Thantsi v S (A103/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 66 (1 April 2022)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Rape — Appeal against conviction and sentence — Appellant convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment — Central issue whether sexual intercourse was consensual — Appellant contended trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and in assessing credibility of witnesses — Court found that the trial court misdirected itself in evaluating evidence, particularly regarding the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the complainant — Appeal upheld, conviction and sentence set aside.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This was a criminal appeal in the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein, arising from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Regional Court, Bloemfontein. The appellant, Zamani Emmanuel Thantsi, appealed against both his conviction for rape and the sentence of life imprisonment. The respondent was the State.


The appellant had been convicted on one count of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. Because a sentence of life imprisonment had been imposed, the appeal came before the High Court as of right. The appeal was heard on 24 January 2022 and judgment was delivered electronically on 1 April 2022.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned whether sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complainant occurred with consent or constituted rape, and, if the conviction stood, whether the trial court correctly applied the minimum sentencing framework when imposing life imprisonment.


Material Facts


It was common cause that the appellant and the complainant had sexual intercourse on the relevant occasion. The central factual dispute was whether that intercourse occurred consensually, or whether the complainant submitted due to coercion and threats.


The complainant’s version, as relied upon in part by the appeal court, was that she had previously been in a love relationship with the appellant which had ended about two weeks prior to the incident. She had been at a tavern with a sibling and a friend when the appellant arrived and, according to her, coerced her into leaving with him. She and the appellant (with others) moved between venues until early morning and eventually went to the appellant’s parental home, where he occupied a separate room. She remained at that home during the day, spent time with the appellant’s mother, and later was in the appellant’s room.


A further dispute concerned the status of the relationship at the time. The appeal court treated as significant that the complainant’s statements to others (and the contents of the medical documentation) reflected that the appellant was her boyfriend and that she had last had intercourse with the same suspect the day before. These features were regarded as undermining the trial court’s acceptance that the relationship had ended two weeks earlier, and as supporting the appellant’s version that they were still in a relationship.


Another factual dispute related to the events preceding the intercourse. The complainant’s evidence was that a confrontation arose after she queried the appellant about another woman. She alleged that the appellant then prevented her from leaving, assaulted her (including with implements), and thereafter demanded intercourse. The appeal court, on its reading of the record, found no support for the conclusion that the appellant’s request for intercourse preceded the altercation in the manner found by the trial court; it regarded the record as showing that the dispute revolved around the other woman and that this ignited the fight.


The complainant alleged that after the assault the appellant used a broken bottle to threaten and subdue her into having sexual intercourse. The appeal court treated as important that, after intercourse occurred, the complainant went immediately to the police station to report rape.


The medical evidence (a J88) and photographs were before court. The appeal court considered the nature of the injuries recorded and reasoned that they were not consistent with repeated assaults with dangerous weapons such as a hammer or stick as alleged, but were consistent with injuries sustained in a scuffle or from open hands. It also noted that the arresting officer did not observe external injuries when first encountering the complainant.


Legal Issues


The principal legal issue on conviction was whether, on the totality of the evidence, the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the sexual intercourse was without consent, in circumstances where the complainant’s evidence contained aspects the appeal court regarded as improbable or inconsistent with objective indicators, and where the matter largely turned on credibility, probabilities, and the evaluation of competing versions.


The conviction enquiry primarily concerned the application of law to fact (the elements of rape, particularly consent) as assessed through factual findings and credibility, rather than a novel question of law. The court was required to make evaluative findings on probabilities and the weight of independently verifiable evidence (notably the J88 and photo album) in determining whether reasonable doubt existed.


On sentence, the central legal question was whether the trial court correctly categorised the offence for purposes of the minimum sentence regime, and whether the trial court’s factual misunderstandings and sentencing approach justified appellate interference. This involved a combination of legal classification under the minimum sentencing legislation and an evaluative sentencing judgment.


Court’s Reasoning


The appeal court restated the general approach that an appeal is a reconsideration on the record, and that factual and credibility findings by a trial court are generally respected unless there is a demonstrable and material misdirection, or the findings are shown by the record to be clearly wrong. It emphasised that the assessment of guilt requires a weighing of the evidence as a whole, including the strengths and weaknesses on both sides and the probabilities.


In examining the conviction, the appeal court identified what it considered to be misconceptions of evidence by the trial court, particularly regarding the relationship status and the narrative that the complainant was forcibly removed from the tavern and held at the parental home against her will. It relied on aspects of the record it considered independently verifiable or objectively significant. The appeal court highlighted that the J88 recorded that the complainant had last had sexual intercourse with the same suspect on 20 June 2015, which was inconsistent with the notion of a relationship having ended two weeks earlier, and that the nursing sister recorded the assailant as the complainant’s boyfriend. It also noted that the complainant had described the appellant as her boyfriend to the arresting officer and in her police statement. On probabilities, the appeal court held that the trial court was clearly wrong to find that there was no ongoing love relationship at the time.


The appeal court similarly questioned the trial court’s finding that the complainant was forcibly removed from the tavern under threat of public embarrassment, noting the absence of evidence that the appellant was armed or that he carried out any threat, and finding it puzzling that the complainant would not seek protection from her sibling if unwilling to go with the appellant. It also considered the complainant’s conduct during the day at the parental home, including remaining there while the appellant was away, interacting normally with the appellant’s mother, assisting with meals, and returning to the appellant’s room, as inconsistent with the trial court’s acceptance of the complainant’s account of coercion in that respect.


A further identified misdirection concerned the trial court’s conclusion that the appellant assaulted the complainant because she refused sexual intercourse, thereby treating the assault as a means of coercion to obtain sex. The appeal court referred to the transcribed record and stated that it could not find evidence that the appellant demanded intercourse before the fight; it considered the record to show that the confrontation was about the other woman.


Notwithstanding these criticisms, the appeal court held that the State nonetheless proved rape beyond reasonable doubt. It treated as decisive that, after a fierce altercation, the complainant was subdued by the threat of a broken bottle and that this accounted for the absence of consent. The court placed weight on the complainant’s immediate report to the police after the intercourse, regarding this as supporting the consistency and probability of her claim that intercourse occurred against her will. In that sense, although parts of the complainant’s narrative were found improbable or overstated, the court accepted that the coercive mechanism (the broken bottle threat) established lack of consent beyond reasonable doubt.


On sentence, the appeal court reasoned that life imprisonment is the most severe form of punishment in the penal system and should not be imposed without proper justification. It held that the trial court’s misunderstanding of the facts rendered the life sentence unjustifiable on the factual matrix as found on appeal. The court concluded that the offence fell within the purview of section 51(2) of Act 105 of 1997, for which the prescribed minimum sentence is ten years’ imprisonment, rather than the regime mandating life imprisonment.


In substituting sentence, the appeal court had regard to the traditional sentencing triad and personal circumstances mentioned in the record. It noted that the appellant was relatively young, had no children, and had a previous conviction for sexual intercourse with a minor committed about seven years earlier, and that he was on parole at the time of the incident. The court expressed the view that long-term imprisonment would suffice and that punishment should not be aimed at breaking an offender but also at rehabilitation. It took into account that the appellant had been incarcerated for two years prior to conviction, and it antedated the substituted sentence accordingly.


Outcome and Relief


The appeal court upheld the conviction for rape, concluding that rape had been proven beyond reasonable doubt on the basis that the complainant was threatened with a broken bottle and did not consent.


The court interfered with sentence and substituted the sentence of life imprisonment with ten (10) years’ imprisonment, antedated to 11 August 2017. The order recorded that “the appeal is dismissed”, but the substantive relief granted reflected that the appeal succeeded in respect of sentence through substitution.


No distinct costs order was made (consistent with criminal appeal practice, where costs orders are not ordinarily granted).


Cases Cited


S v Hadebe and Others 1997 (2) SACR 641 (SCA).


S v Singh 1975 (1) SA 227 (N).


S v Chabalala 2003 (1) SACR 134 (SCA).


S v Aswegen 2001 (2) SACR 97 (SCA).


S v Pillay 1977 (4) SA 531 (A).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, section 51(2).


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, Part I of Schedule 2 (as referenced in relation to rape).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The High Court held that, despite misdirections in aspects of the trial court’s factual findings (including the status of the relationship and certain contextual events), the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to sexual intercourse because she was threatened with a broken bottle, and her immediate report to the police supported that conclusion. The conviction for rape was accordingly upheld.


The High Court further held that the life sentence was not justified on the facts as properly assessed and that the offence fell to be sentenced under section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. The court accordingly substituted the sentence of life imprisonment with ten years’ imprisonment, antedated to 11 August 2017.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


An appellate court generally defers to a trial court’s factual and credibility findings unless there has been a material misdirection or the findings are shown on the record to be clearly wrong; the presumption is that such findings are correct unless displaced by the recorded evidence.


In resolving factual disputes, a court must consider not only demeanour and credibility but also the probabilities and improbabilities on both versions, and should evaluate the case on the conspectus of all the evidence, rather than isolating a single feature as decisive without contextual assessment.


The correct approach to determining whether guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt is to weigh all elements pointing to guilt against all those indicative of innocence, taking proper account of inherent strengths and weaknesses in each version, and then determine whether the State’s case excludes reasonable doubt.


In sentencing, particularly where severe sentences are imposed under the minimum sentence regime, misdirection on material facts may justify appellate interference. The classification of an offence within the minimum sentence framework (including whether it falls under section 51(1) or section 51(2)) materially affects the prescribed sentencing outcome, and sentencing must remain proportionate to the offence as established on the properly assessed facts.

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[2022] ZAFSHC 66
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Thantsi v S (A103/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 66 (1 April 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Appeal
number:   A103/2021
In
the matter between:
ZAMANI
EMMANUEL THANTSI
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
CORAM:
MATHEBULA, J
et
RAMOS, AJ
HEARD
ON:
24
JANUARY 2022
JUDGMENT
BY:
MATHEBULA, J
DELIVERED
ON:
The judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email and
release to SAFLII
on 01 April 2022. The date and time for hand-down
is deemed to be 01 April 2022 at 10H00.
Introduction
[1]
The appellant was convicted in the Regional Court, Bloemfontein on
one count
of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. The charge
arose out of an incident in which the appellant and the complainant
had sexual
intercourse. The central question is whether that act was
consensual or not. Given the sentence imposed on the appellant, this
appeal
is before us as of right.
Grounds
of appeal
[2]
As far as the conviction is concerned the grounds of appeal are: -
1.
The trial court erred in finding that the appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
2.
The trial court erred in finding that state witnesses were credible
witnesses and that there were
no material contradictions in their
testimonies, and
3.
The trial court erred in not accepting the version of the appellant
and thus making a negative inference
against him.
[3]
On the question of sentence, the main ground of appeal is that the
trial
court incorrectly found that there were no substantial and
compelling circumstances present to deviate from imposing minimum
sentence.
The appellant was not a first offender, but a substantial
period of time has passed since the last conviction. The trial court,
it
was argued, did not fully canvas or mention all mitigating factors
and did not cumulatively consider them as substantial and compelling
circumstances.
The
facts
[4]
The complainant testified that she was in a love relationship with
the appellant
which had ended about two (2) weeks prior to the
incident. On 21 June 2015, she visited a local tavern with her
sibling and a friend.
The appellant arrived with his friends and
approached her. He coerced her to leave with him and forcefully
stated that if she does
not, he will embarrass her. She obliged
because she was afraid of him. It appears that they (together with
his friends) club hopped
until early the next morning. Thereafter
they retreated to his parental home. The appellant was staying in a
separate room detached
from the main house. They arrived at around
06H00 in the morning. Two (2) hours later, his friends arrived
looking for him and he
left with them. The complainant, who was left
behind, spent the whole day with his mother and even assisted her to
prepare family
meals. During this period, she even changed into his
more comfortable clothes.
[5]
His mother told her that the appellant had brought home another woman
earlier
in the week. It appears that this did not sit comfortably
with the complainant. The appellant eventually returned and he found
her
in his room watching television. He had a beer in hand and
attempted to kiss her. She was unwilling because she wanted an
explanation
about the woman she was told about. During the four (4)
months that they have been together, the relationship was marred by
infidelity
on the part of the appellant.
[6]
The tiff ensued and she tried to leave the room, but was blocked by
the
appellant. There and there the appellant started assaulting her
with open hands. He took out a stick that was under the bed and
assaulted
her with it. The aforesaid stick is depicted on Photo 5 and
6 of Exhibit “A”. They fell and the appellant picked up a bottle
and assaulted her several times with it. Thereafter he took a hammer
and continued the assault on her. This is also depicted on Photo
4 of
Exhibit “A”.
[7]
After the assault the appellant demanded sexual intercourse from her.
She
refused decisively stating how could she be expected to have
sexual intercourse after sustaining injuries. He was also swearing at
her. In the process the bottle used to assault her was broken. The
appellant took hold of a broken bottle and used it to threaten
her to
have sexual intercourse with him. He even assisted her to undress
because she was injured. Thereafter he proceeded to have
sexual
intercourse with her. When he was done, he lit a cigarette and after
smoking they slept. She observed that he was fast asleep
when she
opened the door and went straight to the police station to report the
crime of rape on her. It will appear that the police
station is not
far from where they were.
[8]
Cross examination revealed that the reason why the complainant did
not tell
her sibling and his friend about the evasive measures from
the appellant is because she wanted to avoid any altercation. She
reiterated
that she was forced to go to the appellant’s parental
home. His mother found her in his bed and she did not divulge her
ordeal.
A question was posed to her why she did not leave during the
absence of the appellant. Her response was that she did not have the
taxi fare. Her handbag was left with her sibling. It was pointed out
to her that her prolonged stay at the appellant’s home was
indicative of her willingness to be there. She disagreed and asserted
that it was far from her home thus she could not walk such
a long
distance.
[9]
The evidence of the arresting officer is briefly as follows. When he
met
the complainant she was emotional and told him that she has been
assaulted and raped by her boyfriend. He did not take cognisance
of
any external injuries. She took them to his place where he was
arrested. The evidence of the nursing sister was largely based
on the
J88 admitted as part of the record. Her injuries are well documented
and requires no further discussion.
[10]
The appellant, on the other hand, alleged a different set of facts.
He was staying
together with the complainant who was only visiting
her parental home. On 20 June 2015, he received a call from the
complainant to
come fetch her from Wiped Inn tavern. He did so.
Immediately after their arrival at home they engaged in
sexual intercourse.
Around 08H00 the parole officers arrived and
thereafter he went to his vegetable market. He returned home around
20H00.
[11]
He ate his food that the complainant had fetched from the main house.
Thereafter they
engaged in sexual intercourse for the second time
that day. Once they were done, the complainant started asking him
about his multitude
affairs. Seemingly triggered by what his mother
told her earlier. The verbal attack escalated rapidly and culminated
in her slapping
him with open hands. She hit him so hard that he
temporarily lost his consciousness. His evidence is to the effect
that the complainant
was the aggressor.
[12]
According to the appellant, the fight ensued and the complainant fell
to the ground.
That is how she sustained injuries on her person. He
vehemently denied assaulting her with a stick and hammer as alleged
by the complainant.
The only injury he was aware of, occurred when
she hit the table.
[13]
On the strength of this evidence the trial court found that there was
enough reliable
and credible evidence to convict the appellant on the
charge of rape as defined in Part 1 of Schedule 2. The main findings
on the
facts are that the appellant forcefully took the complainant
who was his ex-girlfriend to his home. Once there he demanded sexual
intercourse and when she refused, he assaulted her. As a result, she
gave in and he proceeded to rape her.
Legal
principles
[14]
An appeal is essentially a re-trial on the record and its ambit is
limited to the issues
raised by the appellant. It is trite that the
factual and credibility findings made by the trial court are normally
accepted unless
there are demonstrable and material misdirection. The
presumption is that they are correct and will only be disregarded if
the recorded
evidence shows them to be clearly wrong.
[1]
[15]
The learned magistrate correctly referred to the decided cases when
he was dealing
with the principles relating to evidence of a single
witness and approach to evaluating evidence in general. The learned
magistrate
quoted and relied on
S
v Singh
where the
court stated that in order to resolve factual dispute, other than the
merits and demerits of the state and defence witnesses,
the court
must consider the probabilities of the case.
[2]
[16]
The modern approach often quoted and applied in our courts was well
articulated in
S v Chabalala
by Heher AJA (as he then was)
writing for the undivided bench with reference to
S v Aswegen
2001
(2) SACR 97
(SCA)
where he said the following: -
“
[15]
The correct approach is to weigh up all the elements which point
towards the guilt of the accused against all those
which are
indicative of his innocence, taking proper account of inherent
strengths and weaknesses, probabilities and improbabilities
on both
sides and, having done so, to decide whether the balance weighs so
heavily in favour of the State as to exclude any reasonable
doubt
about the accused's guilt. The result may prove that one scrap of
evidence or one defect in the case for either party (such
as the
failure to call a material witness concerning an identity parade) was
decisive but that can only be an
ex
post facto
determination
and a trial court (and counsel) should avoid the temptation to latch
on to one (apparently) obvious aspect without
assessing it in the
context of the full picture presented in evidence. Once that approach
is applied to the evidence in the present
matter the solution becomes
clear.”
[3]
Discussion
[17]
I hold a firm view that there are misconceptions of evidence by the
trial court. The
principle is clear that even if the trial court has
accepted the complainant’s evidence, the court must still look at
the evidence
of the appellant. What stands out is that reliable
evidence must be weighed against the one that is false. The court
should also
not lose sight of any independently verifiable evidence.
In this matter there is a J88 and photo album compiled by the police.
What
is of utmost importance is that the conspectus of evidence is
required. That does not absolve the state of onus on the case in its
entirety or particular issue. The complainant denied that she was in
a love relationship with the appellant. It had ended some two
(2)
weeks prior to the incident. On the J88 it was recorded that she had
the last sexual intercourse with the same suspect (meaning
the
appellant) on 20 June 2015. That is a mere one (1) day before the
incident. The nursing sister even recorded that her assailant
was her
boyfriend, meaning the appellant. This in my view, is consistent,
with the evidence of the appellant that they were still
in a love
relationship.
[18]
The other point is that the altercation was triggered by her
insistence that he must
come clean on the affair with the other woman
who was there earlier in the week. If they were no longer in a love
relationship, why
will she still bother about his many affairs (if
any). When the complainant reported the incident of rape to Constable
Rammogo, she
stated that the appellant was her boyfriend. This is
also boldly written in her statement made for the police. It is
improbable that
both the nursing sister and the police officer
will make the same mistake in the circumstances. On the
probabilities, the learned
magistrate was clearly wrong to hold that
they were no longer in a love relationship at the time of the
incident. This finding is
not sustained by the facts.
[19]
Another finding was that the appellant forcibly removed the
complainant from the tavern
to his parental home. The main evidence
relied upon is that the appellant threatened to undress and embarrass
the complainant in-front
of the other patrons at the tavern. There is
no suggestion that he was armed or did anything to pull through this
stunt. Assuming
indeed that he made such threats. It is unclear on
the evidence that indeed he was even capable to do anything to her.
[20]
The complainant simply alleged that she left with him to avoid
altercation with her
sibling. It is puzzling that if she was
unwilling to go with him and could have been afforded protection by
her sibling, she would
forgo that for a false peace. The evidence on
record shows that together with his friends they visited several
places. At no stage
did she hint to any of them of her predicament
nor make a run for it. The appellant’s mother found her under his
blankets and she
did not report anything untoward. The appellant was
away for the whole day and during this time she was at his home with
her mother.
I am mindful of the fact that the police station is only
a stone throw away from his parental home. She even assisted her to
prepare
lunch. When all was done, she retreated to his room to watch
television. The indications are that she was going to spend another
night there. This somehow tally with the evidence of the appellant
that she was somehow staying there. On this basis, I hold the
view
that the learned magistrate was clearly wrong on the facts.
[21]
I now turn to another error committed by the learned magistrate. The
learned magistrate
concluded that the appellant assaulted the
complainant after she refused to have sexual intercourse with him.
Therefore, the assault
was to coerce her to give in to his demands.
The relevant part of the record before the assault or fight started
read as follows:
-
“
MS
NKHATI:
He then wanted me to kiss him, I then refused and pushed him away.
PROSECUTOR:
Yes, … [recording extremely slow].
MS
NKHATI:
I refused to
sleep with him, Your Worship, demanding something else from him about
the girl that he had brought on Tuesday, whom was
crying in his room,
I demanded to know who she was from him.”
[4]
[22]
Having scrutinised the record I could not find anywhere showing his
request or demand
for sexual intercourse. There is no evidence that
he wanted to sleep with her. The entire conversation revolved around
the woman
who was there and that is what ignited the fight. I also
need to mention that the injuries which the complainant sustained are
not
consistent with those that could have been caused by repeated
assault with dangerous weapons like a hammer and/or stick. These are
well documented in the J88. They are consistent with the injuries
sustained in a scuffle or as a result of open hands. Her injuries
were not even visible to the police officer who went with her to
arrest the appellant.
[23]
It is common cause that the appellant and complainant engaged in
sexual intercourse
on the day in question. The question is whether it
was consensual or not. What is of concern is that it took place after
they had
a fierce altercation. She even told him that how can they be
intimate after she had been injured. The uncontested evidence is that
he used a broken bottle to subdue her in order to have sexual
intercourse with him. Immediately after the sexual intercourse she
went to the police station to report him.  On the probabilities
that demonstrate her consistency that it was against her consent.
To
that extent I am satisfied that the respondent has proved the crime
of rape against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
[24]
This brings me to the question of sentence. The principles relating
to the role of
the court of appeal in matters pertaining to
sentencing are well known and need no restatement.
[5]
Life imprisonment is the capital punishment in the penal system of
the Republic. It stands to reason that it must not be lightly
imposed. Clearly as I have discussed in preceding paragraphs the
learned magistrate misunderstood the facts. Therefore, the punishment
imposed is not justifiable on the facts. The main point is that on
the facts, as this court has found, the offence committed by the
appellant does not warrant the sentence imposed by the learned
magistrate. The offence is within the purview of section 51(2) of
Act
105 of 1997. The prescribed minimum sentence of ten (10) years must
ordinarily be imposed. Therefore, I am at liberty to interfere
with
it.
[25]
The learned magistrate alluded to the basic triad of sentencing
considerations. The
appellant is a fairly young person with no
children. He had a previous conviction which was committed about
seven (7) years before
this incident. He was convicted of having
sexual intercourse with a minor. Apparently at the time of this
incident he was still on
parole. It is my considered opinion that
long term imprisonment will suffice. I am mindful of the fact that
the purpose of the sentence
is not to break the offender but also to
rehabilitate him. In the substituted sentence, I have taken
cogniscance of the fact that
he had been incarcerated for two (2)
years prior to conviction.
[26]
I make the following order: -
26.1.
The appeal is dismissed.
26.2.
The sentence of life imprisonment is substituted with
“Ten (10)
years imprisonment
ante
dated to 11 August 2017”.
M.A.
MATHEBULA, J
I
concur.
A. RAMOS, AJ
On behalf
of appellant:
Mr. P. Mokoena
Instructed
by:
Justice Centre
Bloemfontein
On behalf
of respondent:
Adv. B.G.
Claassens
Instructed
by:
Director of Public Prosecutions
Bloemfontein
/TKwapa
[1]
S v
Hadebe and Others
1997 (2) SACR 641
(SCA) at 645E-F.
[2]
1975
(1) SA 227
(N) at 228G-H.
[3]
2003
(1) SACR 134
(SCA).
[4]
Page 35 of the Transcribed Record at lines 10 – 16.
[5]
S v
Pillay
1977 (4) SA 531
(A) at 535E-F.