Mafube Business Forum and Another v Mafube Local Municipality and Others (1969/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 86 (28 April 2022)

85 Reportability
Municipal Law

Brief Summary

Local Government — Intervention by National Government — Applicants sought intervention under section 139(7) of the Constitution for the dissolution of the Mafube Local Municipality's Council due to failure to meet constitutional obligations — Court found that the Municipality and its officials breached their duties to provide basic services and manage finances effectively — Declared that jurisdictional facts for mandatory national intervention were present and directed national authorities to intervene, implement a Financial Recovery Plan, and report back to the court on progress.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter was brought as an application in the Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein, in which the applicants sought wide-ranging constitutional and remedial relief arising from alleged systemic failures in local government in the Mafube area. The litigation was framed as a constitutional challenge directed at compelling governmental intervention measures and obtaining declaratory relief concerning breaches of constitutional and statutory obligations.


The applicants were Mafube Business Forum (a non-profit organisation representing local business interests in Frankfort, Villiers, Tweeling and Cornelia) and AfriForum NPC (a civil-rights non-profit organisation acting on behalf of members within the municipal area). The principal respondents included Mafube Local Municipality and various local office-bearers and structures (including the municipal manager, administrator, executive mayor, municipal council, and the Fezile Dabi District Municipality), as well as provincial executive actors (the Premier, the provincial Executive Council, and relevant MECs) and national executive actors (various Ministers, the National Council of Provinces, and ultimately the President, who was joined later).


The application was issued on 4 May 2021. When initially enrolled on the unopposed roll, a postponement was sought by most respondents to file answering papers; the matter was postponed and thereafter opposed. The applicants amended their notice of motion, including to address a non-joinder point concerning the President. While the application initially contemplated dissolution of the municipal council and national takeover, by the hearing on 27 January 2022 the applicants no longer persisted with the dissolution of the municipal council, and relied primarily on a draft order (“Draft Order C”), with an alternative (“Draft Order D”).


The dispute concerned municipal governance failure, specifically persistent service delivery breakdowns (water, sanitation, refuse, infrastructure), severe financial dysfunction, and the question whether the court could compel national executive intervention under section 139(7) of the Constitution, or whether relief was confined to compelling mandatory provincial intervention under sections 139(4) and 139(5) together with appropriate reporting and remedial steps.


Material Facts


It was materially common cause that Mafube Local Municipality was experiencing serious and persistent operational and financial distress, although the respondents disputed aspects of the extent and current state of certain service-delivery failures. The court treated as significant the long history of repeated breakdowns and the failure of earlier remedial steps to achieve sustained compliance with constitutional and statutory obligations.


Chronologically, the applicants relied on a history of litigation and court orders concerning the municipality’s sewage infrastructure and related environmental harm. The municipality had previously been ordered (2004 and 2008) to repair sewage pumps servicing Namahadi Township, and it was later found in contempt (2014). Further orders followed in 2015 and 2016 concerning sewage spillage and failing sewage works, and a further contempt-related finding occurred in 2017 in relation to non-compliance regarding sewage operations and maintenance.


The applicants also relied on ongoing infrastructure decay and service failures, including poor road conditions and sewage overflow into streets. They attributed these outcomes to chronic municipal dysfunction, compounded by communication failures such as malfunctioning telephone systems and connectivity problems, which impeded complaint reporting and account disputes.


A further major factual theme was the municipality’s electricity-payment defaults to Eskom, which resulted in disconnections that in turn affected the operation of sewage pumps. The applicants pointed to an order granted on 20 January 2017 authorising the first applicant to make direct payments to Eskom to prevent electricity cut-offs that would stop sewage plant pumps.


The financial distress was supported by allegations (largely not placed in substantive dispute as to the existence of distress) of inability to pay salaries during periods including 2014 and 2020, alleged failure to remit pension fund deductions, and resultant legal action. A criminal case relating to alleged fraud in respect of salary deductions not paid to third parties was opened, and on 5 May 2016 an order was granted in favour of the South African Municipal Workers Union Provident Fund (SAMWU) for approximately R16.2 million.


The municipality also experienced labour unrest and strikes, including violent incidents in 2017, with service-delivery effects including a shutdown of water supply from the Villiers treatment plant. The applicants’ case included that requests for provincial assistance yielded acknowledgment but no effective remedial action.


Environmental harm was supported by reliance on a complaint describing the municipality as a major contributor to pollution of the upper Vaal River, and by a Rand Water water quality report for the period July 2019 to December 2020 identifying unacceptable water quality, including high levels of E. coli and faecal coliforms, attributed to towns under Mafube.


In relation to financial governance, the applicants relied on information emerging from a Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) process, including recurring adverse Auditor-General outcomes since 2014, allegations of unexplained transactions (including a transfer of R40 million between municipal bank accounts), and a disclaimed audit opinion (July 2020) due to incomplete financial information. The municipality’s annual financial statements for 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 were only submitted in February 2021, notwithstanding external assistance.


The court treated as significant that, notwithstanding some improvements claimed by respondents during a provincial administration period commencing in 2017, the municipality’s financial position had not improved and had worsened. The answering material filed on behalf of the Minister of Finance relied on the handover report and on reporting under section 71 of the MFMA, reflecting the municipality owing creditors an amount stated as approximately R715.954 million.


As to intervention history, it was common cause that on 6 April 2017 the provincial executive announced an intervention under section 139(1)(b). National Treasury’s Municipal Financial Recovery Service prepared a draft financial recovery plan in 2017, but it did not receive progress reports from the municipality, administrators, or provincial executive regarding implementation. The provincial executive resolved in December 2020 to terminate the section 139(1)(b) intervention effective 30 March 2021, with post-intervention support to follow under section 154 of the Constitution.


A key later factual development was the local government elections held on 1 November 2021, which resulted in a newly elected municipal council. The respondents relied on this to argue mootness and legal incompetence of relief aimed at dissolving the council or imposing intrusive measures without evidentiary grounding as to failures of the newly elected council. This later factual change also became relevant to the applicants’ request that the first applicant be authorised to participate in or oversee municipal administration under a stakeholders’ “Compact”.


Legal Issues


The central legal issue concerned the proper interpretation and operation of section 139(7) of the Constitution, and whether the court could compel (and structure) national executive intervention on the basis that the provincial executive “cannot or does not or does not adequately” exercise the powers or perform the functions in section 139(4) or 139(5).


Closely tied to that was the question whether the constitutional scheme permits a “leapfrog” approach, namely national intervention preceding mandatory provincial intervention, on the basis that the province has been ineffective historically or appears likely to be ineffective. The court had to determine whether national intervention is triggered only after the province has invoked and attempted to implement section 139(4) or (5), but then fails, or whether national intervention can be compelled where the province has not yet instituted the mandatory intervention though the jurisdictional facts exist.


The matter also raised issues about the court’s remedial powers in constitutional litigation, including the appropriateness of declaratory relief, whether structural or supervisory relief could be granted, and whether the court could authorise a private civil-society actor to participate in municipal administration functions as contemplated by the applicants’ proposed order.


These questions involved a mixture of law (constitutional interpretation of section 139 and separation-of-powers constraints), application of law to fact (whether jurisdictional facts for mandatory intervention were present, and whether the requirements for section 139(7) were met), and evaluative judgment (whether certain relief had become moot given the elections; whether structural relief was appropriate and in what form; and how to calibrate relief to respect institutional integrity across spheres).


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter within the constitutional architecture of distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres of government, emphasising that the scope of intervention by one sphere into another is highly circumscribed and permitted only under defined circumstances and procedures. It drew on constitutional authority recognising local government as having original constitutional status, while also being subject to supervision and support by provincial and national government within constitutional limits.


A preliminary procedural point arose regarding the commissioning of the Minister of Finance’s answering affidavit, which omitted certain attestation particulars. The court held there had been substantial compliance with the regulations under the Justice of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act, accepted the affidavit, and proceeded on that basis.


On the substantive merits, the court found that the applicants established that the municipality was in serious or persistent material breach of its obligations to provide basic services, and also in serious or persistent material breach of its financial commitments, resulting in a crisis in its financial affairs. The court treated the failures in paying Eskom, inability to manage revenue collection and billing, failure to meet statutory and contractual commitments (including employee-related contributions), and the broader record of service-delivery breakdowns as demonstrating the jurisdictional thresholds for mandatory provincial intervention in terms of section 139(4) and section 139(5).


The court then addressed the interpretive dispute about section 139(7). While the applicants argued for a plain-meaning reading that would allow national intervention where the province “cannot” or “does not” or “does not adequately” intervene, even before the province has instituted mandatory intervention, the court accepted the opposing interpretation advanced by Treasury and the President. It reasoned that section 139(7) is framed to apply where a provincial executive “cannot or does not or does not adequately exercise the powers or perform the functions referred to in subsection (4) or (5)”, and that such an assessment cannot be made until the province has been empowered through invocation of the section 139(4) or (5) intervention and then has attempted, but failed adequately, to perform the required functions.


The court placed weight on the institutional respect demanded by section 41(1)(e) of the Constitution and the broader separation-of-powers and cooperative governance framework. It rejected the applicants’ argument insofar as it effectively presupposed inevitable provincial failure. The court characterised judicial resolution compelling national substitution as something that should occur as a last resort, and only when facts demonstrate that the province has in fact been unable or has failed adequately to implement the mandatory intervention once invoked.


Although it declined to order national intervention under section 139(7), the court nevertheless held that the jurisdictional facts for mandatory provincial intervention were present and had been present for some time. It found that the provincial respondents’ conduct in failing effectively to carry out their mandate to intervene and resolve the municipality’s failures was inconsistent with the Constitution, justifying declaratory relief under section 172(1)(a). The court also accepted that structural-type relief was appropriate to ensure that effective steps were taken, given the history of failed undertakings and vague assurances that intervention was “imminent” without concrete implementation.


On the applicants’ request for relief authorising the first applicant to assist and oversee municipal administration pursuant to the stakeholders’ compact, the court declined to grant it. It reasoned that the election of a new municipal council on 1 November 2021 materially changed the factual matrix. The court held that it would be inappropriate and unsustainable to make intrusive orders affecting the newly elected council and municipal governance arrangements without input from the current council, particularly because the new council did not participate in the prior stakeholder meetings that produced the compact. In this respect, the court applied the doctrine of mootness and ripeness, treating the request as no longer grounded in a live controversy showing a concrete and probable threat that the new council would refuse assistance, and indicating that the new council should be afforded a fair opportunity to address inherited problems.


In respect of costs, the court considered that costs should follow the result in relation to the relief granted against the local and provincial respondents, while also applying a Biowatch-based approach in relation to the national respondents and the district municipality, with each party bearing its own costs in respect of the claims against those respondents.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted declaratory relief that Mafube Local Municipality and the identified local respondents were in breach of constitutional, legislative and regulatory obligations to residents, and declared the municipality’s conduct inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent of inconsistency, with specific reference to failures relating to sustainable service provision, a safe and healthy environment, administrative/budgeting/planning management, prioritisation of basic needs, and promotion of social and economic development.


The court declared that the provincial intervention had failed to ensure that the municipality met obligations to provide basic services and meet financial commitments, and declared the provincial respondents’ conduct in failing effectively to carry out their section 139 mandate inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to that extent.


The court declared that the jurisdictional facts for mandatory provincial intervention under section 139(4) and section 139(5) were present and had consistently been present. It directed the provincial respondents forthwith to undertake a mandatory provincial intervention by exercising the powers conferred by section 139(4) and (5), read with the relevant provisions of the MFMA. The provincial respondents were specifically directed to approve a temporary budget or revenue-raising measures to give effect to the financial recovery plan; to implement a recovery plan aimed at securing the municipality’s ability to provide basic services and meet financial commitments with due regard to the existing financial recovery plan; and to take immediate action to ensure that pollution of the Vaal River or other water sources by the municipality’s sewage works ceased.


The court did not grant the relief sought that would have compelled national intervention under section 139(7) at that stage, and it refused the requested orders that would have authorised the first applicant to assist and oversee municipal administration under the compact, treating that aspect as impacted by the intervening municipal elections and the need for the newly elected council’s input.


As to costs, the first to tenth respondents were ordered jointly and severally to pay the costs of the application, including the costs of two counsel where applicable. The eleventh to seventeenth respondents and the applicants were ordered to pay their own costs occasioned by the claims against those respondents.


Cases Cited


Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC).


City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005 (2) SA 323 (CC).


Natal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).


Premier, Western Cape & Others v Overberg District Municipality & Others 2011 (4) SA 441 (SCA).


Premier, Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others 2022 (1) SA 16 (CC).


Unemployed People’s Movement v Eastern Cape Premier and Others 2020 (3) SA 562 (ECG).


South African Municipal Workers Union v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 (1) SA 548 (SCA).


Lohrmann v Vaal Ontwikkelingsmaatskappy 1979 All SA 416 (T).


FirstRand Auto Receivables (RF) Ltd v Makgobatlou 2021 ZAGPJHC 420 (8 September 2021).


S v Munn 1973 (3) SA 734 (NC).


Liviero Civils (Pty) Ltd and Another v Amatola Water Boards (2614/2018) [2018] ZAECGHC 117 (20 November 2018).


City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others [2010] ZACC 11; 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC); 2010 (9) BCLR 859 (CC).


Ngwathe Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings SoC Ltd and Others [2015] ZAFSHC 104 (28 May 2015).


Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT37/96) [1996] ZACC 24; 1997 (1) BCLR 1; 1997 (2) SA 97.


Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (No 2) [2006] ZACC 12; 2007 (6) SA 477 (CC).


National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).


Oranje Watersport CC v Dawid Kuiper Local Municipality and Others [2018] ZANCHC 42 (6 July 2018).


Afriforum NPC and Others v Eskom Holdings SOC Limited and Others [2017] 3 All SA 663 (GP).


Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.


Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.


Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.


Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.


Justice of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act 16 of 1963.


Constitution Second Amendment Act of 1998.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the municipality was in serious and persistent breach of basic service delivery obligations and in serious financial crisis such that the jurisdictional facts for mandatory provincial intervention under section 139(4) and section 139(5) were present.


The court held that section 139(7) does not permit national intervention to be compelled as a first step merely because the province is alleged to have been ineffective historically or is predicted to be ineffective; rather, national intervention “in the stead of” the province is competent only where the province has invoked and attempted the mandatory intervention powers under section 139(4) or (5) and cannot or does not adequately exercise those powers or perform those functions.


The court held further that the provincial respondents’ failure effectively to fulfil their section 139 mandate justified declaratory constitutional relief, and it granted directive relief compelling the provincial respondents to implement mandatory intervention measures forthwith. The court declined, in light of the post-application municipal elections and the absence of engagement with the newly elected municipal council, to grant relief authorising the first applicant to participate in municipal administration under the stakeholders’ compact.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 139 interventions must be understood within the constitutional structure of distinctive, interdependent and interrelated spheres of government, and the scope of one sphere’s intervention into another is highly circumscribed, temporary, and procedurally bounded.


Where the jurisdictional facts exist for an intervention under section 139(4) or section 139(5), the provincial executive has a mandatory duty to intervene by taking appropriate steps aimed at achieving the constitutionally specified objectives of the intervention, including (where applicable) approving temporary budgets or revenue-raising measures and implementing a financial recovery plan.


The threshold for mandatory financial intervention under section 139(5) is met where, as a result of a crisis in a municipality’s financial affairs, it is in serious or persistent material breach of obligations to provide basic services or to meet financial commitments, or admits inability to meet those commitments.


Section 139(7) requires that national intervention occurs “in the stead of” the provincial executive only where the province cannot, does not, or does not adequately exercise the powers or perform the functions referred to in section 139(4) or (5). The court accepted that this assessment presupposes that the province has first been in a position to exercise those powers through instituting the mandatory intervention, and has then failed or been unable adequately to implement it.


In constitutional matters, where conduct is inconsistent with the Constitution, a court is required by section 172(1)(a) to declare such conduct invalid to the extent of inconsistency, and may craft just and equitable relief, including directive or supervisory measures, but relief must remain sensitive to constitutional boundaries, including democratic legitimacy at municipal level and separation-of-powers constraints.


Mootness and ripeness principles constrain adjudication where changes in circumstances mean the dispute no longer presents a live controversy grounded in concrete relief, and courts will be reluctant to grant intrusive orders, particularly against newly elected democratic structures, without a current factual foundation and proper engagement.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 86
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Mafube Business Forum and Another v Mafube Local Municipality and Others (1969/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 86 (28 April 2022)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE
DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable: YES/NO
Of Interest to other
Judges: YES/NO
Circulate to
Magistrates: YES/NO
Case
No.: 1969/2021
In the matter between:
MAFUBE
BUSINESS FORUM
1
st
Applicant
AFRIFORUM
NPC
2
nd
Applicant
and
MAFUBE
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
1
st
Respondent
THE
MUNICIPAL MANAGER: MAFUBE LOCAL
2
nd
Respondent
MUNICIPALITY
THE
ADMINISTRATOR: MAFUBE LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
3
rd
Respondent
THE EXECUTIVE MAYOR:
MAFUBE LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
4
th
Respondent
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL:
MAFUBE LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
5
th
Respondent
THE
PREMIER OF THE FREE STATE PROVINCE
6
th
Respondent
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FOR
THE
FREE
STATE PROVINCE
7
th
Respondent
THE MEC: COOPERATIVE
GOVERNANCE
AND
TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS,
FREE
STATE PROVINCE
8
th
Respondent
THE
MEC: FINANCE, FREE STATE PROVINCE
9
th
Respondent
THE MEC: DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT,TOURISM
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS, FREE STATE PROVINCE
10
th
Respondent
THE MINISTER OF
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
AND
TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS
11
th
Respondent
THE
MINISTER OF FINANCE
12
th
Respondent
THE MINISTER OF HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS, WATER
&
SANITATION
13
th
Respondent
THE MINISTER OF
ENVIRONMENT, FORESTRY
AND
FISHERIES
14
th
Respondent
NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF PROVINCES
15
th
Respondent
FEZILE
DABI DISTRICT MUNICIPALITY
16
th
Respondent
THE
PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF  SOUTH AFRICA
17
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BY:
I VAN RHYN, AJ
HEARD
ON:
27
JANUARY 2022
DELIVERED
ON:
28 APRIL 2022
INTRODUCTION
AND RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE APPLICANTS.
[1] The primary relief
sought by the applicants is that the national executive, more
specifically the eleventh to fifteenth respondents
as Ministers of
four national departments, should intervene in terms of section
139(7) of the Constitution to the effect that the
Mafube Local
Municipality’s Council be dissolved and be placed under
administration of the National Government. The Applicants
furthermore
seek a supervisory/structural interdict requiring the national
respondents to report back to court on their implementation
of the
relief sought. In terms of prayer 3 of their amended Notice of
Motion, the applicants also seek an order that the first
applicant be
permitted to assist and oversee in the Mafube Local Municipality’s
(“the Municipality”) administration
on a temporary basis,
until it can demonstrate to the court that it can successfully
execute its constitutional and legislative
obligations. At the
hearing of this application on 27 January 2022, the applicants no
longer sought the dissolution of the Municipal
Council of the
Municipality. A draft order was handed up, marked “Draft Order
C” which reads as follows:

1. It is declared
that:
1.1
The First Respondent the Mafube Local Municipality
(hereinafter referred to as “the Municipality”) together
with the
Second to Fifth and Sixteenth Respondents (collectively
referred to as “the Local Respondents”) are in breach of
the
constitutional, legislative and regulatory obligations towards
their residents.
1.2
The conduct of the First Respondent, (including
the Second to Fifth and Sixteenth Respondents), in failing to ensure
the provision
of services to its community in a sustainable manner;
in failing to promote a safe and healthy environment for its
community; in
failing to structure and manage its administration,
budgeting and planning processes; in failing to give priority to the
basic
needs of its community; and in failing to promote the social
and economic development of its community, is inconsistent with the

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996; is in breach of s
152(1) and s 153(a) of the Constitution, as read with its
supporting
legislation in terms of the Local Government: Municipal Finance
Management Act of 56 of 2003 (hereafter: “the
LGMFMA”)
and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
(hereafter: “the LGMSA”), and is declared
invalid to the
extent of these inconsistencies.
1.3
In terms of the provisions of section 139(1)(b)
and s 139(4), read with s 139(5), of the Constitution, and read
further with sections
139 and 140 of the LGMFMA, it is declared that
the provincial intervention by the Sixth to Tenth Respondents has
failed to ensure
that the Municipality and the rest of the Local
Respondents meet the obligations to provide basic services and to
meet their financial
commitments.
1.4
The conduct of the Sixth to Tenth Respondents, in
failing effectively to carry out their mandate in terms of section
139 of the
Constitution and the LGMFMA, to intervene and resolve the
issues of the First and the rest of the Local Respondents, is
inconsistent
with the Constitution and is declared invalid to the
extent of these inconsistencies.
1.5
The jurisdictional facts for mandatory National
intervention in the affairs of Mafube Local Municipality in terms of
s 139(7) of
the Constitution, as read with s139, s140 and s150 of the
LGMFMA are now present and have consistently been present in the
past;
as a result of the failure of the First to Fifth and Sixteenth
Respondents, as well as the Sixth to Tenth Respondents, to ensure

that the First Respondent meets its constitutional obligations.
2. In terms of the
provisions of s139(7) of the Constitution, read with the
aforementioned provisions of the LGMFMA, the Eleventh
to Fifteenth
and Seventeenth Respondents (“the National Respondents”)
are directed forthwith to intervene in the affairs
of the First
Respondent – in the stead of Sixth to Tenth Respondents –
by exercising the powers conferred by section
139(4) and (5) of the
Constitution, as read with sections 139, 140 and 150 of the LGMFMA.
The Eleventh to Fifteenth and Seventeenth
Respondents (“the
National Respondents”) are specifically directed:
2.1 to approve a
temporary budget or revenue-raising measures or any other measures
intended to give effect to the Financial Recovery
Plan detailed in
paragraph 2.2 below, to provide for the continued functionality of
the Municipality.
2.2 to implement a
recovery plan aimed at securing the Municipality ability to meet its
obligations to provide basic services and
to meet its financial
commitments, having due regard to the existence and the terms of the
Financial Recovery Plan already developed
for Mafube Municipality
(the plan is attached to the Founding Affidavit as Annexure “JJS26”).
2.3 to take immediate
action to ensure that any and all pollution of the Vaal River or any
other water sources in the Municipality’s
vicinity – by
the Municipality’s sewage works - ceases immediately.
3. The Eleventh to
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Respondents are specifically directed to,
in accordance with section 139(5)(b)(ii)
read with section 172(1)(b)
of the Constitution, adopt the following measures until they can
report back to this Court that the
Mafube Local Municipality is able
to discharge its Constitutional obligations effectively:
3.1 The Eleventh to
Fifteenth Respondents are ordered to permit the First Applicant to
use its expertise to assist with the Municipality’s

administration - in the terms as set out in the Mafube Stakeholders
Compact attached to the founding affidavit as annexure “JJS21”)

– including, but not limited to:
3.1.1 Revenue raising and
debt collection on the Municipality’s behalf;
3.1.2 Administration of
the Municipality’s water treatment and sewage plants by experts
of the First Applicant;
3.1.3 General
administrative functions such as communications with the general
public;
3.1.4 Expert assistance
in specialised matters regarding municipal infrastructure;
3.1.5 Establishing and
serving as an Oversight Committee, as contemplated in the Municipal
Legislation and Regulations, so as to
assist the Eleventh to
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Respondents in their role to provide
oversight and security of the Municipality’s
finances;
3.1.6 Assisting the
Eleventh to Fifteenth Respondents and Seventeenth Respondent in
implementing the Financial Recovery Plan (Annexure
“JJS26”);
3.1.7 Providing skills
training to employees of the Municipality to ensure sustainable
service delivery.
3.2 The relief
contemplated in paragraph 3.1 above shall operate on an interim basis
until the Eleventh to Fifteenth and Seventeenth
Respondents have
satisfied this court that the Mafube Local Municipality will be able
to operate effectively, free of such assistance.
4. The Eleventh to
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Respondents are ordered to report to this
Court under oath and in writing on their
progress in the
implementation of this order, as well as the prospects of the
Municipality being able to execute its own functions,
every three
months from the date of this order being handed down.
5 The First, Third, Sixth
and Eleventh Respondents, as well as any other Respondents who oppose
this application, are ordered, jointly
and severally to pay the costs
of this application on an attorney and own client scale, including
the costs consequent upon the
employment of two counsel”
[2] In the event of the
court not agreeing with the applicants’ submissions regarding
the interpretation of section 139(7)
of the Constitution, then and in
the alternative, the applicants seek an order in terms of “Draft
order D”, which is
basically the same as “Draft order C”
except that the reference to the jurisdictional facts present for
mandatory national
intervention in paragraph 1.5 refers to mandatory
provincial intervention in terms of section 139(4) and (5).
[3] The failure of local
municipalities, often plagued with numerous financial and operational
hurdles, to provide service delivery
to its residents and fulfil
their executive obligations in terms of the Constitution, have been
the subject of numerous court applications
and debates in the media.
The main issue in this application is the interpretation of section
139(7) of the Constitution and the
question whether, if the
jurisdictional facts for mandatory national intervention as provided
for in section 139(7) are present,
the court is entitled to leapfrog
over the provincial government on the basis that the latter “cannot
or does not, or does
not adequately” exercise its obligations
to intervene and whether such intervention may be sanctioned by the
court.
[4] First applicant, the
Mafube Business Forum, is a non-profit organization formed during
August 2019 to address the dire circumstances
in Frankfort and the
neighbouring towns of Villiers, Tweeling and Cornelia (collectively
known as “Mafube”).
The first applicant represents
various business interests in the area, amongst others, farmers,
construction, engineering and local
businesses.  Second
applicant is AfriForum (NPO), a non-profit organisation which
identifies itself specifically as a civil
rights organisation and
acts on behalf of those of its members who reside within the area of
the Municipality.
[5] The Municipality,
cited as first respondent, is a category B municipality which shares
its municipal executive and legislative
authority with the Fezile
Dabi District Municipality, the sixteenth respondent.  The
second respondent is the Municipal Manager
of the Municipality. The
Municipal Manager is the administrative head of the Municipality and
executed his duties in conjunction
with the third respondent, the
Administrator who was appointed by the seventh and eight respondents.
The fifth respondent is the
Municipal Council of the Municipality
(“the Municipal Council”).
[6] The Premier of the
Free State Province is cited as the sixth respondent in her capacity
as the political and executive head
of the Free State Province and of
the Executive Council for the Free State Province, cited as the
seventh respondent. The eight
respondent is the MEC for Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs (“COGTA”) for the Free
State Province. The
ninth respondent is the MEC for Finance for the
Free State Province, cited in this application in her capacity as the
provincial
executive official whose mandate it is to facilitate and
oversee the financial implications regarding the Municipality having
been
placed under administration. The tenth respondent is the MEC for
Economic, Small Business Development, Tourism and Environmental

affairs for the Free State Province.
[7] The eleventh
respondent is the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional
Affairs.  The Minister of Finance is
the twelfth respondent
(“the Minister of Finance” or “Treasury”). He
is cited in his capacity as the national
executive official mandated
with overseeing national financial policy and compliance across all
spheres of government and in particular,
in terms of ensuring that
the municipality (and its administrator(s)) comply with the relevant
national, provincial and local legislation
relating to its financial
requirements.  The Minister of Human Settlements, Water and
Sanitation is cited as the thirteenth
respondent and the Minister of
Environment Forestry and Fisheries is cited as the fourteenth
respondent.
[8] The fifteenth
Respondent is the National Council of Provinces, the national
legislative body responsible for regulating and
legislating with
respect to the affairs of all provinces. The seventeenth respondent
is the President of the Republic of South
Africa (“the
President”), who was joined in this application on 7 October
2021.
[9] The application is
opposed by the first to eleventh, the thirteenth and fourteenth
respondents. They filed one answering affidavit
and are referred to
by the parties and in this judgment as the “local and
provincial respondents”. Both the Minister
of Finance and the
President filed answering affidavits. The sixteenth respondent, the
relevant district municipality only raised
a legal point pertaining
to the grant of the relief sought in prayer 3 of the Notice of
Motion. The applicants filed two replying
affidavits, the latter in
response to the President’s answering affidavit.
BACKGROUND.
[10] The application was
issued on 4 May 2021. When the application was enrolled for hearing
on the unopposed roll of the 29
th
July 2021, only the
Minister of Finance had filed an answering affidavit. The remaining
respondents requested a postponement of
the matter to finalise their
answering affidavits and for the matter to be heard during November
2021. This request was denied
and the application was postponed for
hearing to 16 September 2021.
[11] On 1 September 2021
the applicants filed a notice of intention to amend the Notice of
Motion to meet an objection of non-joinder
of the President as a
party to the application and the legal point raised by the sixteenth
respondent.  At the time, the 27
th
of October 2021
had been proclaimed as election day. The Electoral Commission had
accepted the recommendations of the Moseneke
Report that the local
government elections should be postponed to February 2022 or a later
date. The Electoral Commissions’
application to the
Constitutional Court to sanction the postponement of the local
government elections was however dismissed.
[12] The local government
elections took place on 1 November 2021, which lead to the argument
by the local and provincial respondents
that the primary relief,
which is to dissolve the Municipal Council, has become moot. The
application for an order dissolving the
Municipal Council, which has
been constitutionally elected on 1 November 2021, without
substantiating facts placed before court
regarding any the wrongs or
failures by the newly elected municipal council, is argued to be
legally incompetent.
[13] The Minister of
Finance opposes the application on the basis that, even though the
opposing government respondents accept that
the Municipality is
currently in financial distress, an appropriate response is a
mandatory provincial intervention in terms of
section 139(5) of the
Constitution and not the primary  relief sought by the
applicants.
[14] On behalf of the
President it is contended that the relief sought by the applicants is
inconsistent with the constitutional
and legislative scheme. The
applicants have failed to demonstrate that the provincial executive
has failed to adequately exercise
its powers and functions in terms
of the provisions of section 139(4) and (5) of the Constitution and
have thus failed to make
out a case for an intervention by national
government under section 139(7) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
applicants cannot
be granted the authority by the court to form part
of an elected municipal administration. Consequently, the relief
claimed in
this regard is unconstitutional and unlawful.
THE SALIENT FACTS.
[15] The applicants aver
that the municipality have a long history of problems pertaining to
performing basic services such as refuse
removal, managing dumping
sites, pollution of the environment, repairing and maintaining
sewage pumps/works. On 9 June
2004 the Municipality was ordered by
the High Court of the Free State Division to repair sewage pumps
servicing the Namahadi Township,
situated at Frankfort.  A
similar order was issued on 2 August 2008.
[16] On 20 February 2014
this court, found the Municipality to be in contempt of its orders of
9 June 2004 and 2 August 2008.
On 16 October 2015 a further
high court order was issued pertaining to sewage spillage caused by
the failing sewage works of the
Municipality.  Less than a year
later, on 1 September 2016 yet another high court order was granted
whereby the Municipality
was compelled to take action and to rectify
the multiplicity of problems relating to its sewage works. On 20
January 2017 the high
court again found that the Municipality had not
complied with its order relating to sewage spillage and has failed to
properly
operate and maintain the pumps at the sewage plant.
[17] The applicants
furthermore argue that the Municipality has failed to maintain
municipal infrastructure.  The state of
the roads in Frankfort
is evident from photographs, appended to the founding affidavit,
which illustrate the poor condition of
a road surface and the
presence of potholes. Photographs furthermore indicate sewage water
overflowing from manhole covers into
the streets of Frankfort.
The problems encountered by the residents of the area are exacerbated
by the malfunction of the
municipalities’ telephone/telefax
system and website causing frustration in reporting complaints and
declaring disputes regarding
inaccurate municipal accounts received
by some of the residents of Mafube.
[18] The applicants
complained that the problems relating to sewage spillage and
maintenance of the pumps at the sewage plant are
closely linked to
the Municipality having defaulted multiple times on the payment of
its electricity bill with Eskom. Failure by
the Municipality to make
payments to Eskom culminated into numerous instances where Eskom
discontinued the electricity supply to
the Municipality.  On 20
January 2017 this court granted first applicant the authority to make
direct payments to Eskom in
an effort to prevent electricity cut offs
which would cause the pumps at the sewage plant to cease operating
yet again.
[19] Not only has the
Municipality been unable to execute its most basic constitutional
functions regarding service delivery and
maintaining the
infrastructure, but due to serious maladministration and low levels
of revenue collection, the Municipality had
been unable to pay the
salaries of its employees during 2014 and during 2020. The applicants
contend that the Municipality deducted
pension fund contributions
from the salaries of its employees, but failed to pay the pension
fund contributions over to the pension
fund.  On 27 January 2016
a criminal case was opened under case number CAS 71/05/2015 for
alleged fraud pertaining to money
deducted from employers’
salaries but not paid over to third parties.  On 5 May 2016 this
court granted an order under
case number 3558/2015, in favour of the
South African Municipal Workers Union Provident Fund (SAMWU), for an
amount of R16 249 515.75
to be paid in respect of the
deductions from workers’ salaries by the Municipality.
[20] Employees of the
Municipality embarked upon industrial action during the first week of
November 2014 which intensified service
delivery failures.  On
10 May 2017 the municipal workers embarked on a violent strike and
the unrest quickly spread to neighbouring
towns which fall under the
auspices of the Municipality.  In Cornelia the resident mayor
had to be evacuated for fear of his
safety. During the unrest that
erupted the office of the African National Congress in Cornelia fell
victim to arsonists. On 23
July 2017 the municipal employees occupied
the water treatment plant in Villiers and shut off water supply to
the community.
The urgent intervention by the MEC of COGTA was
requested to salvage the situation experienced at the Villiers
Waterworks. Apart
from acknowledging the state of affairs no remedial
action was forthcoming.
[21] The Municipality was
described as the main culprit for the pollution of the upper Vaal
River in a complainant, dated 30 November
2018, submitted to the
South African Human Rights Committee.  In a Quarterly Water
Quality Status Report (the “Report”)
of the Vaal Dam
Reservoir Catchment conducted by Rand Water for the period between 1
July 2019 and 31 December 2020, it was specified
that all towns
falling under Mafube, including Frankfort and Villiers contribute to
the pollution of the Vaal River. The report
indicates that water
emanating from the Municipality’s water treatment plant is
marked as “unacceptable” in accordance
with the Water
Quality Guidelines. From the report (attached as an annexure to the
founding affidavit) it is evident that unacceptable
high levels of
e.
coli
bacteria and faecal coliforms, amongst other undesirable
contents, are recorded.  The applicants contend that the state
of
affairs is of particular concern as it poses a serious health
risk, even more so due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
[22] During October 2019
the Villiers Business Forum, which has since been amalgamated with
the first applicant, in writing, requested
authorisation from the
Municipality to effect urgent repairs required at the Villiers Water
Treatment Plant. Members of the community
expressed their willingness
and capability, due to their technical expertise, to assist the
Municipality to remedy the deteriorating
situation experienced at the
Villiers Water Treatment Plant. The Municipality failed to reply to
the request.
[23] During February 2019
an unemployed resident, Mr. Petrus Mazibuko began a clean-up
programme in the Villiers area.  Farmers
and local businesses
contributed equipment, fuel and items needed for the expansion of the
clean- up process.  At a public
meeting held at Villiers on 14
March 2019, residents agreed on taking further proactive measures,
within their means, to mitigate
poor service delivery by the
Municipality.  Several meetings were held with the Municipality
and members of the business community
in an effort to improve the
numerous problems encountered by the Municipality.
[24] The applicants
contend that the situation in the Mafube area is exacerbated by the
fact that no municipal accounts have been
rendered by the
Municipality for a considerable period of time. The first applicant
proposed to assist with revenue generation
and debt collection, as
this was a major obstacle in the efforts of the struggling
Municipality to provide services to the residents
of the area.
Pursuant to the judgment delivered in favour of SAMWU on 5 May
2016, the Sheriff attached some 14 farms, the
property of the
Municipality, to satisfy the judgment debt owed to SAMWU. On 2
October 2017 the office buildings of the Municipality
as well as the
residence of the mayor were attached by the Sheriff.  A writ of
execution was issued in favour of an engineering
group against the
Municipality on 10 September 2018.
[25] On 17 September 2019
the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (“SCOPA”)
summoned the Municipality and its administrator
at the time, to a
meeting held in Cape Town regarding the dire situation at the
Municipality.  The issues raised during the
meeting were,
inter
alia,
the Auditor General’s repeated adverse findings
regarding the Municipality’s financial situation since 2014.
The applicants
contend that the second and third respondents failed
to attend several meetings scheduled by SCOPA to account for the
Municipality’s
auditing and financial woes.
[26] Amongst the numerous
issues raised by the applicants, which are also evident from the copy
of the SCOPA meeting summary attached
to the founding affidavit, are
the payment made to the third respondent (the appointed
Administrator) for a period during which
no services were rendered as
well as the transfer of an amount of R40 million from an ABSA Bank
account to a First National Bank
account operated by the Municipality
without providing a reasonable explanation for such a transfer.
Applicants further argue that
the situation regarding of the
financial maladministration at the Municipality remain in disarray as
the Auditor General made a
finding of “disclaimed audit
opinion” in relation to the Municipality on 1 July 2020 due to
a poor financial track
record and wholly incomplete financial
information provided to the Auditor General.
[27] The Municipality
submitted its annual financial statements for the 2018/2019 and
2019/2020 period during February 2021, despite
the employment of
consultants and officials from the Free State Provincial departments
to assist in finalising its financial statements.
It is
applicants’ case that the Municipality is hopelessly insolvent
as is evidenced by the numerous judgments granted against
it and the
fact that some of its immovable and moveable assets have been
judicially attached. A further attachment order in the
amount of R
61 153 440.27 against the Municipality in favour of Eskom,
was granted on 17 August 2020.
[28] The local and
provincial respondents do not take issue with the allegations of the
alleged breach of constitutional obligations
by the Municipality.
However, since the provincial executive intervened during 2017, the
pressing issues that beset the Municipality,
inter alia
the
labour strike has been resolved and the collection of refuse and
maintenance of infrastructure have commenced. Even though
the
discretionary intervention has restored the provision of basic
services, such as repairs to water pipes and provision of refuse

removal by purchasing a new compactor truck, the ideal stage
pertaining to service delivery and maintenance of the Municipality’s

infrastructure has not been attained due to the financial crises
experienced by the Municipality.
[29] On 6 April 2017 the
eighth respondent announced in the Provincial Legislature that the
Municipality was to be placed under
administration in terms of
section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution. Applicants complain that the
provincial executive’s decision
to intervene and take over
responsibility for the executive obligations of the Municipality,
occurred without proof of any internal
or Gazetted notice to indicate
that the Municipality was under administration.  A further
aspect raised by the applicants
is that the appointment of Mr. E M
Notsi as administrator on 16 March 2017, appears to have occurred
prior to the announcement
that the Municipality was placed under
administration. On 1 January 2020 Mr. M Moremi replaced the former
administrator even though
no public notification followed resulting
in a lack of transparency, which is a further complaint raised by the
applicants.
[30] The allegations that
the Municipality is failing to provide reliable water and sanitation
services are denied by the local
and provincial respondents.
Effective electricity services are provided by the Municipality
through a third party and an
effective sanitation maintenance team
maintains the Municipality’s sanitation infrastructure network.
Even though the allegation
that municipal accounts had not been
issued for a considerable period of time is acknowledged, the
challenges with regard to the
printing and distribution of accounts
have been addressed and the Municipality has been printing and
issuing accounts since April
2021. The local and provincial
respondents furthermore admit the problems experienced by the
Municipality regarding its telephone
lines and website connectivity,
but contend that these issues have been receiving attention. The
municipality has furthermore contracted
an external service provider
for repairing the mechanical pumps at the Municipal Water Treatment
Plant.
[31] Since the
discretionary intervention several changes and improvements
followed.  The pollution of the Vaal River remains
a serious
challenge facing municipalities alongside the river and according to
the local and provincial respondents, the Villiers
Waste Water
Treatment Works is currently operating well. However, it is not in
dispute that the Municipality is facing serious
challenges even
though service delivery has been improved. The financial state of the
Municipality remains dire.  It is therefore
accepted by the
local and provincial respondents that the financial challenges facing
the Municipality require a decision by the
provincial executive for a
mandatory intervention in terms of the provisions of section 139(4)
and (5) of the Constitution.
[32] The Municipal
Financial Recovery Service (“MFRS”) was established in
2007 as part of National Treasury and performs
the duties and
functions assigned to it in terms of the Local Government: Municipal
Finance Management Act
[1]
(“MFMA”).  Subsequent to the Free State Provincial
Executive had informed the MFRS of the section 139(1) intervention,

the MFRS prepared a draft financial recovery plan for the
Municipality and submitted same to the Municipality and the
administrator(s)
on 3 November 2017.  The MEC for Finance of the
Free State Province was responsible for approving the final financial
recovery
plan.  Despite requests, the MFRS did not receive
progress reports from the Municipality, its administrator(s) or
provincial
executive on the implementation of the financial recovery
plan.
[33] On 11 December 2020,
the Free State Provincial Executive Council resolved to terminate the
section 139(1)(b) intervention with
effect from 30 March 2021.
Continued post intervention support as envisaged in section 154 of
the Constitution was to be
provided by the Free State Province.  The
Minister of Finance concedes, that the Municipality and the
administrators failed
to implement the financial recovery plan as is
evident from the contents of the Handover Report, a copy of which is
appended to
the answering affidavit filed by the Minister of Finance.
From the contents of the answering affidavit filed by the
Minister
of Finance it is evident that the financial position of the
Municipality has not improved since March 2017 and has in fact
worsened.
The Municipality’s financial situation is confirmed
in the most recent report submitted by the Municipality to National
Treasury
in terms of section 71 of the MFMA.  From the report it
is evident that the Municipality owes creditors an amount of R
715 954
million.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND
LEGAL PRINCIPLES.
[34] The Constitution
established three spheres of government, being the national,
provincial and local spheres.
[2]
Local government no longer exercise powers delegated to it by the
national or provincial governments. Municipal councils are democratic

assemblies exercising original legislative authority as has been
acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in
Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional
Metropolitan Council and Others
[3]
as follows:

The constitutional
status of a local government is thus materially different to what it
was when Parliament was supreme, when not
only the powers but the
very existence of local government depended entirely on superior
legislature.  The institution of
elected local government could
then have been terminated at any time and its functions entrusted to
administrators appointed by
the central or provincial governments.
That is no longer the position.  Local governments have a place
in the constitutional
order, have to be established by the competent
authority, and are entitled to certain powers, including the power to
make by-laws
and impose rates.”
[4]
[35] The term of office
of a municipal council is five years.
[5]
In
City
of Cape Town v Robertson
[6]
the Constitutional Court emphasised that in the new constitutional
dispensation, local government can no longer be considered as
‘mere
local authorities entrusted to provincial councils to administer’.
[7]
Despite its elevated status, the national, provincial and local
spheres of government are ‘distinctive’, ‘interdependent’

and ‘interrelated’.
[8]
However, local government’s autonomy is not absolute and their
‘interdependence’ signifies the supervision of

municipalities by other spheres of government. Each sphere performs
supervisory functions, to varying degrees, over the others.
The
exercise of provincial autonomy is supervised by national government,
while the local government, is supervised by both national
and
provincial governments.  The national and provincial governments
are however barred from compromising or impeding the
ability or right
of municipalities to exercise their powers or perform their
functions.  Both the national and provincial
spheres of
government must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities
to manage their own affairs and exercise and perform
their
functions.
[9]
[36]
Section 41(1) of the Constitution  provides as follows:

All spheres of
government and all organs of state within each sphere must-
...
(e)
respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions
of government in the other spheres;
(f)
not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in
terms of the Constitution;
(g)
exercise its powers in a manner that does not encroach on the
institutional integrity of the government
in another sphere”.
The Constitution entrusts
each province with the general monitoring and support of local
government within its borders.
[10]
These obligations are further set out in sections 105 and 106 the
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act
[11]
(referred to as the “Systems Act”).  Section 105 of
the Systems Act provides as follows:

105.
Provincial
monitoring of municipalities.
(1)
The MEC for local government in a province must
establish mechanisms, processes and procedures in terms of section
155(6) of the
Constitution to-
(a)
monitor municipalities in the province in managing
their own affairs, exercising the powers and performing the
functions;
(b)
monitor the development of local government
capacity in the province; and
(c)
assess the support needed by municipalities to
strengthen their capacity to manage their own affairs, exercise the
powers and perform
the functions.”
[37] Section 106 of the
Systems Act provides for a more intrusive form of monitoring which
must be applied by the MEC to a specific
municipality in certain
circumstances.  It must be applied if the MEC “has reason
to believe that...  maladministration,
fraud, corruption or any
other serious malpractice has occurred or is occurring in a
municipality”. The MFMA has added further
supervisory duties in
respect of financial management which are, however, distinctly
subject to that of the national government.
Unlike the general
constitutional scheme that provides provinces with a principal
supervisory role with regard to local government,
the Constitution
also accords the National Treasury an important supervisory function
in terms of section 216(2). The powers and
responsibilities of
National Treasury in relation to municipalities are set out in
Chapter 13 of the Constitution and section 5
of the MFMA.
[38] The applicants
contend that the Provincial respondents’ intervention in the
Municipality in terms of section 139(1)(b)
of the Constitution has
failed and that they have also failed to escalate their intervention
proactively as required in terms of
the provisions of section 139(4)
and (5) of the Constitution.  Section 139(4) of the Constitution
provides that:

(4)
If a municipality cannot or does not fulfil an obligation in terms of
the Constitution or legislation to approve
a budget or any
revenue-raising measures necessary to give effect to the budget, the
relevant provincial executive must intervene
by taking any
appropriate steps to ensure that the budget or those revenue-raising
measures are approved, including dissolving
the Municipal Council
and: -
(a)
appointing an administrator until a newly elected
Municipal Council has been declared elected; and
(b)
approving a temporary budget or revenue-raising
measures to provide for the continued functioning of the
municipality”.
[39]
Section 139(5) of the Constitution provides as follows:

(5)
If a municipality, as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs,
is in serious or persistent material
breach of its obligations to
provide basic services or to meet its financial commitments, or
admits that it is unable to meet its
obligations or financial
commitments, the relevant provincial executive must-
(a)
impose a recovery plan aimed at securing the
municipality’s ability to meet its obligations to provide basic
services or its
financial commitments, which-
(i)
is to be prepared in accordance with national
legislation; and
(ii)
binds the municipality in the exercise of its
legislative and executive authority, but only to the extent necessary
to solve the
crisis in its financial affairs; and
(b)
dissolve the Municipal Council, if the
municipality cannot or does not approve legislative measures,
including a budget or any revenue-raising
measures, necessary to give
effect to the recovery plan, and-
(i)
appoint an administrator until a newly elected
Municipal Council has been declared elected; and
(ii)
approve a temporary budget or revenue-raising
measures or any other measures giving effect to the recovery plan to
provide for the
continued functioning of the municipality; or
(c)
if the Municipal Council is not dissolved in terms
of paragraph (b), assume responsibility for the implementation of the
recovery
plan to the extent that the municipality cannot or does not
otherwise implement the recovery plan.”
[40] The basis of the
main relief sought by the applicants is premised on their
interpretation of section 139(7) of the Constitution,
which provides
as follows:

(7)
If a provincial executive cannot or does not or does not adequately
exercise the powers or perform the functions
referred to in
subsection (4) or (5), the national executive must intervene in terms
of subsection (4) or (5) in the stead of the
relevant provincial
executive.”
ARGUMENTS
BY THE APPLICANTS.
[41] It is common cause
that the Municipality is currently in financial distress.  The
crux of the dispute revolves around
the interpretation of section
139(7) of the Constitution.  Mr. Erasmus SC, counsel on behalf
of the applicants, contends that
on a plain reading of section
139(7), it simply does not stipulate that national intervention is
only triggered after the provincial
executive first undertook
mandatory intervention in terms of the provisions of section 139(4)
and (5), and it failed.  In
Natal
Pension Fund v Edumeni
[12]
Wallis
JA explained that when one interprets,
inter
alia,
legislative
or constitutional provisions “...  the inevitable point of
departure is the language of the provision itself”.
[13]
On a simple grammatical interpretation of section 139(7) it clearly
provides for three alternative instances which compel national

intervention, as is apparent from the use of the word “or”,
which appear twice in the first line of the section.
According
to the applicants the instances are the following:
41.1
where the province is unable to (“cannot”),
or
41.2
fails completely to (‘does not”), or
41.3
does not satisfactorily (“does not
adequately”) undertake mandatory intervention, where he
restriction or facts for
such intervention are indicated, the
national government
must
undertake
these in the province’s stead. (Emphasis added)
[42] At the time of
hearing of this application there is no decision that deals with
national intervention.  Mr. Erasmus SC
referred to the matter of
Premier,
Western Cape & Others v Overberg District Municipality &
Others
[14]
where the Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 139 of the
Constitution permits and requires a provincial government to
supervise
the affairs of local governments and to act proactively in
ensuring that local governments are not mismanaged and to intervene
when things “go awry”.
[15]
In
Overberg
the local government
failed to approve the annual budget before the beginning of the
financial year. The provincial executive took
the decision,
essentially by reason of its belief that it had no option based on a
proper interpretation of section 139(4), to
intervene, including
dissolving the municipal council of the Overberg District
Municipality, to ensure that the budget or revenue-raising
measures
are approved. Brand JA disagreed with the appellants interpretation
of section 139(4) and held that the meaning of the
section is quite
plain in that:

It provides that,
in the circumstances contemplated, the provincial executive must
intervene. That is the imperative. Not that it
must dissolve the
council.  Accordingly, the executive is obliged to take some
steps.  It cannot do nothing.  But
the actual steps to be
taken are left to the discretion of the executive.  The only
limitation imposed on that discretion
is twofold.  First, the
steps must be ‘appropriate’, that is, the steps must be
suitable. Secondly, these steps
must be suitable for a particular
purpose, that is, to ensure the approval of the annual budget.”
[16]
[43] With reference to
Premier,
Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others
[17]
the applicants in the matter at hand contend that a proactive
approach to intervention in section 139 confers a “duty”

on the provincial executive to ensure that local government meets its
executive obligations as is clear from the majority judgment
of
Mathopo AJ where the court held that:

The framers of the
Constitution used the word ‘may’ in s 139(1) to not
merely confer a discretion, but a power coupled
with a duty”
[18]
Therefore, even if the
discretionary provision in section 139(1) confers a ‘duty’
upon the provincial executive, it
follows that the peremptory
provisions in section 139(4), (5) and (7) confer an even higher duty
on the provincial and national
executives. Mr. Erasmus SC argued that
the provincial executive was obliged to do something about the state
of affairs of the Municipality
long ago to rectify its “persistent
material breach of its obligations to provide basic services or to
meet its financial
commitments”
[19]
[44] There is no need for
a “total collapse”
[20]
of the Municipality before the provincial executive may intervene. To
prevent a total collapse, the national executive must intervene
where
the provincial executive has failed to do so. The applicants contend
that the jurisdictional facts warranting national intervention
are
present and have been present for some time. Section 152(1) of the
Constitution explicitly sets out the objects of local governments
and
compels a municipality to achieve those objects namely:
"152
Objects of local government
(1)

The objects of local government are -
(a)
to provide democratic and accountable government for local
communities;
(b)
to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable
manner;
(c)
to promote social and economic development;
(d)
to promote a safe and healthy environment; and
(e)
to encourage the involvement of communities and community
organisations
in the matters of local government.
(2)
A municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative

capacity, to achieve the objects set out in subsection (1)."
[45] It is the
applicants’ case that there can be no doubt that the
Municipality has failed the community in each of the aforesaid

objects. The first applicant made several attempts to prompt the
national executive to intervene,
inter alia
the following:
45.1
On 21 May 2020 a letter was addressed by the first
applicant to the Minister of COGTA (Eleventh Respondent) to inform
her of the
situation at the Municipality and a reminder of her
department’s responsibility to intervene in terms of section
139(7) of
the Constitution due to the provincial respondent’s
failure to remedy the dysfunctionality prevailing at the
Municipality.
No response was received.
45.2
On 26 November 2020 the first applicant addressed
a further letter to the Minister of COGTA, wherein the factual
background set
out in the application, as well as the first
applicant’s willingness to assist the Municipality as recorded
in the Compact,
and the urgent need for intervention in terms of
section 139(7), were restated.  No response was forthcoming in
spite of the
fact that the letter was served by the Sheriff as well
as service upon the Minister of Finance.
[46] Applicants’
therefore argue that, as envisaged in section 139(7), the province in
casu
has
not, alternatively, does not adequately “exercise their powers
or perform their functions” provided for in sections
139(4)
and/or (5) of the Constitution, read with section 139 and Chapter 13
of the LGMFMA.
[21]
The
dismal state of affairs has existed for almost five years since 2017
and the Municipality’s finances has actually
worsened after the
Province’s discretionary intervention in terms of section
139(1). The worsened financial predicament of
the Municipality is
confirmed by Treasury and alluded to by the President.  The
applicants contend that the Municipality is
hopelessly bankrupt and
the provincial executive acknowledges that the financial affairs of
the Municipality are worrisome and
agrees with the Minister of
Finance’s summation that a mandatory intervention by the
province in terms of section 139(4)
and (5) of the Constitution, read
with section 139 of the MFMA, is warranted.
[47] The provincial
executive has in fact conceded that it will, in consultation with the
national sphere of government and the
Municipality, take mandatory
steps to intervene and restore the financial prudence in the
Municipality and impose a financial recovery
plan. However, despite
the local and provincial respondents conceding the existence of the
miserable state of affairs in its answering
affidavit, deposed to by
the Head of Department of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional
Affairs in the Free State Provincial
Government dated 5 August 2021,
province has yet to implement such mandatory intervention. Therefore,
the applicants contend that
they have endeavoured all reasonable
avenues to engage the officials of the Municipality, the
administrators of the province and
even the representatives from the
National Department of COGTA, but to no avail.
[48] In
Unemployed
People’s Movement v Eastern Cape Premier and Others
[22]
(the “
UPM”
case), the question
whether a provincial government can be directed by court to intervene
in accordance with section 139(5) of the
Constitution,
notwithstanding the assurance that such an intervention was already
under way, was one of the issues to be determined
by Stretch J.
Similarly, as in the matter at hand, it was not in dispute that a
number of crises have befallen the Makana
Local Municipality
(“Makana”). Makana had been plagued, over a significantly
extended period, by a number of financial
and operational crisis
which had led to its failing to provide basic services and to meet
its financial obligations. These problems
remained despite various
interventions by the provincial executive under section 139 of the
Constitution as well as numerous engagements
by the applicants, the
Unemployed People’s Movement with the local and provincial
authorities pleading with them to remedy
the situation.
[49] Stretch J held that
even though the municipal manager and several of the other
respondents, referred to as the “municipal
respondents”
are or should actually be in the best position to advise the court on
what has been achieved through the interventions
and whether there is
any merit in the allegations made by the applicants, they have
instead opted to question the applicant’s
locus standi
and
the constitutionality of the applicants claim. The court referred to
the stance taken by the “municipal respondents”
as
follows:

...  based on
the premise that, given the position adopted by the third respondent,
and given the intended provincial intervention,
dealing with the
factual allegations contained in the founding affidavit would be
‘superfluous.  Apart from joining
ranks with the
provincial respondents on the absence of the jurisdictional
requirements for the relief sought, and blaming the
crisis on
Makana’s debt (and in particular one of some R68 million), the
local respondents likewise take the point that for
this court to
compel the second respondent to invoke the provisions of s139(1)(c)
of the Constitution would involve an impermissible
intrusion by the
judiciary on the constitutional obligations of provincial government,
in disregard of the principle of separation
of powers.”
[23]
[50] Regarding the need
for declaratory orders sought by the applicants, reliance is once
more placed on the
UPM
case where Stretch J made declarations
of constitutional invalidity of the conduct of the local and
provincial government for their
failure to act in congruence with the
Constitution in discharging their duties.  Applicants contend
that, not only is it necessary
for a court to declare conduct
unconstitutional where it clearly fails to comply with the
Constitution, but courts are enjoined
to do so by the Constitution as
envisaged in section 172(1)(a) which provides as follows:

When deciding a
constitutional matter within its power, a court: -
(a)
must declare that any law or conduct that is
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its
inconsistency; and
(b)
may make any order that is just and equitable...”
[51] In the
UPM
matter Stretch J further
considered arguments advanced by the government respondents that the
court’s order would intrude
upon the executive’s domain
and thus violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.  The court
held that the Constitution
has empowered courts to be the ultimate
referee on whether the Constitution or any other law has been
breached.  Section 34
of the Constitution entrenches the right
of everyone to approach courts and to have their grievances resolved
by an impartial court.
The judiciary is tasked with overseeing
compliance with the law by all branches of the state, its organs and
the people of our
country. The checks and balances embedded in the
doctrine of separation of powers demand that courts must ensure that
all branches
of government act in accordance with the Constitution
and therefore, when the Constitution requires that the judiciary
decide upon
a particular controversy, it can never amount to
overreaching.
[24]
[52] Regarding the
constitutional and legislative requirements of community
participation in local government the applicants argue
that the
Constitution itself provides for the “democratic will” of
the residents to be “suspended” in section
139, in
circumstances where the Municipality continually infringes on its
residents’ rights.  Section 16 and 17 of the
Systems Act.
provides that:

A municipality
must develop a culture of municipal governance that complements
formal representative government with a system of
participatory
governance, and must for this purpose-
(a)
encourage, and create conditions for local
community to participate in the affairs of the municipality...”
Furthermore, regarding
community participation through local organisations, section 17(2) of
the Systems Act provides that:

(2)
A municipality must establish appropriate mechanisms, processes and
procedures to enable the local
community to participate
in the affairs of the municipality...”
[53] On 26 September 2019
a meeting was held with representative from the provincial department
of COGTA, the then Administrator
of the Municipality, representatives
of the first applicant, the Villier’s Business Forum and the
District Agriculture Union.
Thereafter a one-day workshop followed
during October 2019 at which the first applicant proposed that it
could assist the Municipality
with revenue generation and debt
collection. Representatives of the sixteenth respondent, COGTA,
national and provincial, provincial
treasury and relevant business
forums attended the presentation. During November 2019 a “Mafube
Stakeholders’ Workshop”
took place between the same
stakeholders. These meetings culminated in the creation of an
agreement called “Dawning of a
New Day: The Mafube
Stakeholders’ Compact” (the “Compact”).
[54] The Compact
comprises a joint venture between Government and the Mafube business
community and was aimed at addressing the
Municipality’s many
challenges in a co-operative fashion and by involvement of the local
community. During January 2020 further
comments regarding the Compact
were received from national treasury where after it was indicated
that an official sign-off cession
will follow during January 2020.
However, attempts to conclude the Compact failed and the initial
enthusiastic support by
the Municipality and provincial stakeholders,
to involve the local community and the first applicant in the affairs
of the municipality,
dwindled and at the end came to nothing.
[55] The applicants
contend that the repeated exclusion of the first applicant from the
council meetings and attempts to assist,
coupled with the respondents
reneging on the signing of the Compact, fly in the face of the
applicable legislation.  In
South
African Municipal Workers Union v City of Cape Town and Others
[25]
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 16 and 17 of the
Systems Act foster a “... culture of participatory
governance...”
by the community as a whole in the
decision-making processes.
[26]
[56] In their replying
affidavit, applicants contend that whatever marginal gains had been
made by the discretionary intervention,
these have deteriorated and
regressed again since the intervention ended in March 2021. Despite
the discretionary intervention
the Municipality still fails to
provide potable drinking water on a regular basis and therefore fails
to provide in the most basic
of human needs to its residents.
On 29 July 2021 this court had to issue a mandatory interdict,
compelling the Municipality
to properly maintain its sewage works.
Due to the Municipality’s dire financial circumstances, it has
been unable to
purchase chemicals for the treatment of potable
water.  A local business had to assist with the required payment
for the chemicals
to avert a disaster due to province’s failure
to assist.
[57] Applicants insist
that the relief sought is for them to be permitted, by court order,
to assist the Municipality with the critical
functions which it is
struggling to perform for an extended period of time. There is no
danger of applicants usurping the established
democratic structures.
During January 2022 the Municipality had yet to appoint a
communications manager, a debt collection officer
and set up a
website to facilitate communication with the community.  The
community is prepared to offer help” free
of charge” and
has brought skills to the table as is evident from the contents of
the Compact, but to no avail.
RESPONDENTS’
OPPOSITION TO THE APPLICATION.
[58] Counsel on behalf of
the local and provincial respondents, Mr Mokhare SC argued that the
application was overtaken by time
and renders the application moot or
the relief claimed legally incompetent.  It will be
unconstitutional to make an order
against the newly elected municipal
council, which has just been elected by the electorate in November
2021, without any facts
placed before court regarding the failures of
this newly elected municipal council.  The new municipal council
must be given
an opportunity to deal with the problems which they
have inherited. The applicants did not file a supplementary affidavit
to put
facts before court regarding the failures by the new municipal
council and merely now abandons the order sought regarding the
dissolution
of the municipal council.
[59] At the hearing of
the matter, I raised the issue that the answering affidavit deposed
to by the Director General of National
Treasury on behalf of the
Minister of Finance, has not been properly commissioned in that the
commissioner omitted to complete
the attestation clause by failing to
state the place and the date of taking the declaration. The deponent
initialled all the pages
of the original affidavit and the annexures
thereto, signed the last page and so did the commissioner of oaths.
[60]
With
reference to
Lohrman
v Vaal Ontwikkelingsmaatskappy
[27]
and
FirstRand
Auto Receivables (RF) Ltd v Makgobatlou
[28]
Ms
Hassim SC, counsel appearing on behalf of the Minister of Finance,
submitted that there has been substantial compliance
with
the requirements pertaining to the commissioning of the affidavit.
The non-compliance with the regulations of the Act made
pursuant to
the Justice of the Peace and Commissioner of Oaths Act
[29]
are directory only as supported by the full bench decision by Van den
Heever J (as she was then) in
S
v Munn
.
[30]
[61]
In the present matter, the stamp of the Commissioner clearly indicate
that the Commissioner is a practising attorney and her
full names and
work address is thus provided
[31]
.
Therefore, only the date on which the attestation occurred is
unknown. From an e-mail pertaining to the filing of the said
affidavit
it can safely be assumed that this must have occurred on or
shortly prior to 27 July 2021.   It is clear therefore, in

my view, that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of
the regulations pertaining to the commissioning of the Minister
of
Finance’s answering affidavit. I therefore accept the contents
of the answering affidavit filed by the Minister of Finance
as
evidence in this application.
[62]
On behalf of Treasury it is argued that the provincial executive
acknowledges that the financial affairs of the municipality
remain
dismal and agrees with the Minister of Finance’s summation that
a mandatory intervention by the province in terms
of section 139(4)
and (5) is warranted. Ms Hassim SC emphasised that the facts in the
UPM
mater are not on par with the matter at hand on the basis
that it is imperative to take into consideration that the election of
the new municipal council, comprising of 15 the new democratically
elected council members occurred during November 2021. This fact,

which took place subsequent to the issuing of the applicants’
application, is conveniently ignored and applicants still seek

extra-ordinary relief even though the provincial executive stated
their intention to intervene in terms of section 139 (4) and
(5) of
the Constitution. The relief claimed by the applicants
unconstitutionally limits the authority of the newly elected
municipal
council and will enable the first applicant to usurp the
powers, functions and duties reserved for the municipal council.
[63]
Section 139(7) is not competent when regard is had to the proper
interpretation thereof and the constitutional scheme of co-operative

governance. Section 139(7) only permits national intervention in the
affairs of a municipality if a mandatory intervention has
been
declared in terms of the provisions of sections 139(4) or 139(5) and
the province is failing to adequately exercise its powers
and perform
the functions assigned to it in terms of a mandatory intervention.
Furthermore, the remaining relief prescribing how
the national
government ought to exercise its power in the event of the relief
being granted, is inappropriate and should not succeed.
On the facts
presented by the applicants there is no evidence that national
government requires such directions from this court
and constitutes
an impermissible intrusion on the national government’s powers.
[64]
The contention on behalf of Treasury boils down to the argument that
the applicants already speculate that provincial government
will
certainly fail if it has to intervene in terms of section 139(4) and
(5) of the Constitution based on the allegation that
the
discretionary intervention failed to alleviate the problems
experienced by the Municipality. Ms Hassim SC accentuated that
the
jurisdictional facts must exist and the procedures must be followed
as held in the
Premier,
Gauteng
matter
prior to the exercise of public power: “Failure to observe the
jurisdictional facts will result in the exercise of
power being
unlawful”.
[32]
The step-
by-step approach is not a novel approach. In the second Certification
of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the
Republic of South
Africa
[33]
the Constitutional
Court endorsed an interpretation of this section that required such
an approach to interventions by the national
executive.
[65]
On behalf of the President it is argued that the legislative scheme
contemplates that the next lawful step after a discretionary

provincial intervention is a mandatory intervention and thus supports
the contentions regarding the interpretation of section 139(7)
made
on behalf of Treasury. The provisions of section 139 of the
Constitution and the interventions provided thereunder must be

construed in the context of the Constitution as a whole
[34]
and the interpretation of the provisions must be consistent with the
scheme of the Constitution.
[35]
According to the President the applicants have failed to establish a
case for national intervention preceding mandatory provincial

intervention.
DISCUSSION.
[66]
The Constitutional Court in
City
of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development
Tribunal and Others
[36]
held that the three spheres of government are distinct from one
another, yet interdependent and interrelated and each sphere is

granted the autonomy to exercise its powers and perform its functions
within the parameters of its defined space. Each sphere should
not
assume any power or function except those conferred on [it] in terms
of the Constitution.
[37]
[67]
The scope of intervention by one sphere in the affairs of another is
highly circumscribed. The national and provincial spheres
are
permitted by sections 100 and 139 of the Constitution to undertake
interventions and to assume control over the affairs of
another
sphere or to perform the functions of another sphere under certain
well-defined circumstances. The Constitution entrusts
provinces with
the general monitoring and support of local government.
[38]
The instrument for intervening in local government is section 139 of
the Constitution. Originally section 139 only permitted a
provincial
executive to intervene in a municipality when the latter failed to
comply with an executive obligation.  Two constitutional

amendments however increased the scope for interventions during
1998
[39]
and 2003. The
following four types of interventions are now provided for in terms
of the Constitution and the MFMA:
(a)
regular interventions in terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution,
which include issuing a directive,
assuming responsibility, and
dissolving a municipal council;
(b)
intervention procedures in the case of serious financial problems in
terms of the MFMA, which may include
imposing a financial recovery
plan, assuming responsibility and dissolving a council;
(c)
intervention in response to a municipality that has budgetary
problems, including measures such as the
mandatory dissolution of the
municipal council and the adoption of a temporary budget or
revenue-raising measures; and
(d)
intervention in response to a municipality experiencing a crisis in
its financial affairs, including
measures such as the imposition of a
financial recovery plan, a dissolution of the municipal council and
assumption of responsibility.
[68]
Section 139(5) was added to the Constitution in 2003 to address the
meltdown of the financial core of a municipality.
An
intervention in the case of a serious financial problem is
discretionary, but a mandatory duty is imposed on the provincial

executive to intervene in the case of a serious financial crisis
calling for more intrusive remedial steps. As this type of
intervention
is even more intrusive and compulsory, clear conditions
are set as it can restructure how the particular municipality is
governed
and delivers services to the community.
[40]
[69]
The substantive requirements for an intervention in terms of section
139(5) are firstly that the municipality is in “serious
or
persistent material breach of its obligations to provide basic
services”; and secondly the municipality is in “serious

or persistent material breach of its financial commitments”.
The first obligation deals with the provision of, not
all service
obligations, but those that are “basic”.  The
applicants contend that the requisite jurisdictional
facts have
existed for at least five years since 2017 and that basic service
delivery remains appalling. There is a duty on municipalities
to
provide the following basic services: water, sanitation, electricity,
public roads, storm water drainage and public transport.
[41]
[70]
I am of the view that the applicants have succeeded in making out a
case that the municipality is in serious or persistent
material
breach of its obligation to provide basic services to the community.
It is furthermore also in serious or persistent material
breach of
its financial commitments in that it is unable to comply with both
contractual and statutory obligations, which,
inter alia
include the duty to pay for services rendered in terms of a contract
(e.g., to pay Eskom for bulk electricity supplied) and the
duty to
make payment to the pension fund- or other contributions pertaining
to its employees.  These failures to comply with
its financial
commitments are clearly due to the Municipality’s inability to
send regular monthly statements to residents,
raise revenue and to
manage the financial affairs of the Municipality. The financial
management is clearly in such a chaotic state
resulting in a crisis
in the financial affairs of the Municipality.
[71]
In
Ngwathe
Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings SoC Ltd and Others
[42]
the
court found that the municipality was clearly in a financial crisis
and due to a debt amounting to R 274. 8 million, had admitted
that it
could not meet its financial commitments.  Eskom, in a
counter-application sought among other relief, a declaratory
order
that the Free State Provincial Executive be compelled to intervene in
terms of section 139(5) of the Constitution on the
basis that all the
jurisdictional facts were present for compulsory intervention.
Jordaan J however found that, even though
all the requirements for a
compulsory intervention were present, the relief to grant the
declaratory order is refused “at
this stage” because the
premier, as head of the provincial executive, was not joined in the
proceedings.
[72]
Once the jurisdictional facts are present, the provincial executive
must intervene. The applicants contend that notwithstanding
the fact
that the Municipality has been in severe and persistent breach of its
financial commitments and is in serious or persistent
material breach
of its obligations to provide basic services, the province has failed
to intervene and to exercise these powers
or perform these duties
adequately or at all.
[73]
The President maintains that mandatory provincial intervention in
terms of section 139(4) and/or (5) is imminent and contends
that the
application for relief sought in terms of national intervention, is
premature.  This also seems to be the gist of
the argument put
forth by both Treasury and COGTA.  The history of events set out
by the applicants provide a strong indication
why national
intervention is preferable.  Provincial intervention in terms of
section 139(1)(b) has not resolved the problems
experienced by the
municipality and at the time of the Handover Report during March
2021, it was already evident that mandatory
provincial intervention,
at the very least, was required.
[74]
Applicants therefore argue that province” has been sitting on
its hands” since March 2021, which necessitates national

intervention.  In any event, even though Treasury furnished a
Financial Recovery Plan as early as November 2017, the Municipality

and administrator(s) failed to implement such plan.  Multiple
provisions in the municipal legislation require active monitoring
of
local government and this was never done by province, which also
provides further support for the applicant’s argument
that the
provincial government cannot be relied upon to aid the Municipality.
[75]
I, however, agree with the arguments raised by Ms Hassim and as
pronounced in
City
of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development
Tribunal and Others
[43]
that
the scope of intervention by one sphere of government in the affairs
of another is highly circumscribed and that the national
and
provincial spheres are not entitled to usurp the functions of the
municipal sphere except in exceptional circumstances and
then only
temporarily and in compliance with strict procedures.  The
national executive is not granted open-ended power to
take over the
administration of a municipality whenever it deems it necessary.
The two jurisdictional requirements must exist
in order to trigger
the valid exercise of powers provided for in section 139(7).
[76]
In the
UPM
matter, the applicants sought an order directing
the Eastern Cape Provincial executive to intervene in the Makana
Municipality
in terms of section 139(1)(c) of the Constitution.
The court found that the jurisdictional facts for a mandatory
intervention
in terms of section 139(5) were present and granted an
order directing the provincial executive to institute mandatory
provincial
intervention and to take steps to dissolve the municipal
council.
[77]
Section 139(7) provides that the national executive must intervene
“...if a provincial executive cannot or does not or
does not
adequately exercise the powers or perform the functions referred to
in subsection (4) or (5)”.  On the basis
that the
provision is phrased in the past tense and not in the future tense,
it does not provide for an intervention if it appears
to the national
government that the province may not be able to exercise the
functions at some point in the future.  What
is required is that
facts exist to establish that the province cannot or has not
exercised the powers and performed the functions
which assessment
cannot be made until such time as the province has been empowered to
exercise the powers and perform the functions
in subsections (4) and
(5).  Furthermore section 139(7) provides that in those
circumstances “...  the national
executive must intervene
in terms of subsection (4) and (5)
in the stead of
the
relevant provincial executive.” (Emphasis added)
[78]
I agree with the interpretation of section 139(7) presented on behalf
of the Minister of Finance and the other respondents
that the
national executive is only empowered to intervene in the affairs of
the municipality if:
(a)
the provincial
executive has invoked the powers and functions in subsections (4) and
(5) by implementing a mandatory provincial
intervention; and
(b)
the provincial
executive has attempted to exercise the powers and perform the
functions required for a mandatory intervention, but
has not been
able to adequately do so.
[79]
Section 41(1)(e) of the Constitution provides that one sphere of
government must respect the constitutional status, institutional

powers and functions of government in other spheres.
Applicants’ argument that the province has failed to intervene

successfully since the difficulties at the Municipality ensued many
years ago, presupposes that province will inevitably fail to

intervene successfully in terms of section 139(4) and/or (5) in the
affairs of the Municipality. I am of the view that the judicial

resolution of this question, which is a constitutional issue, should
only be addressed as a matter of last resort and when the
facts
support such an argument raised by the applicants
[44]
.
[80]
Mr. Erasmus SC argued that the same dilemma which Stretch J
encountered in the
UPM
matter, is present, namely whether the
court can attach any weight what so ever to the contention by the
provincial respondents
that an intervention in terms of section
139(4) and (5) is imminent.  Stretch J explained the reason for
the relief granted
as follows:

[38]
To my mind, it was imperative for the respondents to fully explain
not only to this court,
but more importantly to the applicant, what
the status of the 2015 plan was and is, why it has been necessary to
recommend another
similar plan, what (if any) steps have been taken
in terms of either of these plans, and how it is proposed that the
new resolution
will provide redress to the applicants when the
history of this matter has shown that Council failed to implement the
previous
plan.”
[81]
The respondents do not dispute that the jurisdictional facts for
mandatory intervention exists. The national and provincial
spheres
are not entitled to usurp the functions of the municipal sphere
except in exceptional circumstances, but only temporarily
and in
compliance with strict procedures. This is the constitutional scheme
in the context of which the powers conferred on each
sphere must be
construed. As in the
UPM
matter,
I am satisfied that, as Mr Erasmus SC argued, “at least”
an order for an intervention in terms of section 139(4)
and/or(5) is
called for under the circumstances.
[45]
I am satisfied that, not only is it necessary for courts to declare
conduct unconstitutional where it clearly fails to comply with
the
Constitution, but courts are enjoined to do so.
[46]
I am
in agreement with the submissions made by Mr Erasmus SC and Mr
Eilers, who appeared with Mr Erasmus SC, that even though the

provincial respondents concede that an intervention in terms of
section  139(4) and/or (5) is to be implemented, no indication

apart from the vague concession that such implementation is
“imminent”  has been forthcoming. As in the
UPM
matter, the applicants
and the residents in the Mafube district have done their “level
best”
[47]
to obtain
intervention by the provincial as well as the national executive to
provide a solution for the ongoing difficulties experienced
by the
Municipality.
[82] It has been
contended by the President that, applicants now, do not seek the
dissolution of the municipal council and furthermore,
as an
alternative, seek (in accordance with Draft Order D) mandatory
provincial intervention in terms of section 139(4) and/or
(5) which
relief was not included in their Notice of Motion. I, however, agree
with Mr Erasmus SC that the relief sought in the
alternative is
consistent with the factual statements made and the court is
therefore entitled to grant relief similar or less
than that sought
by the applicants in their Notice of Motion
[48]
.
[83] I am of the view
that the court is entitled by the provisions of section 172(1)(a) of
the Constitution, when deciding constitutional
matters to declare
that the conduct by the respondents, where applicable, is
inconsistent with the Constitution and to grant structural

interdictory relief called for in terms of the constitutional and
legislative provisions upon which the applicants rely for the
relief.
The provincial respondents have clearly not given effect to its
constitutional obligations pertaining to the Municipality
and has
already decided to implement its intervention in the affairs of the
Municipality in accordance with section 139 (4) and/or
(5), but has
not indicated in any clear terms exactly what and when it intends to
do so. The order I intend to grant in this application
goes toward
ensuring that basic services be provided to the residents of the
Mafube district and that the Municipality be financially
capable of
meeting its obligations and resolving the financial crises
experienced for a considerable time.
[84] I do however agree
with Mr Mokhare SC that the effluxion of time and the fact that the
election that occurred on 1 November
2021, has impacted negatively
upon the relief sought by the applicants regarding the structural
interdicts to ensure assistance
by the members of the first
respondent. Even though the applicants have demonstrated, in terms of
the requirements of a structural
interdict, clear rights that
accrue to themselves and the residents of the Municipality, and that
a number of these rights are
still being violated- directly and
indirectly by abject failure of good governance by the Municipality,
the fact that a new municipal
council has since taken over the
functions of the Municipality, requires that the municipal council
should be provided with a fair
and reasonable opportunity to address
the problems that they have inherited since 1 November 2021.
[85]
Local government provides a forum for local community
participation in matters assigned to municipalities. On 1 November
2021 the
members of the Mafube Municipal Council were democratically
elected by those they serve. Municipal Government provides for grass

roots democracy. The choices made by voters at municipal level must
be respected. The new municipal council consists of 15 newly
elected
members with only 2 members who served on the previous council which,
as Mr Mokhare SC argued, is a clear expression of
the voters’
dissatisfaction with their representatives on the previous municipal
council.  I am therefore of the view
that it would be
inappropriate and legally unsustainable to grant the orders in prayer
3 (including the subparagraphs) without
any input from the first
(Mafube Local Municipality), second (the Municipal Manager), fourth
(the Executive Mayor) and fifth (the
Municipal Council) respondents
on the ground that the new municipal council obviously did not form
part of the stakeholders’
meetings regarding the Compact.
[86] The question remains
to what extent do the first applicant and the members of the
community want to assist the Municipality.
In this regard the new
municipal council must be ceased with these issues as they were not
involved in the meetings which led to
the drafting of the Compact.
The Municipality should welcome any assistance by members of the
community as it is laudable to propose
assistance, without
renumeration, to the struggling Municipality. In this regard
applicants’ failure to, at least, postpone
the application for
a period to ascertain from the newly elected municipal council what
their stance is pertaining to the first
applicants’ proposals
to assist the Municipality, is concerning. To my mind the failure to
involve the present municipal
council and its members renders this
aspect of the application moot. The probability exists that the new
municipal council will
welcome any aid from experts in the community
to improve revenue-raising, debt collection, general administrative
functions and
all the other aspects set out in the Compact.
[87] In
Afriforum
NPC and Others v Eskom Holdings Soc Limited and Others
[49]
Murphy J explained the doctrine of mootness and ripeness as follows:

[105] The doctrine
teaches that the courts should decide only cases entailing a real,
earnest and vital controversy between litigants
and not entertain
merely hypothetical cases or cases that are only of academic
interest. The business of a court is generally retrospective;
it
deals with situations or problems that have already crystalised, and
not with prospective or hypothetical ones. Any claim to
be
justiciable must present a real and substantial controversy which
unequivocally calls for the adjudication of the rights asserted.

Litigants should not approach a court if they have not been actually
subjected to prejudice or face the real threat of prejudice
as a
result of legislation or conduct alleged to be unconstitutional or
illegal.
[106] The rules regarding
mootness and ripeness are sub-rules of the doctrine which relate to
the timing of an application –
ripeness discourages a court
from deciding an issue too early, mootness prevents a court from
deciding an issue when it is too
late. Ripeness requires a litigant
to wait until a judicial decision can be grounded in concrete relief.
A case is moot if it no
longer presents an existing or live
controversy. The rules apply equally in constitutional and
administrative law.
[50]
[88] The fact that the
application was issued during May 2021 whereafter the municipal
election occurred on 1 November 2021 implies,
to my mind, that a
change of facts has led to “a fear resting on speculative
apprehensiveness” and not on a clear and
actual controversy of
a “probable threat of future harm” that the current
municipal council will not accept the first
applicant’s
proposal for assistance as set out in the Compact.
[51]
CONCLUSION
[89] On 7 April 2022 it
was announced in the media that the Cabinet has welcomed the decision
of the Free State Provincial Executive
to place Mangaung Metropolitan
Municipality and the Enoch Mgijima Municipality under administration
in terms of section 139(7)
of the Constitution. Evidently the
mandatory intervention in terms of section 139(5)(a) and (c) of the
Constitution since December
2019 of the Mangaung Metropolitan
Municipality failed which culminated in the direct involvement and
takeover of responsibilities
by national government. I mention this
aspect, which occurred subsequent to the hearing of the matter at
hand, merely on the basis
of an announcement conveyed by the media.
The court may take judicial cognisance of the said announcement,
however the underlying
facts and reason for the decision by the Free
State Provincial Government are unknown.
[90] The timing of the
applicants’ application, in my view, hampered the ultimate
success of the applicants’ case in
obtaining, at this stage, an
order for national intervention of the Municipality.
[91] As to costs, there
is no reason why costs should not follow the result only in respect
of the relief granted. There is no reason
why the national
respondents and the sixteenth respondent be mulct with a cost order.
However, concerning the national respondents
and the sixteenth
respondent, I find it apposite that a cost order should be made in
accordance with the principle laid down in
the matter of Biowatch
Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others.
[52]
ORDER.
[92]
The following order is granted:

1. It is declared
that:
1.1
The First Respondent the Mafube Local Municipality (hereinafter
referred to as “the Municipality”) together with
the
Second to Fifth and Sixteenth Respondents (collectively referred to
as “the Local Respondents”) are in breach of
the
constitutional, legislative and regulatory obligations towards their
residents.
1.2
The conduct of the First Respondent, (including the Second to Fifth
and Sixteenth Respondents), in failing to ensure the provision
of
services to its community in a sustainable manner; in failing to
promote a safe and healthy environment for its community; in
failing
to structure and manage its administration, budgeting and planning
processes; in failing to give priority to the basic
needs of its
community; and in failing to promote the social and economic
development of its community, is inconsistent with the
Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; is in breach of s 152(1) and s
153(a) of the Constitution, as read with its
supporting legislation
in terms of the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act of
56 of 2003 (hereafter: “the
LGMFMA”) and the Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (hereafter: “the
LGMSA”), and is declared
invalid to the extent of these
inconsistencies.
1.3 In
terms of the provisions of section 139(1)(b) and s 139(4), read with
s 139(5) of the Constitution, and read further with
sections 139 and
140 of the LGMFMA, it is declared that the Provincial intervention by
the Sixth to Tenth Respondents has failed
to ensure that the
Municipality and the rest of the Local Respondents meet the
obligations to provide basic services and to meet
their financial
commitments.
1.4
The conduct of the Sixth to Tenth Respondents, in failing effectively
to carry out their mandate in terms of section 139 of
the
Constitution and the LGMFMA, to intervene and resolve the issues of
the First and the rest of the Local Respondents, is inconsistent
with
the Constitution and is declared invalid to the extent of these
inconsistencies.
1.5
The jurisdictional facts for mandatory Provincial
intervention in the affairs of Mafube Local Municipality in terms of
s 139(4)
and (5) of the Constitution, as read with s139, s140, s 146
to 149 of the LGMFMA are now present and have consistently been
present
in the past; as a result of the failure of the First to Fifth
and Sixteenth Respondents, as well as the Sixth to Tenth Respondents,

to ensure that the First Respondent meets its constitutional
obligations.
2. In terms of the
provisions of s139(4) and (5) of the Constitution, read with the
aforementioned provisions of the LGMFMA, Sixth
to Tenth Respondents
(“the Provincial Respondents”) are directed forthwith to
undertake a mandatory provincial intervention
into the affairs of the
First Respondent by exercising the powers conferred by section 139(4)
and (5) of the Constitution, as read
with sections 139, 140 and 146
to 149 of the LGMFMA. The Sixth to Tenth Respondents are specifically
directed:
2.1 to approve a
temporary budget or revenue-raising measures or any other measures
intended to give effect to the Financial Recovery
Plan detailed in
paragraph 2.2 below, to provide for the continued functionality of
the Municipality.
2.2 to implement a
recovery plan aimed at securing the Municipality’s ability to
meet its obligations to provide basic services
and to meet its
financial commitments, having due regard to the existence and the
terms of the Financial Recovery Plan already
developed for Mafube
Municipality (the plan is attached to the Founding Affidavit as
Annexure “JJS26”).
2.3 to take immediate
action to ensure that any and all pollution of the Vaal River or any
other water sources in the Municipality’s
vicinity – by
the Municipality’s sewage works - ceases immediately.
3. The First to Tenth
Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the application, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other
to be absolved. This includes
the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel, where
applicable. The Eleventh to Seventeenth
Respondents and the
Applicants are ordered to pay their own costs occasioned by the
claims against the said respondents.
____________________
I
VAN RHYN AJ
On behalf of the
Applicants:                            ADV.

F J ERASMUS SC
ADV
P EILERS
Instructed
by:
HENDRE

CONRADIE INC
On behalf of the First -
Eleventh &
Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Respondents
ADV.W.R.MOKHARE
SC
ADV
T.M.NGUBENI
Instructed
by:
STATE
ATTORNEY
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the Twelfth
Respondent:           ADV
A HASSIM SC
ADV
F HOBDEN
Instructed
by:
STATE
ATTORNEY
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
Sixteenth Respondent:       ADV A.
E AYAYEE
ADV
L MUKOME
Instructed
by:
MODISE & MODISE ATTORNEYS
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
Seventeenth Respondent: ADV M LEKOANE
Instructed
by:
STATE ATTORNEY
BLOEMFONTEIN
[1]
Act 56 of 2003.
[2]
Section 40(1) of the
Constitution.
[3]
1998 (12) BLCR 1458 (CC)
at para 126.
[4]
Fedsure at para 38.
[5]
Section 159(1)
Constitution and section 24(1)
Local Government: Municipal
Structures Act 117 of 1998
.
[6]
2005 (2) SA 323 (CC).
[7]
City of Cape Town v
Robertson at [53]-[54].
[8]
Section
40
(1) Constitution;
City
of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development
Tribunal
and
Others
2020 (6) SA 182
(CC) at [42].
[9]
Section 154(1) of the
Constitution.
[10]
Section 153 and
155(6)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.
[11]
Act 32 of 2000.
[12]
2012(4) SA 593 (SCA).
[13]
Natal Pension Fund v
Edumeni at [18].
[14]
2011 (4) SA 441 (SCA).
[15]
Premier, Western Cape v
Overberg at [1].
[16]
Premier, Western Cape v
Overberg at [19]
[17]
2022(1) SA 16 (CC).
[18]
Premier, Gauteng v
Democratic Alliance at [59].
[19]
Section 139(5) of the
Constitution.
[20]
Premier, Gauteng v
Democratic Alliance at [75].
[21]
Unemployed People’s
Movement v Eastern Cape Premier and Others
2020 (3) SA 562
(ECG) at
[24].
[22]
2020
(3) SA 562 (ECG).
[23]
Unemployed People’s
Movement v Eastern Cape Premier at [15].
[24]
Unemployed People’s
Movement v Eastern Cape Premier at [96]
[25]
2004 (1) SA 548 (SCA).
[26]
At [10]-[11].
[27]
1979 ALL SA 416
(T) at
423.
[28]
2021 ZAGPJHC 420 (8
September 2021).
[29]
Act 16 of 1963.
[30]
1973 (3) SA 734 (NC).
[31]
Liviero
Civils (Pty) Ltd and Another v Amatola Water Boards (2614/2018)
[2018] ZAECGHC 117 (20
November
2018).
[32]
Premier, Gauteng v
Democratic Alliance at [69].
[33]
1996 (CCT37/96)
[1996]
ZACC 24
;
1997 (1) BCLR 1
;
1997 (2) SA 97
at paras 119 -120.
[34]
Premier,
Gauteng v Democratic Alliance at [63] – [64] and [94].
[35]
Matatiele Municipality v
President of the Republic of South Africa (No2)
[2006] ZACC 12
;
2007 (6) SA 477
at
p487 – 488.
[36]
[2010]
ZACC 11; 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC); 2010 (9) BCLR 859 (CC).
[37]
At [43].
[38]
Section 153 and
155(6)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.
[39]
Section 1 Constitution
Second Amendment Act of 1998.
[40]
Steytler et al, Local
Government Law of South Africa, Lexis Nexis, Issue 11, 15-46.
[41]
Oranje Watersport CC v
Dawid Kuiper Local Municipality and Others [2018] ZANCHC42 (6 July
2018) at
para
43.
[42]
[2015] ZAFSHC 104
(28
May 2015).
[43]
2010 (6) SA 182
(CC) at
[44].
[44]
National Coalition for
Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and
Others 2000 (2)
SA
1 (CC) at para 21.
[45]
Unemployed People’s
Movement v Eastern Cape Premier at [92] and [96].
[46]
Section 172(1)(a) of the
Constitution.
[47]
Unemployed Peoples
Movement v Eastern Cape Premier at [62].
[48]
Amler’s Precedents
of Pleadings, (9
th
Edition) Part A:
Principles of Pleadings, VIII Prayers.
[49]
[2017]
3All SA 663 (GP).
[50]
Afriforum v Eskom at
[105] and [106].
[51]
Afriforum v Eskom at
[107] and [108]
[52]
2009
(6) SA 232
(CC).