]
and that the Applicant is not entitled to lodge a successful
claim against both the closed corporation and obtain judgment
against
the sureties.
[15]
[15]
All three Respondents have bound themselves, in favour of the
Applicant, as sureties and co-principal debtors, jointly and

severally.
[16]
The Applicant
herein therefor has the choice and can decide on whether to proceed
against one or more of the Respondents in their
capacities as
co-principal debtors.
[16]
Sight must further not be lost of the fact that all three Respondents
in this case have renounced the benefits of excussion
[17]
in their respective agreements of suretyship, thus entitling the
Applicant to proceed with its claim against any or all of the

sureties and the sureties are in turn precluded from dictating that
the Applicant must first excuss the principal debtor.
[17]
In respect of the application for the condonation of the late filing
of the Respondents Answering Affidavit, the Respondents
explain:
17.1
that a day before the issuing of this application, this Court heard
an opposed motion, in which two of the principal
debtor’s
creditors applied for orders against the principal debtor: One for
the placing of the principal debtor under business
rescue and the
other, for the resolution passed by the principal debtor to be placed
under voluntary liquidation, to be set aside;
17.2
The Respondents anticipated that the judgment in the aforesaid
opposed motion would be given by this Court prior to the
date on
which they were required to file their answering affidavit and that
this expectation led to the delay in the filing of
the answering
affidavit;
17.3
There were severe logistical constraints that the Respondents endured
that resulted in their inability to serve and file
their answering
affidavit within the stipulated time. These are:
17.3.1
That the first and Second Respondents reside in Senekal in the Free
State Province, which is two to three hours’
drive from
Bloemfontein;
[18]
17.3.2
That the Third Respondent was in Bethlehem in the Free State Province
which is two to three hours’ drive
from Bloemfontein and she
could not obtain leave from her employer to attend to the signing and
commissioning of a confirmatory
affidavit;
[19]
and
17.3.3
That the attorney of record of the Respondents is situated in
Pretoria, which further made the practical logistical
arrangements
extremely difficult and cumbersome
[20]
[18]
The factors relevant to the Court’s discretion to grant or
refuse an application for condonation include:

the
degree of non-compliance, the explanation therefor, the importance of
the case, a respondent’s interest in the finality
of the
judgment of the court, the convenience of the court and the avoidance
of unnecessary delay in the administration of justice”
[21]
[19]
It is expected of a party seeking condonation for the non-observance
of the Rules of Court to tender a reasonable and acceptable

explanation and to try to remedy the non-compliance as soon as
possible. A consideration of the Applicants prospects of success
in
the main action is a relevant factor in the exercise of the
discretion of the court on whether the application for condonation

must succeed, but it is not the only factor. A flagrant disregard of
the Rules, even if there are reasonable prospects of success,
should
result in the application for condonation not being granted.
[22]
[20]
The evidence by the Respondents that they did not file their
answering affidavit because they anticipated that the judgment
in the
opposed motion would be given prior to the date on which they were
required to serve and file their answering affidavit
confirms
that the Respondents freely and voluntarily took the decision to
refrain from acting in accordance with the Rules of Court
and that
their default was willful.
[21]
The Respondents have placed reliance on the severe logistical
constraints that were experienced. However the grounds on which
the
Respondents rely lack sufficient detail and substance in the form of
why alternate arrangements could not be made, for example,
in the
form of the use of correspondent attorneys, after hours available
services for the commissioning of documents and even the
use of other
electronic or virtual and digital platforms that could have been
utilized to circumvent the alleged hinderances. In
particular, the
Respondents tender no explanation as to why they did not, at the
earliest available opportunity, apply for an extension
of time in
which to file their answering affidavit.
[22]
The failure of the Respondents to address these logistical challenges
with more vigour and conscientiousness cannot be overlooked.
The
Respondents have not persuaded the Court that their application for
condonation is
bona
fide
and
the reasons provided are not deemed to be reasonable or acceptable
for the non-compliance with the Rules of Court. No good cause
has
also been shown for the granting of the application for condonation.
[23]
All the aspects that the Applicant is required to prove in order to
obtain judgment in the main action have been admitted by
the
Respondents.
[23]
The defences
raised by the Respondents (as discussed above) are not sound in law
and must therefore fail.
[24]
In the result the following order
is made:
1.
The application for condonation is dismissed, with costs.
2.
Judgment is granted against the Respondents, jointly and severally,
the one paying the others to be absolved,
for the sum of R205 884.78
plus interest thereon at the prime rate, plus 11% per annum,
calculated daily and compounded monthly
in arrears from 1 September
2021, until the date of payment, both days, inclusive
3.
The Respondent is directed to pay the costs of this application on
the scale of attorney and client.
_______________
A.K
RAMLAL, AJ
On
behalf of the Applicant
:
Adv. R R van der Merwe
Instructed
by

:       Honey Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the Respondent
:
Adv J B Cilliers
Instructed
by

:       Viljoen Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
[1]
Order
of Court dated 25 November 2021 Paginated page 78
[2]
Paginated pages 12 and 85 of the record
[3]
Pages
15 and 85 of the record
[4]
Pages
15 and 85 of the record
[5]
Pages
16 and 85 of the record
[6]
Annexure
“FA 10” page 39 of the record
[7]
Annexures “FA15”, “FA18” and “FA21”
[8]
Para 4.1.1 page 83 of the Record
[9]
Para 4.1.3 page 83 of the Record
[10]
Para 4.1.5 page 84 of the recird
[11]
Companies Act 71 of 2008
[12]
Clauses 1 and 11 of Annexures “FA15”, “FA18”
and “FA21”
[13]
Para 6.1.1 page 85
[14]
Para 6.1.3 page 86
[15]
Para 6.1.4 page 86
[16]
Clause 1 of Annexures “FA15”, “FA18” and
“FA21”
[17]
Clause 31 of Annexures “FA15”, “FA18” and
“FA21”
[18]
Paginated page 114 of record
[19]
Paginated page 115 of record
[20]
Paginated page 115 of record
[21]
Dengetenge Holdings (Pty)Ltd v Southern Sphere Mining Development
Company Ltd & others[2013]2AllSA251(SCA) at para 11
[22]
Darries v Sheriff, Magistrate’s Court Wynberg & another
1998(3) SA 34 SCA at 40-41E
[23]
Para 6 page 85 of the record