S v Ntepe & Another (4437/2021; 4051/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 78 (22 March 2022)

80 Reportability
Banking and Finance

Brief Summary

Summary Judgment — Credit agreements — Application for summary judgment for the return of motor vehicles — Defendant's claims of non-receipt of monthly statements and disputed arrears — Court's determination of bona fide defense — Defendant's right to challenge amounts included in arrears under the National Credit Act — Summary judgment granted in favor of plaintiffs due to lack of sufficient evidence of a bona fide defense.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These were two applications for summary judgment heard together in the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein. In each matter, the plaintiff sought confirmation of termination of a credit agreement and return of a specified motor vehicle (a Toyota Quantum minibus taxi), together with attorney-and-client costs.


In case number 4437/2021, the plaintiff was Transflow (RF) (Pty) Ltd and the defendant was Moshele Shadrak Chabane. In case number 4051/2021, the plaintiff was Potpale Investments (RF) (Pty) Ltd and the defendant was again Moshele Shadrak Chabane. The defendant operated the vehicles as taxis, and the vehicles were described as a major source of his income.


Procedurally, summonses were issued and the defendant delivered pleas. The plaintiffs then launched Rule 32 summary judgment proceedings. The applications were argued on 10 February 2022, and judgment (with reasons) was delivered electronically on 22 March 2022. The court treated both matters in a single judgment because the facts, issues, and applicable law were materially similar.


The general subject-matter concerned credit agreement enforcement in the context of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA), including disputes about arrears calculations, the inclusion of insurance and tracking charges, and whether the defendant had disclosed a bona fide defence sufficient to defeat summary judgment.


2. Material Facts


In both matters, it was common cause that the defendant acquired Toyota Quantum vehicles through credit arrangements and that the plaintiffs sought termination and return based on alleged payment default. It was also a central factual feature that the vehicles were used as income-generating taxi vehicles, which framed the practical significance of an order for return.


Case 4437/2021 (Transflow (RF) (Pty) Ltd v Chabane)


The vehicle was purchased on credit on 19 February 2019. The plaintiff’s statement of account reflected that the defendant made regular monthly payments up to 6 December 2021, with instalments initially at R15 000.00, and the last recorded payment being R10 000.00. The statement ended on 6 December 2021, and the court noted that the most recent payment history, considered important in applications of this kind, was not placed before it. On the papers, it remained possible that the defendant continued making payments after the last date reflected.


The plaintiff’s summary judgment affidavit was dated 17 December 2021, and the court highlighted that the statement of account was only attached to the papers after the defendant filed his opposing statement. The summons had been issued on 27 September 2021.


A further material factual point was that the defendant complained that he was not provided with monthly statements, which he contended he was entitled to receive. The court also recorded that there was no evidence showing how the instalment and arrears were calculated, including whether amounts for insurance and tracking formed part of the base on which interest was calculated.


The plaintiff alleged that, at termination, the total amount outstanding was R325 228.05 plus interest, and that arrears amounted to R114 496.03. The deposit was R42 100.00.


The chain of contractual rights was also addressed. On 25 July 2019, Potpale, SA Taxi Development Finance (Pty) Ltd, and Transflow concluded a written agreement allowing Potpale to sell and/or cede rights arising from certain credit agreements. On 21 August 2019, Potpale sold and/or ceded the relevant rights to Transflow. On 27 November 2019, Transflow entered into an agreement with the defendant, which he signed. The defendant alleged that it was not explained to him and that he did not understand it, but he did not dispute that he signed the addendum.


The defendant raised disputes linked to an accident involving the vehicle and the insurance position, contending that the plaintiff was contractually responsible for insurance instalments. He also disputed the plaintiff’s inclusion of short-term insurance premiums, life insurance premiums, and tracking fees in the arrears, and complained about the computation of interest over amounts that, on his version, included charges beyond the vehicle finance component.


Case 4051/2021 (Potpale Investments (RF) (Pty) Ltd v Chabane)


The credit agreement in this matter was concluded on 17 August 2018, with a deposit of R68 100.00. The plaintiff alleged the defendant breached the agreement by failing to pay the required instalments, although it was accepted on the papers that the defendant did make regular payments, but not at the level the plaintiff contended was contracted.


The plaintiff alleged arrears of R83 706.59 as at 1 September 2021, and a total outstanding amount of R387 169.87. The court noted, however, that an amount reflected in the indexed bundle showed R286 255.50 on 1 November 2021, and observed that this figure had decreased, which formed part of the factual context demonstrating uncertainty and contestation about the accounting.


The defendant stated that he paid instalments by debit order until October 2019, then by cash deposits. He attributed this change to financial disruption after another vehicle was damaged in an accident and took a long time to repair. He maintained that he had not received statements since purchasing the vehicle and that the plaintiff only provided a breakdown of arrears later, attached to the summary judgment founding affidavit. The defendant contended that, had the statement been annexed to the particulars of claim, he could have pleaded in more detail.


As in the other matter, the defendant disputed the correctness of arrears on the basis that the statement included life insurance, short-term insurance, and tracking/warranty items, and he disputed that the correct instalment was debited. He further complained that a credit agreement annexed to the particulars of claim was unreadable, and maintained that it was financed through SA Taxi Development Finance, though the court treated the plaintiff’s standing as established on the evidence before it.


Disputed and Undisputed Elements Highlighted by the Court


The court treated certain matters as effectively not in dispute for present purposes. It accepted that the plaintiffs’ accounting included premiums and fees (insurance and tracking-related items) within the amounts said to be due, and it treated it as not in dispute in case 4437/2021 that the plaintiff failed to provide a basis for the inclusion of those amounts in the pleaded cause of action.


The material disputes, as framed by the court, centred on the correctness and composition of the instalments and arrears, the calculation of interest, and whether the plaintiffs had placed sufficient foundational accounting material before court to justify immediate final relief by way of summary judgment. In both cases, the defendant’s version was that he had continued paying and that the alleged arrears were incorrectly calculated, while the plaintiffs asserted breach based on non-payment of the contracted instalments.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were directed to whether summary judgment should be granted under Rule 32, read with the requirements and protections of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 as applicable to credit agreements.


The decisive issue in both matters was whether the defendant, in terms of Rule 32(3), had disclosed a defence that was bona fide and good in law, with sufficient disclosure of its nature, grounds, and material facts, such that the matter should proceed to trial rather than be determined on the truncated summary judgment procedure.


Within that principal enquiry, the court was required to address specific sub-issues raised by the defences and the plaintiffs’ responses. These included whether the plaintiffs had locus standi to sue (particularly in light of cession and an addendum signed by the defendant), whether there was compliance with section 129 of the NCA (including the significance of an address chosen for delivery of notices), and whether disputes about the composition of the arrears and the method of calculation (including interest allegedly levied on charges such as insurance and tracking fees) constituted triable defences.


The disputes concerned a mixture of law (the proper test for summary judgment; the legal effect of cession; the legal sufficiency of section 129 compliance), fact (what was paid; what statements were provided; what amounts were included; what the figures reflected), and especially the application of law to contested accounting facts (whether, given the pleaded case and evidentiary material, the plaintiffs had shown an unanswerable entitlement to termination and delivery, and whether the defendant’s challenges were genuine). The court also exercised a value-laden discretion inherent in summary judgment, emphasising doubt, fairness, and the need for proper ventilation of disputes at trial where appropriate.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached both matters through the framework of the amended summary judgment procedure and the established test that remains focused on whether the defendant has disclosed a bona fide defence rather than establishing probability of success. It adopted the articulation of the modern approach to Rule 32 in Tumileng Trading CC v National Security and Fire (Pty) Ltd 2020 (6) SA 624 (WCC), emphasising that Rule 32(3) remained substantively unamended as to what is required of the defendant, that a defendant need not show the defence is likely to prevail, and that the court’s task is not to decide factual disputes but to assess whether the defence is genuine and legally cognisable.


The court further invoked the “eight golden rules” relating to summary judgment adjudication, including that summary judgment does not resolve the entire action, that the court does not decide factual disputes, that summary judgment must be refused in the face of doubt, and that the court retains a residual discretion to refuse summary judgment.


Treatment of the Defences in Case 4437/2021


On locus standi, the court accepted the plaintiff’s response. It relied on the contractual term permitting cession without notice, the evidence that the defendant signed an addendum, and the fact that a cession had occurred. While it observed that it was not clear from the evidence that the defendant understood the transaction, it treated the legal effect of the cession as established and concluded that the plaintiff had standing; this defence therefore failed.


On section 129 compliance, the court rejected the defence as bad in law. It reasoned that the defendant had chosen a domicilium address for service and that the notice was delivered accordingly. It described contrary argument (that domicilium was not the section 129(5) address) as unsustainable, and relied on the Constitutional Court’s approach to the duty of the credit provider in Sebola and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC).


The court’s focus then shifted to the accounting disputes. It identified the defendant’s challenge to the instalment amount, the arrears figure, and the interest calculation (particularly whether interest was calculated on the whole instalment inclusive of insurance and tracker charges) as raising a genuine triable issue. The court observed that the plaintiff’s response established only that the contract required the payments, but did not adequately address the defendant’s challenge to the interest calculation and the basis for the figures advanced. The court emphasised that the onus remained on the plaintiff to prove the correctness of its claim, and regarded the absence of evidence showing how arrears and instalments were computed as a material deficiency supporting the bona fides of the defence.


A further contextual factor was the incomplete and potentially outdated statement of account, ending in December 2021, without an updated payment history at the February 2022 hearing. This supported the court’s view that the matter was not suitable for determination without fuller evidentiary ventilation.


The court also treated the defendant’s statutory entitlement to challenge the debt and its composition as important. It referred to the defendant’s reliance on section 169 of the NCA as supporting a bona fide challenge to the amounts claimed and the method by which they were arrived at.


In exercising its overall assessment, the court considered that an order for return would be harsh given that the vehicle was the defendant’s income-generating tool, and it noted the defendant’s demonstrated regular payment behaviour as indicative of bona fides. It framed the broader context as one in which mediation/consultation and careful compliance with the NCA were important, and concluded that summary judgment would not be appropriate where the accounting dispute remained unresolved and required trial or proper debatement.


Treatment of the Defences in Case 4051/2021


In this matter, counsel for the plaintiff identified several defences, including registration as a credit provider, whether an agreement existed with the plaintiff, breach and payment, the inclusion of premiums and tracking fees, correctness of instalments, and section 129 compliance.


The court accepted the plaintiff’s submissions on standing and credit provider status, concluding that on the evidence the plaintiff had locus standi and was a credit provider at the relevant time. It again rejected the section 129 defence for the same reasons given in the first matter.


However, as in case 4437/2021, the court declined to accept the plaintiff’s submissions on the instalment and arrears disputes. It found that the defendant had disclosed a defence that was apparently genuine and not a sham: he had not ceased payment, but disputed the amount of the instalment and the calculation of interest and arrears. The court considered it significant that the plaintiff had neglected to provide regular statements and had not demonstrated how the calculations were done, which contributed to confusion and supported the need for a trial rather than summary disposal.


The court characterised the application as premature, stating that the parties should have compared notes on the evidence adduced and that “debatement” on the instalment before litigation was imperative. Ultimately, the court reasoned that the summary judgment claims were defective because the defendant had raised a bona fide defence on the key questions of instalment and arrears, coupled with a concern that the plaintiffs may not have carefully complied with NCA-related requirements in the manner they presented their claims.


5. Outcome and Relief


In case 4437/2021, the application for summary judgment for confirmation of termination and return of the 2019 Toyota Quantum 2.5D-4D Sesfikile 16S was dismissed. The defendant was granted unconditional leave to defend, the action was to proceed in the ordinary course, and costs were ordered to be in the cause.


In case 4051/2021, the application for summary judgment for confirmation of termination and return of the 2018 Toyota Quantum 2.5D-4D Sesfikile 16S was likewise dismissed. The defendant was granted unconditional leave to defend, the action was to proceed in the ordinary course, and costs were ordered to be in the cause.


Cases Cited


Tumileng Trading CC v National Security and Fire (Pty) Ltd 2020 (6) SA 624 (WCC).


Sebola and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC).


Legislation Cited


National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (in particular sections 108, 129, 129(5), and 169).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 32 (Summary judgment), including Rule 32(1)–(9) as reproduced in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, although certain defences (notably challenges to locus standi in one matter and section 129 compliance in both matters) could not succeed on the papers, the defendant had nonetheless disclosed bona fide defences that were good in law concerning the correctness, composition, and calculation of the instalments and arrears, including the inclusion of insurance and tracking-related charges and the calculation of interest.


The court further held that the plaintiffs’ presentation of their claims, including inadequate demonstration of how arrears were calculated and shortcomings relating to statements and accounting detail placed before court, rendered summary judgment inappropriate. In consequence, both applications were dismissed and the defendant was granted unconditional leave to defend, with costs in the cause.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that summary judgment under Rule 32 is an extraordinary procedure that does not entail determination of the entire action and is not a mechanism for resolving factual disputes. The court treated the governing question as whether the defendant disclosed a bona fide defence, meaning an apparently genuinely advanced defence rather than a sham, and reaffirmed that the defendant need not show the defence is likely to succeed at trial.


The court applied the approach articulated in Tumileng Trading CC v National Security and Fire (Pty) Ltd 2020 (6) SA 624 (WCC), including that the amended Rule 32 did not change the substantive test, while requiring meaningful engagement by the defendant with the plaintiff’s supporting material. It further applied the accepted guidelines that summary judgment should be refused in the face of doubt, and that the court retains a residual discretion to refuse summary judgment even where technical requirements might otherwise be met.


In relation to the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, the court accepted that compliance with section 129 notice requirements must be assessed consistently with Sebola and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC), and held that service at the chosen address constituted proper compliance on the facts presented.


The court also treated the statutory framework as recognising a consumer’s entitlement to challenge the debt claimed and its composition, referring to section 169 as supporting the defendant’s right to dispute the basis and components of arrears and instalment calculations, thereby contributing to the conclusion that the defences raised were bona fide and warranted a trial.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAFSHC 78
|

|

S v Ntepe & Another (4437/2021; 4051/2021) [2022] ZAFSHC 78 (22 March 2022)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted
from this document in compliance with the law and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE PROVINCIAL DIVISION
Case
No.: 4437/2021
In the matter
between:
TRANSFLOW
(RF) (PTY) LTD
[1]
Plaintiff
(Registration
Number: 2018/631811/07)
and
MOSHELE
SHADRAK
CHABANE
Defendant
(Identity Number:
[….])
Case No.:
4051/2021
In the matter
between:
POTPALE
INVESTMENTS (RF) (PTY) LTD
[2]
Plaintiff
(Registration
Number: 52011/118165/07)
and
MOSHELE
SHADRAK
CHABANE
[3]
Defendant
(Identity Number:
[….])
Coram:
Opperman,
J
Date
of hearing:
10
February
2022
Order
Delivered:
22
March
2022
Reasons
for Judgment:
The
reasons for judgment were handed down electronically by circulation
to the parties’ legal representatives by email and release
to
SAFLII on 22 March 2022. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to
be 22 March 2022 at 15h00.
Summary:
Summary
Judgment – economic concerns and legal certainty
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This case concerns the management of credit agreements in the diverse
social demographics of South Africa.
It is the ever-present tug of
war between economic concerns and legal certainty. Vessio
[4]
defined the impasse:
Economic concerns
are one of the most important considerations that the lawmaker must
contemplate when deciding on legislative frameworks,
especially in
the credit market. The legislative and regulatory framework that is
requisite to have a smoothly flowing economic market
is largely
dependent on economic and social factors being taken into
consideration by the policy maker. The legislator must consider
the
type of population that makes up the country. Is it a largely
educated and sophisticated consumer market, or an uneducated and
unsophisticated market or, as with the South African market, he has
to consider whether there is a large discrepancy between the
wealthy
and educated and the poor and uneducated? The rules that a state
decides to implement and the extent of the intervention
will be
determined by such considerations. However, the counter balancing
consideration is that legal certainty cannot be forsaken.
World Bank
policy has long recognised the importance of open and efficient
courts to sustained and widely shared economic growth,
the fact that
contracts must be enforced, property rights must be protected and
foreign and domestic investors must have confidence
in the legal
security of their investments. This evidences the importance placed
on the enforcement procedures and protection of
rights as relative to
healthy economic growth.
[2]
The plaintiffs seek Summary Judgment against the same defendant, Mr.
Chabane, in two separate cases for
the delivery of two motor
vehicles. The vehicles are operated as taxis and are a major source
of income for the defendant.
[3]
I will deal with the two matters in one judgement. The facts, law and
issues are similar. The plaintiffs
pray for:
Case:
4437/2021
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO BE GRANTED IN FAVOUR OF THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT FOR: -
1.
Confirmation
of termination of the agreement;
2.
Return
of the 2019 TOYOTA QUANTUM 2.5D – 4D SESFIKILE 16S with engine
number 2KDA986653 and chassis number AHTSS22P607049125 to
the
Plaintiff forthwith;
3.
Attorney
and client costs to be taxed.
and
Case 4051/2021
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO BE GRANTED IN FAVOUR OF THE PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT FOR: -
1.
Confirmation
of termination of the agreement;
2.
Return
of the 2018 TOYOTA QUANTUM 2.5D – 4D SESFIKILE 16S with engine
number 2KDA974045 and chassis number AHTSS22P907044274 to
the
Plaintiff forthwith;
3.
Attorney
and client costs to be taxed.
THE LAW
[4]
The current law on Summary Judgments has been deduced proficiently on
30 April 2020 by Binns-Ward, J in
Tumileng
Trading CC v National Security and Fire (Pty) Ltd
2020
(6) SA 624
(WCC).  The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA) is
applicable in tandem with the law decreed on Summary Judgments in
Rule 32
[5]
of the High Court
Rules
in
casu
.
[5]
The governing law to be the following as correctly reflected in the
matter
supra
:
1.
Rule
32(3), which regulated what was required of a defendant in its
opposing affidavit, was left substantively unamended in the
overhauled
procedure.
2.
That
meant that the test remained what it always was: whether the
defendant disclosed a
bona
fide
(i.e.,
an apparently genuinely advanced, as distinct from sham) defence.
3.
There
was no indication in the amended rule that the method of determining
the above had changed.
4.
A
defendant was not required to show that its defence was likely to
prevail; only a legally cognisable defence on the face of it,
that
was genuine or
bona
fide
.
(See paragraph [13])
5.
The
effect of the amended requirements for a supporting affidavit was,
however, to require the defendant to deal with the argumentative
material in its opposing affidavit.
6.
Defendants
who failed to do that, did so at their peril.
7.
However,
the fact that the bones of a triable defence had been made out in the
plea, did not mean that Summary Judgment must be refused.
8.
The
issue was whether the ostensible defence pleaded was
bona
fide
or
not. (See paragraphs [39] – [41])
[6]
The eight golden rules in Summary Judgments remained intact and
applicable:
[6]
11.2 The eight
golden rules
Without suggesting
that they constitute a numerus clause, the case law has crystallized
eight distinct guidelines which may conveniently
be referred to as
the eight golden rules of the adjudication of a Summary Judgment
application. These rules are the following:
1.
Resolution
of a Summary Judgment application does not entail resolution of the
entire action.
2.
The
adjudication of a Summary Judgment application does not include a
decision on factual disputes.
3.
In
determining a Summary Judgment application, the court is restricted
to the manner in which the plaintiff has presented his case.
4.
Conversely
the court is not necessarily bound to the manner in which the
defendant has presented his case.
5.
The
defendant is not subject to the strict considerations applicable to
the plaintiff.
6.
It
is permissible for the defendant to attack the validity of the
application on any proper grounds.
7.
Summary
Judgment must be refused in the face of any doubt whether or not to
grant it.
8.
The
court is vested with a residual discretion to refuse Summary
Judgment.
CASE 4437/2021
[7]
The vehicle was purchased on credit on 19 February 2019. Annexure
YN2; the statement of the account supplied
by the plaintiff, shows
that the defendant made monthly payments and religiously so up until
the 6
th
of December 2021. He started off with instalments
of R15 000.00 and the last payment was R10 000.00. The statement
of the account
ends at 6 December 2021. The application was on 10
February 2022 and the most recent payment history, that is imperative
in applications
of this nature, was not submitted. It might be that
the defendant still pays instalments.
[8]
It must be noted that it is the case of the defendant that he was not
provided with monthly statements
as he has a right in law.
[7]
The statement of payment was also only attached to the papers in the
application after the defendant filed his statement. It was
belatedly
attached to the affidavit in support of the application for Summary
Judgment dated 17 December 2021. The summons was issued
on 27
September 2021.
[9]
There is also no evidence on record as to how the instalment and
arrears were calculated and if the instalments
for the insurance and
tracker formed part of the amount on which the interest was
calculated.
[10]   The
total amount outstanding at the date of the termination of the
agreement is purported to be R325 228.05 plus
interest. This was at
the date of the affidavit in support of the application for Summary
Judgment on 17 December 2021. The arrears
alleged to be R114 496.03.
The initial deposit was R42 100.00.
[11]   On
25 July 2019 Potpale, SA Taxi Development Finance (Pty) Ltd and
Transflow concluded a written agreement in terms
of which it was
agreed that Potpale could from time to time sell and/or cede to the
plaintiff the right, title and interest that
Potpale held to credit
agreements it had concluded with consumers.
[12]   On
21 August 2019 Potpale sold and/or ceded to the plaintiff all of the
above rights. On 27 November 2019 Transflow
entered into an agreement
with Mr. Chabane that he signed. He claims that it was not explained
to him and he did not understand it.
[13]   A
defence of the defendant is that he is embroiled in an opposed action
against the plaintiff of which no particulars
were supplied to court.
The dispute arose from an accident the vehicle was involved in and
the insurance thereon. The plaintiff was
ex contractu
responsible for the payment of the insurance instalments.
[14]   The
defendant also has a grudge with the fact that the interest is
calculated on the whole of the instalment that
includes the tracker
fee, insurance on the vehicle and life insurance. The instalment is
denied and the defendant claims that he
is not in arrears.
10.3
[8]
It is not in dispute that the Applicant included premiums for short
term insurance, life insurance and monthly tracking connection
fees
in the arrear amount. It is further not in dispute that the Applicant
failed to provide a basis for the inclusion of these amounts
in the
cause of action as stated in the particulars of claim. There is not
even an allegation by the applicant that they might (sic)
payment of
these amounts on behalf of the respondent indeed (sic) particulars of
claim.
10.4
The Respondent further disputed that correct instalment amount was
debited on the statement and stated that all instalment calculators
would indicate that the instalment should be R11,240.00. If one looks
at the terms of section 169
[9]
of the
National Credit Act, it
is indeed a right of the Respondent to
dispute the amounts included by the Applicant in the arrear amount,
as well as how the instalment
they claimed was calculated and arrived
at.
10.5 The
Respondent’s right to challenge an arrear amount or outstanding
debt is acknowledged by the terms of
Section 169
and is therefore a
bona fide
defense that is good in law.
[15]   The
opposition of the application as a whole is, in summary, based on the
following:
1.
The
locus
standi
of
the plaintiff is disputed;
2.
the
defendant claims that the arrear amount “includes short term and
life insurance premiums, as well as tracking connection fees,
together with interest thereon and is therefore incorrect”;
3.
the
third defence is that there has not been compliance with the
section
129
-notice of the
National Credit Act 34 of 2005
;
4.
the
last defence is that the plaintiff is not entitled to terminate the
agreement because it lacks
locus
standi
,
alternatively he is not in breach of the agreement and the
outstanding amount is incorrect.
[16]
Counsel for the plaintiff dealt with the defences in detail and one
by one.
I.
The
locus
standi
issue
1.
Clause
20 of the agreement with the defendant states that the credit
provider Potpale may cede its rights in contract without notice
to
the defendant;
2.
The
defendant was aware that the agreement had been ceded to the
plaintiff. He signed an addendum to the agreement on 26 November
2019.
3.
The
defendant admits that he signed the addendum but state that he went
to the SA Taxi for relief. He apparently did not understand
the
transaction but he signed it. The cession took place and the
plaintiff has
locus
standi.
4.
It
is not clear from the evidence supplied by the plaintiff that the
defendant understood the transaction but the fact remains that
the
cession took place and legally so and the plaintiff has
locus
standi
.
Counsel for the plaintiff is correct and this defense must fail.
II. The defense
that “the arrear amount includes short term and life insurance
premiums, as well as tracking connection fees, together
with interest
thereon and is therefore not correct.”
The only answer the
plaintiff has to this is that the contract stipulates these payments.
Argument of counsel for the plaintiff is
silent on whether interest
is calculated on the instalment for the vehicle only or on the whole
amount; payment for the vehicle,
insurance and tracker. She deals in
paragraphs 23 and 24 of her Heads of Argument with the issue. She is
correct that the defendant
agreed to the amounts being recovered in
the instalment but she does not touch on the interest calculated. The
onus is on the plaintiff
to prove the correctness of their claim.
This is vital and makes the defense of the defendant to have
veracity.
III.
The defence that “
section 129
of the NCA was not complied with”
This
defense by the defendant is mistaken. It is the case for the
defendant that he had to allocate and choose an address specific
to
the 129 - notice. The defendant chose and contracted his
domicilium
citandi et executandi
to
be the address where the
section 129
- notice was delivered. The
plaintiff served according to the law and the argument of counsel for
the defendant at paragraph 11 of
his Heads of Argument that the
domicilium
citandi et executandi
is
not the address chosen in
section 129(5)
, is desperate and bad in
law. The Constitutional Court has settled the extent of the duty of
the credit provider in complying with
section 129
of the NCA in
Sebola
and another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and another
2012
(5) SA 142
CC.
[10]
IV. “The
applicant is not entitled to terminate the agreement because it lacks
locus standi, alternatively he is not in breach of
contract of the
agreement and the outstanding amount is incorrect”
As said above; this
might be a defense that is good and valid. The defendant made monthly
payments with the instalment being in dispute.
He might have
contracted to an instalment but it is clear that there is a dispute
and that he has a right for this to be clarified.
CONCLUSION
[17]
Both parties seem to miss the point. We have moved into an era
wherein mediation and consultation are advocated by
the courts. We
just moved through the covid pandemic and our economy is in severe
distress. Both parties will have to come to the
table and discuss the
dispute of the interest and the instalment. A Summary Judgment in the
prevailing circumstances of this case
will be contra-constitutional
values and the
Batho Pele
doctrine that is embedded in African
law. The vehicle is the tool that provides for the income of the
defendant. An order to return
it is draconic and he has shown his
bona fides
by paying a regular instalment. If all else fail
the matter will have to go to trial to insure legal certainty for the
credit provider.
Credit providers must be meticulous in their
compliance to the
National Credit Act.
[18]  The
defendant has discharged the onus required to avoid Summary Judgment
and, on the facts so disclosed, the defendant
appears to have a
defense that is both
bona fide
and good in law on the
instalment payable and the arrears.
CASE 4051/2021
[19]   The
crux of the plaintiff’s claim is that the defendant breached the
terms of the credit agreement by failing to
make the required
instalments. He did pay regular instalments but not the instalments
contracted.
[20]   On
17 August 2018 the credit agreement was concluded between the
parties. The deposit was R68 100.00. the arrears
are alleged, and as
on 1 September 2021, to be R83 706.59. The total amount outstanding
alleged to be R387 169.87. The outstanding
amount on page 17 of the
Indexed Bundle shows it to be R286 255.50 on 1 November 2021. It is
notable that this amount decreased.
[21]
The verbatim defense of the defendant on the above is:
[11]
2.1
I have purchased the vehicle refer (sic) to in the Plaintiff’s
particulars of claim from Pat
Hinde Toyota on the 8
th
of
August 2018 and financed the remainder of the purchased price, after
payment of a deposit of R68, 100.00, through a company known
as SA
Taxi Finance.
2.2
I have always paid my monthly instalments by way of debit order until
October 2019, whereafter
I have started making payments by way of
cash deposits. The above mentioned was caused by the fact that one of
my vehicles, which
I also operate as taxi, was damaged in an accident
and took a considerable time to repair.
2.3
I have not received any statements since I purchased the vehicle from
either the Plaintiff
or the SA Taxi Development Finance. I have
denied in my plea that I were in arrears in terms of the credit
agreement, since I’ve
made monthly payments and further did not
receive any statements which reflected any arrears. I have noted that
the Plaintiff has
only now provided a breakdown of how the arrears,
claimed in the particulars of claim, is calculated, and arrived at,
by way of an
attachment to the founding affidavit of the application
for Summary Judgment. I submit that if the Plaintiff had annexed the
statement
to the particulars of claim, I would have been able to
plead and answer in much more detail.
2.4
The Plaintiff has alleged in the particulars of claim that I breached
the agreement by failing
to pay the instalments, referred to in
paragraph 8.3 of the particulars of claim and furthermore that I was
in arrears with my instalments
in the sum of R61, 190.96 on 25 May
2021.
2.5
I have denied being in arrears in my plea and still deny being in
arrears. It is evident from the
statement annexed to the founding
affidavit, that premiums for life insurance, short term insurance and
cartrack warranty were included
in the calculation of the arrear
balance. I was advised that the Plaintiff has not made out a case in
its particulars of claim in
terms whereof they were allowed to
include these premiums in the arrear amount.
2.6
I further deny that the correct instalment amount is debited on the
statement, since according
to all instalment calculators, I used, the
instalment for the period from May 2020, at an interest rate of 23,5%
should amount to
R11, 240.00 per month. I also submit that all the
instalments prior to May 2020 are incorrect on the statement.
2.7
In order to proof that I am not in arrears, I submit that the total
amount of incorrect instalments
debited to the statement from April
2020, when I started making cash payments, amounts to R232,670.69 and
have I paid during this
period a total amount of R237, 242.09, which
includes my payment of 5 November 2021 in the amount of R12 000.00. I
therefore submit
that I am not in arrears and that the arrear amount,
as alleged by the Plaintiff in the particulars of claim are incorrect
based
on the above mentioned.
[22]   In
paragraph 6 of the same document the defendant proceeds to state that
the agreement annexed to the plaintiff’s
particulars of claim is
unreadable, as well as the further copy that was emailed by the
plaintiff’s Bloemfontein attorneys to his
attorneys prior to him
filing his plea. He did not deny that he concluded an agreement when
he purchased the vehicle from Pat Hinde
but understood it to have
been financed by SA Taxi Development Finance. He persisted that he
bought the vehicle through the SA Taxi
Development Finance.
[23]   In
paragraph 7 the defendant pointed to his detailed explanation of his
case and denied a bald denial.
[24]
Counsel for the plaintiff correctly identified six defenses by the
defendant. She discusses it in detail in her Heads
of Argument. They
are:
1.
That
the plaintiff was not duly registered as a credit provider;
2.
the
defendant did not enter into an agreement with the plaintiff;
3.
that
the defendant has not breached the agreement and has paid his monthly
instalment;
4.
that
the arrear amount includes short term and life insurance premiums as
well as tracking connection fees together with the interest
thereon
and is not correct;
5.
that
the wrong instalment has been charged; and
6.
that
there has not been compliance with
section 129
of the
National Credit
Act.
[25
]
Counsel for the plaintiff is correct that the evidence shows that the
plaintiff was a credit provider at the time of
the agreement and she
is correct that the evidence shows that the plaintiff has
locus
standi
.
[26]
Her submissions in regard to the third, fourth and fifth defenses
cannot be accepted in light of the evidence of
the defendant and the
fact that he has
disclosed
a
bona
fide
and
“an apparently genuinely advanced defence that cannot be defined as
a sham – defence”. He did not stop payments; he does
not agree
with the instalment and calculation of the interest. The plaintiff
neglected to provide regular statements of account to
the defendant
and this contributed to the confusion. The plaintiff did not show how
the calculations on the arrears were done.
[27]   The
sixth defense of the defendant is bad in law and rejected as I have
explained above in the other case. The
section 129
- notice was
served properly.
CONCLUSION
[28]   To
reiterate and add; the application for Summary Judgment is premature.
The parties should have compared notes on
the evidence they adduced.
Debatement on the instalment before litigation is imperative.
[29]
The claims for Summary Judgment by the plaintiffs are defective
because the defendant has a
bona
fide
defense
on the issue of the installment and arrears and possible lack of
careful compliance by the plaintiffs to the
National
Credit Act
.
[30]
ORDERS
Case: 4437/2021
1.
Summary
Judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant for
confirmation of termination of the agreement and return of the
2019
TOYOTA QUANTUM 2.5D – 4D SESFIKILE 16S with engine number
2KDA986653 and chassis number AHTSS22P607049125 to the plaintiff,
are
dismissed.
2.
The
defendant is granted unconditional leave to defend the claims.
3.
The
action thus to proceed and the normal rules to apply.
4.
Costs
to be in the cause.
Case 4051/2021
1.
Summary
Judgment to be granted in favour of the plaintiff against the
defendant for confirmation of termination of the agreement and
return
of the 2018 TOYOTA QUANTUM 2.5D – 4D SESFIKILE 16S with engine
number 2KDA974045 and chassis number AHTSS22P907044274 to
the
plaintiff, are dismissed.
2.
The
defendant is granted unconditional leave to defend the claims.
3.
The
action thus to proceed and the normal rules to apply.
4.
Costs
to be in the cause.
M OPPERMAN, J
APPEARANCES
FOR THE
PLAINTIFFS

ADVOCATE J.F. MITCHLEY
083 561 6674
MARIE – LOU
BESTER INC
011 486 0775
MLB/jv/SG11705
C/O BOKWA
ATTORNEYS
121 President Reitz
Avenue
Westdene
BLOEMFONTEIN
051 448 6369
S Smith/cb/M0001944
FOR THE
DEFENDANT

MR.
R COETZEE
STEENKAMP
& JANSEN INC
Hydro Office Park
100 Kellner Street
Westdene
BLOEMFONTEIN
R. COETZEE/CHA5/0003
EMAIL:
litigasie@sdvc.co.za
[1]
“
Transflow”
[2]
“
Potpale”.
[3]
“
Mr.
Chabane”.
[4]
2015:
Vessio,
L.M.,
The
National Credit Act 34 of 2005
: Rationale and Background for its
Enactment; With a Specific Study of The Remedies of The Credit
Grantor in The Event of Breach
of Contract,
University
of Pretoria,
https://repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/32291/browse?value=Vessio%2C+Monica+Laura&type=postgraduate
on 14 March
2022 at page 93.
[5]
32.
Summary judgment. —
(1)  The plaintiff may,
after the defendant has delivered a plea, apply to court for summary
judgment on each of such claims
in the summons as is only—
(a)
on a liquid document;
(b)
for a liquidated amount in
money;
(c)
for delivery of specified
movable property; or
(d)
for ejectment; together with any
claim for interest and costs.
[Sub-r. (1) substituted by
GNR.842 of 31 May 2019.]
(2)
(a) Within 15 days after the date of delivery of the plea, the
plaintiff shall deliver
a notice of application for summary
judgment, together with an affidavit made by the plaintiff or by any
other person who can swear
positively to the facts.
(b)  The plaintiff shall,
in the affidavit referred to in subrule (2) (a), verify the cause of
action and the amount, if any,
claimed, and identify any point of
law relied upon and the facts upon which the plaintiff’s claim is
based, and explain briefly
why the defence as pleaded does not raise
any issue for trial.
(c)
If the claim is founded on a liquid document a copy of the document
shall be annexed
to such affidavit and the notice of application for
summary judgment shall state that the application will be set down
for hearing
on a stated day not being less than 15 days from the
date of the delivery thereof.
[Sub-r. (2) substituted by
GNR.1262 of 1991 and by GNR.842 of 31 May 2019.]
(3)
The defendant may—
(a)
give security to the plaintiff
to the satisfaction of the court for any judgment including costs
which may be given; or
(b)
satisfy the court by affidavit
(which shall be delivered five days before the day on which the
application is to be heard), or with
the leave of the court by oral
evidence of such defendant or of any other person who can swear
positively to the fact that the
defendant has a
bona
fide
defence to the
action; such affidavit or evidence shall disclose fully the nature
and grounds of the defence and the material facts
relied upon
therefor.
[Sub-r. (3) substituted by
GNR.842 of 31 May 2019.]
(4)
No evidence may be adduced by the plaintiff otherwise than by the
affidavit referred to
in subrule (2), nor may either party
cross-examine any person who gives evidence orally or on affidavit:
Provided that the court
may put to any person who gives oral
evidence such questions as it considers may elucidate the matter.
[Sub-r. (4) substituted by
GNR.842 of 31 May 2019.]
(5)
If the defendant does not find security or satisfy the court as
provided in paragraph (b)
of sub-rule (3), the court may enter
summary judgment for the plaintiff.
(6)
If on the hearing of an application made under this rule it appears—
(a)
that any defendant is entitled
to defend and any other defendant is not so entitled; or
(b)
that the defendant is entitled
to defend as to part of the claim, the court shall—
(i)
give leave to defend to a
defendant so entitled thereto and give judgment against the
defendant not so entitled; or
(ii)
give leave to defend to the
defendant as to part of the claim and enter judgment against such
defendant as to the balance of the
claim, unless such balance has
been paid to the plaintiff; or
[Sub-para. (ii) substituted by
GNR.1883 of 1992 and by GNR.842 of 31 May 2019.]
(iii)
make both orders mentioned in
sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii).
(7)
If the defendant finds security or satisfies the court as provided
in sub-rule (3), the
court shall give leave to defend, and the
action shall proceed as if no application for summary judgment had
been made.
(8)
Leave to defend may be given unconditionally or subject to such
terms as to security, time
for delivery of pleadings, or otherwise,
as the court deems fit.
(8A) . . . . . .
[Sub-r. (8) bis amended by
GNR.1262 of 1991 and renumbered as (8A) by GN R.2410 of 1991 and
deleted by GNR.842 of 31 May 2019.]
(9)
The court may at the hearing of such application make such order as
to costs as to it may
seem just: Provided that if—
(a)
the plaintiff makes an
application under this rule, where the case is not within the terms
of subrule (1) or where the plaintiff,
in the opinion of the court,
knew that the defendant relied on a contention which would entitle
such defendant to leave to defend,
the court may order that the
action be stayed until the plaintiff has paid the defendant’s
costs; and may further order that
such costs be taxed as between
attorney and client; and
[Para. (a) substituted by
GNR.842 of 31 May 2019.]
(b)
in any case in which summary
judgment was refused and in which the court after trial gives
judgment for the plaintiff substantially
as prayed, and the court
finds that summary judgment should have been granted had the
defendant not raised a defence which in its
opinion was
unreasonable, the court may order the plaintiff’s costs of the
action to be taxed as between attorney and client.
[6]
Van
Niekerk, AJ
et al
,
Summary Judgments - A
Practical Guide
, Last
Updated: March 2021 at 11.3,
https://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/Index.aspx
on 15 March 2022.
[7]
Page
67 of the Indexed Bundle at paragraph 2.3. See Van Niekerk
et
al supra
at 6.5.9:
“
The obligation to deliver
statements of account
A credit provider must offer to
deliver to each consumer periodic statements of account
(Section
108(1)).
A credit provider under a mortgage bond is obliged to
deliver to the consumer a periodic statement at least every six
months
(Section 108(2)(c)).
In the case of an instalment agreement,
lease or secured loan, the statement of account must be supplied at
least every two months
(Section 108(2)(b)).
In respect of all other
credit agreements, the statement of account must be issued every
month
(Section 108
(2)(a)).”
[8]
The
Heads of Argument of the defendant at page 5.
[9]
169.
Proof of facts. —
(1)  In any proceedings in
any court for the recovery of debt in terms of a credit agreement,
if the consumer—
(a)
alleges that the cost of credit
claimed by, or made to, the credit provider exceeds the maximum
permitted in terms of this Act;
and
(b)
requests
that the credit provider be called as a witness to prove the amount
of debt claimed to be owing, the court must not give
judgment until
it has afforded an opportunity for the consumer to examine the
credit provider in relation to the debt claimed to
be owing, unless
it appears to the court that the consumer’s allegation is prima
facie without foundation, or that examination
of the credit provider
is impracticable.
(2)  In any criminal
proceedings in terms of this Act—
(a)
if
it is proved that a false statement, entry or record or false
information appears in or on a book, document, plan, drawing or
computer storage medium, the person who kept that item must be
presumed to have made the statement, entry, record or information
unless the contrary is proved; and
(b)
an
order certified by the Chairperson of the Tribunal is conclusive
proof of the contents of the order of the Tribunal.
(3)  A statement, entry or
record, or information, in or on any book, document, plan, drawing
or computer storage medium is
admissible in evidence as an admission
of the facts in or on it by the person who appears to have made,
entered, recorded or stored
it unless it is proved that that person
did not make, enter, record or store it.
[10]
Scholtz,
JW
et al
,
Guide to The
National
Credit Act,
Last
Updated: July 2021, https://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/Index.aspx
on 14 March 2022 at 12.4.
[11]
Page
58 of the Indexed Bundle paragraphs 2, 6 and 7.