Blue Print Housing (PTY) Ltd and Another v Loeto and Others (048243/22) [2022] ZAGPJHC 1000 (5 December 2022)

78 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Interdict — Urgent application for interdict — Applicants seeking to interdict respondents from interfering with construction activities — Applicants alleging threats and violence from respondents disrupting operations — Court determining urgency based on potential for substantial redress — Applicants demonstrating that ongoing threats and violence necessitate urgent relief — Court granting interim interdict to prevent further interference pending final determination of the dispute.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an urgent application in the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, in which the applicants sought interdictory relief restraining the respondents from allegedly disrupting and threatening the applicants’ property development activities. Although framed as relief pending the final determination of a broader dispute under Part B, the applicants ultimately pressed for a final interdict, with an interim interdict sought only in the alternative.


The applicants were Blue Print Housing (Pty) Ltd and Dino Properties (Pty) Ltd, described as property development companies engaged in a large-scale mixed-use development. The respondents comprised eleven identified individuals (the first to eleventh respondents) and additional respondents described in functional terms as persons attempting to interfere with the applicants’ business and development activities. A further respondent, the Station Commander of the Roodepoort Police Station (the twelfth respondent), was cited, though the judgment treated “the respondents” as referring to the first to eleventh respondents, dealing with the Station Commander separately where necessary.


Procedurally, the application was launched on 17 November 2022 and was initially set down for 29 November 2022. The matter did not proceed then because answering papers had not been filed; the answering affidavit was only filed on 1 December 2022 (the morning of the hearing), and the matter was stood down and heard later that day. Judgment was delivered on 5 December 2022.


The general subject matter concerned alleged interference, intimidation, and violence at the applicants’ development site and threats directed at the applicants’ employees and business operations, including at the applicants’ head office. The respondents’ answering version located the conflict in an alleged payment dispute involving a subcontractor (Tri-Star), which the judgment noted formed part of Part B and was not directly before the court in this urgent Part A application.


2. Material Facts


The applicants were engaged in a property development on land described as The Remaining Extent of Portions 1 and 5 and Portion 404 of the Farm Roodepoort 237, Registration Division I.Q, Gauteng. The applicants stated that phase 1 had been completed and that they were due to complete phase 2, which they alleged ought to be concluded by 15 December 2022. The applicants contended that they were unable to proceed with phase 2 because the respondents repeatedly caused construction to stop through violence, force, and intimidation directed at the applicants’ employees and persons working on site.


On the applicants’ version, the immediate events grounding urgency occurred during 7 to 10 November 2022. On 7 November 2022, a group allegedly led by the first and fourth respondents arrived at the site and threatened to close it the next day. On 8 November 2022, a group of approximately 200 people, allegedly led by the first to sixth and ninth respondents, arrived and threatened persons working on site, resulting in the site being closed for that day. The applicants stated that they reported these events to the South African Police Service (SAPS), received an undertaking of assistance, but no police members arrived. A similar large group allegedly arrived again on 9 November 2022, and work was again halted for safety reasons.


A significant fact treated as essentially undisputed in the judgment was that physical violence occurred on 10 November 2022 at the construction site. While the respondents broadly denied various allegations, the deponent to the answering affidavit, Sisanda Thompson, admitted that engagements with the subcontractor Tri-Star sometimes did not end well due to a dispute about money the respondents believed Tri-Star owed them. The judgment also recorded that the respondents did not deny that violence occurred, and that some denials were either bald, inconsistent, or contradicted by other parts of the answering papers.


The applicants further alleged that the respondents used vehicles to block entrances to the site on 10 November 2022; the judgment noted there was no response to that specific allegation in the answering affidavit. The applicants also relied on threats and hostility extending beyond the site, including threats affecting their head office at 539 Ontdekkers Road, Florida North, Roodepoort.


The respondents’ version, as reflected in the judgment, was that the underlying conflict concerned a payment dispute with Tri-Star and that construction was not stopped by the respondents but by the applicants themselves when the respondents were not agreeable to the applicants’ suggestions. The court considered that assertion improbable in light of the applicants’ allegations about deadlines and project delays, and in light of the admitted conflict and violence.


3. Legal Issues


The court was required to determine two issues sequentially.


The first legal question was whether the matter was urgently enrolled in terms of the applicable urgent procedure, which required the applicants to demonstrate that they could not obtain substantial redress at a hearing in due course and to set out explicitly the circumstances rendering the matter urgent. This issue primarily concerned the application of established procedural principles to the facts alleged regarding timing, ongoing threats, and the feasibility of waiting for ordinary motion court processes.


The second legal question, if urgency were established, was whether the applicants had made out a case for a final interdict, or alternatively an interim interdict pending Part B. This required determining whether the requisites for interdictory relief were satisfied, including whether the applicants had a clear right (for a final interdict) or at least a prima facie right (for interim relief), whether there was an injury committed or reasonably apprehended (or irreparable harm in the interim context), and whether there was an absence of an adequate alternative remedy. This component involved a mixed inquiry of law and fact, assessing how the legal standards for interdicts applied to the factual matrix of alleged intimidation, disruption, and admitted violence.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On urgency, the court applied the settled test that an applicant must set out explicitly the circumstances rendering the matter urgent and must explain why substantial redress cannot be obtained in due course, referring to East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd 2011 JDR 1832 (GSJ). The court emphasised that urgency depends on the absence of substantial redress, a standard distinct from (and lower than) the irreparable harm requirement for interim relief, and that delay is not necessarily fatal but may bear on whether urgency is genuine.


The respondents argued that the matter was not urgent because the events relied upon occurred earlier (in September 2022). The court, however, accepted the applicants’ account that the relevant urgent events occurred between 7 and 10 November 2022, and noted that this chronology was set out in the founding affidavit and not seriously challenged in the answering papers. In evaluating the explanation for the set-down date, the court accepted counsel’s explanation that the matter was set down for 29 November 2022 (rather than the earliest possible date) to afford respondents a reasonable opportunity to deliver answering papers, relying on the approach described in Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and others 2016 (4) SA 99 (GP), which treats the inability to obtain substantial redress as the primary enquiry and then considers other factors including respondents’ ability to present their case and any delay.


The court found that the applicants had demonstrated they would not obtain substantial redress in the normal course if the alleged conduct persisted, particularly given the ongoing threats and disruption and the asserted inaction by the police after reports had been made. It was satisfied that the urgency requirement was met.


On interdictory relief, the court recorded that the applicants sought a final interdict on the basis that they had established a clear right, with interim relief only in the alternative. The judgment nonetheless set out the requirements for an interim interdict (including prima facie right, apprehension of irreparable harm, balance of convenience, and absence of other satisfactory remedy) with reference to Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A), and stated the approach to evaluating a prima facie right in contested affidavit proceedings with reference to Simon NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others [1998] ZASCA 79; 1999 (1) SA 217 (SCA).


For the final interdict, the court applied the requisites stated in Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221, namely a clear right, an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy. It understood the applicants’ right to arise from their contracted entitlement and obligation to develop the property and meet project milestones, and treated their ability to proceed with construction as a protectable interest that was being unlawfully interfered with.


In assessing harm, the court accepted that the applicants’ apprehension was reasonable in light of the respondents’ conduct described in the affidavits, including repeated disruptions, threats, and the occurrence of physical violence on 10 November 2022. It reasoned that the respondents’ conduct had already led to cessation of construction and had materially affected the applicants’ ability to meet deadlines, making further harm reasonably apprehended.


The court also addressed the respondents’ contention that the applicants should pursue criminal complaints through SAPS as an alternative remedy. The court rejected this as an adequate alternative on the facts before it, because the applicants alleged that they had approached SAPS more than once without receiving assistance, and SAPS had filed no affidavit to explain its position. In the absence of evidence contradicting the applicants’ allegations of ineffective police assistance, the court concluded that the applicants could not be said to have an alternative satisfactory remedy available.


Having found urgency and the substantive requisites satisfied, the court concluded that a proper case for a final interdict on an urgent basis had been made out and stated that it had no discretion but to grant the relief in the circumstances.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court held that the application was urgent and granted a final interdict.


The first to eleventh respondents were interdicted and restrained from interfering with the applicants’ facilities, installations, buildings, construction site and personnel at the specified property; from damaging buildings, facilities, vehicles and similar items at the property; from threatening, intimidating, harassing, or assaulting persons at the property; and from interfering with the applicants’ business activities and/or employees at the applicants’ head offices at 539 Ontdekkers Road, Florida North, Roodepoort.


The order further authorised service on the first to eleventh respondents by the erection of notice boards at entrances and strategic points around the property boundary and affixing the order to those notice boards, and/or by WhatsApp and/or email to contact details in the applicants’ possession.


The first to eleventh respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the application.


Cases Cited


East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd 2011 JDR 1832 (GSJ).


Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and others 2016 (4) SA 99 (GP).


Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A) at 691C–E.


Simon NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others [1998] ZASCA 79; 1999 (1) SA 217 (SCA) at 229G–I.


Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227.


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(12).


Held


The court found that the applicants satisfied the requirements for urgency, primarily because the alleged interference and threats were ongoing, had recently culminated in admitted violence, and could not be adequately remedied by awaiting ordinary motion court timeframes.


On the merits, the court held that the applicants established the requisites for a final interdict, namely a clear right arising from their entitlement and obligation to proceed with the development, injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended through threats, intimidation and disruption (including physical violence), and the absence of an adequate alternative remedy given the applicants’ uncontradicted allegations that SAPS did not provide assistance despite reports.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Urgency under Rule 6(12) requires an applicant to set out explicitly the circumstances rendering the matter urgent and to explain why it cannot obtain substantial redress at a hearing in due course; this enquiry is distinct from and less stringent than the irreparable harm requirement associated with interim relief, and delay must be evaluated contextually rather than treated as decisive.


A final interdict requires proof of a clear right, an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and the absence of protection by any other ordinary remedy, as formulated in Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.


An interim interdict requires, among other elements, a prima facie right, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, a favourable balance of convenience, and the absence of another satisfactory remedy; in assessing a prima facie right on affidavit, the approach is to consider the applicant’s allegations together with undisputed or indisputable respondent allegations and the inherent probabilities, and then to consider whether the respondent’s disputes raise serious doubt about the applicant’s case.

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[2022] ZAGPJHC 1000
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Blue Print Housing (PTY) Ltd and Another v Loeto and Others (048243/22) [2022] ZAGPJHC 1000 (5 December 2022)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 048243/22
Reportable:No
Of interest to other
judges:No
Revised:No
5 December 2022
Before:
The Honourable Acting Judge Muvangua
Heard
on:
1 December 2022
Delivered
on
: 5 December 2022
In the matter between
BLUE
PRINT HOUSING (PTY) LTD
First Applicant
DINO
PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
Second Applicant
And
FLEANCE
LOETO
First Respondent
SIVIWE
SEPTEMBER
Second Respondent
SISANDA
THOMPSON
Third Respondent
LUNGISIZWE
STAFANS
Fourth Respondent
MZUKISI
JADA
Fifth Respondent
SNETHEMBA
NKABI
Sixth Respondent
ZUKO
SOYAMBA
Seventh Respondent
NANDIPHA
COBA
Eight Respondent
ITUMELENG
ALFRED MOTHLANKANA
Ninth Respondent
THOSE PERSONS
ATTEMPTING TO
INTERFERE WITH THE
APPLICANTS’
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
AND
DEVELOPMENT AT THE
REMAINING
EXTENT OF PORTIONS 1
AND 5 AND
PORTION 404 OF THE
FARM
ROODEPOORT 237,
REGISTRATION
DIVISION
I.Q, GAUTENG
Tenth Respondent
THOSE PERSONS
ATTEMPTING TO
INTERFERE WITH THE
APPLICANTS’
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
AND EMPLOYEES
AT
THEIR HEAD OFFICES
Eleventh Respondent
THE STATION COMMANDER
OF THE
ROODEPOORT
POLICE STATION:
BRIGADIER
IRENE SEKWAKWA
Twelfth Respondent
THOSE PERSONS
ATTEMPTING TO INTERFERE WITH THE APPLICANTS’ BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES AND
DEVELOPMENT AT THE
REMAINING
EXTENT OF PORTIONS 1
AND 5 AND
PORTION 404 OF THE
FARM
ROODEPOORT 237,
REGISTRATION
DIVISION
I.Q, GAUTENG
Tenth Respondent
THOSE PERSONS
ATTEMPTING TO
INTERFERE
WITH THE APPLICANTS’
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
AND EMPLOYEES
AT
THEIR HEAD OFFICES
Eleventh Respondent
THE STATION COMMANDER
OF THE
ROODEPOORT POLICE
STATION:
BRIGADIER
IRENE SEKWAKWA
Twelfth Respondent
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1
The application before me was brought on an urgent
basis. It is in substance for an order interdicting the first to the
eleventh
respondents from engaging in certain conduct, pending the
final determination of a dispute between the parties under Part B.
2
There are twelve respondents before court, but the
twelfth respondent is the Station Commander of the Roodepoort Police
Station.
“Respondents” in this judgement refers to the
first to the eleventh respondents. The Station Commander will be
referred
to as such, where necessary.
3
There are two issues for determination in
sequence. The first is whether the matter is urgent. If I find that
it is, then the second
question is whether the applicants have made
out a proper case for a final, alternatively for an interim
interdict.
URGENCY
4
The test for urgency is settled in law. A court
may dispense with the forms and service provided for in the Uniform
Rules of Court
in the event of urgent applications. In order for the
court to do so, an applicant must show why it could not be afforded
substantial
redress at a hearing in the normal course, and also
persuade the court under oath that circumstances explicitly stated in
the affidavit
render the matter urgent.
5
In
East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd
and Others
,
[1]
Notshe
AJ said the following in relation to urgency:

[6]
The import thereof is that the procedure set out in rule 6(12) is not
there for taking. An applicant has to set forth explicitly
the
circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent. More
importantly, the applicant must state the reasons why he claims
that
he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.
The question of whether a matter is sufficiently urgent
to be
enrolled and heard as an urgent application is underpinned by the
issue of absence of substantial redress in an application
in due
course. The rules allow the court to come to the assistance of a
litigant because if the latter were to wait for the normal
course
laid down by the rules it will not obtain substantial redress.
[7]
It is important to note that the rules require
absence of substantial redress. This is not equivalent to the
irreparable harm that
is required before the granting of an interim
relief. It is something less. He may still obtain redress in an
application in due
course but it may not be substantial. Whether an
applicant will not be able obtain substantial redress in an
application in due
course will be determined by the facts of each
case. An applicant must make out his cases in that regard.
[8]
In
my view the delay in instituting proceedings is not, on its own a
ground, for refusing to regard the matter as urgent. A court
is
obliged to consider the circumstances of the case and the explanation
given. The important issue is whether, despite the delay,
the
applicant can or cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing
in due course. A delay might be an indication that the
matter is not
as urgent as the applicant would want the Court to believe. On the
other hand a delay may have been caused by the
fact that the
Applicant was attempting to settle the matter or collect more facts
with regard thereto
.”
[2]
6
The applicants allege that the application is
urgent effectively for two related reasons: the first is that there
is great hostility
between them and the respondents that has led to
threats of violence being made by the respondents against the
applicants. There
was physical violence on 10 November 2022, and this
demonstrates that the respondents are capable of carrying out their
threats
of violence. The second reason is that the respondents are
continuously threatening to, and disrupting the construction
operations
of the applicants.
7
The applicants argued that they would not get
substantial redress in the normal course. The continuing nature of
the threats and
the intensity of the hostility, coupled with inaction
by the police required the immediate attention of the court.
8
Counsel for the respondents, Mr Ralikhuvana argued
that this case was not urgent because the events on which the
applicants relied
for the urgency happened in September 2022. The
applicants’ case is that the events on which they rely for
urgency took place
from 7 to 11 November. The founding affidavit
catalogues that chronology. The applicants’ version of events
has not been
seriously challenged in the respondents’ answering
affidavit. These events are as follows.
9
The applicants explain that they are property
development companies and are presently engaged in a large-scale
development, which
will consist, inter alia, of residential,
commercial, and educational facilities.
10
They have already completed phase 1 of the
development and are due to complete the second phase. They have,
however, been unable
to work to complete phase 2 because the
respondents forced them to stop the construction on several occasions

through the use of violence,
force and intimidation levied towards the Applicants’
employees
.” The applicants also
allege that on 7 November 2022, a group of people, led by the first
and the fourth respondents arrived
at the construction site and
threatened to close it the next day. The next day, (8 November), a
group of approximately 200 people,
led by the first to the sixth, and
the ninth respondents arrived at the construction site and began to
threaten people who were
working there on the day. This led to the
closure of the site for that day. The applicants alleged that they
complained to the
South African Police Service (“SAPS”),
but despite an undertaking to assist, no police members arrived to
the aid of
the applicants. A group of about 200 persons arrived at
the construction site on 9 November again, leading the construction
work
to be halted for safety reasons.
11
The
applicants also explain in their founding papers that there was
physical violence on 10 November 2022. The respondents do not
deny
that there was violence at the construction site. To the contrary,
the deponent to the answering affidavit on behalf of the
respondents,
Sisanda Thompson, admits that sometimes their engagements with a
sub-contractor on the site (Tri-Star), do not end
well because of a
dispute about money that they believe is owed to them by Tri-Star.
[3]
12
The respondents deny the allegations in the
founding affidavit, but the denials are either bald and without
explanation, or contradicted
in other parts of the answering papers.
For example, Mr Thompson alleged in one part of the answering
affidavit that the respondents
never stopped construction work on the
site, but that such work was stopped by the applicants themselves

seeing that we were not agreeable
to their suggestions

. The
applicants alleged that the current phase of the project ought to be
concluded by 15 December 2022, but that it is running
behind. In the
light of that, it is improbable that the applicants would themselves
stop a project without violence or threat thereof.
13
Mr Thompson alleged in another part of the
affidavit that the events alleged to have taken place on 7 – 10
November simply
never took place. This is aside from the fact that he
admits to the violence on 10 November.
14
The respondents are alleged to have used their
cars to block entrances to the site on 10 November 2022. There is no
response to
that direct allegation in the answering affidavit.
15
On the respondents’ version, there is a
dispute about the payment of money between them and Tri-Star. That
dispute remains
unresolved and it is the reason for the constant
engagement and stand-off between Tri-Star (which is subcontracted to
do work on
the site at the moment) and the respondents.
16
On 17 November 2022, the applicants launched this
application to interdict the respondents from the alleged acts
referred to above.
The application was set down for hearing on 29
November 2022. I asked counsel for the applicants, Mr Hollander, why
the application
was set down for hearing on 29 November when it could
have been set down on 22 November, which was the soonest Tuesday
after the
Thursday on which it was launched.
17
His
response that the matter was set down for hearing on 29 November
because the applicants wanted to give the respondents a reasonable

opportunity to file answering papers. He pointed to a decision by
Tuchten J in
Mogalakwena
Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo
,
[4]
where
the court held as follows:

[64]
It seems to me that when urgency is in issue the primary
investigation should be to determine whether the applicant will be

afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. If the
applicant cannot establish prejudice in this sense, the application

cannot be urgent. Once such prejudice is established, other factors
come into consideration. These factors include (but are not
limited
to):
whether
the respondents can
adequately
present their cases in the time available between notice of the
application
to them and the actual hearing
;
other prejudice to the respondents and the administration of justice;
the strength of the case made by the applicant; and any
delay by the
applicant in asserting its rights. This last factor is often called,
usually by counsel acting for respondents, selfcreated
urgency”
.
[Underlining added].
18
I am satisfied by the explanation given for the
delayed hearing. At any rate, the respondents had not filed answering
papers on
29 November 2022, and the matter had to stand down in order
to enable them to do so. They only filed their answering affidavit on

1 December 2022 in the morning. The matter was stood down to be heard
at 2pm on that day.
19
The applicants have demonstrated that they will
not obtain substantial redress in due course. Should the events
catalogued by the
applicants be allowed to persist, it will not be
possible for the applicants to obtain substantial relief at a hearing
in the ordinary
course. The applicants have also adequately explained
why the matter was only set down for 29 November 2022. I am, in these
circumstances,
persuaded that the application is urgent.
INTERIM
INTERDICT
20
During
oral argument, Mr Hollander made plain that his clients sought a
final interdict in that they had established a clear right.
An
interim interdict was only sought in the alternative. The difference
between a final interdict and an interim interdict is that
for the
latter, a party must show a
prima
facie
right
to the relief sought in the main proceedings; a well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not

granted; that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an
interim relief, and that the applicant has no other satisfactory

remedy.
[5]
21
In
assessing whether the applicants have established a
prima
facie
right,
I am required to follow the approach in
Simon
NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others
[6]
.
That
approach is this:

The
accepted test for a prima facie right in the context of an interim
interdict is to take the facts averred by the applicant,
together
with such facts set out by the respondent that are not or cannot be
disputed and to consider whether, having regard to
the inherent
probabilities, the applicant should on those facts obtain final
relief at the trial. The facts set up in contradiction
by the
respondent should then be considered and, if serious doubt is thrown
upon the case of the applicant, he cannot succeed."
22
The
court in
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
[7]
stated
the requirements for a final interdict as follows:

So
far as the merits are concerned the matter is very clear. The
requisites for the right to claim an interdict are well known,
a
clear right, injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and
the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary
remedy.”
23
I understood the applicants’ prima facie
right to arise as a consequence of their having been contracted to
develop certain
properties. They have an absolute right to the
development of the property and are under an obligation to meet
certain milestones
by certain dates. They explain in their affidavits
that the current phase ought to be completed by 15 December 2022.
24
The applicants’ apprehension of harm is
rooted in how the respondents have conducted themselves thus far, and
the threats
that they have made against the applicants – which
include damage to the applicants’ head office. I have set out
this
conduct and threats above. That apprehension is, in my view,
reasonable. The respondents’ conduct has led to the cessation

of the construction, and it also culminated in physical violence on
10 November 2022.
25
I have noted above that the applicants are under
an obligation to develop the property and meet certain milestones by
certain times.
They alleged that their ability to meet their targets
on time has already been frustrated by the respondents’
conduct, and
that it will continue to be frustrated if the interdict
that they seek is not granted. The balance of convenience favours the
granting
of the interdict.
26
Turning then to alternative remedies. The
respondents argued that the complaints of violence and intimidation
in the applicants’
papers are criminal in nature and ought to
be reported to the SAPS. It is inappropriate for this court to be
requested to grant
an interdict in these circumstances, so the
argument went. The nub of the argument is that the applicants have an
alternative remedy
– the criminal justice route by reporting
these activities to the SAPS. My main difficulty with this argument
is that the
applicants say they have gone to the SAPS more than once,
and the SAPS never came to their aid. The SAPS did not file an
affidavit
to explain its position in these proceedings. Absent
evidence to the contrary, the applicants cannot be said to have an
alternative
remedy available to them.
CONCLUSION
27
I find that the applicants have made out a proper case for the
granting
of a final interdict on an urgent basis. I have no
discretion but to grant it, in the circumstances.
ORDER
28
I make an order as follows:
28.1
The First to Eleventh Respondents be interdicted
and restrained form:
28.1.1
interfering, or causing interference, with the
Applicants’ facilities, installations, buildings, construction
sites, agents,
contractors, sub-contractors, labourers or any other
person at the property described as The Remaining Extent of Portions
1 and
5 and Portion 404 of the Farm Roodepoort 237, Registration
Division I.Q, Gauteng ( “
the
property

); damaging any
buildings, facilities, vehicles, and the like at the property;
28.1.2
threatening, intimidating, harassing, or
assaulting any agents, contractors, sub-contractors, labourers, and
any other person at
the property;
28.1.3
interfering or causing interference with the
Applicants’ business, activities and/or employees at the
Applicants’ head
offices situated at 539 Ontdekkers Road,
Florida North, Roodepoort.
28.2
The
applicants may serve this order the first to the eleventh respondents
as follows:
28.2.1
by erecting notice boards at the entrances to the
property, and if necessary, at strategic places around the boundary
of the property
and affixing it to such notice boards; and/or
28.2.2
by
way of WhatsApp and/or e-mail at the cell phone numbers and e-mail
addresses in respect of each of the first to the eleventh

respondents, in the possession of the applicants.
28.3
The first to the eleventh respondents are ordered
to pay for the costs of this application.
N
MUVANGUA
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Appearances
Counsel
for the applicants:
L Hollander
Instructed
by:
Vermaak Marshall Wellbeloved Inc.
Counsel
for the applicants:
N Ralikhuvana
Instructed
by:
Makhuni Inc. Attorneys
[1]
East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd
2011
JDR 1832 (GSJ).
[2]
East
Rock Trading 7
at
para 8.
[3]
That
dispute forms part of Part B of this matter. It was not before me.
[4]
Mogalakwena
Local Municipality v Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo and
others
2016
(4) SA 99 (GP).
[5]
Eriksen
Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton
1973
(3) SA 685
(A) at 691C-E.
[6]
Simon
NO v Air Operations of Europe AB and Others
[1998] ZASCA 79
;
1999
(1) SA 217
(SCA) at 229G-I.
[7]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914
AD 221
at 227.